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...CERNING · POLITICS · & · RELIGION



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No. I.

ON SOME POPULAR ERRORS CONCERNING POLITICS AND RELIGION.

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ON SOME

POPULAR ERRORS

Concerning Politics and Religion.

BY

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU, M.P.

Our forefathers took care to do only that which is lawful, and to say only that which is true; but we call that lawful which we choose to do, and assert that as true which we find it convenient to believe.

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PREFACE.

THIS book has been taken from the "*Risposte popolari alle obiezioni più diffuse contro la religione; opera del P. Secondo Franco.* Torino, 1868." It is not a translation of that excellent Italian work; for much has been omitted, and even the forms of expression have not been retained. Nor yet is it an abstract; for other matter has been added throughout. The aim of the Editor has been merely to follow out the intention of P. Franco, and adapt his thoughts to the circumstances and mind of England.

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ON SOME POPULAR ERRORS

Concerning Politics and Religion.

INTRODUCTION.

In all times there have been sins and sinners—there have been errors, the false prophets who have invented the errors, and followers who have spread them. If any one, during the fifty-nine centuries of the world's age, from the Creation to 1789, had been found hardy enough to deny this fact, he would have been reckoned as a fool. To this nineteenth century has been reserved the distinction of denying what no one was foolish enough to deny before. Most men in these times refuse to regard as sin that which is sin, and has always been held as sin; most men assert, also, that it concerns us not to know the truth, so long as we are "sincere" in the error that we hold. In bygone ages, he who committed a crime knew that he was a criminal. Now, he that does wrong, "wipeth his mouth and saith, I have done no evil." Men now answer to the description given by the Apostle of one who, "Having looked at his face in the glass, straightway forgetteth what manner of man he is."

Nay, they have gone a step beyond this. No one now ever looks at his conscience; no one cares to know what manner of man he is, but commits whatever sins he desires, and asserts whatsoever "opinions" he fancies, and goes about flattering himself that he is a Christian man and a gentleman.

This feat of self-justification is performed, in true logical fashion, by the invention of major propositions, which free men's conduct from the unpleasant conclusion that it is sinful. These maxims or principles of conduct are far more mischievous than the sins which they are invented to excuse. A sin is then no longer "a gradual letting in of water." The maxim unreservedly throws open the sluice gates and bears down the bank. A great statesman, who was certainly not remarkable for godliness, remarked this character in the men of modern times—*Au lieu de pratiquer nos maximes*, said he, *nous maximons nos pratiques*. A man, for example, becomes negligent in his religious duties; he may, even, feel bored by them, and omit them. If he acknowledges that he has done wrong, and that his soul has come into an unhealthy condition, no permanent injury, beyond the commission of the sin, is done to him. But if, in order to excuse himself, he accepts or invents a false principle, such as, "God does not care for such practices," or, "They are not necessary," or, "The feeling of the heart is all that God desires," then the transgressor's mind has undergone a change; he has swallowed poison; he has done a permanent injury to himself. In former days, men gave way with vehemence and boldness to their passions. Yet, as they recognized the fact that

their acts were dissolute, their minds were not corrupted further than each sinful act had degraded them. That was far better than the practice of these days, when men who give the rein to their passions, go about seeking grounds for their conduct, and establishing principles, or major premisses, from which the innocence of their acts may be concluded. "It cannot be wrong to follow the impulses of nature," say they; "It is impossible to resist such passions;" "It cannot be wrong where there is real love;" "All men do the like." False maxims give to the passions a free course in the future, so that, without check or hindrance, they run away with the soul, down the fearful incline, towards an unlimited sea of corruption.

Before the Prodigal Son left his father's house, our Lord said that "he asked for the portion of goods which should come to him." We are thus informed of the desire which was in the Prodigal's mind *before* he quitted his father's roof; his aim was to spend those goods without restraint or remonstrance. For the same purpose, also, he took the goods "into a far country," where he would no longer be under his father's eye. Thus it is with every sinner. When his passions begin to gain a sway over him, he invents maxims and principles of conduct, in order that he may rid himself of the reproaches of the law of God —"putting for the commandments of God the traditions of men"—and by giving euphemistic names to his sin, he stills the voice of conscience within him. The next step is to "go into a far country;" he denies the providence of God, until he has accustomed himself to believe that God does not rule the world,

nor see, nor care what acts a man commits. The denial of the providence of God is, therefore, the first step in the career of vice and destruction, while the invention of false maxims is the preliminary to it.

There are two causes which favour the multiplication and spread of false principles—(1) The many inventions, euphemistically grouped under the term "Modern Civilization," for inducing persons to abandon themselves to their passions: such are the varieties and excellence of cookery and of wines, which foster luxury, and lead men to desire other sensual gratifications. These latter also have their own allectations. Such also are the various inventions to obviate unpleasant consequences, which might otherwise be expected to follow on sins; such also are the gratifications of eye and ear, the excitements of novels and the stage; such is the Press, which ministers to indolence and pride, by supplying men with ready-made conclusions, true or false; and discourages them from acquiring the habit of investigating every subject for themselves, and of examining every principle before they accept it. Every one who yields to "modern civilization" must begin by smothering the whisperings of remorse, and putting his conscience to sleep. This he easily succeeds in effecting, by means of the axioms and principles which he either invents, or hears proclaimed from the housetops, and reads in the daily journals. He learns to call good, evil; and evil, good. If he cannot invent a principle to excuse some special crime, he deludes himself by changing its name. Burke remarked that nations also delude themselves thus, perpetrating crimes, and commencing a career of decadence, while flattering themselves that

they are Christian. How many national thefts have been committed under the appellation of "annexation" or "material guarantee;" and how many private robberies are done under the cloak of "a loan," or in the guise of a joint stock company? How many public murders have been committed under the grand title of war? How many adulteries, seductions, and debaucheries have been shielded under the sacred name of love?

(2) The other cause is the principle called "Freedom of Conscience," or "the Right of Private Judgment." To this cause such false axioms as the following may be traced—"Every one must determine for himself what is right;" "That is true which a man troweth;" "Every man must do what seems proper to himself;" "If another man chooses to act foolishly, it is not my business to put him right;" "No one can judge what is another man's duty;" "One religion is as good as another;" "No one has authority to lay down laws of morality;" "Every one has a right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech, and liberty to publish what he thinks right."

As those who live in a vitiated atmosphere can rarely preserve their natural health and strength; so those who daily hear and read such false maxims, soon lose the uprightness of their intentions and the correctness of their judgment. Viewed in this light, we may partly understand the anxiety with which St. Paul warned Timothy to "keep the deposit of Faith which had been committed to him." We may see, also, one reason why our Lord founded an eternal Church upon an immovable rock. When all things

are moving on the tide, they retain their relative positions, and the motion is not perceptible. But if they are compared with a rock in the stream, then the velocity and direction of their motion is at once perceived. False maxims and principles of conduct cause men and nations to move, and no one perceives the decline; but fix the eye upon a Faith unchanged, and on a steadfast Church which has ever denounced the errors of the day, and caused men to reduce their faith to acts, and all will at once become clear, and the motion of the age will be apparent. For that steadfast and eternal Faith is repugnant to the false and changing maxims of the day; they cannot coexist in the same mind, nor can those who, in heart, acknowledge the Church, ever defend their acts by the false principles which are current in their time.

There is now an inundation of such false maxims and principles. Against the fundamental maxims the Syllabus was directed. The following pages contain an attempt to direct men's attention to some of the more insidious of them, so that, as mariners avoid shipwreck by studying the marks of the rocks and shoals upon the chart, earnest men may escape a far more fatal calamity—the destruction of their souls—by being brought to see the errors against which they must be on their guard.

CHAPTER I.

THE BASIS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

THE knowledge of God is the foundation of morality, the spring of right action, and the very basis of society. For it is only by the knowledge of God that we can know our end; and it is by the end that our moral actions are determined—*In moralibus finis est principium operandi.* Whence then do we obtain the knowledge of God? It is contained in "the deposit of Faith once delivered to the saints." True religion is, therefore, of all things the most necessary for every man, in order to the regulation of his life, and essential to every Government, in order to the proper ruling of the nation. Unbelief commences its destructive action by obscuring the knowledge of God. The first measure of the infidel revolutionary party is to prevent children and youths from obtaining religious education. Infidelity begins by calling in question the providence of God, by casting doubts on the justice of God, and by distorting the notion of His goodness. It thus cuts away the foundations of society.

In every nation which is undergoing the process of corruption we find, therefore—(1) On the one side those who bear in mind the infinite greatness of the

Triune God, Who, when He was alone, created the whole universe out of nothing, and expended as much art in forming the wing of a gnat as on the huge planet Uranus—Who orders and directs everything throughout the universe at every moment of time, clothing the lilies, and caring for the death of a sparrow and the fall of a hair of a man's head—Who made man in His image and likeness, giving him reason and a free will—Who calls Himself the loving Father of every man, and requires every one to retain that image and likeness, and teaches him, and guides him, and gives him wisdom, so that he may see that, as his eternal happiness will consist in the fruition of God (that is, in contemplating God's infinite excellences and loving Him for them, and therefore becoming more and more one with Him)—so his happiness on earth consists in meditating on the perfections of God (as shown to us in example in the life of Christ), and in becoming like God by imitating His Son. (2) On the other side we find those who discard the consideration of God, and deny that He ordinates all things in heaven and earth; who make some earthly thing their end in life, and shape all their acts as means to that end; who love riches, or honours, or sensual pleasures, and care not to follow Christ in their lives. "Who does not see and plainly feel that a society of men, set loose from the bonds of religion and of true justice, can have, in truth, no other end than the purpose of obtaining and amassing wealth, and that it can follow no other law in its actions except the inordinate desire of the soul to minister to its own will and pleasures."[1]

[1] *Encycl.*, December 8, 1864.

There are then two camps. To those in the latter camp it would be useless for me, I fear, to address myself. They love a different end, and must therefore act on different principles. To those in the former camp it is also useless to speak, for they already know all that I can say. There are many, however, between the two camps, who profess the faith and moral principles held by the one, but have accepted the false maxims and pernicious principles of the other. The Rev. Père Félix, in one of his *Conférences*, supposes one of this class to be speaking—"Homme politique, dit-il, je suis doublé d'un homme religieux ; homme d'état et homme de foi, j'ai des devoirs tout différents. Homme religieux, j'ai ma croyance à moi, mon culte à moi, ma pratique à moi. Homme politique, je n'ai plus ni foi religieuse, ni culte religieux, ni pratique religieuse. Homme privé, prêt à mourir pour defendre ma religion, je lève hardiment, comme homme d'état, le drapeau désormais consacré de l'indifférentisme religieux."[2] On the 18th of June, 1871, Pope Pius IX., in replying to a French deputation headed by the Bishop of Nevers, said—"My dear children, my words must express to you what I have in my heart. That which afflicts your country, and prevents it from meriting the blessings of God, is the mixture of principles. I will speak out, and not hold my peace. That which I fear is not the Commune of Paris, those miserable men, those real demons of hell roaming upon the face of the earth. No, not the Commune of Paris ; that which I fear is Liberal Catholicism. . . . I have said so more than forty times, and I repeat it to you now, through the love

[2] Note 1.

that I bear you. The real scourge of France is Liberal Catholicism, which endeavours to unite two principles as repugnant to each other as fire and water. My dear children, I conjure you to abstain from those doctrines, which are destroying you. . . . If this error be not stopped, it will lead to the ruin of religion and of France." In a Brief, dated July 9, 1871, to Mgr. Ségur, the Holy Father said—"It is not only the infidel sects, who are conspiring against the Church and society, that the Holy See has often reproved; but also those men who, granting that they act in good faith and with upright intentions, yet err in caressing liberal doctrines." On July 28, 1873, His Holiness thus expressed himself—"The members of the Catholic Society of Quimper certainly run no risk of being turned away, by the writings and efforts of the declared enemies of the Church, from their obedience to the Apostolic See; but they may glide down the incline of those so-called 'Liberal' opinions, which have been adopted by many Catholics, otherwise honest and pious, who, by the influence of their religious character, may easily exercise a powerful ascendancy over men, and lead them to very pernicious opinions. Tell the members of the Catholic Society, therefore, that on the numerous occasions on which we have censured those who hold Liberal opinions, we did not mean those who hate the Church, whom it would have been useless to reprove, but those whom we have just described. Those men preserve and foster the hidden virus of Liberal principles, which they sucked as the milk of their education, pretending that those princi-

ples are not infected with malice and cannot interfere with religion; so they instil this poison into men's minds, and propagate the germs of those perturbations by which the world has for a long time been vexed."

The knowledge of God is the basis of society. From the Liberal or infidel camp therefore we hear, at the outset, an objection to "God's Providence," that is, to God's rule of the world. *We see* (say they) *an unequal distribution of the good things of the earth. If God is as good as you say, or if He rules the world, He surely would not allow one man to roll in every kind of delicacy, and another to gnaw miserably a stale crust of bread. How, if He be just, could He permit many a criminal to go on in crime, prospering more and more, while righteous men, remain poor and ignored, and even trampled upon?*

This objection has two parts; the first does not rest on the unequal distribution of good things; but on the unequal distribution of one species of good things—viz., material and temporal things; the second part rests on the fact that criminals often prosper, and enjoy the good things of the earth, while righteous men possess few of those things.

We may answer at the outset: The other kind of good things (viz., spiritual and eternal things) are far better; and, if we consider the end of man, we shall acknowledge that they are far more to be desired. A man, therefore, who has earthly good things, and not spiritual, is much to be pitied; while the righteous man who has spiritual advantages, and not earthly, is much to be envied.

But let that pass. Let us address ourselves to

the proposition itself, which is—that God does not order all things in the world, because that distribution of the good things of the earth, which we all see, is unjust. As God has created man and all things else, He might, without injustice, have ordained that *all* men should receive of the good things of earth only the bare necessaries of life. He might also have ordained that all men should bear the amount of labour and privation now borne by the poor; and yet He would not have been acting unjustly. That must be conceded. *But how* (you will say) *can He make an exception in favour of a privileged few, giving them a superabundance of the good things of this earth, while He stints others, giving them little or none of them, without being unjust?* I will still put out of the question the restoration of the balance by means of spiritual advantages, and answer, in the words of the parable which our Lord told for our instruction on this point—"Is thine eye evil, because Mine is good?" Have I wronged you, because I have given more to another? If I have a right to leave all men in poverty and suffering, how am I unjust when I choose to relieve the condition of some?

Moreover, it is for the common good, for the benefit of all, that some should be poor and others rich. For without want and superfluity, society could not exist. There would then be no charity, and no gratitude; no service, and no protection; no labour, and no commerce; no obedience, and no rule. There would, in short, be no unity; for there would be no variety of functions working towards a common end. "If all were the eye, where were the hand?" The

head is more noble than the rest of the body, but yet the body cannot be all head. So in society. The poor are no less necessary than the rich; but the functions of the poor and those of the rich are different. In every society some must rule, and many must obey. Some must study and teach; others must be docile and learn. Some must exercise rigorous discipline for the public good; and others must submit to it for the public good. Yet ruling, and teaching, and imposing of discipline cannot be accomplished without much previous study and thought; and for such study, much leisure and a sufficiency of the necessaries of life are required. Again; in a society it is necessary that the arts should be practised, the earth cultivated, the country defended, the professions exercised. There must therefore be, in every society, those for whom the arts are practised, those for whom the professions are exercised, those who are defended, and those who reap the fruits of the earth. All these classes are necessary. Yet if all the members of a society had enough by nature, there would be no labouring, no studying, no teaching, no practice of arts and professions. We conclude, then, that the fact of some being in want, while others have enough and to spare, is a proof of the providence of God, and not a valid objection against it.

Of those who are languishing in misery and poverty, we may, moreover, ask: Why are you in poverty and misery? Some, if not many, must answer: It is the result of our own acts. Is God then obliged to work miracles in order to save you from yourself? He gave you the light of reason,

the guidance of superiors, the beacons of the Faith, and He not only desired you to steer your course by those lights, but also commanded that the whole of society should be directed by them. Why have you not been thus governed? why have you not thus regulated your steps? If you have not kept your end steadily before you, and if society has not aimed at aiding its members to fulfil that common end for which God created both you and society, then you have no right to complain; you may not, in justice, mention your condition as an objection to the over-ruling providence of God. If the student has grown weary of his studies, or the labourer become languid at his work, they can no more murmur at their consequent poverty than a soldier, if he sleeps at his post, can lay upon others the blame of a surprise by the foe. If a chase after pleasures absorbs your whole attention, or if the inertness of sloth has damped your energies, then your poverty and misery are of your own making. Had you listened to your religion, to the voice of conscience, or even to reason, you would have resisted these baneful tendencies, and saved yourself from the evils which have thence resulted.

If the servants of a house find that their master gives many blows and hard words, and little good food and wages, will they continue in his service? If they had, from childhood, been warned that such and such a master always treated his servants thus, would they have taken service under him? or having taken service under him, would they blame him that had warned them? Why then, let me ask, did you

take service under such hard task-masters as the devils of pleasure, of indolence, or of worldly honour? Having taken service under them, you have only yourself to thank for your starved, lean, rent, and beggared condition, wherein you would fain fill your belly with the husks which the swine will hardly touch. Do not blaspheme God's providence for the consequences of your slothfulness at work; for the effects of drunkenness; for the results of running after pleasures and frivolities and fashions, instead of attending to your shop or your profession. Do not accuse Him of having made you poor, if you have wasted your resources on extravagances, luxuries, and gambling.

Take the trouble to investigate the condition of those who are really in want, and you will find that more than nine-tenths of them owe their misery to some cause of their own choosing; while the majority of the other tenth were plunged into misery by the sins of their parents, or by following in their father's footsteps, instead of mending their ways. None of them have any valid ground for doubting the providence of God.

This, although true, is a narrow view of things. Let us, then, raise our eyes and look further. Let us consider the end for which God has sent man on earth. A far larger field is thus opened for our consideration. Unless there were great and small, nobles and commonalty, rich and poor, how could eternal life be a reward (obtained through grace freely given, it is true, but yet a reward) for suffering, labours, and merits? How could immunity from eternal pains be

the fruit, through God's loving liberality, of the "deeds done in the flesh"? If there were no varieties of condition, what scope would there be for the exercise of virtues? By such inequalities, the rich are tried; for God has told them to wean themselves from the notion that the sensible pleasures and the ease with which they are surrounded are really good things. He has commanded them to exercise compassion, to practise sympathy, to show generosity, to give alms to those that are in want. He has urged them, by precept and by example, not to spend their possessions on themselves, but to regard themselves as mere stewards or land-agents of God. By such inequalities the poor also are tried; because God requires of them humility, patience, subjection, and submission to His will. Those who possess any power, influence, or rule, are thus tried; for God looks, in them, for modesty in the midst of luxuries; for humility while surrounded by pomp and grandeur; for a care of the lowest of those that are under them; and for unknown self-sacrifices for the good of all. Those who are in a position of subjection are thus tried, to see if they are tolerant in their judgments of their rulers, and respectful and obedient to those whom God has placed in a position above them. It is from such inequalities that the social, political, moral, and religious virtues arise and interlace each other; and if every one were faithful in the condition in which God has placed him, there would be no misery, although there would be wants; no starving, although there would be hunger; and, above all, there would be no pretext to call in question the

providence of God. Misery and starvation are caused by men ceasing to love God above all things, by their rating things at wrong values, and by their ignoring their real end (viz., the imitation of Christ in this life, and the consequent fruition of God in the next), and setting their hearts on some earthly pleasure, or honour, or power, as if it were the *summum bonum*. It is false, therefore, to assert that inequality in the conditions of men is an argument against the providence of God. It proves only that men persist in ignoring the overruling providence of God. Nay, more; this inequality is a means by which God brings His marvellous providence to light. Those only can doubt it who have never considered the end for which we have all been sent upon the earth. Those who look on pleasure and ease, on banqueting and dancing, on amassing wealth and spending it, on hunting for honour and glory and strutting in their beauty and pageantry, as the end of their life—forgetting that they have souls, and that eternity awaits them—those of course cannot understand the inequalities in the lot and conditions of men. But neither do they understand how they themselves differ from the beasts that perish—beasts who have no end beyond this earth. This fact is truer than the Darwinian theory, and quite as little likely to be appreciated by the subjects of it. They, on the other hand, who are ever saying to themselves, "We have not here a lasting city, but we seek one that is to come"—they can understand it; they readily acknowledge the providence of God; they remember always that God rules the world, and

orders all the circumstances and events in it. They go beyond this confine of religious knowledge; they believe that those are the best off who are poor, those who have not the good things of this world, those who have to suffer and to wait. "Blessed are ye poor; blessed are ye that suffer now; blessed are ye that hunger now; blessed are ye when men persecute you." For both poor and rich are tried, each in their proper way; and the trial of the poor is less searching than that of the rich. The poor are more likely to exhibit the virtues required of them in their condition, than the rich are likely to fulfil the duties which are expected of them; "how hardly shall the rich man enter the kingdom of heaven!" Hence the poor and the suffering have a better ground for expecting "an exceeding and eternal weight of glory." Riches puff up the heart, and distract the soul from its end. Riches inflame the passions, and offer ready means to gratify all the heart's desires; for it is hard to refrain from tasting, when the cup of pleasure is put to your lips. Poverty, on the other hand, naturally abases the spirit, and helps the heart to disengage itself from the things of the earth, and to place its affections on a treasure in heaven. Poverty urges its victim to conquer his natural indolence, and is thus a "handmaid to many virtues."

Let us return to the position from which we started—viz., that the end of man is to become like God by the contemplation of His perfections. What, then, did Jesus Christ teach us by His life and by His words? He was poor; He worked for

His bread; He was "in subjection;" He "had not where to lay His sacred head;" He said, "Blessed are the poor," and "Woe to you rich;" He went through a life of suffering and sorrow, without a ray of human happiness or comfort—a life which culminated in His agony, in His abandonment by all men, in the scourging, the crown of thorns, the cruel mockings, and the crucifixion. Those, then, who are Christ-like, will condole with every one who is rich, and congratulate and honour the suffering and the poor.

The second part of the objection against God's intimate rule of the world, which is called "God's providence," is that bad men often go on prospering, while righteous men generally fail.

It has been said that heaven has been made for those who have failed on earth. Let us, however, first consider the truth of the assertion that bad men prosper in earthly things. There are some misfortunes which are common to bad men and good: such as the ravages of floods, blight, famine, pestilence, the horrors of war, &c. There are some misfortunes which are individual: such as bankruptcy, sickness, blindness, premature death, &c. As the former class is common to both bad and good, we cannot, of course, say that they are proper to either. The latter class, consisting of individual misfortunes, is the only one which we have to consider. Let us see whether they are proper to good men, while bad men escape them. This class cannot be said to be proper to good men; nor yet does it

belong to good men more than to bad. Bankruptcy often hits the spendthrift, the gambler, the man who ministers to his passions; while the industrious man, the simple-minded, the frugal man generally escapes. Sickness, ailments, and premature death also assail the man of pleasure more than the moderate and abstemious man. Of fines and imprisonments, I need say nothing; the case in regard to them is self-evident. It is therefore false to assert that the wicked prosper on earth, while the virtuous fail.

But there are exceptions (says the objector), *an innocent, and even virtuous, man is sometimes overwhelmed in misfortune. Is that consistent with the notion of God's providence?*

All those persons are not innocent and virtuous who call themselves so; nor are those without blame who are esteemed so by others. There are whited sepulchres in the world; there are wolves in sheep's skins. God looks not on such persons, as men look on them. He "judges not according to appearance, but judges righteous judgment." He has seen all their secret pleasures, their hidden vices, their concealed crimes. How often the world cries out that a just man has been struck down by affliction, in a career of prosperity; while God, Who struck Him, knows him to be a grievous sinner and an accomplished hypocrite. Instead, therefore, of murmuring against the divine justice, and regarding the fate of that man as an argument against an overruling Providence, we should glorify God Who has thus called the secret sinner to a speedy repentance. Even if the sufferer was a just man at the time the

stroke fell upon him, yet we may ask whether he had always been a just man. We know that God is long-suffering and slow to anger; and also that He will by no means spare the guilty. As a youth the sufferer may have resisted God, he may have caused scandals, he may have soiled his soul by much carnality, and not yet have received punishment for those sins at the hands of God. God may then have led him to desist from his course of sin, and presently let fall the stroke upon him. Is there anything unjust in God's patience? Would it have been right to have made an exception in his favour, and have let his sins go unpunished? Nay, it was merciful in God to have delayed no longer, but rather to have let him expiate his sins in this life, and have allowed him to make satisfaction now instead of having to render it hereafter. It was merciful in God to have sent him affliction and suffering, in order to raise his degraded mind, through patience, to a higher level, and wean him from temporal ease and pleasure.

But (says the objector) *we are told not to account those as sinners, more than other men, who were slaughtered by the oppressor while engaged in sacrificing, nor those unoffending persons on whom the Tower of Siloam fell; so that, in some cases at least, misfortunes fall on good persons, and that too at the very time when they are engaged in good actions. It follows that such events cannot be ordered by an overruling Providence; and, further, it cannot be true that God does "whatsoever is done upon earth," or He would have protected His own.*

I forbear to urge that exceptions prove the rule. I do not point out that, if there have been some occasions when God has refrained from directing events, yet it is not thereby proved that He does not generally order all things, but that rather it is proved that He does so as a rule. I do not urge this, because I do not admit that anything ever happens except by God's overruling providence. I assert that there are no exceptions. Yet I do admit that good men are sometimes struck by misfortunes. Are these admissions inconsistent? I have said that the end of man is to attain the fruition of God, by becoming in the image and likeness of God. It follows that the end of man on this earth is to lead a life like that of Jesus Christ. As a life in heaven is to consist in the fruition of God, that is, the eternal contemplation or intuition of the infinite perfections of God, and the assimilation of the infinite perfections of God; so every man's life on earth must consist either in beginning that heavenly life (*i.e.*, approaching nearer, in resemblance, to God), or else in receding further and further from the likeness of God. *Quos præscivit et prædestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui*—"Whom He did foreknow, them He did predestine to be made like His Son." To what likeness, then, are we to conform? To the likeness of Jesus Christ. Jesus was poor; He suffered hunger, and cold, and want; He endured the contradictions of men; He was humble, and yet He was ever more humbled; He was persecuted; He suffered agonies of body and mind; He was traduced, abandoned, maligned, calumniated, treated with the

greatest ingratitude and contempt by those whom He had just loaded with benefits; He was spat upon, buffeted in the face, scourged, crowned with thorns, tortured, murdered. "Behold THE man." There was *the* man, *par excellence:* the Representative Man. Would *you* be much of a man? There are the lineaments of Christ. Would you be like Him? You, too, must have those lineaments. In proportion, then, as Christ loves you, and intends you well, He will, in His rule of the world and His minute ordering of all things, help you to become more and more like Him. He will make your life more like His life. Even after your past sins have been expiated, after you have been weaned from the things of this world, and have become as pure as a mean man can be pure, yet you are not quite like Him. Moreover, there is still a danger of your falling away from that likeness. What greater kindness, then, can He show you than to make your life more like His? The stone for a building has to be more hewed and cut, in proportion as it is designed for a position and honour. That continued chiselling of a good stone is no proof of a want of art and intelligence in the master-builder, but the contrary. That stone, if it could feel, would cry out under those repeated strokes, and confess that they only proved the peculiar providence and care of the builder. The plant which is intended for an ornamental ground is pruned, and cut, and trained with care; the tree which is grown for fire-wood is abandoned to itself. In both cases the intelligent providence of the cultivator is shown. But which of the plants has the best

right, if any, to complain, or to doubt the providence of the cultivator? The one which does *not* feel the sharp strokes of his hand, and is left to its own devices and will. Apply this to yourself, and to the argument before us. Has God thrown the bridle on the neck of your passions? Have things gone smoothly with you? Does the world speak well of you? Have no reverses met you, and no tribulations assailed you? Then tremble lest God is no longer pursuing you, as a father, to punish, but as a judge to condemn. Has God said of you, "Leave him alone, he is joined to his idols?" Has He said, "My Spirit shall no longer strive with him"? Then He will presently say, "Cut him down; why cumbereth he the earth?" The adversity of a good man, as well as the prosperity of the bad man, comes from the overruling providence of God. The father is a ruler; the judge is a ruler; that is, they both exercise providence. But the punishments of a rhadamanthine judge are retributions, or satisfactions for evil, while those of a father are not only retributions but also medicaments for the soul; and the punishments of God are retributions for evil, remedies for the soul, and compensations for much good which we may have left undone. The only feeling, therefore, which can reasonably be raised in us by seeing the prosperity of a bad man, is a feeling of horror. If a godless statesman seems to succeed in his nefarious measures; if a dissolute man revels unchecked in his voluptuousness; if an unjust judge is not called to account for making merchandize of his judgments; if a shopkeeper, unpunished, adulterates his goods, or extorts exorbi-

tant profits; if a monarch advances victoriously in his usurpations, rapine, spoliations, and unjust wars, we should only say with David—"Fret not thyself because of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly wither away as grass, and as the green herbs shall quickly fall. . . . Envy not the man who prospereth in his way, the man who doth unjust things, . . . for the evil doer shall be cut off. . . . The Lord shall laugh at him, for He foreseeth that his day shall come, . . . the wicked shall perish; and the enemies of the Lord, presently after they shall be honoured and exalted, shall come to nothing, and vanish like smoke. . . . I have been young, and now am old, and have not seen the just forsaken, nor his seed begging bread. . . . I have seen the wicked highly exalted, and lifted up like the cedars of Libanus; and I passed by, and lo he was not, and I sought him and his place was not found. . . . The unjust shall be destroyed together, and the remnants of the wicked shall perish." Are the wicked prosperous? Then God is reserving them for dire punishments hereafter. Are they prosperous? Then God is withholding from them the means of reclamation, as He sees that they would be ineffectual. Are they prosperous? Then they are conforming themselves, more and more, to this world, and departing more and more from the likeness of Christ. Then be not emulous of evil doers, and do not deny the overruling providence of God when you see either the prosperity of the bad man or the afflictions of the good.

The objector sometimes argues, on a ground not

far removed from that which we have been considering, against the position that God's providence supervises even the most minute affairs of life. *On what just ground* (he says) *can unbaptized infants be condemned to hell? Is it just, moreover, if God rules all things, for Him to condemn so many Gentiles, to whom the Gospel has never been preached; and also so many persons, born in heresy, whose early prejudices have always been too strong for their reason? Either the position "Outside the Church there is no salvation," or the position of the overruling providence of God must be abandoned.*

In the last chapter we considered, as an objection against God's providence, the charge that God does not punish many who merit it; now the objection alleged against God's providence is, that God does punish many who, in the objector's judgment, do not deserve punishment. The objector assumes, in short, that idolaters, heretics, schismatics, and unbaptized persons, have a right to eternal life, and that God defrauds them of that right. *Why* (he asks) *should pagans be condemned, if they never heard the Gospel preached; or if their fathers heard the Gospel, but rejected it? Above all, why should babies be damned because their fathers neglected to get them baptized?*

First let us inquire what is the truth with regard to unbaptized babies? What is the teaching of the Church on that point? The Church teaches, certainly, that they will not be admitted to the beatific vision; but She has never said that they will be thrown into torments. Nay, many doctors of the Church have asserted that those will enjoy an agreeable state of

life, who, not having sinned, have yet not had the stain of original sin washed out. Eternal happiness, or the intuitive vision and possession of God, is not natural to man. It is a state to which he can arrive only by supernatural assistance. God, therefore, no more commits an injustice when He forbears to raise a human creature to that supernatural state, than He wrongs a stone by not raising it to the superior nature of a plant. He has given to each being all that is proper to it, according to the order in which He has placed it. The happiness proper to a human creature, who has not been raised to a supernatural state, is a happiness proportioned to his natural reason and senses. Is there any injustice in assigning to him this happiness rather than a superior kind of happiness, which is not natural to him? And if there is no injustice, then how is the fact that some human creatures die unbaptized, an argument against the providence of God?

Baptism raises man to a supernatural state; and his proper happiness in that order is a supernatural happiness, *i.e.*, the beatific vision. "By baptism we are made members of Christ, and of the body of the Church, . . . and baptized persons, if they die before they have actually committed a sin, will at once enter the kingdom of heaven and attain to the vision of God."[2] The Council of Trent[3] defined that baptism is a translation from that state in which every descendant of the first Adam is born, to the state of grace, to an adoption, as sons of God, through the second Adam, Jesus Christ our Saviour; and said: "By

[2] Bull of Eugenius IV., *Exultate Deo.* [3] Sess. vi., cap. 4.

baptism we put on Christ, and become new creatures."[4] Unbaptized children, on the other hand, as St. Thomas of Aquin says[5]—"Sibi (Deo) conjungentur per participationem naturalium bonorum, et ita etiam de Ipso gaudere poterunt naturali cognitione et dilectione"[6] (that is, they will be happy in God, through a natural knowledge and love of Him).

Yet there is an injustice (continues the objector) *in their being aware of their privation of a higher kind of happiness; so that if God is just, He does not rule the world, for, if just, He would never have permitted any one to have remained unbaptized.* To this St. Thomas answers, "Cognoscunt quidem beatitudinem in generali secundum communem rationem, non autem in speciali; ideo de ejus omissione non dolent."[7]

Moreover, as the beatific vision is a gratuitous gift, no man is wronged by not receiving it; nor yet are some men wronged if others receive it, and they do not; for no one has a right to the beatific vision; and where no right is infringed, no wrong is done. If you deny this proposition, you must allow that by giving alms to some poor persons, you do an injustice to all those poor persons who receive nothing from you.

But let us pass to the other limb of the objection against God's providence, namely, the accusation that He deprives some Pagan idolaters of life before they have become Christians, and then sends them to hell. First, it must be remarked that perhaps some of those whom we comprise under that name were not really idolaters. Job and his friends were not idolaters; the centurion of the Gospel was not an idolater. In other

[4] Sess. xiv., cap. 2. [5] 2a. 2æ., 33, q. 2, a. 2.
[6] Note 2. [7] Note 3.

words, some who were educated as Pagan idolaters, have attained to the knowledge of the true God. We may fairly suppose that this was the case with many who, as St. Paul said, "were a law unto themselves;" "because that which is known of God is manifested in them, for God hath shown it unto them; for the invisible things of Him—His eternal power and divinity—invisible from the creation of the world, are clearly seen by them, being understood by the things that are made." That is: by right judgment, freed from fallacies and errors, and by reason pure of passion, they worked themselves out of their idolatry. For every man is given enough grace to know the true God; and "knowing Him," says St. Paul, "they glorified Him as God." "Constat Dei quidem existentiam multasque alias veritates ab iis etiam qui fidem nondum susceperunt, naturali rationis lumine cognosci, sed illa reconditiora dogmata (quæ supernaturalem hominis elevationem, ac supernaturale ejus cum Deo commercium respiciunt) Deum solum manifestasse. . . . Et sane cum hæc dogmata sint supra naturam, idcirco naturali ratione ac naturalibus principiis attingi non possunt."[8] If this were not so, if it were not possible for Pagans to rise out of their idolatry, then their idolatry would have been no sin; for there is no sin in that which cannot be avoided; nor is there sin without the knowledge of it. Only those, therefore, have been condemned who were not faithful to the grace given to them.

But baptism and the Faith are necessary to salvation. Certainly; but we know, on the other hand, that God

[8] Epist. Pii IX., December 11, 1862. Note 4.

did reveal the knowledge of the Redeemer to some Pagans—Pagans who probably had made good use of the grace which God had given them, and which He gives to every man. Thus Job had learned to say, "I know that my Redeemer liveth." Many others also had, at least, an implicit faith in God's providence, knowing that He would punish the guilty with a dire Nemesis, and that He could and would liberate those who looked to Him. Thus St. Thomas,[9] "Multis gentilium facta fuit revelatio de Christo. . . . Si qui tamen salvati fuerunt quibus revelatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt salvati absque fide Mediatoris; quia etsi non habuerunt fidem explicitam, habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam in divina Providentia, credentes Deum esse liberatorem hominum," &c.[10] So also with regard to baptism; it is not absolutely necessary that it should be received in fact, if it has been in the desire. And where there is an ignorance of the necessity of it, yet it is comprised in the act of loving God beyond all things. Thus Pagans, who remained faithful to the means of salvation which they had (although those means were far less than ours), did yet attain to salvation. In short, God enables every man to know Him; and knowing Him, to glorify Him. To every man, moreover, who has used those means of knowing Him, God has given more grace, in order to bring him to that which was beyond his nature and out of his power.[11] There is, therefore, in

[9] 2a. 2æ., q. 2, § vii., ad. 3.

[10] Note 5.

[11] The Curé d'Ars used to say that the shortest and surest way to the true Faith, was to do good works; according to the eternal words of our Master, "He who doeth the truth shall come to the light" (*Esprit du Curé d'Ars*).

the objection no argument against the providence of God, but another argument in favour of it.

As to heretics and schismatics, the Church does not teach that they must all be damned, although She says, using the words of St. Augustine—"Outside the Church there is no salvation." There are two modes of being outside the Church. (1) A man may have been born and brought up outside the Church; or (2) a man may, of his own free will, have renounced the Church. A person (1) in the former case has no guilt of heresy, as long as he has experienced no doubt, which he refused to investigate, as to the correctness of the doctrines in which he had been brought up. He is then *materially* separated from the Church, but not *formally* nor *finally* separated. If he has been baptized, he has been baptized into the Church. He may, moreover, believe some or many of the grand points of the Faith; while it is only through an ignorance, not yet overcome, that he does not believe all the other revealed truths. It is true that he has not the advantage of as many sacraments and means of grace as the faithful; but yet he may make good use of those means which he has; he may act up to the light which has been given him; and so God, without doubt, will, in His own good time, give him more light and more grace to enable him to rise still higher. This, also, is an example of the providence of God.

But (2) to embrace heresy from some evil motive, or to remain in heresy from a desire to enjoy more of the good things of this world, or from indolence and a dislike of the trouble of investigation, or from vanity and the fear of man, or in any way from bad faith, is

quite a different matter. How can any one, in such a case, charge God with injustice, for condemning a heretic who has thus vilipended His truth and grace, and preferred some temporal advantage? God has given him light, but he has resolutely shut his eyes. God has called, but he has refused to come. There is no salvation, outside the Church of Christ, for those who know that they are outside the Church, and acquiesce in standing outside, preferring not to enter. In this condemnation there is no injustice; and therefore their condemnation does not disprove the providence of God over all the events of the world.

Let those, however, who are in the Church, remember this overruling providence; let them bear in mind that they have all the means of grace which God has provided; and that it is, therefore, incumbent on them to remember their end, and to become more like Christ than those who have not the advantage of those means. If some are lost for want of the Christian Faith, many, alas! are lost for want of a Christlike life.

If there be an overruling providence of an infinitely good God, how is it that moral evil is permitted? for moral evil is the ruin of men. How is it also that God allows His Church to be oppressed and persecuted, as it always has been, and now is, if His providence is over all the events of the world?

It would be a sufficient answer to both these questions to say—Because so it pleases His Divine Majesty and infinite Wisdom that it should be. Let us, however, enter into the questions.

(1) *How is it that the existence of moral evil is permitted?* The proposition that, consistently with the overruling providence of God, moral evil could not be permitted, must rest on one of two premisses—either because it is incompatible with God's perfections, and therefore destructive of them; or else, because the exigences of human nature require that moral evil should not exist; in other words, because the permission for moral evil to exist would be in contradiction, either to God's perfections, or else to God's works. Now, the nature of man is not such as to require that he should be impeccable. On the contrary, it is his nature to be gifted with intellect and will, so that he may dispose of himself. St. Thomas remarks that no being can be free who is not also intelligent. The converse is also true. Man has been given the power of knowing good and evil, and of desiring or abhorring them; because he was also made free to choose the one or the other. In other words, moral evil must be possible—it must be permitted. Without it there could be no virtue, no vice, no merit, no sin, no moral order at all. The existence of moral evil, then, is not inconsistent with the providence of a perfectly good God. Nay, it is a field for the exercise of that providence and of that goodness. For, together with the liberty to commit evil, God surrounds every man with numerous incitements not to commit it, and numerous allurements to choose the good. The mother makes her child begin to walk alone, at the risk of falling, in order that it may learn to walk; yet she holds her arms on either side of the child, lest it should fall

with too much violence to the ground. So God permits moral evil; and yet, He brings to bear on every man an infinite number of influences and precautions to induce him to choose the good and reject the evil. First, there is His law, so that we may know the evil from the good; then He gives us hopes of blessings and fears of chastisements. Besides external inducements, He gives us graces to strengthen us, and His Spirit to "intercede with groans" within us. Then there is a feeling of horror at the first suggestion of a sin; an approval of conscience if it has been resisted, a sense of shame if we have held a parley with the tempter within us. If we have listened to the devil and committed the sin, then remorse gnaws the soul until the sin has been cancelled by repentance, with a resolution to amend, and by confession and penance and absolution. There are, moreover, a multitude of other lights in the mind, and of affections in the heart, by which, in His love, He lays siege to us. There is also the Church, who gives so many helps, and is always raising up every variety of engine against moral evil. What more could God have done than He has done?

Let us take a step further. God, in permitting evil, causes it to work a greater good. This we are taught by St. Augustine—"Neque Deus Omnipotens, cum summe bonus sit, ullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse, nisi usque adeo esset Omnipotens et Bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo."[12] How great is the providence and goodness of God, which, from the perversity of man, can draw advantages for man. The Assyrians, the Chaldæans, the Egyptians, each

[12] Note 6.

did God's work in punishing the children of Israel for their sins, "Albeit he did not think so in his heart," said Isaias; that is, each of them subjugated the Israelites through ambition, or lust for rapine; but yet they were each "the rod of God's anger," to correct the Jews and wean them from their sins. So the Goths, and Vandals, and the Mahommedans, were used to punish Europe; and Napoleon I., at a later time, was, as he himself said, "a scourge of God." Persecutors there have been in all ages; but they have added glories to the martyrs. Infidels and heretics there have always been; yet they have urged on the Doctors of the Church in their studies, and caused the Church to define the Faith more in detail. "Blessed are ye when men shall revile and persecute you," exclaimed our Lord, "for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you," who also were "perfected through sufferings," and made blessed.

In permitting evil, therefore, God shows His good providence. Yet He does not make evil; He never did make evil. This was a puzzle which vexed St. Augustine. We can see, in his *Confessions*, the arguments which brought him out of the perplexity, and led him to conclude—"Malum non esse nisi privatio boni, usque ad quod omnino non est." And, "Quæsivi quid esset iniquitas, et non inveni substantiam, sed a summa Substantia, te Deo, detortæ in infima voluntatis perversitatem." This is the teaching of the Church. In the Bull of Eugenius IV.[13] we read —"Deus, qui quando voluit, bonitate sua universas tam spirituales quam corporales condidit creaturas;

[13] *Cantate Domino.*

bonas quidem, quia a Summo Bono factæ sunt; nullamque mali asserit (ecclesia) esse naturam, quia omnis natura, in quantum natura est, bona est." The Council of Lateran (A.D. 1215) decreed—"Diabolus enim et alii dæmones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali." The expression, "the existence of moral evil," which was used by the objector, is, therefore, not correct; but the fact of sin, which was thereby meant, is a proof of the providence of God, and not an objection against it.

Let us pass to the other part of the objection, and consider how it is that the Church is always oppressed by enemies, while God in His providence rules all things. The difficulty here suggested arises from a mistaken idea of the Church. The Church was instituted by our Lord, in order to keep truth and maintain justice; and the objector falsely concludes that She must therefore necessarily be held in honour by men. That is not true. Here She is in a state of pilgrimage and of war. Her Founder warned her to expect persecution and a sword; for "the disciple is not greater than the master, nor the servant than the lord." The only crown which the Church may expect on earth is the crown of thorns; and Her sceptre, as ruler over "all the kingdoms of the earth," She must hold amid mockings, contumelies, and buffets. The Church was sent as "a sheep among wolves;" and She was told that "the day will come when in killing you they will think they are doing God's service," and that "ye shall be hated for My name's sake." The persecution of the Church is, therefore, no argument against

God's overruling providence; for God had foretold it as part of His providential plan.

We may stop for a moment to remark the good that comes of persecution. If persons have been at ease, if they have "waxed fat and kicked," then persecution humbles them and brings them to submission. In the fires of affliction, the Church is seven times refined, as silver is refined. This has been already said, when showing that events and occurrences which we call evil are the workings of God for good. The knife of the surgeon, which lays open the ulcer and causes it to heal, may yet compel us to cry out with pain. The persecutions of the Church, therefore, so far from being an argument against the providence of God, are a proof of His overruling care.

CHAPTER II.

RELIGION.

THERE are not many persons who deny the necessity of some religion. But there are many persons who have adopted, with regard to religion, certain false axioms, which have set on foot a thousand disorders. One of those axioms let us now consider. *Every religion is good; it avails not, therefore, to make researches after the true religion, or to hold religious controversies, or to proselytize; those who think otherwise, and try to bring persons over to their religious views, are merely intolerant.* The proposition—*Every religion is good*, means that every superstition, every idolatry, every error concerning God, is as good as the knowledge of Him and pure obedience to His commands. *Every religion* comprises the Jewish religion, the Brahminical religion, Buddhism, the Iroquois Indians' religion, the Sandwich Islanders' religion, the Fiji religion, and so forth. In other words, truth and error, the honour of God and contempt of Him, knowledge of Him and falsehoods concerning Him, the adoration of Him and devil-worship, are put on exactly the same footing.

Why was God so minute in His commands con-

cerning the worship of Himself? Why was He always so severe in His punishments of idolatry? Why did He annihilate so many nations who had committed idolatry? Before our Lord's death, the Jewish religion was the only true religion; for God Himself had revealed it, and commanded all the observances of its worship. If every religion is good, why did He come on earth and suffer on the Cross to change the Jewish religion? If every religion is the same to God, there was no reason for the change.

The objector may limit his assertion, by saying, *Every religion, which recognizes Jesus Christ, is good.* This is as absurd a position as the former. The subject—*Every religion which recognizes Jesus Christ,* comprises not only the Catholic religion, but also the thousand Protestant sects which gradually shade off into deism. If all religions are good, why did you ever leave the Catholic Church? Why did you become Mormons? Why Quakers? Why Shakers? Why Jumpers? Why Spiritualists? Why any one of the sects who say they recognize Jesus Christ? *Recognizing Jesus Christ* is, moreover, a very ambiguous expression. It comprises Socinianism, Unitarianism, and even Mahommedanism; for all these sects say that there existed a "good Man" of that name.

If all religions are as good, the one as the other, we come, just as we did by the last proposition, to a thorough indifference as to truth and error. If consistent, we must be as ready to change our religion as our clothes.

A person who asserts such an axiom must mean in his heart, either that Christ never made a revelation of the Faith which He wished men to believe, and of the practices which He desired them to observe; or else that He, having made such a revelation, cares not whether men regard it or not. Why, then, did He teach the truth Himself, and ordain apostles to "teach all nations"? Why did He establish a Church to "keep the deposit of the Faith," promising to give Her His Spirit to guide Her unto all truth, and saying that He Himself would remain with Her "all days, even unto the end of the world," to keep Her from error—if, in these last days, persons are to discover that, after all, one religion is as good as another? Why was the blood of all the martyrs spilled? Why have men suffered persecution in all ages, rather than change their religion, if they were not quite certain that one religion only can be the true one? No one, moreover, who believes one religion to be as good as another, will take the trouble to go out as a missionary, to preach, to argue, to proselytize. Yet men do so. If one religion is as good as another, there is no such a thing as heresy; and yet St. Paul[1] classes heresy with murder and adultery, and says that heretics shall not enter the kingdom of heaven; he even commands the faithful not to keep company with heretics. Why did St. John command us not to receive heretics into our houses? And why, as St. Irenæus testifies, did he refuse to enter the public baths when the heretic

[1] Gal. xx. 21.

Cerinthus was there? If every religion is good, it was absurd to command us to "keep the deposit of Faith" with so much care. The solicitude of the Church, in all ages, to keep the faithful from error, has also been vain. Her Councils, and Her struggles against heresies, have been mere trifling. Nay, the Church herself is a folly; and the promise of the Holy Ghost to guide Her to all truth, was mere emptiness; and Her preaching has ever been but idle declamation!

The Curé d'Ars had, one day, an interview with a wealthy Protestant. This servant of God, in ignorance that the other belonged to the "Reformed" Church, spoke, according to his wont, with the greatest warmth and eloquence of our Lord and of the saints, and ended by placing a medal in the hand of his interlocutor.

The Protestant replied, "Monsieur le Curé, you are giving a medal to a heretic. At all events, I am a heretic from your point of view. Yet, in spite of the differences of our faiths, I hope that some day we shall meet in heaven."

The good Curé took the Protestant's hand, and fixing his eyes upon him—eyes full of the enthusiasm of his belief, and of the ardour of his charity, said, with the deepest feeling and the tenderest sympathy, "Alas! my friend, we shall be united above only if we have begun to be united here below; death changes nothing. 'As the tree falls, so will it lie.'"

"Monsieur le Curé, I believe in Christ, Who said, 'He that believeth in Me shall have eternal life.'"

"Ah! my friend, our Lord said other things, also, for us to believe. He said that he that heareth not the Church, must be regarded as a heathen man, a publican; He said that there must be but one shepherd and one fold; and He established St. Peter as the Chief Pastor to feed the sheep." The Curé then added, in a voice of ineffable sweetness—"My friend, there are not two good ways of serving our Lord, there is only one; namely, to serve Him as He desired to be served." M. Vianney abruptly left his visitor; but the seed had been sown, and in time bore good fruit.[2]

A similar false principle is couched in the following words—*I respect every religion.* What does this mean? I regard no religion as the true religion; but I hold that every religion has a portion of truth in it, mixed with much error; in short, there is no true religion. Here again we are confronted with the same deductions as to the emptiness of Christ's promises, and the folly of instituting a teaching Church, against whom the gates of hell should not prevail—the folly, I say, for if that hypothesis be correct, She cannot teach a true religion! Here, again, we are constrained to deny the fact of a revelation, as well as the overruling providence of God.

I respect every religion! The adoption of such an axiom is an act of formal apostacy; for he that doubts the Faith which he professes is an infidel—an unbeliever.

[2] *Spirit of the Curé d'Ars.*

I respect every religion! Such an axiom arises from vanity—from the conceit of philosophical sublimity and superior toleration. Yet nothing can be more contrary to philosophy than this axiom. What philosopher would assert that he believes contradictories?

I respect every religion! An inhuman maxim! For, although we should not despise an erring brother, yet we should never lead a brother astray by countenancing his errors and flattering his fallacies.

I respect all religions! You mean that you respect that which you say is false (for you allow no religion to be true). You respect that which God hates! You respect that which God desires to exterminate from the world!

Then am I to hold that all men will go to hell who do not believe what I believe? I have already shown you that no one goes to hell who does not choose it; for God gives, to every man, sufficient grace to lead him out of error. Now I ask you one thing—Do you hold that all will go to heaven, whatever their views, and maxims, and principles of conduct may be? If so, why did our Lord come on earth to establish a religion? Why did He say that whosoever shall not believe on Him shall be damned? The Catholic Faith teaches us that God desires the salvation of every one, and that He has clearly traced out the way which leads to eternal life, so that the wayfarer shall not err therein. It follows that every one who does not take that way cannot be saved (except only those who labour under an ignorance—an ignorance

which cannot be removed, because the ignorant person will not believe that he is ignorant; for in such a case, as has already been said, he may receive help and grace from God, on the ground that he is doing the best he can, in the state in which he is, to rise to something higher). God will not save an idolater, letting him remain an idolater; but He will save him by leading him on to the truth necessary for salvation. If this be not so, why do you send missionaries to the heathen, to disturb them in their religion and lead to bloodshed, instead of leaving them in their ignorance? God saves by leading men from their sins and taking them out of their errors. Jesus Christ saves us from our sins. He that surrenders himself to God's grace will be saved, and he that resists God's grace will perish. Thus it is that those who go to hell go there, not because they think differently from us, but because they have been unfaithful to the divine grace which they received. This is very different from the maxim which asserts that all religions are deserving of respect. He who adopts such a maxim will be constrained, by logical necessity, to extend it to Mussulmen, and to rationalists, and to atheists, and to libertines, to Nero even, and to Judas. These all acted under views of their own, which were different from ours; for they did not take these maxims as their principles of conduct—"He that believeth and has been baptized shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned;" and "Without faith it is impossible to please God."

Catholics are intolerant; the Catholic Church, at least, is intolerant, and therefore not divine. Those who cry up toleration, if watched when in power, are themselves found to be either most intolerant towards those who differ from them; or else most indifferent to religion. Such an one cries up toleration in the State. Follow him to his home, and see whether he allows his son to differ from him in religion; ask him whether he will, even, engage a servant of a different religion to his own? Or, look at those who are so tolerant while on the opposition benches of the legislature. They presently come into office, and see! they give all the places at their disposal to those of the same shade of religion as themselves; they deal with those parts of the country, where the majority hold another faith, on principles different from those which guide their action towards those parts of the country which agree with them. In Prussia and in Switzerland—those very tolerant countries—we see with what bitterness the Catholic Church is treated.

The word intolerant is used ambiguously, denoting (1) those who persecute persons who venture to differ from them; and (2) those who dissent verbally from propositions which they do not hold to be true. The former kind of intolerance cannot be ascribed to the Catholic Church; in the second sense, Catholics certainly are intolerant; and so they ought to be. They dissent from false propositions, propounded and enforced in their hearing; for it is their duty to do so. Every one who believes that he knows the truth, must, unless he is very maliciously inclined, be anxious to set those aright who are in error. Suppose

some one were to assert that it would be well to establish the Druidical religion, with its human sacrifices, or Mormonism, with its plurality of wives; would you tolerate such an one? Would you allow his proposition to pass unchallenged and undenied? No, of course not. Why not? Because you consider it wrong? Yet your opponent thinks it right; you are therefore yourself intolerant. Such intolerance is, however, a duty. Or suppose some persons to hold, conscientiously, that property is repugnant to the principles of Christianity, and that all things should be possessed in common. Would you allow such persons to promulgate and support their doctrines in your presence, without a word of dissent or a sound of dissatisfaction from you? Of course not; you would feel yourself a mean coward, a craven hound, if you did. Here again, then, you acknowledge that it is right to be intolerant. I may continue to offer examples, to which you will find yourself constrained to give the same answer. What, then, becomes of your principle of toleration?

Apply the same reasoning to us Catholics. We think—nay, we know—that we are in possession of the true religion. We believe, moreover, that both temporal and eternal evils will overtake and overwhelm us, if we allow any one to corrupt the Faith which is in us. We believe that other religions are far from the truth in proportion as they differ from the Catholic religion. We believe further that our religion has been built upon three pillars—of reason, authority, and faith. We are, therefore, ready to "resist unto blood" rather than deny our religion.

Are we, then, to be censured if, when we hear persons asserting false propositions in religious matters, we correct them, and endeavour to lead them right? Are we to be blamed if we refuse to admit premisses which would insidiously undermine our own faith? A man who tolerates error, knowing it to be error, must either be full of malice, or else the meanest and most despicable "worm, and no man." No mathematician would listen to a false proposition in mathematics, without correcting it; no naturalist allows an error to pass in natural history; and no good lawyer allows his friends to make a fallacious assumption in a legal matter, without telling them of their error. Can we, then, suppose that any man, who knows a truth, and knows that he has it from God Himself through the appointed channels of communication, would for a moment prostitute himself to a man's fancy, as if that truth were no better than a man's fiction? Never! even though that prostitution were called toleration, enlightenment, progress, or philosophy. As, moreover, the Catholic knows that the truth, which he holds, is the only means of salvation for others, what villainy it would be in him to treat it as if were a doubtful matter! Hence, in one sense of the word, every Catholic that is sincere, is intolerant; and if a Catholic is not intolerant, he is either a hypocrite, or else he does not really believe what he professes. Some Catholic, on reading this, may excuse himself by saying, "It is from false shame that I do so; from a false respect of men; shrinking from giving offence to another, I omit the manifest duty of warning him

of his error." In God's name, then, let your conscience, and not the fancy of others, be your rule of life. It shows an abject and ignoble mind to live at the beck and bid of others. What payment will you get from them, for giving up your duty and relinquishing your position as the possessor of a great truth, in order to please them? They will merely despise you for it. Nay, let them censure you, rather than that you should incur the censure of God. "Him that confesseth me before men, will I confess before the Father in heaven." The courage to deny errors or to correct others is a matter of habit; habituate yourself therefore to conquer false shame.

This timidity, pusillanimity, or slavery is found especially in those persons who are careful to intimate to you that they cannot breath in the narrowness of superstitions. If you could look at their hearts you would see that they are, in reality, more abject than the worm which crawls in the dust. Respect of man influences all their acts; fear of what may be said, agitates them like a leaf; the world turns them hither and thither as the wind causes the vane to veer; and every man with a little roughness, or even decision of manner, is able to impose upon them a yoke, beneath which they groan, but which they dare not refuse. They know the truth of the Catholic religion; they are aware of the sacredness of the mysteries, and are not ignorant of the laws of the Church; they even fear the sin which they are committing by breaking them. Yet what do they? If they have to practise their religion, they go where they will not be seen, and shield themselves with as

many pretences as if it were a shameful deed. When they enter a church, they put on an air of distraction, as if they had merely accompanied some friends to the place, while their hearts remained elsewhere. Is that courage? Is it a nobleness of heart worthy of such persons? Follow them into the saloon, hear their conversation, and learn their vileness. If they are in the presence of some one who is loud in his blasphemies, or who is sneering and incredulous in his talk, they are anxious to show that they have no scruples, and volunteer to converse in the same manner. They vie with him in their insolence to the Sovereign Pontiff, and their sneers at religion, and scoffs at miracles, and disparagement of confession, and gibes at indulgences, and derision of absolution. The fear of being suspected of fanaticism, or of being thought religious, makes them commit impieties, and deny Jesus Christ before men. Anxious to prove themselves unprejudiced, they show that they are under the tyranny of the grossest prejudices of the day; and having nothing whereon to value themselves, they seek to gain credit by affecting audacity against God. The fear of appearing timid to men leads them to commit the most dastardly acts towards God. The world imposes on them any yoke it likes, and they stoop to take it. They think merely as others tell them to think, and speak as others wish them to speak. They sacrifice their well-being, their eternal peace, their very soul itself, to some wicked man, who, in his turn, sacrifices his to a man more wicked, but more energetic than himself. To the fear of man they scruple not to offer

up the external practices of their Faith, the honour of Jesus Christ, and the eternal life of their souls. The saints call such persons traitors, and apostates; because, as Judas sold his Master for thirty pieces of silver, so they deny Him merely to escape a sneer, or to gain an infidel's good word.

But charity demands a little toleration! What do you mean by charity? Charity means a well wishing to others. If you believe the Catholic Faith, you believe your religion to be the greatest good for every man. If you are charitable, you must be anxious that others also should accept it. If indifference to religion is a great evil, you must desire to form clear and strong convictions of the truth in other men, and you must resist every endeavour to confuse or weaken the true Faith. Charity demands the disproof of error, and the destruction of fallacies. Would you not warn a blind man whom you see approaching a precipice? Such an act would be an act of mere charity; it would not be called intolerance, even though the blind man were to be obstinate in the belief that he was on the right road. If you hold your peace when a person speaks in your presence against the Church or the Faith, you would not be charitable; you would not be tolerant; you would merely evince a cowardly meanness, and be guilty of a species of apostacy. We should honour God with all our hearts. But if you sit quietly by when you hear His Faith denied, where is His honour? We are bound to love our neighbours as ourselves. But if we let him advance towards his destruction without warning him by our protest,

where is our love? Let those who preach toleration, first learn to tolerate your protest; let them practise what they preach before you consent to hear them. Let those who speak of charity learn to practise it towards you, when you from duty defend your Faith.

The false maxims which we have been considering are the basis of a practical principle—*religious indifferentism.* This indifference as to religions is the bane of modern society. It generally springs from a desire to appear superior to others—from straining to seem a philosopher, or one who is above the vulgar prejudices of the many. What is indifference to religion? Religion consists in a number of observances and affections, as well as a series of truths about God and man, about the present and the future life, and about the truly good—truths revealed to us by God Himself. Indifference to religion means, therefore, a contempt of those truths, which are, nevertheless, of the highest importance to us. Could anything be more absurd and stupid than this? He who can be indifferent about such matters can never have asked himself whether he has an immortal soul, or whether he is as the beasts that perish. He must disbelieve that there is a God Whose Providence is over all things, a God "that judges the earth." How can such a man aspire to the character of a philosopher? How can he imagine that he is a lover of wisdom and superior to other men? Such a man has not even common sense. For as no man who is indifferent, even to his earthly interests, can be said to have common sense; still less can he be said to

have common sense who is careless about his paramount interests and his eternal welfare. No man who disregards a petty advantage, which affects only a few months of his life, enjoys a character for intelligence; how much less is he intelligent, who is careless of that which will shape, for weal or woe, his existence for ever! What would be said of a father, who has no thought to provide his family with food for the morrow? What of a general who is indifferent to the safety of his army? or a captain who is reckless of the position of his ship? How much more stupid is he who is indifferent as to religion, which is a promise of good things in this life and of eternal life hereafter!

Nay, it is worse than this. For if God has made us, and society also, and if His providence is over all things, how shall we style an indifference to the truths concerning ourselves and society, and concerning the laws of God's providence, which He has taught us; and an indifference as to the character of the acts which He demands of us? What would you think of your wife, if she told you she was indifferent as to whether she continued to live with you or with some other man? What would be your feelings towards a daughter who cared not to remain in your house? or a soldier who was indifferent as to whether he obeyed his own general or the enemy's leader? The love of the husband, the paternal care of the father, the authority of the general, utterly set at naught! What shall we then say if you set at nought the love, the paternal care, the authority of God? Indifferentism means that you entertain the same feelings and preserve the same state of mind towards the

Church of Christ and the synagogue of Satan. It is apostacy from Jesus Christ. It is what the prophets called adultery, or "having many lovers." Indifferent as to which religion we take! Indifferent whether we have any religion! This is practical atheism. For if you regard every religion as equally true and good, you must deny that there ever was a revelation made by God to man. You must deny that there is any religion which is divine. It follows that you cannot feel fervour in practising any religion. Nay, you cannot practise any religion. For indifference is a monster, who lives upon the earth as if there were no God in earth and heaven. A gentleman once vaunted himself at a party, that there was no one else in the house who disbelieved in God. "You are wrong; there are others also in the same case as you!" said the host. "Who are they?" "My dogs and cats, and other beasts, have the same misfortune as you in not knowing God; but they have the good sense not to boast of it; the only beings who know God and yet do not honour Him, are the wretches in hell."

God does not require external worship; He cares only for the heart; the forms of worship are not essential. Are you sure that this is true? I, on the contrary, am certain that is it not true. You cannot give Him your heart, except by means of rites and ceremonies. A man's feelings must be evinced by external acts; and external acts raise his feelings. Man is body and soul. A body alone would be a corpse; a soul alone would be a disembodied spirit. Every man is body

and soul. His operations must, therefore, spring from this union. That is the reason why his heart cannot be full of any feeling without its becoming apparent through the body.

Even if a man could exercise all his religion by the heart alone, the body taking no part in it, would this be lawful? No; worship is a duty which does not belong to the individual alone, but to the whole society also; all in common must take part in it. When your sovereign visits your native town, is it thought sufficient if each one entertains a feeling of reverence in his heart? No; there are public acts and public festivals, whereby the reverence of the whole community or social body is testified. For the king is not the sovereign of each man, but the sovereign of the whole society. So God, although He is Creator and Lord of each individual, is the Creator and Lord of every society also. He has, therefore, a right to recognition and worship, not only from individuals, but also from societies. But how can societies worship in common, except by external forms?

All religion must certainly come from the heart; but *religion of the heart* is a cant term to signify a worship denuded of all external forms. Ask any one who speaks of a religion of the heart, whether he has ever really practised it. Did he ever, and does he every day, withdraw into his chamber alone, saying to himself that he is in the presence of God, and adoring God as he would if he saw God before him? Does he then, as in the presence of God, enter into the most secret and hidden places of his own heart,

humbling himself, and asking pardon for all his hidden sins of thought, and word, and deed? Does he raise his feelings fervently to God, allowing perhaps sincere ejaculations to escape from his lips? Does he make firm resolutions, which shall regulate his future conduct? Does he offer, in homage, his whole heart to God, which, we are told, is the only incense which He desires? Is that the daily practice of any one who urges a religion of the heart? Is it not rather the daily practice of those who adhere to the ancient forms?

A *religion of the heart*, without any externals or forms, is an impossibility. Every one knows this who has tried it. The term is merely a war-cry, and a first step towards getting rid of religion altogether. Every one, in every age, has had some forms of religion. Or if there have been a few who, by practice, have come to discard them, they were regarded as atheists by all their fellows. A *religion of the heart* is an individual religion. If it were to become general there would be no religion in the society; society would have become atheistical. Nay, more, the individuals themselves would have become atheistical; for every one who has a religion must have one of the species of religion; and the species are distinguished from each other by their forms.

But what can God want with our external acts of religion? Of what advantage can they be to Him? They are not necessary to Him, nor even of use to Him. Yet, from this admission it does not follow that you are released from rendering those external acts. They are of great use to you; they are neces-

sary for you. Your virtues, your good deeds are of no advantage to God. Are you, therefore, not bound to render them to God? Are you to be full of vice and wickedness?

We are entirely dependent on God for everything; at every turn we have to trust in His providence. If He did not preserve us, defend us, keep us in existence every moment of our lives, we should be utterly lost, and come to nothing. He has also given us a law, which we are continually breaking. Do we not, then, require His pardon, continually? Do we not require His help to amend? Do we not desire to evince to Him and to others the depth of our gratitude?

Even if we could live without acts of adoration, acts of contrition, acts of gratitude, acts of faith and acts of love, yet God has a right to them, and chooses to demand them of us. Who shall refuse to yield them? Your children's morning and evening acts of respect and salutation may be of no use to you, yet what parent would allow his son to omit all signs of recognition and honour? It would even cause your son to vilipend and despise you. At the time of the French Revolution the soldiers' salute was abolished. Soon all respect and all discipline were gone, and the salute had to be restored with more strictness than before. The reverence of subjects, and the ancient forms of homage may be of no use to the sovereign. Yet what sovereign would dispense with them? He might as well abdicate his throne. This is much more true in regard to God. For the sovereign is not the end of the subject's life; but God is the

end of every man. If, then, the forms of homage must be preserved between children and parent, between soldier and officer, between subjects and sovereign, much more must they be maintained by men towards God.

Even if God chose to say that He does not want our worship, yet we must render it. If He were to forbid the sun to illuminate the day, or the fire to burn, or the wind to blow, He would be telling them that their nature must cease; He would be commanding them to come to nothing. So if He were to tell us not to render worship to Him, He would be commanding us to void ourselves of our very nature. For He made our intellect to know Him, and our heart to love Him—just as He made the bird to fly, and the tree to bud and grow. The intellect cannot rest from knowing, nor the heart from loving, until they rest in Him—"Fecisti nos, Domine, ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te."[3] To cut them off from this end and satisfaction, would be to cut them off from their existence—it would be eternal death. A little human kindness moves us to love. Shall the goodness of God not move us at all? A penny puzzle incites us to see and understand it. Shall the incomprehensible attributes of God leave our minds inert?

If God does not care for our worship, why did He come on earth in order to establish it? Why did He send out Apostles to teach us observances and laws? Clearly He does care to see us practise those observances, as much as He desires to see

[3] Note 7.

us fulfil His laws. There is no way out of this except by denying that He came on earth, by getting rid of the Incarnation; nay, by setting aside all revelation; in other words, by becoming atheists. To this the vaunted *religion of the heart* must come.

A certain set of persons are loud in supporting *the law*, and say of religion—*It is enough to obey the law, not to rob, not to murder, and to be beneficent!* If that which we have just been considering is called *the religion of the heart*, this may be nicknamed *the religion of legality*. What do you mean by saying that it is enough to obey the law? Do you mean that obedience to the law excuses you from religion? A lawful life is a very good, nay, a necessary thing; but it is not enough to constitute a good man; it cannot take the place of a religious life. Goodness of life consists in (1) piety (towards God); and, springing out of this, (2) justice (towards men); and (3) sobriety (in regard to oneself); duty to God, duty to one's neighbour, and duty to oneself. You are content with the record of these, and are satisfied with quoting the dictum of Cicero, so often enforced by Mirabeau, Proudhon, and others, that *Justice is the foundation of States*. All that you say of justice is very good, provided that you do not limit justice to not robbing, and not committing murder. It is very necessary that you should be just in your dealings with others. But are you also temperate in your desires? Are you self-restraining? Do you "keep your body under," as St. Paul advises? Perhaps some of those

who rest on law and justice are also temperate. Still you lack something; you are not good men unless you evince piety towards God. I have shown that religion is a sacred duty. Can he be called a good man who omits it? Can he be called a good man who despises God's promises, disregards His threats, makes light of some of His commands, and neglects the observances which He taught? No one can be a good man who has not the foundation of all goodness—piety towards God.

Let us look a little closer, and see whether your life is as lawful as you pretend. Perhaps you never rob, nor murder; for you and your followers rest so much upon this. But do you not break the law in other points? Perhaps you are not scrupulous about violating the law which enjoins you to keep the Sunday holy? Perhaps you covet? Perhaps you do not respect truth? Let me further ask you —What virtues do you exhibit? You seem to know only one—beneficence. Where, then, are all the theological, the cardinal, the moral virtues? If your lawful life consists only of not robbing, not murdering, and being beneficent, you cannot aver that it is sufficient to lead a lawful life. Would you permit, perhaps, all the vanities of life, all the modes in which this present world is idolized? Do you indulge in theatres, in balls, in dress, in amusements and excitements of all kinds? Perhaps, even, you give way to various excesses, say, in eating, in drinking, or even in carnal and sensual pleasures? Do you also join in secret societies, and so take part in conspiracies, by becoming cognizant of them,

or by playing an active *rôle* in them? Laying siege to the wives of others, and prostituting your own, does not, perhaps, contravene your modicum of law—for that is neither robbery nor murder? When you do not go so far as this, yet foul thoughts and gross conversation may find a place in your daily life? Perhaps you spend your time in some lazy and indecent manner? Your law seems to allow you just those pleasures, and just that amount of warmth and of indolence which is the happiness of animals. If such be your life, how will a spice of beneficence season it? Beneficence does not impose upon you the obligation to repress yourself, to combat your inclinations, to deny yourself, and take up your cross by laying unpleasant tasks upon yourself daily. Unless you practise these things, your beneficence will not become a heroic virtue, it will remain a mild philanthropy. Nay, that beneficence itself may soon begin to decay and corrupt; it may admit of fierce denunciations against others; of suspicions; of harsh and unjust judgments of those who do not work with you; of "speaking evil of dignities;" of accusations of treason and other vile crimes which, if true, should be brought before a court of law. Without more than this, neither law nor beneficence will serve you.

There is another important point for the consideration of Catholics. Without God's grace it is impossible to continue in well-doing. This is especially true of those who are placed in the midst of the temptations of the world. "Without Me ye can do nothing." St. Paul tells us that "if justifi-

cation could have come by the law (or by nature), then did Christ die in vain." God's grace is, therefore, absolutely necessary for you if you would compass justice, *i.e.*, be justified. But prayer and the sacraments are means of obtaining grace. To absent yourself from these, is like going into battle without arms or ammunition. If your religion consists only of not robbing, and not murdering, and being beneficent, you are endeavouring, without assistance, to overcome obstacles which are above your powers. In other words, the men of legal lives, those who look merely for "law" and "justice," fall into many sins which, perhaps, they are not able completely to conceal. The Catholic, on the contrary, knows that to be a good man means much more than this; it means more, even, than refraining from all evil; it means that you must do good solely for the love of God, and for the love of other men which flows from it. The love of God and of men involves respect and obedience to superiors; being gentle and kind towards inferiors; hiding the faults of others; assisting others when they need assistance; not returning evil for evil, but bearing patiently the injuries which are done to us; and, above all, accepting without murmuring the will of God in all things. Do such virtues appear to flourish in those who say, *My religion consists in justice; it is enough to act according to law?*

This fallacy is often expressed in another and more insidious form—*He is one of the best and most virtuous of men; he only wants a little religion!* As if, without religion, he could be *one of the best and*

most virtuous of men! Has God fallen so low in your estimation that you consider it no fault in a man when he casts God aside and has no religion? Is it nothing to disregard the rights of God, and neglect His precepts? What would you think of me if I said—"He is one of the best and most virtuous of men, only he sometimes drops poison into his neighbour's plate"? or, "He is one of the best and most virtuous of men, only he is very apt to come up to you, while in a rage with some one else, and strike you in the face"? What would you think if I were to say of a lady—"She is one of the best and most virtuous of women, only she is not faithful to her husband, and has indeed a multitude of lovers"? Any one who spoke thus you would regard as either a fool or a knave. Yet it is far worse to be wanting in our duties to God than to disregard our duties towards man; it is far worse to be unfaithful to God, than perfidious to man.

An honest man never changes his religion. Some false maxims are like fashions in dress; they go the round of the world. This is one of them. It has been uttered by Catholics as well as Protestants. Yet it is a grave error. Is every one who changes his religion a dishonest man? Why, then, do you send missionaries to China? to make men dishonest? Do you wish Buddhists to remain Buddhists, and Mohommedans to continue to be Mahommedans? if not, you wish them to be dishonest, unless that maxim be false. Shall Jews blaspheme Jesus Christ under pain of becoming dishonest? Perhaps the only

honest men are some African tribes, who eat the missionaries that are sent to them. If that maxim be true, you will have to conclude (*horresco referens*) that Jesus Christ, in sending out His Apostles to the four quarters of the globe, to "teach all nations," was making the world dishonest. Why did not the Apostles answer—"It is useless, O Lord, to preach to honest men, for they never change their religion; and if we preach successfully to others, we shall only make them proclaim their dishonesty, and all men will know that none except dishonest men become Christians." Moreover, our Lord Himself was brought up a Jew, and yet taught the Christian religion before He ascended to heaven.

The intellect of man was made to seize the truth and reject error; just as his heart was made to cleave to the good and turn from what is bad. But the true religion not only teaches us truth regarding God and man, but points out to us, in all things, what is truly good, and what has merely a false appearance of goodness. Whenever God, therefore, shows us the truth, we must embrace it, discarding any false notions which we may before have held.

An honest man never changes his religion, provided it is one of the Christian religions! This limitation does not cut out of the maxim the falsehood and absurdity which is contained in it. Nor can any one suppose that it does so; unless he holds that no religion is true, but that all religions, which are called Christian, have in them some truth mixed with much surrounding error. As both contradictories cannot be true, it follows either that one religion only is true,

and the others false in all points wherein they differ from it; or else that every religion is partly false. In other words—No more than one religion can be the true religion; and therefore we must say either that one is the true religion, and all the others false religions; or else that there is no true religion. But to deny that there is a true religion, is to deny our Lord's revelation to man. For the Church, which has the deposit of the Faith committed to it, must have the true religion.

There is one case only in which the maxim is true: when it refers to the true religion, which has, in its favour, such clear and numerous arguments, testimonies, and authorities, that every man who rejects it must be aware that he is acting against reason, with some dishonest aim in view. We may say—No Catholic who changes his religion can be honest; just as we may say—No man who removes from the rock, to build upon the sand, can be sane. For the Church of Christ is the only one that is built upon the Rock; all the others are built upon the shifting sands of men's opinions. Built on men's opinions! Freedom of conscience; the right of private judgment! that is why they are called heretics, said St. Jerome, a word which comes from the Greek of "to choose," because they choose for themselves what they will believe. Built upon the Rock! That is the reason why the Catholic Church is the only one which has stood until this day, although every throne and every power of the earth has been arrayed against Her, although "the floods came and beat upon that house." Every ancient throne, every ancient dynasty, has passed

away. Every existing dynasty has but lately come upon the stage, and is already decaying. But the Catholic Church remains as she was of old. Her long succession of Pontiffs has been unmoved, when all men have been changing around them. The Catholic Church remains; while other Churches have been born, and fluttered awhile in the sunshine, and died in the evening, like "flies of the latter spring." The more a pretended Church differs from the Catholic Church, the shorter is its life. Pretence Churches they are, and no more; for they have no tradition that goes back to Jesus Christ, they have no miracles to confirm their teaching, they have no saints to shed a lustre on their name, they have no unity either of belief or of jurisdiction, no hierarchy, and no infallible authority. They cannot say "they are led unto all truth." They differ the one from the other, and no one of them is the same from year to year; for the faith of this year is changed the next. Moreover, they are spoken well of by the world—"Woe unto you when men shall speak well of you"—while the Catholic Church is hated, maligned, covered with obloquy and false accusations. They receive the good things of the world; the Catholic Church is persecuted. Converts to them are courted; converts to the Catholic Church meet with scoffs, derision, and contempt. Their congregations may live in secret sins, and be "religious" on Sundays; the members of the Catholic Church have to confess their secret sins; they must lay their consciences bare, and do penances as a satisfaction. He who joins any of the Protestant sects may be a thorough hypocrite and utterly immoral.

Religion is certainly good for the people, and for women who like religious emotions! The false axioms with regard to religion cannot all be exploded; for, as soon as some are refuted others are invented. One thing they all have in common: they are prompted by an implacable hatred against religion. *Religion is good for the people!* How so? *Because it restrains them from excesses, and preserves a certain public morality and decorum!* Do you mean, then, that religion is good for every one (if so there is no further dispute); or good for "the masses" only? *The latter.* Then, as you say that religion is good for them alone, because of their excesses, and immorality, and want of decorum, you set yourself apart from "the masses," and put yourself above them, pluming yourself on your genius, or culture, or philosophy, or condition in life. By uttering the above maxim, you say in fact—"Stand off, for I am better than thou!" Tell me, then, for God's sake, whether you regard religion as something true, or as a mere fiction? Is there any duty to recognize God, to obey Him, to reverence Him, and to honour Him, by acts of worship and submission? or is there no such duty? If there is no such duty, it must be either because there is no God to honour; or because, if there be one, He sees us not, nor cares what we do. Which of these fearful alternatives can claim your assent and support? If, on the other hand, there is such a duty, then it clearly must be binding on all men. Or, if there is any difference between men in this respect, it must follow that those to whom God has given more intelligence, more genius, more industry, more learning,

more culture, or greater advantages of position, must owe this duty in a greater degree than those whom you are pleased to lump together as "the masses." If you do not render this duty, your impiety is far greater than the impiety of lower persons, when they are lax in fulfilling their duties. Your malice is greater, in proportion as your knowledge is greater. Do you think, then, that God will pass over your iniquity, while He condemns them? No; you cannot plead the excuse of ignorance. But you say that there is no such duty for any man. You assert that the duties of religion bind no one. It matters little whether you ground this upon the assertion that "there is no God," or upon the proposition that "all action of God on mankind and on the world is to be denied"—*negandа est omnis Dei actio in homines et mundum.* On either ground it follows that all religion is folly. But if religion is an invention of men, a fiction, a piece of folly, in what way, I ask, can it be good for the people? Is it because "the people" have no right to truth, and are better without knowing what is true? Should they, like children, be amused with fables? If this be your principle, then why do you educate them at all? Why do you let them know what is going on in the world? Why do you not confine their attention to fairy tales, Robinson Crusoe, and Jack the Giant Killer? Keep them in ignorance! you say. Bind them in a despot's chains! O people of all countries! Learn to know what these irreligious politicians would do for you! O glorious nineteenth century! In all the former centuries men had heads on their shoulders, and hearts

in their breasts, and gave themselves up to acts of worship. But you, nineteenth century, as a resplendent sun dispelling darkness, you have shown us that the centuries have been in error, and that religion is a fiction! All hail then to thee, nineteenth century, with thy newspapers, telegrams, strikes, revolutions, International, and petroleum! These things, without a God, are such supreme happiness!

Yet the centuries have something to say for themselves. They have left us grand cathedrals, and other great monuments of energy and genius; noble pictures and other works of art; and a multitude of learned tomes, which the nineteenth century has not equalled, and cannot even understand. That fiction, the Christian religion! What a stupendous system to invent! what a glorious achievement, for the centuries, was the framing of that fiction! Why cannot the nineteenth century produce a divine intellect to invent such another fiction! And those vast volumes of irrefragable proofs of it, and irrefutable arguments in its favour! what dialectical talent was there evinced, what research, what patience! Can you, nineteenth century, produce works or men to equal these? That religion was, you say, a fiction, a human invention; and those logical works were written to persuade men that the fiction was a reality! Who was He, then, Who held all those logicians in His hands, and bound them to His car, and made them devote their time, their energies, their very life's blood to the defence of that fiction? Can you, nineteenth century, produce such an one? If religion is such a splendid fiction, surpassing any novel that ever was

written, any poem that ever was composed, any web of philosophy that ever was woven, it must truly be *good for the people:* aye, and for the learned man also; for, such a stupendous monument of genius, learning, and talent, was never seen; such an example of patience and perseverance cannot now be produced.

Religion is good for the people! Yes, very good. But why? Because the people is composed of men —creatures of God, who are destined for heaven.

Religion is good for the people! because the people's passions have to be conquered; and they will never conquer them until they are swayed by the motives supplied by religion.

Religion is good for the people; because they have to suffer much, and to bear the hardships inseparable from their condition in life. By the hopes of a future life they must be consoled for the rubs of the present; and thoughts of heaven must help them to forget the earth. But let other men know that, on the same grounds, religion is good for them also. They have the same end as other men have, and all men must attain that end by the very same means. There are, moreover, other reasons which make religion more necessary for persons in a higher range of society, than for persons in a low condition of life. The vanity, which arises from a high position and culture, must be moderated; the pride, which flourishes more in castles than in cottages, must be reduced; the avarice, which is fed by being surrounded with a multiplicity and accumulation of pleasant things, must be repressed; the concupiscence, which is excited by luxury and idleness, must be checked.

For all these ends religion is necessary. Therefore, religion is good for all persons in the higher grades of society. As for the lower, it is a matter of congratulation to us that a Liberal statesman and philosopher should have discovered that religion is good for them. The next step is to see the necessity of it for every one.

Religion is good for women, who want religious emotions. As I said above, if religion is true, it is good for all. If it is a duty, it is binding on all. If it is not true, nor a duty, it has no more to say to women than to men; for fiction and deception are good for no one. But why do you say that religion is good for women? *Because they have tender hearts, which must be gratified by tender emotions.* You mean, then, that, being a man, you have a heart which is not tender, and which can feel no emotion—no emotion, at least, towards our Lord? Do you pride yourself upon this? Do you regard yourself as superior in this to women? I praise you not.

It is true that women find religion necessary, not only for the reasons common to both sexes—that they have being, and life, and intelligence; but also for reasons of special application to themselves. They are spiritually weaker than men, and therefore have a stronger craving for divine support and comfort. Their hearts and affections are also more fresh and less corrupted. There is yet another reason: woman has, by nature, the office of raising the next generation, and of dropping into their innocent young hearts the first seeds of virtue and religion. In order to enable her to fulfil this function, God has given her

a more tender heart and warmer affections than He has awarded to man. This very tenderness and warmth of affection is directed towards God, and shows itself in her worship. That is why we view with more horror an impious woman than an impious man. To see a dog bite will excite no surprise nor horror; but to see a sheep do the same will cause horror, because it is so contrary to the nature of a sheep. By our horror at seeing an impious woman, we testify that religion is in accordance with the nature of women, and good for women.

Is it not also good for men? As the affections prevail in women, so the discourse of reason is stronger in men. If women are drawn to religion by the affections, men should be brought to religion by conviction. Moreover, as man rules the woman, it is more necessary that there should be something to rule, to restrain, and to bind him. That something is called *religion*, from its power to bind.

Woman, again, is weaker, more modest, more timid, more prudent, and more restrained than man. Man has, therefore, more want of religious motives to hold him back from shamelessly rushing headlong where his passions impel him.

Moreover, man rules his family. If, then, the mother is to implant the first seeds of virtue and godliness; the father must aid, but not thwart, her in this work. Every ruler also requires special assistance from God to enable him to govern. He requires light and wisdom to fulfil his office of rule. Every one will acknowledge this. That this light and wisdom must come from God, every one must allow,

who rejects the notion that all things happen fortuitously, and who holds that God rules the world, and that nothing falls out by chance.

But even the true religion, however good in a man's own house, should not interfere with the external affairs of society; it should occupy itself with heaven alone, and not mix itself with the affairs of earth. Certainly, religion should not command armies, nor frame statutes of the realm, nor regulate the exchange, nor manage banks. But to understand this axiom we must call to mind what religion is. It is the sum of all our duties to God; it consists not only of prayer, and sacrifice, and the sacraments, and pious practices; but also of justice, and honesty, and temperance, and the other virtues. How, then, can we say that religion should not mix itself in human affairs? Can society be carried on without justice, and honesty, and faithfulness, and temperance, and the like?

Well, but in considering political matters, such as advantages to one's own country, and its relations with other countries, surely religion has no place? Good God! Is not society, as much as every individual, obliged to maintain justice, and to honour God by evincing virtue in its acts? Are murder, and robbery, and fraud, and impiety not crimes unless when they are committed by single persons, and in small affairs? Do they change their nature, when they are committed on a grand scale by a nation? No, their nature remains the same, even when the acts are multiplied a thousand times. Religion, therefore,

must enter into diplomacy, and preside over international relations.

The same argument may be applied to the internal administration of the country, and to the measures of legislation which are proposed or promulgated by a government. These measures and this administration touch existing rights. It is, therefore, possible, by means of them, to violate those rights. In other words, it is possible, in legislating and in administrating, to do wrong, to commit fraud, to perpetrate a robbery, to inflict oppression, to promote falsehood, or to "make and believe a lie." Here also religion is wanted, with its motives for preserving justice, honesty, and faithfulness. If religion does not step in here, robbery may cease to be called robbery, and be generally practised under a milder name. The same impunity may be accorded to other crimes. The names of crimes, and our notions concerning them, may become changed, and so we may deceive ourselves as to our character, while we practise the crimes. It is the true religion and the Church which do not change, and which persist in calling crimes by their proper names, and in exploding the maxims of the day, which are invented to excuse wrong-doing. Therefore, above all, religion should preside over legislation. All laws must be commensurate with God's eternal law, without which they have no force or validity as laws. It was for this that every great legislator of antiquity pretended to a divine assistance and sanction in framing and promulgating his code. Whoever imagines that he can make laws

without regard to religion, is more a tyrant than a legislator; for he would never refuse the additional sanction for his laws unless he knew that his laws were in contradiction to religion. Every ruler, who desires to act uprightly and justly, is glad of the light and guidance which religion can afford.

Must not religion, also, enter the shop, the bank, the place of business? Is there no room for fraud, dishonesty, unfaithfulness, falsehood, and injustice? If so, then the motives to virtuous conduct, which are urged by religion, are necessary also there. Even in the army, religion is necessary; not only because an army without religious motives would be mere brute force, but also in order to enable it to fight to the best advantage. In the Old Testament we read that when the Jews departed from God, they were beaten by their enemies; while even a few, who looked up to the overruling providence of God, could always put many thousands of enemies to flight. During the Franco-Prussian war, I saw a letter, written from Orleans, or from Le Mans, by the colonel of a French regiment, who described himself as having, all his life, been *un Voltairien*. He nevertheless said that he had just been to the Bishop to ask for a chaplain (*aumonier*) for his regiment, as (he said) he had found out the reason why De Charette's men fought so much more bravely than all the rest of the French army.

Religion has not to command armies, to legislate, to buy and to sell. Yet religion must be the soul of all these proceedings, and of all the other acts of public and private life. Dangerous "questions"

will otherwise crop up, and refuse to be solved; and evils will show themselves when too late to be repressed. For, when a generation has been brought up without religion, you must wait until "the third or fourth generation," patiently educating each, and acting upon each, before you can effectively change the nation and make it become a religious nation.

The position, for which we have been arguing, follows directly from the fact that Christ, the Author of the Church, is the Ruler of the world, ordering all that is done therein, and punishing men and nations who act against His eternal laws. For it is by religion alone that men can learn how a State may be ruled so that it shall flourish, and how men and nations may escape serious reverses, and perhaps final destruction. If religion is not to enter into the management of public affairs, it follows either that every public man must begin his career by divesting himself of his conscience; or else that he must obtain two consciences, one for his public conduct, and another for his private life. How otherwise can a minister rob a whole province (*e.g.* Hanover), without also being ready to pick a man's pocket, or cheat him at cards? How could a minister bring about or carry on an unjust war, without being as willing to poison his friend? How could a statesman argue all night against religious education, or defend the spoilation of the Church, unless he despises the notion of going to church, and scoffs at Holy Communion? It is by setting up two codes of morality, the one public and the

other private, by pretending to have two consciences, by being no longer simple-minded and with a "single eye," but "a double-minded man," that these things can be done. The lives of such men are plainly seen to consist in trying to serve God, without giving umbrage to the devil; in attempting to gain applause from infidels and revolutionists, without driving Christians into extremes; in seeking to satisfy the swelling passions in their own breasts, and yet stifle "the worm that dieth not," and smother "the fire that is not to be quenched." Yet God, unfortunately for them, has said, "He that is not with Me is against Me, and he who gathereth not with Me, scattereth abroad; for no man can serve two masters."

But we must exercise prudence, the juste-milieu; all exaggerated and strong opinions should be carefully avoided; we should accommodate ourselves to others, and be conciliatory; all exclusiveness is bad. This is another half-and-half mode of serving God without offending the devil. I do not deny that you should exercise prudence. Our Lord said, "Be wise as serpents, and harmless as doves." But there is such a thing as carnal or animal prudence. The Church is prudent; she does not proceed at a venture. Neither should you do so. You should state your end to yourself, and keep it always before you, so that it may determine all your actions and all your choice of means. Those, however, who use the above maxim and demand prudence, do so in hypocrisy; for their intention is to kill off some part of the

Faith; by putting the respect of men in the place of reverence for the truth, they sacrifice their honesty through fear or false shame.

But we shall never come to an end if we try to go through all the half-means which have been invented to make a truce with error—not a mere parley, but a capitulation. The Faith is accepted —but only so far as reason endorses it; the supernatural being entirely denied. The mysteries of religion are endured, provided they are not put too much in the foreground. Miracles are received with a shrug of the shoulders—if the demands made upon our belief are not exorbitant. The authority of the Church is acknowledged, provided that it is not exercised. Christ's life is taken as a rule and example, where it does not interfere with our amusements. The teaching of the Sovereign Pontiff is treated with respect, wherever his forms of diction are moderate, or even meaningless. This is the *religion of the juste-milieu.* It is religion denaturalized—religion without the nature of religion. For the principles and precepts of the Church cannot be modified without a concession or partial consent to error. A compromise is the refuge of a weak mind, which cares not for truth. The truths which God has revealed are not half-truths; and the precepts which Christ has left are not to be observed only in part. The principles of a man may vary; God's principles cannot vary. A man's spirit may be fluctuating, lax, and uncertain; but God's Spirit does not depend upon the mutability of men. Every modification, every restriction, every accommodation

of the commands and ordinances of God is, therefore, a perversion and corruption.

If you wish to know the real character of this false *moderation*, look at its origin. It springs from a creeping, crawling vileness of mind. It is found in bastard souls, without force or energy, which sacrifice all that is holy and good and true, to the petty exigences of the moment. It is found alongside of an abject scepticism, and timorous, carping unbelief, which has not the heart to show itself. It is a confusing of good and evil, and a want of will to distinguish them. It is a chaos in brain and heart. The stupid minds of the pretended "moderate" men have been darkened, and their reason has become inert, and their feelings blunted, from the habit of not distinguishing good and evil; so that, instead of forming judgments, they accept the opinions of the first man who has spoken, or the last man who has spoken to them on the subject. Modern "moderation" is the child of vanity and a grovelling servility or abjectness of mind.

To what does this false "moderation" lead? Observation and experience will show that it leads men to every kind of falsehood and abomination. Who are those who inoculate others with the spirit of revolt, and propagate principles subversive of society? Not the fierce demagogues, not those bold and hardened man who say what they intend, and do what they say; not those men who resort to gunpowder and petroleum rather than fail. Such men only excite horror, and turn others away from their revolutionary doctrines. Those who do the most evil

are your quiet and "moderate" men, who preserve temper in all things, and cover themselves with the mantle of "law," and make a pretence of seeking only the benefit of the world. These men allow no sign of hardness to escape them unawares. No act of violence will they commit. Of no want of "prudence" will they be found guilty. They give men no warning of their real character, nor scare persons from unwittingly accepting, as maxims of conduct, the mischievous opinions which they let drop, rather than continue to be guided by the sure landmarks of the Catholic Faith. The Calvinists and Lutherans fail in their attacks on the Catholic Church, because they are open mouthed; while those Liberals, who pretend to be Catholics, work a world of mischief, because their objections and false maxims are dressed in a garb of moderation and prudence. Those Liberals consort with Catholics, and say that their end is the same (but it is not), and that their means only differ, in that theirs are more gradual and gentle. It is the gentleness and stealth of hemlock, or of a poisonous opiate. Evil always enters in disguise. If the devil were to knock at your door, in the guise of evil, you would bolt and bar it fast against him.

When you gaze on the starry heavens, or on a wide and fertile plain of earth, or on forest scenery, or on still and silent mountains, or on rocks and cascades and babbling brooks, or on great clouds, certain feelings arise in your mind; you become rapt in an ecstasy of admiration; psalms of love are unimprisoned in your heart; poetry comes to your lips, and idylls of gratitude

break forth and rise to the sky; this is religion. What need, then, of your fixed, unchangeable, inexorable Faith, which is the dungeon and death of reason, and poetry, and passion? No; I cannot believe, I cannot accept your Faith. I am forbidden to do so by the reason which God has given me. Those natural truths, and that natural religion are all that I can receive!

I cannot believe! Have you ever tried to know what is the Faith of which you speak? Faith, in so far as it is the object of our belief, is a series of truths which God, the Truth, has been pleased to reveal to us. Faith, in so far as it is in us, is the assent of the intellect to those truths, because of the authority of God Who has revealed them. To believe or accept the Faith, therefore, means to give assent to what God has said. I ask you then: What is there, in this mental act which you cannot do? against what part of it does your reason rebel? Does your reason stumble at the facts that God can speak and has spoken to men? Shall He, that has formed the eye, not see? and can He, that has fashioned the ear, not make men hear? Can He, that made the mouth, not utter a voice? To deny this would be folly too great to enter the heart of man. But perhaps you think that it would not be "becoming" in God to speak? What! having formed man, and given him liberty, and freedom of will, and intelligence, and knowledge of many things, and having made him altogether the most perfect work of the creation, would God not watch over man with His providence? Would He not give to man the knowledge of Himself also, and of His will? Would He not warn man of what will

injure and what will do good to him? To deny this would be a paradox. Or do you say that God has not a right to speak to man? This would be worse than a paradox, it would be blasphemy; for He is the cause of all beings, and can impose His will, and no one can appeal against Him to any superior. If such are your objections, it is not reason, but delirium, which stands in your way.

Perhaps you grant this, but defend yourself by saying, *Of course if God has really spoken, I accept all that He has said, for it would be worse than absurd to doubt His veracity; but how can I be certain that it is God Who has spoken?* This certainty would be an act of faith. What, then, is an act of faith? It consists of two parts: one is the act of believing, the other is the act of willing to believe. The former is an act of the intellect, in submitting itself to the authority of God, Who speaks; the latter is an act of the will, in commanding the intellect to submit. Each of these acts has its proper motive; the motive of the act of intellect is the authority of God (authority denotes an efficient cause of belief); the motive of the act of will is to consider the proofs that it is God Who has spoken. To make this clear let us suppose that a plenipotentiary is sent to a rebellious province to offer the pardon of the king. The ambassador is believed merely because he is ambassador; and it is known that he is an ambassador—that is, one sent by the king and uttering the words of the king—because the people determined to examine his credentials, and did examine them. *Precisely* (say you), *but I have not seen the credentials, and therefore do not know that it is*

God's ambassador who has spoken. The credentials or proofs have never been hidden from you; they have been put before you in numbers so great that you may more correctly accuse us of superfluity; they have appeared to you in such clearness and verisimilitude that you cannot gainsay them. "Thy testimonies are become exceedingly credible." Let me, then, ask you whether you have seriously studied them? whether you have anxiously weighed them? whether you have even condescended to glance at them? They involve no less a question than this: Whether God has spoken to you or not—a question which involves your eternal happiness or woe. If you have not looked at these proofs, of what use to name them here? They cannot be unfolded here, space would not permit it. They would occupy many volumes. Consider this, however: Forty centuries looked forward to Christ as God, and foretold what He would do and teach; nineteen centuries have looked back on Christ as God, and have meditated on what He did, and believed what He said. If you do not believe the same, you must invent new canons to warrant you in rejecting the historical testimonies. As for the facts and the institutions which remain to this day, the problem of explaining them away is too stupendous to be satisfactorily solved. What shall we do also with the testimonies of legions of martyrs, and the arguments of thousands of the acutest intellects of the world? You think, perhaps, that all these generations have been deceived, and that you, without previous labour, have unravelled the deception! No, it is not because Faith is contrary to reason, that you have

rejected the Faith (the Faith is not in any point repugnant to reason); your *non possum credere* means *non volo credere*, you *will* not even look at the proofs, you *will* not arrive at the only logical conclusion which can be drawn from them; and that is, because you will not bend to the authority of God.

But I do not want other truths beyond those which my reason teaches me. That is blasphemous. It is not a question as to what you want, but what God requires. If God, of His loving kindness, condescends to reveal truths which your reason cannot reach, are you to say that you do not want them? Likewise, if God chooses to impose on you certain observances, and give you certain precepts, to which your reason would fail to lead you, have you the right to withdraw yourself from them? And, further, if God has chosen that man's only happiness shall be the eternal vision of Him; and that no one shall attain to that vision unless he has been like Christ on earth; and that no one can become like Christ without the free grace of God; and that the means of obtaining His grace are in the Church (that body which He instituted); and that those who have the one Faith are members of that one body—are you wise in saying, *I cannot believe, I do not want any truths except the conclusions of my understanding?* Are you to impose limits on the will of God? Are you to dictate the conditions of His grace? If so, destroy yourself and re-create yourself at once; and preserve yourself for ever, and provide for yourself, and form your own eternal beatitude! Then, and only then, will you be really independent of God.

Let us take another step. I deny that the Faith is in any point opposed to reason. Faith and reason are quite reconcileable, or rather consistent. How should it be otherwise, if from God come both faith and reason? How should it be otherwise, if there is only one truth, of which, whether by faith or by reason, we know "line upon line, here a little and there a little."

Yet you discard Faith, and will know all by reason alone. When you were little, you blindly believed your parents; and thus it was you learned. You grew older, and you believed your masters and teachers, and trusted in them; and thus it was you learned. You came to man's estate, and you gained credit with others; that is, other men believed in you. So do you also believe in other men; you unfortunately and foolishly believe in your *Times* newspaper also. The whole commerce of life is a system of belief and trust (for societies are not, as yet, quite dislocated). But yet you will not believe in God; you refuse to know Him except by your reason! For God's sake begin at the beginning! Why did you believe in your father? *Because he was my father.* Because he was your father! How do you know he was your father? Did your reason teach you that? You may, perchance, be an adopted son, a changeling, or a bastard! If you persist in taking upon trust that you are your father's son, have at least the same faith in God. You learned some history, no doubt, from your masters and tutors. Have you verified all the sources of that history for yourself? Have you drawn your own

conclusions therefrom? You have, perhaps, also learned geography. Did you visit all those countries which you learned about, and see for yourself whether all that which you learned is true? Later in life you may have been taught farming, or medicine, or some manufacturing process. Did you prefer to arrive at that knowledge by long courses of complicated and varied experiments, or did you take it all upon trust? You have not exercised your reason in every-day matters of small moment, and yet you at once apply it to God, and to your temporal and eternal happiness—matters of the highest importance! You are accustomed to put faith in fallible men, as to matters where your reason can guide you; and you will not put faith in God, as to matters which your reason fails to reach! The same argument may be applied to acts and observances. You send for your doctor when you are ill. Do you do what he tells you, and submit to what he advises? Why is it that you do not argue with him? Why do you not inform him you cannot believe him, and that you do not want to hear any medical truths from him, except what your own reason will teach you? You send for your lawyer when an action is pending against you. Why do you not tell him, also, that you despise his counsel, and that you do not want any truths on legal subjects except those to which your reason has brought you? If you were to say this, he would regard you as a fool. By the false maxim which you have urged in objection you have, then, proved yourself a fool. For if it is not contrary to reason to believe in men, why is it contrary

to reason to believe in God? But if it is reasonable to believe in God, it is folly to disbelieve. It is as absurd not to believe, when there is some ground for believing, as it is irrational to believe when there is no valid ground for believing. The former error is called incredulity; the latter, credulity. You believe that there is such a place as America. Why? You have never seen it? You believe it because you have been told so; or you have seen some persons who said they were Americans; or you have seen some products that were said to be American. You believe, in spite of Archbishop Whateley's *Historic Doubts*, that Napoleon I. existed. Yet you never saw him. *No; but I have read of him in history.* If you persist in disbelieving the existence of America and of Napoleon, you would be accounted a fool. It follows, then, that it is contrary to reason to disbelieve some things which you have not seen, and which your unaided reason cannot teach you. Yet what proofs of the existence of Napoleon are there, which equal those of the existence and divinity of Christ? History, tradition, monuments, writings of friends and foes, of learned and unlearned, of civilized and barbarian—all these, and more too, witness against any one who disbelieves in our Lord.

There are two valuable signs of the reasonableness of the Faith: (1) Men of the most powerful minds and greatest names have believed it—the Tertullians, the Augustines, the Cyprians, in Africa held that Faith. What other great Africans were there who did not hold it? The Basils, the

Chrysostoms, the Gregorys, the Origens, and the Theodorets held it? Mention any great Greeks after the Christian era who have not believed it. The Jeromes, the Ambroses, the Leos, the Gregorys, were Latin writers who held it. The Bedes, the Alcuins, the Anselms, the Alberti Magni, the Duns Scoti, were Teutons, and they held the Faith. Therefore the Faith is reasonable, or else error is a property of wisdom.

(2) Who are those who disbelieve? Those who do not use their reason, but allow themselves to be carried away by passion—the proud, the corrupt, the ignorant, the young, the giddy. Look at the character of those newspapers that are written to please unbelievers, and you will see how low and how unreasonable is the character of atheism. Look at the expression of countenance of atheists, and you will find sensual, morose, and depraved traits. Consider the life of any atheist; it is a giddy round of pleasures and excitements, with little leisure devoted to meditation. Weigh their arguments against the Faith, and you will find that they consist of sophisms, a hundred times exploded by the learned; of assertions, concerning the Church, which refute themselves; and of speculations unsupported by argument, such as those of Rénan or of *Ecce homo*. The professed atheists are mostly proud, vainglorious men, who profess atheism in order to attract attention; or else they are dissolute men, who profess not to believe, in order to persuade themselves that no punishment awaits them in another life.

My reason will not allow me to admit the mysteries of the Faith, for they involve contradictions. Faith presents various kinds of truth for our acceptance. There is one class of truths to which human reason can reach unaided; or which, at all events, are seen by the reason alone, after revelation has told us what they are: *e.g.*, the existence and perfections of God, the immortality of the soul, the creation, the eternal principles of justice and morality. There is another order of truths which the human reason can never attain; and which, moreover, even after they have been revealed, the mind cannot understand; but which the intellect must bend itself to believe, in obedience to the Faith: *e.g.*, the Trinity and Unity of God, the Incarnation of the Divine Word, the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, &c. These last truths are called "mysteries." Now, half-and-half believers propose to receive the former class of truths, but reject the latter. To them we reply, in the first place, that Faith and reason each have their own spheres, but that these spheres are not separate. If you say that you will accept nothing except what can be reached by human reason, you reject Faith utterly, although you may assert some truths which the Faith also teaches; for you assert them, not because they are taught by the Faith, but on the ground of reason alone. But if you accept Faith as well as reason, then you must travel also out of the sphere of reason, and accept every truth which Faith teaches (although it cannot be attained by reason), on the sole ground that it is of the Faith.

But my reason will not admit of mysteries. Of course not; for they would not be mysteries if your reason could deal with them. But if you, by faith, admit whatever God has said; if you do so on the sole authority of God, what difference does it make in the ground of your belief, whether it is understood by you or not? You do not accept it on the ground of its being intelligible; you accept it on the authority of God. God's word is equally infallible, whether you understand it or not. He has, moreover, full rights over you, as His creature; and may, if He chooses, require of you the entire sacrifice of your reason. It follows that you cannot say—*God cannot require of me to believe what I cannot see by my reason.* Knowing a thing by your reason, is not belief. To believe is to feel sure of a thing which you cannot see. You have, therefore, to say—"God has said so, and I believe it although I cannot see nor understand it."

It is a falsehood to say that you cannot believe what you do not understand. You believe many things you do not understand. You cannot get on in the world without believing much that you do not understand. Do you mean to tell me that every thing in this world is clear and intelligible to you? You know that there are many mysteries under your very eye. Can you explain the laws of storms? Yet you believe that the wind blows! Can you explain all the phenomena of light and unfold its nature? Yet you do not keep your eyes resolutely closed, refusing to admit the light. Can you say why children of the same parents should

be so different in mind, in stature, in form and feature? Yet you do not deny that they are different. Do you refuse to believe all that you cannot understand in contagion, in epidemics, in the action of medicines, in physiology, in physical sciences? You admit many mysteries, and yet you do not consider your reason to be thereby offended. Le Père Lacordaire puzzled such an one as you are, by asking whether he understood why fire should soften butter and harden an egg; and whether, from not understanding it, he refused to believe it, and therefore never eat fried eggs.

If you embark on the sea, you expect to meet with tides, and currents, and winds, and waves; for these belong to the nature of the sea. If you would consider God, you must likewise expect depth and height and immensity past comprehension, and perfections that are infinite; in other words, you must expect mysteries. For man to comprehend God, he must be equal or superior to God. Any one therefore who assumes that he is to believe nothing but what he comprehends, evinces the pride of the evil spirit who said—"I shall be like unto the Most High."

But further; our nature is framed for the mysterious. It seeks the mysterious, and is delighted with it. Hence the passion of the young for fairy tales, and the delight of older persons in "sensational novels," in magic and sleight of hand, and even in superstitions, and table-turning and spiritualism. If we do not satisfy the spirit with the mysteries of religion, it will seek mysteries in wicked superstitions.

For mystery is necessary to man. His nature has been adapted for mystery.

But religion should accommodate itself to the changes of the times; there must be progress in religion, as in other things; the exigences of modern civilization cannot be disregarded; this is an age of conciliation and concessions, and so the Catholic religion must not be too rigorous, but must adapt itself to modern civilization; then the Catholic Faith will become enormously extended. These fallacies seem too outrageous to mislead any Catholic. Yet, as many books and newspaper articles are written, now-a-days, to urge this modernizing of Catholicism, it may be as well, for a short time, to dwell upon the errors which those maxims involve. First, let me ask: What is the meaning of a true religion? What is the Catholic religion? It is the religion which was revealed by God, Who came on earth to teach men, and to rule men for ever—"of His kingdom there shall be no end;"—it is a religion consisting of truths to be believed and observances to be practised. How, then, can it come into any man's head to change a jot of that religion? Who dares to say that he wishes to alter an institution of God?

Secondly, let me ask: What are the changes which those, who utter such maxims, point to as necessary? Changes in the supreme Authority of the Church, in the obligation of fast and abstinence, in confession, in the indissolubility of marriage, &c. And who is to make such changes in the laws of the Church? The Church herself can do no more than

determine, in detail, the modes in which the laws of the Church are to be satisfied in practice. She cannot repeal one law of God, nor alter an item of the Faith, nor abolish a jot or tittle of the precepts imposed by Christ. God's commands are eternal, and cannot be abrogated. Protestants who make for themselves, or at least choose for themselves, their own religion, by the exercise of their "private judgments," can of course change or alter their religion as much as they please. What man has formed, man can also reform. This license has, at all times, been very amply exercised by Protestants. Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, Knox, or Huss, would be greatly astonished by seeing the present forms of the religions which they severally established. Those, on the other hand, who profess to "hold fast" that which Jesus taught, and to "keep the deposit of Faith once delivered to the saints," can of course not allow any change to be made therein. Change is repugnant to the nature of a true religion.

As the true religion cannot change, "progress" is utterly alien to the Church. She is stationary, firm, and immovable as the rock upon which She is built. She holds, in every part of the world, what She has ever held, and what all Her members hold and held with their bishops. She repudiates all novelty (*quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*). The early Christians were taught by our Lord to yield submission to the Authority of the Church; and the Church always did demand and still demands submission to her Authority, as exercised by the constituted hierarchy. The early Christians

were enjoined to fast and abstain ; and the Church still directs, as She always did direct, that this shall be done. The early Christians were commanded to confess their sins ; and the Church always, to this day, has commanded confessions to be frequently made. The Church, at the earliest ages, taught and still teaches submission to the legitimate authority of rulers. She then denounced, and She still denounces, rebellions, conspiracies, and every kind of crime. As She was then, so is she now, while dynasties have passed away, and nations have waxed and waned.

We do not desire that dogmas, nor whatever is essential to the Church, should be changed ; we seek only a modification in her practices, in order to make them suit the exigences of the times. This sentence contains the most pernicious error which has assailed the Church for three centuries. The open heresy of Luther is not likely to do such harm as this. The blasphemies of atheism are not so contagious as the notion that Christianity should be re-fashioned, and adapted to the changes which have been brought about in the people, and to the variations in the circumstances of the world. This maxim is far more mischievous than heresy, open and allowed ; because its inherent malignity is not apparent. Superficial Christians may be led, by this maxim, to think of their religion as an antique bronze, or a cinque-cento work of art, covered with the rust and crust and dirt of time. They then, of course, feel a desire to scrape off this crust, so that the original metal may again be polished up and made bright and smooth. Or

perhaps some, of an antiquarian ritualistic turn, desire to keep on a little verdigris, over which they smear a coat of brilliant varnish. But all who have accepted this maxim, must look on religion as something against which the gates of hell and the rust of time have prevailed; and their fingers itch to begin polishing, so that they may overcome the pernicious effects of hell, and save the Church of Christ from her premature decrepitude.

In order to see the force of this fallacy, let us remember that religion comprises two sets of truths—natural truths, and supernatural truths. That there is a God; that He is good and holy; that the soul is immortal, &c., are natural truths; they are truths to which the unassisted reason of man may attain, if only it be properly used. But the truths that God is one in Being and yet three Persons; that One of these Persons was incarnate; and so forth, are truths which man's reason can never compass; they must be revealed before we can know them. Likewise in the practical order; there are some moral precepts to which natural reason alone may arrive: *e.g.*, Thou shalt not rob; thou shalt do no murder; thou shalt not covet; thou shalt not tell a falsehood, &c.; for God has told us these by the voice of nature as well as by the word of revelation. There are also some moral precepts to which unassisted human nature cannot reach; such as: Love your enemies; give your life for your neighbour; practise rites and ceremonies and exercises for your sanctification. These latter precepts, Jesus Christ has commanded by a positive and sole act of His will.

Let us also bear in mind that Christianity, while embracing all the natural precepts, yet perfects and raises them, as Jesus Christ explained. Christianity thus exhibits more perfectly, more purely, the holy law of God, than the Decalogue which was given to the Patriarchs and to Moses, and the law as it may be seen by the light of nature. The ancient law certainly commanded acts of love to one's neighbour; yet it permitted in certain cases the *lex talionis* ("an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"). Jesus Christ commanded us to love even our enemies, to do good to them and to benefit them whenever it should be in our power to do so, "in order that we may be like our Father which is in heaven." The ancient law prescribed the honourable use of the good things of the earth; yet it permitted the enjoyment of a superfluity of such things, and even promised a superfluity of good things as the reward of a just life. Jesus Christ enjoined us to give our superfluity to the poor, and taught us to wean our hearts from things of sense, and even to prefer poverty, "in order that we may live lives like Jesus Christ's life," promising us, as a reward of such a life, spiritual benefits instead of temporal advantages. The ancient law conceded, in certain cases, a plurality of wives. The law of Jesus Christ not only forbids more than one wife, but also favours the desire in some men for a life of untouched purity. The ancient law had its rites and ceremonies, which were figures of the coming mysteries, but conferred no righteousness or justice beyond the external or legal justice; they "could not make the comers thereunto perfect."

The new law has sacraments, which justify a man, by communicating to him an interior grace. The ancient law was supported by terrors, rather than by love. The new law leads by love more than it drives by fear. The ancient law said, "Thou shalt not kill." The new law commands us to abstain even from anger. By continuing the comparison of the two laws, we may see how much higher is the Gospel law than the Decalogue—how superior is the law of charity to the law of justice.

Let us again turn to the operations which are being directed against Christianity, by means of false maxims. Various speculative doctrines of Jesus Christ were, formerly, attacked; for the aim then was to annul Christianity in its faith. In our days the attempt is directed against the practical part of Christianity; that is, against the ulterior perfection, which Jesus Christ grafted on to the natural law and Decalogue; and the aim is to bring us back to the state in which men were before the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. The following considerations will explain the mode of attack.

Jesus Christ intended to establish a love of the good things of heaven, on a detachment from the good things of earth. Under pretence of accommodating His religion to the people and to the times, or "harmonizing religion with modern civilization," the fallacies of the day urge that the earth should not be despised in deference to heaven.

Jesus Christ, in order to form a spiritual people, and to repress a love of the world and of carnal pleasures, commanded men to do penances and

fasts, and lead a mode of life which shall avoid the occasions and temptations to carnal pleasures. Under colour of "moderation," the fallacies of the day condemn austerities and penances as "excesses," —and a life, which avoids the occasions to sin, as "rusticity" and as "mediæval;" and, further, modern fallacies favour continuous and subtle panderings to the senses or "the flesh."

Jesus Christ, in order to bring about an entire submission of man's spirit to God, inculcated humility and self-abnegation, and contempt of oneself and disregard of one's own will and fancies. Modern fallacies stigmatize, as "imbecility" and "baseness," all that tends to a humilation of oneself, —and as "fanaticism" all that makes war upon one's self-will.

Jesus Christ, in order to obtain our sanctification, instituted means superior to all human means, viz., supernatural virtues—faith, hope, and charity; and supernatural means, which bring us interior grace—such as prayer and the sacraments. Modern fallacies, denying all that is above nature, and repudiating the sacraments and even prayer, substitute human virtues—as self-assurance, self-respect, self-love, philanthropy, humanity, honesty, satisfaction of the natural desires, &c.

Jesus Christ desired us to depend entirely upon His Church, for putting in practice the means which He had instituted—setting up the Church in His stead, for the teaching and guidance of the faithful. Modern fallacies, ignoring that established Authority, prove that those who utter them proudly imagine

that they suffice for themselves; and so they provide for themselves, without heed to the guidance of the Church.

Jesus Christ, in short, ordered special modes and means for the salvation of those who remain faithful to Him; but modern fallacies altogether set aside those modes and means. By accepting those fallacies men come by degrees to deny the whole of Christianity, and to evince no virtues except those which the Pagans manifested. In other words, men are ceasing to be Christians. For Christianity consists in being moved by Faith, in cherishing the Hope of obtaining the eternal good things of heaven, and in always acting through Love. Christianity consists in submission to the Supreme Pontiff, and to the bishops whom God has appointed to rule His Church. Christianity consists in practising those special virtues which Christ taught by His example and precepts—purity, humility, detachment from things of earth, supernatural love of God and of one's neighbour. Christianity consists in honouring God, not according to man's caprice, but by those means which Jesus Christ determined, by the sacrifice of the Mass, by prayer, by Holy Communion, &c. If these are unnecessary, then Christ's teaching would be in vain. His foundation of the Chuch, with all Her treasures of grace, would be useless, and "the Cross of Christ would be of none effect." For men would bear no fruits which their own nature would of itself not bear. If we dispense with the positive practices of Christianity, then we are in no better position than Pagans. Nature alone is sufficient for

a natural religion. But if Christ has raised us to a supernatural state, in order that we should be followers or imitators of Him, then we must adopt all the means which He has provided for attaining that elevation and that perfection. In other words, it is not religion that must comply with the exigences of the times, but we that must bend to the exigences of religion.

A denial of the supernatural is the foundation of a thousand errors. Yet this is the universal tendency of the day. Some men exclude the supernatural, unwittingly; others do so of set purpose, saying that, *Reason is sufficient to regulate our intellect, and the heart is sufficient to order our affections.* Both kinds of men reduce Christianity to a natural religion. Reason and the heart are not enough, without the supernatural which Jesus Christ has added to them. Remember that God, in creating man, was not content to assign him a natural end; but raised him up to have a supernatural end. He made him "a little lower than the angels." By a natural end is meant such an end as any one may attain to by his natural powers alone. A supernatural end is such that a man cannot attain to it by his natural powers alone, but requires that God should implant in him another principle of action. God, then, in creating man, formed him with regard to an end for which his natural powers are not intended to be sufficient, so that he may constantly find it necessary to obtain the assistance of supernatural means. As God created man for that supernatural end, man must always tend to it, or fall into eternal misery. For

that supernatural end is the only real happiness of which man has been made capable. It is, therefore, folly to say that we will be satisfied with some natural end. For one of two things we must inevitably tend to: either the beatific vision of God, which transforms us into His likeness; or else a privation of God and of all resemblance to Him, which sinks us deeper and deeper into the bottomless pit.

If God were to determine to raise a plant to a reasonable life—a life which is not natural to a plant, but is above the nature of a plant—then He must give the plant new faculties and new organs adapted to that life. So God, in determining to raise man to a supernatural life, must have given us new principles to fit us for it; namely, a quality transfused by God into the soul, and called "sanctifying grace." This was a treasure which mankind lost by the Fall of our first parent, but which every man, before the Crucifixion, could recover by faith and hope in a coming Redeemer; and which every man (who has lived since Christ, by His merits, recovered this grace for us), must obtain by making use of those means that Christ provided as the only means available for reaching our supernatural end. Hence the first thing which is necessary for man is faith in Jesus Christ our Redeemer, through Whose merits the graces and helps necessary for us to attain salvation are conferred upon us. This Faith is given to us in Baptism. Secondly, we must possess sanctifying grace, which also was conferred in Baptism. It was subsequently lost by our sins, but may always be regained by the

Sacrament of Penance. Thirdly, conformity to Jesus Christ is necessary for man. For God has determined that we shall not attain to salvation, except by being like to Jesus Christ, by doing acts like His acts, and by leading a life like His life. Our good acts and our virtues must, therefore, be supernatural; in other words, they must spring from the sanctifying grace infused into us, and must be done from motives which are known only by the light of the Faith. Without the use of these necessary means, the attempt to attain to our end is vain. For there are no other means that are proportioned to that supernatural end; and in all cases the means must be proportioned to the end. A plant which uses no organs but those of vegetation, must remain a plant. If a plant is to rise to a reasonable nature, it must use means which are above the nature of a plant, and in proportion to the reasonable end—it must use reasonable means. For the organs of vegetation have no proportion with the use of speech and thought. So, likewise, the beatitude which we look for, is out of proportion with acts natural to man, and therefore cannot be the effect of natural acts—*qualis causa, talis effectus.* Only by means of God's grace can we do acts which will avail for attaining our supernatural end.

This being so, it is plain that the only means of salvation are: Faith, and grace, and the imitation of Christ, and works done from supernatural motives. How then can any one say that *reason is sufficient?* To deny the necessity of sanctifying grace and of actual grace is the proud heresy of Morgan, *i.e.* Pelagius, and a contradiction of our Lord, Who

said—"Without Me ye can do nothing;" and of St. Paul, who said that even if he did every kind of good work, yet "without charity he was nothing." To deny the necessity of Faith is to contradict the Apostle, who said—"Without Faith it is impossible to please God;" and our Lord, Who said—"He that believeth not shall be damned." The necessity of the imitation of Christ is stated by St. Peter, who said that "Christ went before in order that we may follow in His steps;" and by St. Paul, who tells us that "no one is predestinated whom God did not foreknow would be conformed to the image of His Divine Son." The necessity of putting before us our supernatural end, in every good act we do, is taught by our Lord, Who said that if we have an earthly end in view we "have already our reward," *i.e.*, the end we desire, and therefore we cannot look forward to an exceedingly great reward to come. As to the supernatural life which we are bound to live—all the preaching of Christ, His life, His example, the institution of the Apostles, the foundation of the Church—all teach us that we are called out of darkness to the light; that we must be dead to this world and alive again through grace; that the old man may no longer live in us, but the new Man; that the spirit must triumph over the flesh; that the second Adam has buried the old Adam; and myriads of other passages command us not to regulate our lives by our hearts or reason alone, but by principles of a higher order than our reason, and by affections superior to the natural affections of the heart.

I need not now descend to an exposition of the weakness and insufficiency of the human reason, and to a rehearsal of all the errors into which men have been led by it. I need not enlarge upon the evil, and the subtle deceptions and vain imaginations of man's heart. Every one knows how sentiments and passions have misled those who have yielded to them. Those who are content with their heart and reason, must necessarily think light of the Faith, to which heart and reason are subordinate. It is they who say —*Every religion is good; it is enough to refrain from robbery and murder, and to benefit others; there is no difference between a Protestant, a Deist, and a Catholic; the essence of religion is probity;* and many other such empty sophisms and nebulous fallacies.

Moreover, those who regard their heart and reason as sufficient, must make light of grace; and then, of course, they cannot see the necessity of maintaining themselves in a state of grace, nor the necessity there is that grace should be the new principle of all their acts; nor can they see that it is by grace alone that they can be sons of God and pleasing in His eyes. Such persons are heartily vexed over the loss of a small sum of money; while a sin, by which they have lost the grace of God, concerns them very little. Of course, all the means that are necessary for acquiring and maintaining grace, will be neglected by them—prayer, the sacrifice of the Mass, the sacraments, alms—all fall into disuse, or are regarded with listlessness and indifference; for they say that *reason is sufficient.* Yet no good work is of any avail for salvation unless it is performed in a state

of grace, and also from supernatural motives; and no virtue is of any use, unless it is exercised from supernatural motives; otherwise it is merely a human virtue, not a Christian virtue. Instead of charity, for example, there is only philanthropy. There may be asylums, it is true, and orphanages, and reformatories, and Magdalen retreats, and poor schools! but they will not be pervaded by the spirit of the Gospel; they will do you no good in the way of your salvation, unless they spring from the love of God and a resulting love for man. There is, moreover, a vast *practical* difference in schools and orphanages which spring from philanthropy, and those which come from a love of God. In the one there is secular education, but not in the other. If your so-called "charity," which is mere philanthropy, were to become a love for God, where would be your charity balls, your charity benefits at theatres, your charity bazaars, your poor laws, &c.? Where would be the alms that are given in these days? A sixpence tossed to a beggar, to get rid of his importunities, is not charity; because it is not done for God's sake. Human reason taught the pagans to "love their friends and hate their enemies," as Aristotle said; and our Lord, when speaking of loving those that love us, said, "Do not even the Gentiles the same?" But Jesus Christ taught us to love our enemies, and to do good to those who have injured us, for the love of God Who befriends them. Human reason counselled modesty in merit and in praise; but our Lord led men to true humility, which makes them despise themselves, and even sacrifice themselves for others. Human

reason urged an honourable use of the good things of the earth; and, in some cases, it went so far as to teach men not to care to accumulate wealth beyond what was sufficient; but our Lord showed men that poverty is a more blessed state than wealth, and the origin of many blessings. Human reason hardly knew a limit to the enjoyment of pleasures, except, perhaps, satiety, and the limit of lawfulness; but our Lord told us to deprive ourselves even of lawful pleasures; He said, furthermore, that sorrowing and mourning is more blessed than enjoyment. Reason could not get beyond temperance or moderation; but mortification and penances and austerities were precepts of Christ. Reason endeavoured to persuade men to virtue, for those motives which it knew; to justice for the sake of order; to continence, for the sake of health; to benevolence, for the sake of the satisfaction which it gives; and so forth. But the virtues taught by Christ are not only greater and more numerous; but also the motives to virtue which He urged were far higher, namely, love and imitation of our Heavenly Father, and of Himself. Those who ignore the supernatural, being content with reason, therefore cut off all that which Christ did, and return to the pagan state.

He, moreover, who accepts such an axiom, must ignore the nature and end of the Holy Church. God ordinated all men in an universal society, by means of which He furnished all who chose, with the means necessary to acquire eternal happiness. That Church, although external and visible in Her union and government, is entirely supernatural in

Her internal properties; supernatural in the end She proposes, for She does not direct Her members towards any earthly end; supernatural in the means She uses, which consist of the application to us of Christ's merits and satisfaction, by the sacraments, prayers, indulgences, and sacrifices. She is supernatural in her Head, as he is invested with an immediate authority from Christ, the invisible Head. She is supernatural in Her bonds of union, which are faith and charity. She is supernatural, above all, in Her laws, seeing that they have been sanctioned, either mediately or immediately, by God. She is supernatural in Her hopes, as She promises good things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and which have not entered into the heart of man to conceive. She is supernatural in Herself, because it is the Spirit of God Who forms Her, and Christ Himself Who rules Her and gives Her life. He, then, who ignores the supernatural, must deny the Church; and if he denies the Church, how can he attain to eternal life?

Miracles are impossible. That means that the idea of a miracle involves a contradiction. If a miracle was ever performed, then miracles are possible, and do not involve a contradiction. The denial of miracles is, therefore, a denial of the truth of the Holy Scriptures; a denial of Christ's life; a denial of the proofs, given by God to the world, that the Christian religion was from God. For if these are admitted, then the occurrence of some miracles is admitted, and the possibility of miracles is affirmed.

But a miracle is a violation of the laws fixed by God from eternity; so that if God permits miracles, He alters His decrees, and therefore is changeable, as we are. You admit, then, that God has established the laws of nature? *Yes; and He has established them immutably, from all eternity; therefore He cannot make an exception to them, which a miracle would be.* Stop! I deny the consequence, for "all things are possible with God." Although God is immutable, perhaps those laws, which you are pleased to regard as the laws of nature, may not be immutable laws of nature. You will doubtless allow that God foresaw the future when He was creating all things; and that His providence is not only a ruling at the present moment, but is, as the name denotes, a perfect foreseeing—or rather, as the poet says, "With Him is no Before;" that is, God is not subject to the conditions of time. God, then, may have decreed a law for the sun (for example) according to which it shall rise in the east, and travel its course to the west, daily, except on the day on which He had arranged that Joshua should fight in the valley of Ajalon. What if that were the immutable law for the sun? If a watchmaker constructed a clock, so that the figure of a man should come out on Christmas Day, but on no other day in the year, would you, having watched the clock from the beginning of the year until the middle of December, deny the possibility of the figure's appearing, on the ground that you had concluded, from sufficient observation, that the non-appearance of the figure was the law of the clock? Because you have not seen it appear, you

have no ground for assuming that it cannot appear. It would be very illogical to do so. Fancy constructing a syllogism in support of your conclusion! The major proposition would have to be—"Nothing is possible except what I have seen!" which would be absurd. Thus God may have made laws for nature, causing them to run on in a continuous course for some time, and then altering their course at a specified moment. For, as there is no time with God, as He is above all time, past, present, and future, the so-called exceptions may have been ordinated by Him as part of His eternal laws. They are not really exceptions, nor violations of the law; and no change in God is thereby involved.

But miracles never come to pass in these days. Even if this were true, it would be no proof that miracles have not occurred in former days; it would not show that all the holy men, who bore testimony to miracles, had been guilty of falsehood. Moreover, the assertion that there are no miracles in modern times, is false. In all times there have been miracles in the Catholic Church. The Church has affirmed very many miracles; yet no miracle was ever affirmed by the Church until after ample evidence, and after sifting it with far greater care than is ever done in the trial of a prisoner. A miracle has been authenticated, only when the proof of it was clear and undeniable.

That miracles should be wrought, from time to time, in the Church of Christ, you may gather from the last words which our Lord spoke on earth—"He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but

he that believeth not, shall be condemned. And these signs shall follow them that believe: In My name they shall cast out devils; and they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they shall drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; and they shall lay their hands upon the sick, and they shall recover."

The marvellous thing is, that those who deny miracles believe in mesmerism, and clairvoyance, and table-turning, and spiritualism, and I know not what other marvellously silly things. So true is it that those who are incredulous of the Faith of Christ, are the most credulous persons alive. They will believe almost any nonsense, provided it be not to God's glory.

I have mentioned mesmerism and spiritualism, because a well known lady and gentleman, who associated themselves together to write books, propounded the theory that our Lord's miracles and life were to be explained by mesmerism. A few more words on the same subject may be well, as mesmerism, spiritualism, and the kindred arts, may presently have more political signification than is generally suspected at the present moment. We will, therefore, consider the objection which is so often urged against every condemnation of spiritualism—*I do not see any harm in spiritualism.* You may, perhaps, see no harm in it; or you may deceive yourself into thinking that you see no harm. Others, however, who have a clearer vision than you, may see harm in it. Are you, then, to constitute yourself the supreme judge, without appeal, of good and evil?

If there is harm in it, you should doubtless abstain from it, whether you see the harm or not; because your inability or unwillingness to see the harm, will not prevent the injury from being done. You can hardly venture to assert the proposition—"Whatever a person does not see harm in, that he may freely do."

The things that are done at the *séances* of the spiritualists, are so marvellous, that it is difficult to explain them in any other way than by the direct action of spirits. The professors of those arts, and those persons who frequent the *séances*, openly assert that they do invoke the action of spirits, and therefore call themselves spiritualists. It behoves us, then, to inquire what spirits are invoked and obey the invocation. There are four kinds of spirits which may be supposed to be called up: (1) The good angels, who behold the face of God the Father—most pure and holy spirits, whom God employs in ministering to those who are to inherit eternal life. (2) The bad angels, who have no divine grace, and are condemned to eternal pains, and who employ themselves in tempting men, by every means, to their eternal perdition. (3) The souls of dead persons, who are reigning with Christ in heaven; or those who are being purified in purgatory. (4) The souls of wicked men who are dead, and who have been condemned to the bottomless pit. Which kind of spirit is it, which can be invoked by the professors of spiritualism? God would not allow the good angels, nor yet the spirits of just men, to take part in a proceeding which has been forbidden

by Himself in the Bible, and has been condemned by the Church. "Seeking spirits of divination," and "witchcraft," are, in Scripture, enumerated among the gravest sins; and Saul was rebuked for calling up the spirit of Samuel, God having expressly sent the spirit of Samuel to carry His rebuke. As to the Catholic Church, she holds that effects which are unnatural cannot come from natural causes; but communication with departed spirits does transcend nature, and therefore it comes from some cause out of nature. If it is not this, then spiritualism is not really a communication with spirits, but is a deception. But if there is really a communication with spirits, then the physical modes of procuring it are deceptions; for the real conjurations or evocations cannot be physical. Therefore the Church has condemned table-turning, clairvoyance, spiritualism, &c. She has not decided that it is not a balance of mechanical forces which turns the table; nor that a nervous (physical) power does not produce sleep. She has, however, condemned table-turning, and clairvoyance on the ground that there is, in these proceedings, an intervention of spirits which must therefore be evil spirits. The Sacred Congregation (in the Encyclical of August 4, 1856, directed to all the Bishops of Christendom) said—"Cum ordinentur media physica ad effectus non-naturales, reperitur deceptio omnino illicita et hæreticalis, et scandalum contra honestatem morum." It calls spiritualism and the kindred arts, "Novum genus superstitionis," and says: "Decipiendis ac seducendis hominibus student neoterici plures, rati posse occulta,

remota ac futura detegi magnetismi arte vel præstigio, præsertim ope muliercularum quæ unicè a magnetizatoris nutu pendent." And further, "Hinc somnambulismi et claræ intuitionis, uti vocant præstigiis mulierculæ illæ . . . abreptæ, se invisibilia quæque conspicere effutiunt, ac de ipsa religione sermones instituere, animas mortuorum evocare, responsa accipere, remota ac longinqua detegere, aliaque id genus superstitiosa exercere, ausu temerario præsumunt. . . . Ad tantum nefas et religioni et civili societati infessitissimum efficaciter cohibendum, excitari quam maxime debet pastoralis solicitudo," &c. Necromancy is defined by Dr. Johnson as the art of divining future events by a communication (real or pretended) with dead persons. St. Paul cast an unclean spirit out of a girl "who brought her master much gain by divining." Our Lord Himself and His disciples very frequently cast out unclean spirits. There is a great consensus of testimony, during the middle ages, in favour of the theory of real manifestations of the devil, or demonology, and all the States of Europe legislated for its suppression.[4] The Sovereign Pontiffs frequently denounced such practices; which the Church would not have done if those sorceries had been mere tricks.[5]

But I abjure any dealings with an evil spirit. Your adjuration cannot alter the nature of this or of any other evil act. What is required is obedience, and not adjuration. A compact may be

[4] See the works of Jean Bodin, who lived in the sixteenth century.

[5] Pope Innocent VIII. in 1484, Julius II. in 1504, and Adrian XI. in 1523.

explicit or implicit—expressed or understood. An implicit compact is made, when some means, known to the two parties, are adopted; which means are nevertheless not naturally proportioned to the end. It may be likened to ringing a bell; the sound of a bell is not naturally adequate to bring a servant up into your room; yet it is a conventional means of doing so; and any person, who rings a bell in ignorance, cannot complain if a servant enters his room. Explicit dealings with evil spirits are, of course, wrong. An implicit dealing is innocent only if done in ignorance; but it is as wrong as an explicit dealing, if the result that will follow is known.

Before passing from this subject, let us consider for a moment the descriptions of the last days which have been given to us. We are told[6] that Satan shall be loosed, "and shall go forth and seduce the nations." The seduction of the nations will be so subtle, that, if it were possible, the elect would be drawn into error.[7] Iniquity shall abound, and charity shall grow cold, and there shall be little Faith on earth.[8] Men shall love themselves, and be grasping, proud, blasphemers, disobedient to their parents, without regard for the rights of relationship, without natural affection, and enemies to order and peace.[9] They shall despise all legitimate authority, and speak evil of all ecclesiastical dignitaries.[10] Then shall appear a new kind of impiety, never seen until that time, which shall consist not in embracing a false religion, but in despising all worship; each one

[6] Apoc. xx. 7. [7] St. Matt. xxiv. 24. [8] St. Luke xviii. 8.
[9] 2 Timothy iii. 3. [10] Jude 8.

putting himself above all that is holy and all that is reverenced, and "attendentes spiritibus erroris et doctrinis dæmoniorum"—listening to false spirits, and giving heed to information imparted to them by devils.[11] Thus they shall prepare the way for him whose coming shall be the work of the devil,[12] and who shall work signs and portents and false miracles to seduce men from the Faith. In those days, the only safety will be in the Church upon the Rock, against which the gates of hell cannot prevail.

[11] 1 Timothy iv. 1. [12] 2 Thess. ii. 8.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHURCH.

THE faithful speak of the Church of Christ, as "Holy Church," or "The Holy See," or "The Apostolic See." Unbelievers speak of "The Court of Rome," so that they may feel no qualms of conscience at their insolence when they talk of "the pretensions of Rome," "the usurpations of the Court of Rome," "the exorbitant demands of the Court of Rome." In such expressions there is a hidden malice: the qualities and defects of men are applied to an Institution. We hear such phrases on the occasion of a dispute about benefices, or concerning discipline, rites, prohibition of books, definition of dogmas, &c. But what has the Court of Rome to do with any of these things? The word "Court" denotes the sovereign's family, his grooms of the chamber, his chamberlains, stewards, master of the horse, and other obedient adherents. In ecclesiastical affairs there are no such personages. In ecclesiastical affairs there is only the voice of the Supreme Pastor, uttered either by his own mouth, or transmitted through his prelates. It is therefore absurd to speak of "the Court of Rome," or "Curia Romana," instead of saying "The Holy See," "The Apostolic See," "The Chair of St. Peter," "The Vicar of Jesus

Christ," or "Holy Church." But, any one who uses these correct terms, will not be able to suggest that Jesus Christ has been guilty of "pretensions," or that Holy Church should be rebuked for her "exorbitant demands." Prejudice and horror would be excited against you if you did so; and therefore you soon find out the necessity of changing the name. It is an old trick to feign to regard as from the agent, that which is done by the master, in order that you may appear warranted in heaping abuse upon the act. We hear "ministers" lampooned, and "government" held up to obloquy, where it would be inconvenient to abuse the sovereign. In the Church, it is not so; there are no "responsible ministers" of the Pope. The Vicar of Christ is responsible to his Master for the government of the Church; and no one can relieve him of his responsibility, by an axiom. "The King can do no wrong," is true in a "constitutional kingdom;" it is true, only in so far as the king is a nullity and can act only on the advice of responsible ministers. It is true in the Church only in so far as the Head of the Church enjoys divine guidance and assistance, in virtue of our Lord's promises: "I will give you the Spirit of Truth;" "I will be with you always;" "The gates of hell shall not prevail;" "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven;" "He that heareth you, heareth Me;" "If any man will not hear the Church, let him be as a pagan and a publican;" "The Church is the pillar and foundation of the Truth," and so forth.

This is an ecclesiastical law—merely priest's law. This fallacy is especially applied to the laws of abstinence and fasting, and to laws for the prohibition of books and journals. Those laws are either laws of the Church, or they are not. If not, they are neither here nor there; they are not laws at all; they have no validity, nor existence, whatsoever. If they are laws of the Church, then you, by this fallacy, directly impugn the legislative authority of the Church. You cannot excuse yourself by saying that, among so many Churches, you really did not know which was the Church of Christ; for He said that His Church is "like a city set upon a hill, which cannot be hid." She is "the Light of the World, and no man lighteth a candle and putteth it under a bushel measure." She has certain marks or tokens by which She can be known; She is One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic. You cannot, then, err in deciding which Church is the true Church.

The Church is the continuation of the work of Jesus Christ. She is heir to the rights of Jesus Christ. She is the faithful depositary of the spiritual treasures of Jesus Christ. She is the infallible teacher of the doctrines of Jesus Christ. She wields the authority of Jesus Christ. She lives by the life and spirit of Jesus Christ. She enjoys the guidance and help of Jesus Christ. She speaks, orders, commands, concedes, prohibits, defines, looses and binds, in the name of Jesus Christ. How then can you say of a law of that Church—*It is only priest's law*, thinking you may disregard it with impunity? If you admit that the authority of the

Church is the authority of Jesus Christ, then the insult you offer the Church in this fallacy, is a new insult to Jesus Christ, like those which Pilate's soldiers heaped upon His head. If you say that the authority of the Catholic Church is not the authority of Jesus Christ, then you may be a Protestant or a Pagan: but you are not a Catholic. If a soldier refuses to receive an order from his general's aide-de-camp, he refuses to obey the general's orders, and is in open mutiny; and mutiny against the general is mutiny against the king. So if you refuse to accept a law of the Church, you are in rebellion against God.

Yes; if I knew the Church were speaking, I would obey. Do you expect "the Church," in the abstract, to speak? Do you not know that the organ of the Church, which speaks, is the Head? When the Head speaks from the Chair of St. Peter, it is the Church that speaks. You reject His voice!

Look at those countries which have rejected the authority of the Vicar of Christ; their Churches have fallen under a woman—a child—a minister of worship—a colonel of dragoons in Moscovite synod—a commissary of police. Can any man, whatever his religion, gravely say that the rejection of the authority of the Vicar of Christ has been a benefit to religion or to the nation?

But you say that *the Church usurps men's rights*, and you would have *tribunals of appeal against her abuses!* Would you erect tribunals to prevent a mother from usurping the rights of her children? It was the Church that founded every kingdom in

Christendom; and do you think she could wish to take away their rights? Remember, moreover, that it is the Holy Spirit Who guides her, and Jesus Christ Who remains with her, "all days even unto the end of the world." If she then commits usurpations, it is God Who does it. If He does it, are you wise in resisting Him?

But kings are the natural protectors of the Church, in their several States; it is for kings, therefore, to watch over her external good in their States; and, above all, to prevent a conflict of jurisdictions, by defining the limits of those jurisdictions, and thus obviating the monstrous disorder of an imperium in imperio. How can it be that kings are the natural protectors of the Church, when the Church, at Her birth, had no such protection? Jesus Christ assigned Her the assistance of the Holy Spirit, and not the protection of princes. Christ founded Her, and then caused Her to be propagated, against the will of magistrates, and rulers, and secular authorities. He made Her the mother and teacher of princes and emperors; He did not make them protectors. If She is not the mother and teacher of princes and emperors, then we must conclude that such men are excluded, by their dignity and position, from the kingdom of heaven. No; if princes desire to be saved, they must fulfil exactly the same conditions of docility, obedience, faith, and love, as the poor.

The Church has never been protected by princes. For three centuries the Church stood against all the power of the Cæsars, and had to wade through Her own blood, which was shed by Her persecutors. For

She was strong with the strength of the Holy Spirit; and, although sorely afflicted, She was not exterminated; although distressed, She was not destroyed. She had next to withstand the Byzantine Cæsars; and then the false and barbarous German emperors. Never were princes Her friends or Her protectors. Yet she was a friend to princes, and made them at peace with each other, and gave them wise counsel, and helped them to make just laws—when they submitted themselves to Her supremacy. Rulers always have been, and always must be, either Her enemies, or else members of Her body, and in obedience to Her Head.

In order to govern the faithful, who are the Body of Christ, and the Spouse of Christ, the Church must hold a special commission from Christ, and have an ordination, which Christ has not given to the princes of the earth. Temporal rulers have their mission, and their special graces, in order to enable them to rule a human society, which forms part of the Church. But the Head of the Church rules the whole Church, which is a spiritual society extending over all States. How then can temporal rulers be protectors of the Church, when they must, in God's order, be subordinate to the Church? "Quæque sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt."

Princes have a protectorate over the Church, by natural right and independently of the Church; and, in virtue of that protectorate, they may each interfere in the arrangements and regulations of that part of the Church which is within their several dominions. This is a reappearance of the maxim, *cujus regio,*

illius religio; and of the claim of *jus circa sacra;* which were put forward by the first Protestants. If this axiom were conceded, then each prince would define, in matters of religion, whatever and whenever he pleases. In other words, there would no longer be a Church of Christ—of which one of the marks is being One; for there would be as many Churches as there are States; and each king would be a sort of Pope or head of his own Church. Such Churches, it is needless to observe, would be human institutions; yes, political institutions or engines. Each one would be made to subserve the purposes of the ruler, and increase his power, by pronouncing his political operations to be right, instead of correcting them when wrong. This, of course, would get rid of another mark of the Church, namely, being Holy. As the establishment of each of these Churches would be "legal"—that is to say, as it must be made by the law of the land, and would be governed by the ruler of the kingdom, it would not be Apostolic. Finally, as it would be a national Church, it would not be Catholic, or universal. Yet the Church of Christ, in which all profess to believe, is "One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic." She is "One Body," living consequently under one Head. She is "One Sheepfold under one Shepherd." She is a Kingdom under one King. She is an Ark, or Ship, which is commanded by one Captain. She is built on one immovable Rock, which is Peter. She is neither provincial, nor national; and those who will not "hear the Church, are as heathen men and publicans."

But princes are the natural judges in the controversies which arise between the two jurisdictions; this they must be; otherwise there will be an imperium in imperio. In this false maxim we have a false assertion, and a pretended conclusion. Princes (it asserts) are the natural judges in controversies which arise between their own jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Head of the Church. The pretended conclusion is the supposed necessity that princes should be this in order to avoid an *imperium in imperio*. The suppressed major premiss is perhaps such as this: wherever a king has not the entire appellate jurisdiction throughout his kingdom, there is an *imperium in imperio*. To this I say, in scholastic language—*nego: probo si placet*. But those who have invented the enthymeme had better be called upon to try to complete the syllogism.

Let us take the assertion first. *Princes are the natural judges*, &c. This is a solemn falsehood. The natural judge in the supposed case of disputed jurisdiction between Church and State, is the Universal Church. In human affairs, there may be litigation, and a collision of rights, and a doubt as to which tribunal it belongs to give judgment; and, in such a case, recourse must be had to an authority superior to both,—an authority to which both tribunals are subordinate. But in a collision between an ecclesiastical and a lay authority, the Church knows infallibly that it belongs to Her to determine the question. Not only has She alone authority over spiritual matters; but also She has to define whether the point in dispute be a spiritual matter, or necessarily

connected with a spiritual matter. This follows from the fact that to Her has been given the Spirit of Truth to lead her unto all truth. By that Spirit She determines the limits of the spiritual—that is, the limits of Her direct jurisdiction. And Her decision must be just; for if She could be truly accused of error, if She could be guilty of prevarication, She would no longer be the faithful and immaculate Spouse of Christ; in other words, She would not be the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.

If, on the other hand, the Church were to be made subordinate to the judgment of any prince, we should have the Church of Christ depending on a man. She would be judged and condemned by a man, as if She were ignorant and unable to distinguish the spiritual from the temporal. As no human tribunal is infallible, the Infallible would, thus, be guided by the fallible, the seeing would be led by the blind, and of course, "both would fall into the ditch." Whoever, then, asserts such a maxim, must either be "making and believing a lie;" or else he must be utterly ignorant what the Church is.

But the matters which come in dispute between the Church and Kings, are not articles of the Faith, but questions of discipline; and every one knows that discipline must be mutable; it is, therefore, foolish to be so obstinate about it. This is another very common sophism. In the first place, it is not true that the disputes are always, or even generally, on questions of pure discipline that is, on points of discipline not intimately connected with dogmas of the Faith. This limitation excludes disputes about marriage

laws, religious vows, and the legislative authority of the Church, which are intimately bound up with the Faith. Let us grant, however, for argument's sake, that a point of discipline is in question; let us grant also, for the moment, that discipline is mutable. Yet, even so, how can you thence conclude that it is for the secular authority to determine it, and for the Church to give way?

The external discipline of the Church is the exteriorizing, or manifestation of dogma. In other words, discipline is the Faith put in practice. We will suppose now, that in different epochs and circumstances, the same truth may be expressed better in one way than in another; yet only the authority which has an infallible knowledge of dogmas, can define how they ought to be expressed. Who is he that can express a thought by word or action? Only he who has the thought in his mind. So, also, he alone who has a certain knowledge of a dogma, can know how it ought to be externalized in discipline.

Furthermore; if a law is mutable, yet it cannot be changed except by the proper authority. The laws of the State, for example, are mutable enough, God knows. Yet no king would allow each man, nor even each town, nor yet each province, to chop and change the laws of the State. That power is reserved to the sovereign authority in the State. So with regard to the disciplinary laws of the Church, whatever is mutable may not be altered except by the Church. It is not for the children of a family to modify the disciplinary regulations of the family as may suit their fancies; it is for the father to impose whatever discipline he judges best.

Then an imperium in imperio is inevitable. The expression here means *the part of the Church within the State.* This you profess to regard as a great evil. Evidently you deem it certain that the State will crumble to pieces before the Church. You arrive at this conclusion from your own observation, and your anxious love for the State; and not from Daniel's prophecy concerning the little stone, which shall crush the toes of iron and clay.

Let us look a little closer at your assertion. How do you say that if the Church maintains Her rights inviolate, she will be an Empire within the State? You mean, doubtless, that there will be two centres of authority in the same social body, from which an antagonism will arise. This antagonism, you say, will destroy the body politic. To avoid this, the rights and spiritual powers of the Church must be placed at the absolute disposal of the temporal ruler —at the beck and bid of the ruler of the body politic. Here, then, you have stated the evil you fear, and the remedy you propose. It seems, indeed, at first sight, to be wonderfully well put! But suppose some one were to answer: Yes—to have two centres of authority in the same body politic, does make an *imperium in imperio;* and this, truly, would be an intolerable disorder; therefore the temporal authority must be subordinate to the spiritual; the civil authority, and its rights and powers, must be placed at the absolute disposal of the Church. If some one were to adopt your own line of argument and meet you in this way, how would you answer him? He would seem to me to have the best of it; he would

be more likely to be able successfully to maintain that the temporal should be subordinate to the spiritual, than you would be likely to surmount the difficulty of proving that the spiritual should lie at the disposal of the temporal. Certainly, the greater must contain the less. The less cannot be made to contain the greater. The whole is more than a part. The part cannot exceed the whole; and we know that the Church is Catholic, or universal, and that each State is only a part. So again we must all allow that the rights of that which is older, precede the rights of that which has come after. Now we know that no State in Europe dates as far back as the Church. Not one of the present States of Christianity was known at the time of St. Peter, or of St. Linus, or of St. Cletus, or of St. Clement, and then the Church was a hundred years old; nor at the time of St. Victor, when the Church was two centuries old; nor at the time of St. Anastasius, when the Church was four centuries old; nor at the time of St. Gregory the Great, the sixty-fifth Pope, when the Church was six hundred years old. Now the two-hundred-and-fifty-seventh Pope sits on the throne. Verily, a long succession of sovereigns. England was not one nation when the hundred-and-fifty-ninth Pope came to the throne, and the Church was more than a thousand years old. How much older then is the Church than any of the dynasties of Europe! How much more sacred and indefeasible are Her rights, than the rights of any king! Furthermore, it was the Church who formed all the States of Europe. They are all Her children. So then they

depend on Her, and not She on them. She made them. Shall the clay then rule the potter? Again, in a conflict of authorities, it is the more noble that must have the preference. But the Church, instituted by Christ and watered by the blood of the Apostles and of tens of thousands of Popes and saints and martyrs, is more noble than any kingdom, sullied probably by rapine, murder, and fraud. Lastly, the Church, whose end is the highest end of man, must be preferred before any State; for all States regard only a temporal or earthly end. If, then, we have to avoid an *imperium in imperio*, it is necessary that the temporal State should give way to the eternal Church.

Far be it from me to say that the State should be at the absolute disposal of the Church; although that would be truer than the converse. The civil state, I say, must exist with all its attributions, as well as the Church with all her rights. I say, moreover, that there are means of harmonizing the two, and avoiding an *imperium in imperio*. There may be two centres of authority in the same body, if they are not of the same order; for in that case they cannot clash. They may each have attributions; but it does not follow that the attributions should be contradictory. It is, moreover, possible that a subject of both may be faithful to both, by observing our Lord's precept to "render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's." A similar thing occurs in daily life. You may be a Londoner and an Englishman. In so far as you are a Londoner, you obey the municipal laws of London:

and in so far as you are an Englishmen, you obey the Imperial laws of England. There is no confusion of authorities; there is no disputed fealty or divided duty; there is no *imperium in imperio.* Why? Because the ruling authority of London is subordinate to that of England. So also a man, in his social life, may be subject to his prince; and, in his moral and religious life, he may look to the Church. There will be no disputed jurisdiction, and no conflict of authorities, if the State and Church are subalternate. Let, then, the temporal power remain a temporal power, and strictly mind its own affairs, and not step out of its sphere. Let it look to the civil and criminal laws, its army, its trade, its finance, its railways, its screw frigates, and its telegraphs; but let it not step out of its province, and, like Oza, put forth its hand to hold up the ark of God. A man cannot serve two masters, if they are coordinate. Still less can he serve two masters, if they are contradictory, like God and Mammon, or like an atheistical State and the Church. But masters that are subalternate—that is, when one is subordinate to the other—are served by every man throughout his life, without conflict of jurisdiction. The difficulty arises, therefore, not from a conflict of jurisdiction, but from a Pagan character in the rulers of the State, which puts them in contradiction with the Church of Christ.

A free Church in a free State, or *Separation of Church and State.* The aim of any one who uses this maxim with sincerity, and not as a cloak for

further evil designs, must be, that the Church and State may each have its own sphere, and be free in that sphere, but not go out of it; so that the one may not be able to make war upon the other. This is very easily said; but it cannot be reduced to practice without the ruin of the State, and the injury of religion. But most of those who use this maxim do not use it in sincerity; they propose it merely as a stepping-stone to the destruction of the Church. To those who have been beguiled into adopting this maxim, and who have no ulterior designs, the following points may be suggested for consideration.

What is a free Church? The Church is the union or body of all the faithful who possess the Faith and obey the laws of Jesus Christ, and live in obedience to their legitimate superiors and to the Pontiff—the Head of all. The word "free" denotes that this body is unrestrained by any interference of the State, and undeterred by force in the exercise of the Faith, and in fulfilling the mission of teaching all nations, and practising the laws and precepts of Jesus Christ. Let us ask, in the first place, whether any of those who use this maxim really desire the Church to be free? If the Church is to be free, the Supreme Pastor must not be trammeled in extending His work to the furthest confines of the earth. If the Church is to be free, its Supreme Pastor cannot be the subject of any prince, nor may he be in the power of any Government. It was in order to secure to the Church this freedom that temporal power, or a kingdom, was given to the Holy Father. For every man is either a sovereign

or a subject,—he is either independent or else he is under the power of some one. For this reason the Pope must be also an earthly sovereign.

Unless the teaching Church is free, how can She be unbiassed in pronouncing definitions, in proscribing errors, in condemning false maxims, in denouncing crimes, in keeping the deposit of the Faith once delivered to the saints, in upholding good customs and arraigning bad fashions, in ordering the hierarchy, in decreeing and enforcing discipline, and in making laws and regulations which shall bind the faithful—in all parts of the world. Is the Holy Father now free? Can he publish Encyclicals and Pontifical Constitutions, or nominate bishops in every State of Europe, without the necessity of any *Placet regi*, or *Exequatur*? Is the Church free to fulfil Her mission, "Docete omnes gentes," or is the education of children and youths taken out of Her hands? If not, why do Governments establish secular schools and lyceums? Is the Church free, when difficulties are put in the way of communication, between the bishops or laity of every nation, and the Holy Father? Is the Church free, when the fruits and externalizing of Her doctrines—*e.g.*, the religious orders—are forbidden? Is the Church free, when She may not administer and dispose of Her own property? Is it not clear that the maxim, in so far as it regards a free Church, is mere hypocrisy and base fraud?

By a consideration of the rest of the maxim, it will become more clear that it is used merely to deceive the unwary. A State which is free from the Church is an atheistical State; it denotes a

godless Government and godless laws. A State which is free from the Church, is a State which admits no influence of the Church in legislation, nor in administration, nor in the social condition of the people. It denotes a State which takes no account of what the Church has defined, decreed, or counselled. Is it to be supposed that such a State, which has "freed" itself from the Church, will allow itself to come under the power or influence of any other religion? Of course not. *A free State,* —the latter half of the maxim, means, therefore, an atheistical State, a State which regards no form of worship, which knows nothing of any kind of religion, and which, therefore, determines to do without God. Ancient history relates of no people, pagan or barbarian, that ever determined to "free" its laws and administrations from all religion, and rid them of every thought of God. Yet this is the aim (even if it be no worse), of those who use this maxim in supposed sincerity.

It may, indeed, be a matter of wonder how so many persons could have adopted it. The solution of this puzzle is, that many persons, who have not intelligence enough to see for themselves, nor humility enough to be taught by the Church, are easily blown about by every wind of doctrine, and led captive by every sophism. "Except ye become as little children, ye cannot enter the kingdom of heaven."

Yet wherever the Church is oppressed by the State, this maxim must certainly be right. To this I answer —No; certainly not right. You may desire that the State shall not oppress; but you must desire still

more strongly that the State and society shall not become atheistical. The Church does not live for Herself; She does not seek for liberty for Herself, but for the good of others. She desires to be free; not that She dislikes bondage or fears persecution, but that Her action in bringing men to the truth, and saving souls, may be greater. But if the Church is to be isolated from the State, and the State from the Church, this action would be reduced to a minimum. Persecution and oppression would be far more fruitful than the liberty of isolation. It has always been in times of persecution and oppression that the Church has spread most. Thus it was that our Lord said, alluding to His coming tortures and death, "If I be lifted up, I will draw all men unto Me." As if He had said—If I show Myself a King, if I obtain twelve legions of angels and archangels to fight for Me, I shall not convert the world; but if I am cruelly used and tortured and crucified, then I shall greatly prevail. The servant is not greater than the Master, and the One that is sent is as the Sender.

Another sophism is that—*Although the isolation of the Church and its separation from the State, will cause numerous errors and false religions to spring up; yet, as errors are various, and truth is one, the errors will tend to neutralize each other, and truth will finally prevail.* If you really think this to be the case, why are you so anxious, by means of coercive laws, and compulsory teaching, to guard the principles of honesty, of justice, and of the rights of property? Because you know full well that the ignorance and

evil passions and corruptions of men's hearts would otherwise cause mischievous maxims to prevail. Yet the principles of the religion revealed by God, are quite as precious as honesty and justice and the rights of property; and much more easily lost or perverted. Why, then, do you urge a different action in the two cases? Because the one touches your pocket, which you care about; the other affects your religion, of which you are heedless. We do not trust to the principles of honesty to defend themselves, because we know that man is not a pure intelligence, that his reason is overridden by sense, and sense is vitiated and corrupt. But then, why do you trust to the principles of true religion to defend themselves? That very clouding of the reason and corruption of the sense makes men hate the true religion and prefer the falser forms.

Let us now turn to the practical effect of separating the Church from the State. What is the action of the Church on an individual? The religion of Christ does not consist only of certain practices to be observed in secret. The scope of the Gospel is to form the whole life of man, to correct his customs, and change him both internally and in his relations with other men. The Church does not reform man only in his individual life, but also in his family life, and in his civil life. He cannot bring a family into the world, except through a sacrament of the Church; he cannot rule and educate his children, except in accordance with the teachings of the Church; he may not allow, into his house, newspapers or books (which are means

of education), except they are such that the Church approves; he cannot accept any power or office, without being reminded, as the Church invests him with it, that he must wield it in God's name, and as God's minister; and he cannot leave the world without the services of the Church; so that his whole life, from beginning to end, is connected with the Church. Yet his life, which belongs to the Church, belongs also to the State, or to society. If they are subalternate—that is, if the State is subordinate to the Church, there is no confusion. But by separating Church and State, you cut man in two, and make an inextricable confusion. As he belongs to the State, the State will put him under laws, and impose obligations upon him, such as suit its aims and views. But as he belongs to the Church, the laws and regulations, which are framed to bring him on to the highest end of man, the precepts and discipline of the Church have a hold upon his conscience which he cannot shake off. There must arise, in such a case, a conflict of authorities, and a divided duty.

Again: religion imposes obligations, not only on individuals, but also on society. If the State and Church are separated, the whole society feels bound to evince its religious feelings in obedience to the law of Christ, and yet is called upon to desist from doing so, in obedience to the atheistical laws of a godless State. When the above considerations have been fully meditated, it will be seen that a separation of Church and State is the destruction both of the State and of the religion of the people.

There is another point for reflection. The State, apart from the Church, cannot do more than take cognizance of the natural law. Yet Christianity added perfection to the natural law. Nature teaches you to love those that love you, and to hate those that are your enemies. Jesus Christ taught us to love our enemies and to do good to those that persecute us. Nature tells you nothing of the evangelical counsels—voluntary poverty, perpetual chastity, and religious obedience. The Church invites us, in the name of Jesus Christ, to practise these counsels. Nature cannot point, for your sanctification, to those rites and ceremonies and sacraments which we use; it was Jesus Christ Who ordered and established them. The law of nature commands you not to murder and not to rob. The new law enjoins us to watch the first germs of temptation, commanding us not to be angry, not to desire what does not belong to us, not even to look upon what belongs to another, if looking upon it raises a desire in the mind. In short, Jesus Christ carried the law of nature and the Decalogue to perfection. If the State, then, is to be separate and isolate from the Church of Christ, it sinks back into the imperfect natural law, or clings, like a Mahommedan, to the Decalogue alone, losing all these added perfections and refinements. The body cannot be separated from the soul without becoming a corpse, and falling a prey to dissolution and rottenness. So the State cannot be separated from the Church, without commencing its decadence and ruin. As the body cannot tell the soul to limit herself to all internal acts, leaving all external things

to be dealt with by the body alone (for the body has no life nor activity without the soul); so the State cannot exclude the Church from the external acts of the State, because the State requires the life which comes through Her alone. But the State must obey the legitimate authority of the Church, and be in subordination to the Church, so that there may be no clashing of authorities or conflict of jurisdictions.

I have spoken of ulterior designs in assailing the Church. Let us now consider the antagonist of the Church, from whom these designs proceed. It is a just judgment of God, and plainly a law of history, that those who, through a spirit of rebellion, refuse submission to a legitimate authority, are sure to fall under a fierce but despicable ruler, who is sure, before long, to tyrannize over them. This may be proved by many examples in the history of former centuries, and by still more numerous examples during the last hundred years. This law asserts itself in the secret societies. Unhappy men, who have left the Church, by joining a secret society—such as the Freemasons, the Carbonari, the Marianna, the Illuminati, the Fenians, &c., which are under the ban of the Church—are tyrannized over by a mysterious and terrible despot, whom they do not even know,—a despot who takes care that they, while feeling their galling slavery, shall declare that they are free, and shall work to entrap others into the evil into which they have plunged themselves. *What harm* (say they to their yet innocent victims) *to enrol your name in a secret society? This society is only a philan-*

thropical society, with merely beneficent objects. If the intended victims pay any heed to the ban of the Church, they will save themselves from the trap prepared for them.

What harm? By entering a secret society, you renounce your dignity as a free man, and the very name of Christian. You pretend that you are struggling for liberty; and yet you resign your independence, your will, your every action, your very life, into the hands of an unknown master. You may no longer even do what your reason and prudence direct. You may not even appeal to the laws of God, nor to the law of nature, nor even to the laws of the land to protect you. The deeds you may be ordered to do may be the grossest violations of those laws. Yet, all the while, you will have to speak like an enthusiast in favour of justice and law; for you will have put yourself and yours, your property, your body, your energies, the faculties of your mind, all into the hands of an unknown man, who will not care for you further than as an instrument, and will dispose of you in any way that will best subserve his end. The obedience of the Jesuits has been censured. Yet the Jesuits merely promise to obey their acknowledged Superior, where they can do so without sinning against the laws of God; and they always have an appeal to a higher authority. But you, if you join a secret society, will have to obey, even to spreading false reports and calumnies, and committing robberies and assassinations. The Jesuits know who all their rulers are, and appeal against their commands if they are unlawful; you will not know any except your immediate

superior (a subordinate); and if you attempt to appeal to the law against the command conveyed to you, you will yourself be assassinated. By joining a secret society, you renounce your personal liberty and your rights as a man.

No one becomes a malefactor at once. This is known and observed by the organizers of the secret societies. The intended victim is at first merely led, or persuaded, or cajoled into discrediting the ban of the Church, and joining the society. He is then slowly, and with great care, and with many precautions and tests of his feelings, led on step by step to greater evil. His moral pulse is being continually felt, as the moral poison is being instilled; for one false step, one exaggerated remark, or dropping the mask for one instant, may cause the victim to take fright, and make him break away. That is one method of corruption; another is for an adept to lead the intended victim into some sin, in which he would not like to be discovered—into an infidelity to his wife, perchance; or into cheating at cards. Under fear lest it should be revealed, he is next persuaded to do something worse—a lucrative fraud upon a greater scale, perhaps; and so on, until he gets so deep into the mire, that there is no help for it but to resign himself, body and soul, into the hands of the secret society. The first fault was the first link of a "chain of iniquities," whereby he has become bound, if he had not the courage to break the chain, by confessing his sins, and resolving to amend his life and brave the consequences. By one method or the other, all the members of the secret societies are

entrapped. Yet those slaves to the devil are made to protest to strangers that they joined the secret society from honest conviction! Honest! As every member has to swear that he will obey the orders he receives, even to the murder of his dearest friend or nearest relation, every one who joins a secret society becomes thereby guilty of an intention to murder.

The aim of the secret societies is to overturn every legitimate authority, to destroy the present bases of society, and to construct a new society (if it may be called a society), wherein they will have free scope for their passions. That is to say, the end which every member adopts in joining, is wickedness of the greatest enormity.

Moreover, the secret societies intend not only to abolish the Christian religion, and the Church of Christ, but also to banish the law of God, and the idea of His overruling providence. Their end is, therefore, contradictory to the end of the Church, and of every Christian man—the contradictory of the constant desire to do all to the greater glory of God—*ad majorem Dei gloriam*. They thus make vain the coming of Christ, and His preaching, His example, His life, His death. The Church of Christ and the secret societies are in the utmost antagonism. It is the Church and Antichrist. The Church of Christ, and "the synagogue of Satan."

Was not Pope Clement IX. right in pronouncing the sentence of excommunication[1] against "every one of the faithful, of whatever state, rank, condition in life, order, dignity, or eminence, whether lay or

[1] Encycl., *In eminenti.*

clerical, &c., who shall dare, under any pretext or colour, to enter any of the secret societies, whether called Freemasons or by any other name, or dare to propagate them or show favour to them, or to receive or harbour them in his own house or elsewhere, or to subscribe to them, or attend any of their meetings, or to give them help or counsel, whether open or secret, whether directly or indirectly," &c. &c. Pope Benedict XIV.[2] approved, renewed, and confirmed the decree of Pope Clement, and again pronounced the penalty of excommunication against any one who should infringe it. Pope Pius VII. renewed the same constitutions, adding a prohibition against reading or keeping, whether in manuscript or in print, any documents or statutes of a secret society or clandestine sect, whether Carbonari or otherwise called, and against reading anything written in their defence.[3] Pope Leo XII., in the Apostolic Letter, *Quo graviora mala*, rehearsed and confirmed the foregoing decrees, placing under major excommunication all who join any secret society, and those who refrain from denouncing their accomplices. He at the same time declared, in the words of the third canon of the Third Council of Lateran, that no one is bound by that wicked oath, because it is not an oath, but an act of perjury when a man swears to do anything against the Church of Christ. It is, therefore, evident that every one who joins a secret society, not only renounces his dignity as a man, and incurs the guilt of the greatest crimes, but also ceases *ipso facto* to be a member of the Church.

[2] Encycl., *Providas.* [3] Encycl., *Ecclesiam a Jesu Christo.*

These are gross exaggerations; the only aim of the secret societies is to encourage brotherly love, and to unite men for mutual assistance. In the midst of the light of Christianity, in the bosom of Catholic society, is it necessary to combine in concealment, and to use oaths of secrecy, in order merely to encourage mutual love, and induce men to seek the good of their neighbours? This was, and is, the aim of the Church. Has the Church, then, so failed of Her object, that you must substitute something else? Have the States of Christendom forbidden brotherly love, and visited, with pains and penalties, the attempt to benefit others? If not, why so anxiously conceal your endeavours to effect this good. Pius VII. removed, however, the veil from this mystery. "There is no necessity for conjectures, nor even for argument, to arrive at the judgment which we have enunciated. Their printed books, which describe the observances practised at the meetings of their higher grades, their catechisms, their statutes, and the other authentic documents of a very grave character, the testimony of their own members, who have left the society and revealed to the magistrates all their errors and frauds, all these prove that the Carbonari (which term comprises all the secret societies) have for their principal end to bring about an indifference in matters of religion, and to induce every one to exercise a license in framing for himself a religion by his own genius, and consisting of his own opinions—the most pernicious error which it is possible to conceive—to profane and pollute the Passion of Jesus Christ by certain wicked ceremonies

of their own; to cast contempt on the sacraments of the Church and the mysteries of the Catholic religion, by substituting for them (most horrible sacrilege!) other new ones, invented by themselves; and to overturn this Apostolic See, against which, because of the primacy which, as St. Augustine says, it has always possessed, they entertain a peculiar hatred, and contrive the most baneful and pernicious plots.

"Nor are the moral precepts taught by the society of the Carbonari (as shown by the same documents) less nefarious; although they vaunt themselves, with a most confident air, that they exact from their followers the practice of charity and of every kind of virtue, and a careful abstinence from every species of vice. That society, then, impudently encourages lustful pleasures, and teaches that it is lawful to kill those who have violated the secret oath which we have mentioned above. And, although Peter, the Prince of the Apostles, commanded that Christians should be subject, for God's sake, to every man, whether to the king as supreme, or to rulers, as appointed by him, &c.; and although the Apostle Paul enjoins that 'every soul should be subject to the higher powers,' &c.; yet that society teaches that it is right to excite seditions, and thus to hurl from power kings and all other rulers, whom they dare, over and over again, to call by the insulting name of tyrants. . . .

"It must not be imagined that all these evils, and many others also which we have not mentioned, are falsely and calumniously attributed to these clandestine sects. The books which their members have

dared to write about religion and about the State, show us that they spurn the authority of religion and of political rulers, that they blaspheme majesty, that they are never tired of calling Christ 'a scandal' or a 'folly'; nay, they not unfrequently assert that there is no God, and that the soul of a man dies and comes to nothing with his body. Their documents and statutes, in which they explain their purposes, and give minutes of their meetings for consultation, clearly prove all that we have mentioned of their endeavours to overturn legitimate rulers and entirely to destroy the Church, and avow that all such attempts which have occurred in the world have proceeded from them. Moreover, from these sources it is proved beyond doubt that all the clandestine sects, although they differ in name, are yet intimately connected in the bond of their most nefarious counsels."[4]

Again, Leo XII.[5] adds: "Those sects must be repressed. For the cause of religion is, especially in these times, so bound up with the stability of society, that in no way can the one be sundered from the other. For all that belong to those secret societies, dearly beloved Catholic princes and sons in Jesus Christ, are the enemies, not less of your authority than of religion also. They are making an attack upon both; they are plotting to overturn both from their foundations, and if they prove able they will, for a certainty, not permit either any religion or any royal power to exist. So great is

[4] *Ecclesiam a Jesu Christo*, September 13, 1821.
[5] *Quo graviora*, March 13, 1826.

the cunning and astuteness of these men, that when they appear most bent on extending your power, then they are most busy in contriving its total overthrow. They give you very many reasons to persuade those who have in their hands the administration of affairs, that Our power and that of the bishops should be curtailed and weakened, and that many of the rights which belong to this See, and those which belong to the bishops who participate in our cares, should be transferred to those secular rulers. This they do, not only from that most bitter hatred which they bear to all religion, but also from a cunning scheme, hoping that the peoples who are subject to your authority, when they see those restraints abolished, which were imposed by Christ and by the Church which He established, will be the more easily induced, with such an example before their eyes, to change or even destroy the form of the political government. . . . Be assured that no one can join any of those societies, without becoming guilty of a most grave crime; therefore, all ye beloved children who profess the Catholic Faith, shut your ears to the words of those who, in order to persuade you to assent to join the lower grades of their societies, affirm most vehemently that nothing is permitted in those grades which is contrary to reason or to religion; and, further, that nothing is seen or heard which is not holy, and right, and pure. Yet that wicked oath, which we have already mentioned, and which has to be taken even in the lowest grade, is enough in itself to make you see that it is criminal to join even the lowest grades, or

to remain if you have joined. Moreover, although the weightier and more criminal matters are not usually committed to those who have not attained to the higher grades, yet it is very plain that the power and audacity of these mischievous societies are increased in proportion to the numbers and the unanimity of those who have inscribed their names. Therefore, those who have not passed the lower grades, must be held guilty of the crimes committed by any in the higher grades. The sentence of the Apostle therefore falls on them, 'Those who do such things are worthy of death; and not only those who do them, but those also who consent to those who do them.'"[6]

It would seem as if enough had been said upon this point to open the eyes of all who are not beyond redemption, were it not that a false objection is sometimes based upon the very arguments which have been adduced. *What* (it is urged) *is the good of excommunication, if the secret societies flourish in spite of it? Has it any effect at all?* You might have asked the same concerning the excommunication which the Apostle Paul launched against the incestuous Corinthian, or the excommunications against the heresiarchs in the earlier centuries of the Church—if you had lived at the time each excommunication was fulminated. As we live in later times, we do not ask concerning excommunications of former times, because those heresies have all died out as a fire which has been deprived of fuel. Our Lord gave to His Church that power

[6] Rom. i.

of separating men from the "one fold," and making them "heathen men and publicans." Your difficulty arises, then, solely from the fact that you do not see those, who are struck by excommunication, instantly succumb under temporal calamities. Therefore it is that you doubt the effect of excommunication. To this I reply—First; it has not been proved that God does not send earthly evils on those who receive sentence of excommunication. On the contrary, history relates that this has often occurred in a very glaring manner. But it is not always so. If it were always the case, we should doubtless be tempted not to look forward; we should think that God's punishments were all temporal. But if we see the wicked "flourishing as a green bay tree," we look forward to another life, to the time when "he will receive his reward." To find glaring histories of temporal punishments on the excommunicated, we need not go back to the times of Frederick Barbarossa. Napoleon I. made light of Pius VII., and his Bull *Quam memorandum.* Yet it became so fixed in his mind (although he endeavoured to hide his anxiety), that he could get no repose by day nor by night. He then ordered one of his Ministers to prepare a return of all the excommunications which had been pronounced from the earliest days against monarchs. Deceived by the apparent indifference of the Emperor, the Minister cast the matter aside. Napoleon again urged it; and the return was finally presented to him by M. de Champagny. There were eighty-five cases in the list; the first in the list having been that of an excommunication pronounced by St. Athanasius

against the Governor of Libya in 398. The last excommunication, which was on June 10, 1809, had been, by courtesy, omitted. Of these eighty-five, every one had visibly taken effect in one way or the other. Napoleon, however, did not repent. Cardinal Pacca relates, in his *Memoires*, that Napoleon exclaimed that an excommunication could not make the muskets drop out of the hands of his soldiers. Within three years he went to Russia, and a frost, such as had not been known before, did make the muskets drop out of the hands of his soldiers. His whole army was destroyed; and his downfall began.

The proper effect of excommunication, however, is not to induce sickness or other temporal misfortunes, but to cut the culprit off from the Body of Christ—to cast him out of the Church of Christ, as unworthy of the name of Christian, and as deprived of the rights which were acquired by Baptism. This evil does certainly fall on the excommunicated. They are shut out from those avenues of grace which have been provided in the Church; they have not the advantages of the sacraments; the Holy Sacrifice is not daily offered for them; and if death surprises them while they still obstinately defy Holy Church, the separation from the Church, which they have deliberately chosen to maintain on earth, will be maintained also in heaven.

But the Pope should not touch temporal affairs, much less should he employ excommunication for acts done in that sphere. Do you mean, then, that the Head of the Church has no authority, neither temporal nor spiritual? Perhaps you will allow him

some authority to decide in matters of ecclesiastical benefices? Yet you say that he may not have any power in regard to houses or lands, or any material objects. He may institute bishoprics, parishes, and all that appertains to ecclesiastical rule; but the sees, and the parishes, and his written decrees are temporal and material, and therefore do not belong to him. He may define concerning matrimony and its conditions; but men and women are material and temporal, and therefore do not come under his jurisdiction. He may likewise consider the matter of education; but he may not issue any orders regarding children or youths, schools or universities. Literature is in his province; but he has nothing to say to books, or newspapers, or any other published matter; he may neither approve nor condemn them.

But we mean that he may deal with such things only in so far as they are spiritual, and not deal with them in so far as they are material; for example, if the Pope fulminates an excommunication against some one for taking away his temporal power or kingdom, we consider that he excommunicates for a material, temporal, or worldly object. Yet, I may adopt your own phraseology, and reply that he does so not in so far as it is a material, temporal, or worldly object which is taken from him; but in so far as that object has a spiritual aspect, and in so far as the act of spoliation has a spiritual effect. A judge condemns a robber for taking the goods of another, not in relation to the matter of the goods (for the punishment is not more or less according as the value of the goods is greater or smaller, nor is it

of a different quality as the stolen property varies in substance). The judge punishes the moral act—the deed of theft. The punishment falls on the criminal because he broke the law of God, because he committed a breach of justice, because he disregarded right. Do you mean, then, by your objection, that it does not appertain to the Sovereign Pontiff to define a moral fault? Even if you shut the State up in a sphere of temporal affairs, and the Pope in a sphere of spiritual affairs, ought not the punishment of crimes, the repression of moral evil, to be in the hands of the Pope? By your false maxim, therefore, you deny him even the exercise of spiritual authority. You do not even allow him to declare what acts are in accordance with God's laws, and what acts are not conformable to those laws—the very ground of his being the teacher of all nations, the very function for which, above all others, he has the assistance of Jesus Christ and the guidance of the Holy Spirit! What authority, then, do you leave him, if you deny the value of his sentences? But if the spiritual power of the Pope is a fiction, the Church is a vain idol; and so we find the same foundation to this objection as underlay all the others—namely, a denial of the Church, a denial of the Christian Faith, a denial of God's providence.

At one time excommunication had its terrors, greater than the terrors of death; and the culprit on whom the sentence had been passed, was regarded with horror and detestation from one end of Europe to the other. But in these days of fœtid civilization, some material evil, or some temporal misfortune

causes horror—such as a flood, the burning of a house, the breaking of a bank; while spiritual censures are regarded as nought. If you would only look beyond the grave, where your temporal enjoyments will have passed away, and you will have been despoiled by death of all your honours, your titles, your reputation, and your possessions; if you would see yourselves as you will be, after you have passed from this earth and from temporal things; if you would contemplate yourselves standing apart in utter isolation from the Body of Christ, with no one to lean upon, and no plea to urge, as you appear before the awful judgment-seat of a slighted and offended God, with the great company of angels, witnesses to your crimes, around His throne! If you would also picture to yourselves the poor, the despised, the persecuted of the earth, standing there too upon the same day, surrounded by "their good works, which follow after them," and forming part of the Body of Christ, in the company of the martyrs and saints, and with Christ Himself in their midst to advocate their cause with unfailing advocacy;—yes, those men whom, in the pride of your worldly authority, you despoiled and struck down, have risen and appear in your presence before the almighty and just God, the Judge of all the earth! Those whom you, the great men of the world, despised, are now honoured; those whom you persecuted, are at the right hand of God. Then consider what a miserable lot awaits you for those deeds! For ever! You, wealthy, luxurious ones, who could not brook a moment's inconvenience, and

who would complain loudly if your little finger were burned for a second, are to be cast into the "fire prepared for the devil and his angels," where you will burn, not for a minute only, not for an hour, not for a day, not for a year, nor for millions of years, but for ever!

Think of this, and you will say that it is a poor exchange that you make, when, to gain a paltry object, you incur the censures of the Church of Christ.

There is a law of the Church regarding literature, to which a passing allusion has been made. This law is in contradiction to that absolute liberty of the Press which is now assumed, without consideration, to be a beneficial arrangement, and is regarded as an axiom, which requires no proof. Let us, therefore, take into consideration the following fallacy.

The Church has no business with a censorship of the Press. And why not? There is certainly no matter which more urgently requires the attention of the Church. The world having lost every idea of Christianity, the Church has every day to inculcate the most elementary truths of religion. The Church is essentially the Teaching Authority. To take this from Her, would be to deprive Her of life. The Church is God's appointed Teacher, and She must educate. She is the established Guide for man, and therefore has to lead. She is the Depositary of immense treasures of the Faith, and must dispense them. She is the "pillar and foundation of the

truth," and must guard against error. She is the "light of the world," and must shine. No power on earth can transform Her into anything else than Christ has formed Her. This is what you mean when you say, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church," and "I believe in One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church." But how can She exercise Her proper functions if She may not say, of any publication, whether it enunciates and supports true doctrine or false? How can She fulfil Her divinely imposed duty, if She may not forbid the faithful to read that which She knows to be baneful?

That particular part of Her functions, which is here under consideration, was first exercised in the days of the Apostles, when there was a grand burning, in the market-place, of books which had been condemned by the authorities of the Church. In the succeeding centuries, the works of heretics were condemned as they appeared. The practice of condemning false and immoral books has been continued to this day.

This is done only for the weak-minded and ignorant. The Church has never made any such distinction; and as She alone is the Teaching Authority, we cannot venture to introduce such a distinction where She has not made it. No man has a right to subtract himself from the operation of a law, on any plea whatsoever. If it were allowed, every one would disobey the law on the ground that he considered himself strong-minded and learned enough not to come under it. A law is made only where the natural tendency of men is to do what the law

forbids; and if every one may permit himself to evade the law, it is useless to make it.

But what danger can there be in bad books and newspapers? There is a very great danger; for literature is a means of education; it forms men for good or for evil. It is surrounded with many seductions to make it attract readers, so that its influence may be extensive. Every one who has a theory or opinion, to which he desires to gain adherents, writes in the newspapers or publishes a book. For it is well known that the unwary (and they are nearly all men), are thereby entrapped into accepting such opinions as truths, and defending them afterwards as their prejudices. An external power must therefore step in to judge of the truthfulness of them, and to forbid the reading of bad books and of journals. How easy it is to present a false maxim to the public, to invent a subtle sophism, to distort a fact which occurred either long ago or in a distant country! How rare it is to find any one with acuteness of intellect enough to expose a fallacy, with the erudition necessary to detect an incorrect statement of fact, with discourse of reason sufficiently practised to solve a subtle difficulty! If the book treats of a moral question, we must remember that the corruption of man's heart is sure to make him side with error; and when errors are cleverly introduced, under cover of a novel or the beauties of poetry, they are sure to mislead the unwary.

But I have tried, and found no harm to result. You confess, then, that you have disobeyed the

Church. If you have read a bad book, or a bad newspaper, knowing that it was prohibited, the commission of this act of disobedience alone has done you great harm. No one sins without corresponding degradation and injury. Add to this the further sins which, as appears by your advancing the objection, you evidently purpose to commit. You plainly mean, by alleging that you have experienced no injury, that you intend to disobey on other occasions; you would otherwise not care to assert that maxim. You have shown, then, that you have arrived at the point of despising the Church; you do not regard Her as guided by the Holy Spirit of Truth; you do not accept Her as the Teacher appointed by Jesus Christ. Perhaps you content yourself with not being a member of Christ's Church? If you believed in the Church, you would be sure that whatever She condemns as bad is injurious to your soul; and then you would feel conscious that to the injury which results from the book itself, must be superadded the evil caused by your sin of disobedience.

But why does the Church forbid it? Is it that She does not desire us to know good and evil, truth and falsehood? Why should you? Do you desire to exercise a "right of private judgment"? or do you consent to obey? Obedience is one thing; to follow the guidance of your own understanding is another. The latter is the principle of Protestantism; it is the contradiction of the principle of the Catholic Church. The grounds of the prohibitions of the Church are, however, plain enough—the danger of seduction. We learn in ecclesiastical history, that

Eutyches, the intrepid defender of the Faith, became an arch-heretic by reading a Manichæan book. Bardasanus of Syria, from the same cause, fell away and became a supporter of the Valentinians. Avitus, not heeding the counsel of St. Jerome, became entangled in the errors of Origen. The books of Wicliffe corrupted all Bohemia; those of Luther in the sixteenth century, led all Europe away; and those of the Encyclopædists in the eighteenth century have poisoned the minds of all the "civilized" world. You ascribe to the Church a fear of your learning both evil and good, both falsehood and truth? Yes; She knows that evil has more attractions for you than the good. Falsehood is presented to you in golden goblets, and you drink with pleasure the sparkling liquor; but truth is found by him, who would drink only in the cold springs of the deepest wells. Error comes in romances, stories, poetry, fiction, and "leaders;" it is highly spiced; it is furnished day by day in various forms; it is rehearsed at every club and drawing-room by every mouth that addresses you. Error, I have said by mistake; I should have said errors, for the departures from truth are infinite in number. Truth, on the other hand, is slowly and drily uttered, by a few good and learned men; it comes without the charm of passion or the license of imagination. Truth is sober and sedate; error is the "courteous god of joyous wit, with brow solute, and ever-laughing eye." To conceive or accept an objection to truth is easy, and costs no trouble or labour. Hundreds of false maxims are daily repeated as objections to one truth. But to sound an objection

and find its inanity, requires a depth of intellect which few possess. Here, then, the guidance of the Church is of inestimable value; and "the shield of the Faith, by which we may guard against all these fiery darts of the wicked one," cannot be dispensed with. Is your Faith of so little value to you, that you would venture to risk it by disobeying the Church, and reading fallacious or immoral publications? Yet you are careful not to contract the slightest stain upon your clothes! Are you in favour of a law to prevent the indiscriminate sale of poison? Yet the evil of a material poison is only temporal; the evil of spiritual poison is eternal. Be consistent, and give up the false maxims by which you oppose the endeavour of the Church to prevent the sale of bad books and journals.

But one of the means used, by the Catholic Church, for the repression of erroneous opinions is or was that infamous Inquisition? What was the Inquisition? The Inquisition was an ecclesiastical tribunal, whose office it was to discover, judge, and condemn those Catholics who were corrupting the Faith, or vitiating Christian morals. Every society has the right to preserve or defend itself; it has, *a fortiori*, the right to repress those members of its own body who are attempting to disturb or destroy it. But the Church is undoubtedly a society, and therefore the Church possesses these rights. As to the means, it is plain that as it is a repression of men, the means must touch both body and soul, since man consists of both.

There is a further ground of right over Her members, which is special to the Church alone of all societies. Every member has voluntarily, through sponsors at Baptism and of themselves at Confirmation, accepted the position of a son. Every one has promised to regard the Church as a mother, and to receive all Her doctrines, and to yield Her obedience. The Church, on Her part, gives them all the treasures of grace, and engages to protect the Faith of Her children from all assaults.

Every society must pay attention to the common good. No private person is ever allowed to engage in that which is held injurious to the whole society, or to other members of the society. To repress persons who persist in carrying on injurious pursuits, no society is content with counsel and advice, and promises of reward. Every society has resort to menaces and punishments, and even to imprisonment and death. Any Government who neglects to perform this duty for the society under its control, is held to be censurable for not performing the prime functions of a ruler. So also it is the duty of every Government to take precautions against admitting any infected persons within its territories; and if any of the members of the society itself become infected, the Government has to put them under restraint and to isolate them, and to confine them to fever hospitals, and constrain them to undergo medical treatment; and lastly, the Government has a right to burn all property of theirs that has become infected. If every temporal society has this right and duty in regard to physical infection, has not the Church much more

this right and duty in regard to spiritual infection? The Jewish Church was commanded to try, and, after sentence, to stone any one, whoever he might be, who counselled them to depart from the true God. So solicitous did God require that Church to be, in saving the people from error. St. Augustine defended, or rather urged, the most strenuous measures against the Donatists, in order to correct, or at least to repress them. This, he said, is the proper exercise of the "power instituted by God for the preservation of the Church;" and even (he continued) if many complain of such an exercise of power against them, yet that is no reason to desist from applying it; for mad persons do not relish the restraint that is placed upon them, nor the medicines which they are forced to take.

Yes, we acknowledge the right of every Government to repress any private persons engaged in acts which may result in injury to others or in damage to the commonwealth; but such an argument does not apply to religious matters. Why not? How can you utter such a maxim? It is because you think it of such small consequence what religion a man may adopt; so that although you compel every Londoner to sweep his chimney each quarter, lest an annoyance should be caused to others by a chimney catching fire; yet you say that a man may mix up as much error as he likes, with the Faith, and then propagate his false opinions even though this act should mislead others and cause them to lose the purity of their Faith. This is religious indifferentism, or rather atheism. It comes from the assumption that

you are upon the earth only to amuse yourself and cull every pleasure. It is because you live on earth with no higher end than the brutes. That is the character of the age in which we live. Is not the maternal rigour of the Church, in endeavouring to get men out of this degraded state a proof of Her love and solicitude?

Every State, of whatever religion, has acknowledged by its acts that it is necessary to put down erroneous doctrines, especially in matters of religion, in order to save society from injury. All Europe once ranged itself against Saracens, Moors, and Turks. Afterwards the revived Manichæism of the Waldenses and Albigenses was put down by force. In these days, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, attack the Catholic Church with violence; and England has persecuted the Irish Church for three centuries, and still refuses to extend to Irish Catholics the treatment which their Protestant fellow-subjects enjoy. The United States is sending her troops against the Mormons. The Russians are repressing the Rashkolniks and the Starowirtzi. All these actions spring from the universally acknowledged necessity of putting down erroneous opinions by force. This is universally acknowledged. But many Governments err as to what opinions are erroneous, because they do not know the truth. Luther, Calvin, Cranmer, Ridley, Latimer, Knox, &c., affirmed, quite as strongly as Catholic writers, the necessity of repressing errors.

We do not dispute this maxim, nor do we complain of its being put into execution; all we complain of is

its abuse—the cruelty and bloodshed in putting it into practice. This is the one charge against the Inquisition. This statement shall presently be sifted; but first a fallacy must be pointed out. Even if the statement were true, this would be no argument against the Inquisition. To prove an abuse of a thing, does not prove the necessity of repressing the use of it; otherwise every institution would have to be put down, and not even railways and telegraphs would escape. An institution is condemned only when the abuses are not accidental, but spring necessarily from its essential character; that is, when the abuse is the effect caused by the institution itself. Apply this canon to the Roman Inquisition. Its mode of proceeding against accused persons was accurately defined by Bulls of the Popes, and by canon law. No one could even be imprisoned until his guilt had been clearly established before a judicial tribunal. No one could be worried by excessive delays in legislation, as the utmost length of delay was, by canon law, expressly limited. There were also stringent rules with regard to the character of witnesses; and false testimony was ordered to be treated with the utmost severity. There was a power of appeal given to the accused; and there were a number of other minute precautions in favour of the accused, some of which have been followed in our system of law, and others of which it would certainly be well to observe. Above all, there was pardon offered to all the condemned who should acknowledge their fault within a certain time. Was there any cruelty in this? On the contrary, the proceedings of the Inquisition

were far more just than those of any judicial court in Europe.

So, also, the prisons of the Inquisition were, at the time they were in use, the best in Europe—as even Llorente was constrained to admit. A prisoner, he said, was never even put in chains, except he had made an attempt on his own life. As to torture—it was in use in the civil tribunals of Europe until the end of the eighteenth century, long after the Inquisition had ceased to apply it.

But the Auto-da-fé! Yes; what was that auto-da-fé? It was the *actus fidei*, an act or profession of faith pronounced by the acquitted prisoner on his being set at liberty. This is the testimony of Llorente, a great enemy of the Inquisition. That writer speaks of the crass ignorance of some that confounded the auto-da-fé of the acquitted, with the punishment of the convicted.

It remains then for us to see what was the punishment of the convicted? They were simply delivered over to the secular arm to be dealt with as the secular judges thought fit. The punishment was awarded by the secular judges, not by the Inquisition. Were the punishments severe? It was the laity who apportioned them. The laity, at that time, felt the gravity of an offence against God, and had some care for the honour of God. They did not make light of blasphemy, sacrilege, apostasy or atheism. They held that an insult to the Supreme Ruler of all society, was an insult to society itself; and they measured the punishment by what they esteemed the gravity of the offence. If, in those times, bar-

barous punishments were resorted to for the worst offences, it was merely a consequence of the rough-and-ready character of the times.

The Inquisition in Spain, at all events, passed the limits of justice. Certainly it did. Every time that temporal princes persist in meddling with matters that do not pertain to their province, they always will do so. The Spanish Inquisition had been withdrawn from the authority of the Holy Office in Rome, and had become a political tribunal carried on with purely political ends. It pretended, even, to judge many cases which were entirely outside the competence of the Inquisition. The Sovereign Pontiffs wrote private letters and public constitutions, in the endeavour to moderate the action of that tribunal: but without effect. This statement can be verified by Llorente's work, or by Professor Hefele's (of Tübingen) Epitome of Llorente in his *Ximenes.*

From the beginning of the action of the Spanish Inquisition, Pope Sixtus IV., was very ill contented with it, and urged his objections so strongly, that the Ambassadors of both Courts were ordered to leave their respective stations, and Ferdinand commanded all his subjects to quit Rome. The Pope at last made concessions by the Bull of November 1, 1478. On receiving further accounts of the cruelties done by the Inquisitors of Seville, he retracted the Bull, and ordered that, in future, the Inquisitors should pass no judgment without the assistance of the bishops. He further commanded that the Inquisition should not be established in any other province,

there being already the ordinary tribunals of the bishops. When Isabella afterwards desired the withdrawal of the decree which ordered the bishops to sit with the Inquisitors, Pope Sixtus IV., courteously, but firmly refused.

The next year, in order to temper the severity of the Inquisition, he appointed Manrique, Archbishop of Seville, as Papal Judge of Appeals, before whom all who thought themselves hardly treated by the Inquisitors, could take their cases. He further gave an appeal from the Archbishop to himself. The Holy Father thus quashed many prosecutions, and softened the punishments in other cases. He, moreover, required that all those who had abjured their heresy, should be treated with the utmost leniency; and conjured the King and Queen, "by the bowels of mercy in Jesus Christ," to show more tenderness to their subjects—to those, even, who had unfortunately fallen into error. But King Ferdinand, and afterwards the Emperor Charles V., replied by endeavouring to stop appeals from being carried to Rome.

The Pope also insisted that the civil status and the property of every condemned person should be restored to him, or if he was no longer alive, that these should revert to his children. He also ordered, on February 11, 1486, that fifty prisoners under trial should be set at liberty, by the Inquisitors—but secretly, for fear of the civil tribunals; the next day as many more; and again more by a brief of June 30; and a vast number more in July. Llorente himself relates these facts.

Under Julius II. and Leo X., the appeals to Rome were continued. Llorente moreover mentions a long series of cases, for which the Pope appointed special judges, so as to withdraw the accused from the hands of the Inquisitors. The Popes also commanded the Inquisitors to set at liberty all those against whom very grave offences had not been proved. They also reprieved many of the others from carrying the sanbenito, or sackcloth of penance, &c. Many of these Pontifical mitigations, it is true, proved ineffectual. For the King of Spain, terrified, with threats, the judges whom he had appointed in the place of the Inquisitors. Sometimes, also, the King or Emperor forbade the execution of the Papal briefs; and sometimes there was an open refusal of obedience to the Pope's commands.

The Pope, or the Papal Nuncio, often had to menace the Inquisitors with excommunication, for continuing to prosecute prisoners who had appealed to Rome; and more than once the sentence of excommunication had actually to be pronounced. Pope Leo X., for example, excommunicated the Inquisitors of Toledo, thereby giving great annoyance to the Emperor Charles V. The Pope sometimes quashed judgments which had been passed, but were yet unexecuted. Virues, for example, the chaplain of Charles V., had been condemned by the Inquisition for Lutheran tendencies, and had been sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. Paul III. declared him innocent, and made him, moreover, Bishop of the Canaries.

In 1519, Leo X. wanted to reform the whole of

the Spanish Inquisition, on the ground that so little attention had been paid to his letters of pardon. He issued three briefs for this object; but Charles V. at first endeavoured to turn him from his design; and afterwards did as much as he could to hinder the execution of it. Pope Paul III. lamented bitterly the condition of the Spanish Inquisition, and assisted those who were opposing its introduction into Naples. Pope Pius IV. aided St. Charles Borromeo in keeping it out of Milan; and Llorente confesses that the Spanish Government always abetted the Inquisition both on these occasions, and whenever the Holy See decreed anything against them.

From these facts it is clear, therefore, that the Church cannot be blamed for the excesses of the Spanish Inquisition. We should, in fact, have heard very little about it, if it had not been erroneously regarded as a blot on the escutcheon of the Church.

In judging of distant times, we must judge them, not by our feelings and thoughts, but according to the feelings and circumstances prevalent in those times. The same rule must be applied to the epoch of the Inquisition. Men were then most jealous for their Faith. In these days, if a man is punished for rejecting the Faith, or even for insulting God, every Government and every nation of Europe cries out against the sentence. Yet when Communists burn public buildings, every one is loud in protesting that shooting would be too good for them. Every one then gnashes his teeth and insists on death being dealt out broadcast. Is, then, a denial of the Faith, or blasphemy against God, not a far worse

crime than the burning down of public buildings or setting fire to public libraries?

Verily, by maintaining the unity of the Faith, the Roman See saved the world more bloodshed, and spared it far more ruins, than all the monarchs of the world have been able to accomplish by their palliative or their coercive legislation. But the Church is hampered now, while States are free to legislate as they list. What do we see? Seditions, revolutions, communes, internationals, intransigentes, and all their concomitant horrors. Secular States cannot rival the Church in bringing "peace on earth to men of goodwill."

Even the Spanish Inquisition can say this in excuse: "Our secular Government saw all Europe in flames, and all lands reeking with blood, wherever the unity of the Faith had been lost; the Peasant's War, the Thirty Years War, and other wars in Germany; the excesses of the Anabaptists; seditions in France, England, and Flanders, and so forth. Our rulers, seeing this, determined to spare Spain these horrors, by preserving, at all costs, the unity of the Faith. The Inquisition was the means that our rulers devised. How can you blame them for the deaths and tortures of a few heretics, when we thereby saved all Spain from interminable wars and horrors?"

The Church is, at all events, censurable for the massacre of St. Batholomew. The massacre took place under Charles IX. of France, in the year 1572; and it certainly constitutes one of the blackest pages in history. Let us, then, investigate the matter, and

see on whom the blame justly rests. In doing this, let us, however, consult history, and not a host of declamatory writers. Grotius remarks that the Calvinists, in France, led away nobles and other persons of dissolute habits ; and that when they had thus acquired strength, they went among the lowest of the people, and stirred up seditions. The factions at the French Court adding considerably to the power of the Calvinists, they passed from town to village, carrying fire and sword wherever they went, and disseminating their opinions by force of arms. They desecrated and defaced the churches, ruined monasteries, killed priests, dishonoured the virgins of Christ, and slaughtered Catholics who refused to renounce their Faith. As the King of France discountenanced such proceedings, they openly incited the people to rebellion, by means of the most inflammatory writings. They soon got so far as to oppose force to the King's power, and laid siege to cities. La Rochelle they captured, and made it their chief stronghold. They next appealed to the Protestants of Germany, and to Queen Elizabeth of England, for aid in men, money, and arms, which they readily obtained. Admiral Coligny began to assume the airs of a king, and reigned over various provinces in France, levying imposts and appointing governors over the cities, and strengthening the civil war against his legitimate sovereign. Charles IX., having in vain tried milder means of bringing the Admiral and the Calvinists back to their allegiance, had great fears of losing his kingdom, like so many other Catholic princes, and determined to anticipate

the catastrophe by a *coup d'État*. He took his measures with the utmost secrecy, and killed Admiral Coligny and the other leaders of the Protestants. It was even said, on good authority, that Charles had discovered a plot to murder him, his family, and the members of his Government, before he resolved on the sudden and violent blow which he dealt with so much effect. Three days after the massacre, he went in person to his Parliament, and explained the reasons which had induced him to crush the rebellion by killing those conspirators, whom he had so often pardoned, when he had got them into his power; and who, with the blackest perfidy, had returned to their dark plots the moment they had again enjoyed their liberty. So says Davila.

In all this catastrophe the Church, as all the documents testify, took no part whatsoever. No suspicion, of that which had been so suddenly determined by the King, was aroused in the mind of any one of the foreign Ambassadors; and when the news of it reached Rome, the greatest astonishment and perplexity prevailed. Salviati, the Nuncio in Paris, knew nothing of the intention, as Chateaubriand has shown by the correspondence of Gregory XIII. Sir James Mackintosh was also evidently aware of the Nuncio's ignorance. Philip II. of Spain was in equal ignorance, as Capefigue has shown from the archives of Simanca, which were captured by Napoleon. Even Catharine, the mother of Charles IX., could not have known of the intention; for she was engaged in attempting, through La Mothe Fénelon, to marry one of her sons—either the Duc d'Anjou, or else

the Duc d'Alençon to Queen Elizabeth. It would clearly have been foolish to take all this trouble, if she had known that a measure was about to be taken which would naturally incense Elizabeth, to the greatest degree, against the French Court. At all events she would have informed La Mothe Fénélon, Ambassador in London, of what was in preparation. Yet, when the event had taken place, he was reproachful at having been kept in complete ignorance of the whole affair. The fact was that it was a very sudden thought of the King, and was communicated to no person, except the few to whom was intrusted the immediate execution of it. There was no ecclesiastic in the Council of the King; and no part of the execution of it was confided to any ecclesiastic. The author of *Annales Politiques* testifies that no priest was in the least cognizant of the intention. He asserts also that it was, from beginning to end, a merely political expedient. In the face of such testimony, how, with any show of justice, can any blame be insinuated against the Church? On the contrary, while it was in execution, the Church interfered to save the victims. At Lyons, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Bourges, and other cities, the bishops and other ecclesiastics succeeded in their indefatigable attempts to save persons from the effects of the King's orders, and from the fury of the populace.

Yes; but when Pope Gregory XIII. came to hear of it, he caused the Te Deum to be sung in Rome. The occurrence was announced in Rome in the same terms as it was announced to every other Court of Europe; namely—"It was necessary to anticipate the

execution of a horrible conspiracy (which had, by a miracle, become known) to massacre the King, the royal family, and all the Government, including the Queen-Mother and the King's brothers, the Dukes of Anjou and Alençon, and even the King of Navarre as well." No more than this was known in Paris and the rest of France; and no more could be learned in Rome. The *Te Deum* was sung for the miraculous salvation (as had been stated) of the King of France and of the royal family from a malignant conspiracy by the old disturbances of the public peace. It was a *Te Deum* in thanksgiving for deliverance. The soft-hearted Pontiff was nevertheless often heard to sigh, during the singing of the *Te Deum*, and to say to himself: "Who knows whether, among the guilty, some innocent persons may not also have fallen?" That was the only part the Church can be said to have taken in the matter.

The controversy has often turned upon the number who were slain in the massacre. This clearly does not in the least affect the question of the authorship of the deed; nor yet does it alter the character of the transaction. It may, however, be well remarked that the *Martyrology of the Huguenots* (published in 1581, nine years after the occurrence, and compiled by the Huguenots themselves, and received, with entire approbation, by the sect) estimates the extent of the massacre at fifteen thousand one hundred and sixty-eight, after explicitly rejecting the common report that thirty thousand had perished. When the names of the victims are, however, reckoned up, there appear only to have been seven hundred and eighty-six.

But this makes no difference as to the author, or the amount of criminality of the deed.

There was another act of the Church in repressing what She deemed erroneous opinions—namely, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes; what defence can be set up for that act? First let us examine what the Edict of Nantes was, and then let us inquire why it was revoked. Henry IV. of France was a Protestant until he came into possession of the throne of France. He then changed his religion, in order to be able to mount the throne. On his accession he found that the heretics had usurped, in rebellion, many of the prerogatives of the royal authority. It seemed to him, therefore, hardly politic to resist them at once; besides, he had a leaning towards his former co-religionists. By an edict, published at Nantes, he therefore conceded to them, many civil rights—such as the public practice of their religion, and the civil and religious government of many towns. In course of time, the turbulence of these persons became more languid; and La Rochelle, their stronghold, having been taken from them, the members of the sect began to diminish rapidly. Louis XIV. came to the throne, and laboured for twenty years, with considerable effect, to bring these ignorant and misguided persons back to the unity of the Faith. He was prudent, and therefore not in too great a hurry. He abhorred rigorous measures, and respected the concessions of his ancestors. The nobility, half of whom became Protestant under Henry IV., were now all Catholic. The Chancellor d'Aguesseau, stated that his father, who governed

Languedoc, himself saw six thousand Protestants, of that province, return to the Faith; and gave this as a fair sample of what had happened through the rest of France. The Protestant Sismondi, bears testimony to the good results of the measures of Louis, and states the general opinion that the moment had arrived for reuniting all France to the Faith. The Chancellor Tellier, then eighty-three years of age, and very infirm, petitioned the King as a last consolation before his approaching death, namely, to countersign a royal edict which should revoke the Edict of Nantes. The King saw full well the political advantages of unity, and yielded to the entreaties of his Chancellor.

The King had a perfect right to do so. Grotius, a Protestant, wrote—that "all Protestants should be aware that the Edict of Nantes, and the like, were not treaties of alliance, but decrees made by the sovereign ruler of the realm for the common good; and therefore revocable whenever the public good demanded such a step." All Protestant nations have exercised such a right in regard to Catholic fellow-subjects. They have thus put themselves out of court, and are unable to dispute its justice. As to its prudence, however, it may be observed that all the grounds for the Edict of Nantes had passed away; and the few remaining Huguenots showed a disposition to reunite themselves, on the slightest pressure, to the Church of their forefathers. To Louis, the unity of the realm was a matter of the greatest moment. It was in his reach. Was he imprudent in putting out his hand to take it? Louvois, it is

true, was somewhat harsh in carrying out the edict, but what had the Church to say to it? She had no hand in the matter. She was in no way to blame, as Saint Simon himself declared. Nay, the Church, as on former occasions, was at once there to labour for the mitigation of lay severities. Fénélon wrote—"O pastors of the flock! put away all narrowness, and open to them, at once, the bowels of mercies. You know nothing, if you know merely how to command, to repress, to correct, to follow the letter of the law. Be fathers. Nay, that is not enough. Be mothers also, and suffer the pangs of labour in forming Jesus Christ, if only in one heart." Bossuet likewise set himself against the use of any force, and permitted no one whom he could protect, to be molested. The Church did more. She obtained, from Louis XIV., the Declaration of 1698, the "King's Instruction" to the Governors, and the "King's Letter" to the bishops, by which the kingdom was re-opened to the Protestants, and their goods were restored to them, on the sole condition of their not refusing instruction. Here again the Church appeared in the character of an advocate, a moderator, a mother. How then can you find fault with the Church, when Her only action was kindness and love? Nay, censure Luther, rather, who gloried in having been the author of the Peasant's War, in which more than one hundred thousand persons perished for their religion. Censure Calvin; because the Consistory established by him in Geneva (as appears by the registers of the city) condemned upwards of one hundred and fifty persons on the

sole charge of magic, besides many hundreds exiled, imprisoned, or burned for their religion. Condemn the massacres by Protestants in Dalecarlia, in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. Condemn England for the cruelties which followed the Reformation, and for the oppression which has been practised for centuries in Ireland. The tyranny and blood-thirstiness of Cromwell almost surpasses belief. The prescriptions, fines, exilings, imprisonments, tearing the bowels out of living men and women, the "Scavenger's daughter," and a thousand other nicetics of torture, should for ever stop England's mouth and prevent her throwing stones against her neighbour's cruelty. Let England deplore her own cruelty to Catholics, rather than attack France for her lesser cruelties to the Huguenots. Above all, let her not pour contumely on the Church for acts in which the Church had no part.

But Galileo's treatment, at least, is a proof of the errors the Church has fallen into, when endeavouring to repress the publication of errors. A very false picture has been drawn of Galileo, and a flood of sickly sentimentality has been shed over it in Protestant lands. But it is all imagination of some one deceived, or the rank falsehood of a deceiver. These were the facts of the case. Galileo asserted, in contradiction to the generally received opinion, that the earth turned round. As long as it remained in a state of theory or hypothesis, the Holy See took no part in the controversy. Cardinal di Cusa had, indeed, already maintained the motion of the earth;

and Copernicus had been permitted to dedicate, to the Pope, the book in which he advanced his theory. Galileo was, therefore, not subjected to the opposition which every innovator raises up, and every one who ventures to start an opposition to generally accepted opinions, is sure to receive. He was, indeed, well received by Prince Cesi and others; and Cardinal Bellarmine wrote to the astronomer Clavius, and to three other Jesuits to ascertain their opinions on the new discoveries. They replied that they were favourably inclined to them. In Galileo's native country, however, an opposition sprang up, which shortly spread from Tuscany to Rome. The character of the opposition was that Galileo's doctrines were contrary to Scripture, and therefore heretical. Hereupon Galileo imprudently, and to the injury of his own cause, abandoned the scientific grounds and defended himself by inventing new and dangerous canons of interpretation, so as to get rid of those passages of Scripture which had been alleged against his theory. This is shown by his letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, as well as by other documents.

A Protestant writer, Mallet du Pan, has drawn some curious arguments on this subject from the despatches of Guicciardini, who was Tuscan Ambassador in Rome at the time. From a despatch of March 6th, 1619, it appears that Galileo had required the Pope and the Holy Office to declare the system of Copernicus well founded on the Holy Scriptures; that he had written memorial upon memorial, insisting upon this demand, and had besieged the antichambers of the Pope and of the

Cardinals, showing that he esteemed his own opinion (says Guicciardini) far more than the judgment of those who were his friends. Galileo even went so far as to say that the mode of interpretation of Scripture had, until his time, been fallacious; (this is confessed by Libri, who has collected all that has been said on the subject, against the Church). Bartoli, in his *Life of Cardinal Bellarmine*, says that the Cardinal was always Galileo's friend, and openly defended him before the Holy Office. It was Bellarmine who conveyed to him the order from the Pope, which was also inscribed in the Register of the Holy Office, "not to speak more of those theological points of agreement between the Sacred Scriptures and the theories of Copernicus."

The Genevese writer, Mallet du Pan, also tells us that Galileo would not pay the slightest attention to the Pope's order; and that, a few years afterwards, he published *Six maxims of the system of the world;* and *A Discourse addressed to Christina of Lorraine*, wherein the theological arguments were again used in support of the theory. The same writer also asserts that "Rome was inundated with writings by the Tuscan astronomer, wherein he appeared to be endeavouring to force the Holy Father to erect his (Galileo's) system into a dogma of the Faith." For these things, says Du Pan, he was cited to Rome, where at length he went after many futile excuses had been advanced and proved useless. Pope Urban VIII. then made known to him, in confidence, the accusations of his enemies and rivals, in order that he might be prepared with

his answers; and commissioned a special Congregation, with the necessary scientific learning, and competent to undertake the investigation. The palace of the Ambassador of Tuscany, Francesco Nicolini, and not a room in the Holy Office, was assigned to Galileo for his residence;[7] and when he afterwards went for eight days to the Holy Office, he occupied the apartments of one of the principal officials, and retained full liberty of ingress and egress. At the end of the eight days, he returned to the Tuscan Minister's palace. The defence which he chose to set up before the Holy Office, was peculiar to his character and most injurious to his case. He did not attempt to prove the truth of the earth's motion, but drew arguments, against his judges and rivals, out of the books of Job and Joshua, losing himself, at last, in a perfect maze of theological subtleties. His own manuscript of his apology contains all this absurd matter. It may be observed that this, besides being a ridiculous defence, was also in direct disobedience to the friendly command of the former Pope, and in total disregard of the earnest advice of his late friend, Cardinal Bellarmine. A condemnation was therefore passed on him, for having relapsed into errors, and a retractation was demanded of him; but (says Du Pan) not the slightest harshness or severity was shown him. This retractation he gave, and instantly retracted by the half-audible protest, saying, "E pure muove la terra." His enemies, we must remember, were not ecclesiastics, but his rivals, the other astronomers of those days; with the exception of the Jesuit astron-

[7] April 12, 1633.

omers, who were favourable to his theory, while shrinking from his theological arguments. How was it, we may be asked, that the Jesuits and the Holy Office differed in their appreciation of the theory of Copernicus? The Jesuits had carefully examined it on mathematical and astronomical grounds. These grounds had, by Galileo, been kept from the Holy Office, while he supported his theory on theological grounds alone. The Holy Office, seeing the fallacies in the defence, of course condemned the conclusion. How was it that they condemned the conclusion as false, solely because the premisses were false? It was in obedience to the well known canon of interpretation of Scripture, which forbade them to depart from the literal sense of Scripture, whenever there is no plain reason to demand a metaphorical explanation. This canon was held and defended by St. Augustine, and has been observed by the whole Church ever since. Is there any one now who denies its soundness? As Galileo offered no reason for adopting any other but a literal interpretation of the passages in question, but desired, on abstract grounds, to abolish the old canons of interpretation and introduce new canons, can we wonder at the failure of his case? As far as his defence went, his theory of the motion of the earth was no more than hypothesis. It had no astronomical support. He made it rest on theological grounds, starting from new canons which he had arbitrarily assumed. As these assumptions were not granted, his case necessarily fell to the ground.

There were, it is true, good reasons why Galileo should shrink from resting his case on astronomy (although the fact that there were these reasons does not touch our argument): the phenomena of aberration, the depression of the earth at the poles, the variations of the pendulum according to latitude, and a hundred other phenomena now so well known, had in those days not yet been discovered. It had, of course, not been proved that the atmosphere of the earth could revolve with it. In fact, science was then in such a condition that it would have been very hard to make it appear that the earth did turn. Even Descartes, it may be remembered, placed himself in contradiction with some points of the Copernican system. Gassendi, also, would not venture to affirm it, and Bacon derided it as repugnant to natural philosophy. Nay, more, Galileo's own explanations of the theory were false. Cantù says he read, in the archives of Rinuccini in Florence, an autograph of Galileo, written towards the close of his life, in which he renounced the Copernican system, and rehearsed the physical arguments which had led him to it; and these, says Cantù, were such that no scientific man could accept, any more than he could reject the theory which they were advanced to prove. Could the Holy Office, then, be blamed for refusing to accept metaphorical interpretations of Scripture, when no reason for so doing had been laid before the Holy Office, and when Galileo's theory was unsupported by evidence? Let us, in the next place, remember that the Holy Office is not gifted with infallibility, not being the Church. What, then,

had the Church to do with the question? What argument against the Church can be drawn from this page of history?

If Galileo had been content to let theology alone, and to advance his theory as an astronomical hypothesis, the Holy Office would not have concerned itself with him, any more than it did with Cardinal di Cusa and Copernicus. Still less would he have been hindered from working out reasonable proofs, on astronomical grounds, of an astronomical truth. When this was done, in later years, the Church did not utter a word of opposition.

There is no proof, then, that the Holy Office abused its powers in this instance; and even if this could be substantiated, yet it would not serve to make out a case against the utility of the Holy Office. Still less could such a fault be transferred to the Church. If every right is to be annulled that has once been abused, and if every ruler or director is to be accounted guilty of every abuse committed by a subordinate, then there is an end to every authority on the earth. As to the action of the Church, and even of the Holy Office, there is no room for such a charge; no abuse can be alleged, except through gross malice, or through crass ignorance.[8]

So far the accusations against the Church have been proved groundless. There is only one more charge against the Church Herself which now

[8] If any one desires to enter into more detail, let him consult the works of Mgr. Marini, and of Signor Alberi.

demands our attention. *The sale of Indulgences, and of the Briefs and Bulls for the investiture of benefices, and of dispensations from abstinence*, &c.

The sale of indulgences. Here is no question of the spiritual value of indulgences. That was defined by the Council of Trent, and, as I speak to Catholics alone, the question may be regarded as undisputed. Let me, then, ask you whether you have ever had to pay a single penny for an indulgence? Have you ever expended anything for all the indulgences that you have gained in your life, whether plenary or partial, whether general or attached to special works? Can you point to a single instance of a payment having ever been made to the Church by any person, for the promulgation of an indulgence?

But in order to gain some indulgences you have to give alms. To whom? Do your alms go to Rome? No. Your alms you give to the poor; you relieve actual distress. Why have you to do this in order to gain some indulgences? Because the doctrine of indulgences teaches that indulgence is granted only on the performance of some good work, whether it be prayer, or mortification, or alms.

But perhaps it was not so in Luther's time. Yes, it was. In all times the Church has had the greatest horror of the sale of holy things. She has issued decrees, either by Her Councils, or through the mouths of Her Popes, which ordained that those who commit simony (so called after Simon Magus) shall be treated as heretics. This was done long before Luther was born. We may take as examples the Council of Constance and the Council of Lyons.

Numerous Pontiffs, also, prohibited such abuses under pain of the severest punishments. What more could the Church do to prevent such abuses from being committed by individuals.

But surely there were cases of the sale of indulgences by some bishops or priests? If this is the premiss you labour to prove, how can you have the face to pretend to draw from it a conclusion affirming aught against the Church? Do you condemn all fathers of families because some servant, or other person in the family, has committed an act of dishonesty? Do you abolish all Governments because some hot-brained officer has levied an unjust war? Do you find fault with all rulers, and their constituted laws, because some vice may be found to exist, or some crime may be discovered? "Offences must come," says our Lord. He does not add a woe to the rulers whose people commit offences; but "woe to those individuals by whom the offences are done." The Church never sold an indulgence. The Church has always been most vigilant and solicitous in preventing such an abuse. Let any one who can, prove the contrary.

But Briefs, Bulls, Dispensations, and other faculties are sold in Rome. If you had told me that in England they sell livings and chapelries for money, and ecclesiastical appointments for a vote, I would readily admit it. In blaming the Catholic Church for selling briefs and bulls for the investiture of benefices, you appear zealous for purity. Be equally ardent then in blaming the English Church. There, indeed, you may find plenty to blame; but in Rome such a traffic has never taken place.

Nor has any similar traffic been carried on. Absolution from major excommunication is, and always has been, given gratis. Authentic relics, which have been preserved in Rome, are, and always have been, given gratis. Dispensations from certain laws of the Church are, and always have been, given gratis. Dispensations from fasting and abstinence are, and always have been, granted gratis. For, as we said before, if, in some cases, the Church imposes a commutation of good works—*e.g.*, giving alms to the poor if you are unable to fast—yet that is not a sale of a dispensation. Rome obtains nothing thereby, and the poor alone are benefited.

I solemnly appeal to every Catholic, and ask him if any Christian can believe that the Church of Christ could prostitute Herself in the administration of the good things which Christ has left to Her, and sell the gifts of the Holy Ghost for money? Can you deem yourselves sons of God, and coheirs with Jesus Christ, if you offer such insults to Holy Church, your mother? How different from your forefathers, who devoted their goods to Jesus Christ, by leaving them to the Church, for Her to administer in perpetuity, for the good of souls and the advancement of the kingdom of Christ! How different from your forefathers, who gave their blood for the Church, confessing Jesus Christ before men! For you pour contumely on Jesus Christ and His Spouse, and dishonour your ancestors in the face of the world.

The objections which are brought against the Church sometimes take the form of malignant

calumnies against the Sovereign Pontiffs. *Papal vices* have been loosely spoken of. The libertines and revolutionists who bring this charge are doubtless so zealous for the glory of God that they *cannot suffer His name to be evil spoken of among the Pagans on the ground that vice has been detected in some of the Supreme Pontiffs of His Church. Such scandals, moreover,* say they, *are apt to shock timorous Christians also, and to make them doubt the divine character of the Church.* There is one point in this excellent sentiment which arrests our attention, and makes us ask: Why, if you are zealous for the glory of God, and afraid for the constancy of frail Christians, why should you be so anxious to rake up every scrap of calumny, and jump at every rumour of evil conduct, and then repeat it *ad nauseam*, and take every opportunity of spreading it far and wide? How often have you treated at large of such calumnies, already a hundred times exploded, in the daily papers, and in monthly and quarterly reviews? Is that for the glory of God? You weave it into novels, you drag it into comedies, and exaggerate it on the stage; you make it the subject of your pictures, and the chief incidents of your poems. Are these things for the glory of God? What kind of zeal is this? Is it like the zeal of Him Who said, "The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up?" No, it is only Cham who would point to the shame of his parent. It is a worse son than Cham who would prompt the invention of calumnies. Are you not the "accursed children," who "bring false accusations," hypocritically pretending to a zeal for God?

But let us inquire whether there was any Pontiff who was unworthy of this highest dignity. The Pontiffs were but men, and so we must believe that, in their private lives, they were not without sin; although we believe, also, that every Pontiff, when speaking on Faith and morals from the Chair of St. Peter, was kept from every error by the Spirit of God. There have been two hundred and sixty-two Popes. Against how many do you bring charges? Perhaps against six or seven. What accusations do you bring? Charges, verily, that would appear but small in any man except a Pope. You do not attempt to allege against them one sin in their Pontifical lives, as great as those with which your greatest kings were covered—such as Peter the Great, Napoleon the Great, Henry VIII., good Queen Bess, William of glorious memory! Truly, then, you manifest your appreciation of the high dignity and sacred character of the office, if so small a sin in a Pope, can be so great a stain on his character. What then is your accusation? Nepotism! What is that? It denotes an endeavour to benefit one's relations. But is not that a virtue—a natural virtue? To leave father and mother, and brother, and sister for Christ, is an Evangelical perfection. Those whom you accuse—how did they become Popes? They were chosen when kings and men of the world without, and angry factions within, were agitating and hampering the Church. Look at those Popes with the eyes of those who lived in their own day. Do not judge them according to modern ideas, and other circumstances, wants, and necessities. Yet,

even if you do judge them according to other ideas, even if you regard them as surrounded by the circumstances and conditions of modern times, what is all that you can lay to their charge? Those few were less worthy of that high throne, than the many others. Yet those few were better than the best of kings. How marvellous, then, must have been the excellence of all the others! It is only "the good shepherd who giveth his life for the sheep;" yet more than sixty Pontiffs gave their lives for the sheep, while many others calmly advanced with their lives in their hands, but were denied the martyr's death and crown. There were others who shone with the perfections of the Evangelical virtues. Others were remarkable for zeal in apostolizing barbarous lands. Others were marvels of wisdom and learning. Others showed patience, calmness, and a perfect trust in God during continual persecutions and in the most harassing times. Love of the poor, private disinterestedness, self-abnegation, mortification of the flesh, holiness of manners, a loving piety towards God, zeal for the good of others, watchfulness over the flock committed to them, constancy in prayer—these virtues are too common, in the lives of the Popes, to arrest our attention or call for a remark. If you will not trust history, yet consider those whom living men may have seen—the patience and forbearance of Pius VI., the gentleness and piety of Pius VII., the zeal and firmness of Leo XII., the gravity and justice of Gregory XVI., the angelic fervour of Pius IX., and his calm trust under lasting persecutions and imprisonment.

But why that luxury of the Sovereign Pontiffs, the Cardinals, and the Prelates of the Church? Is that consistent with Evangelical poverty? Let them rather part with their luxuries and give to the poor. When we discuss the earthly sovereignty or temporal power of the Popes, then more can appropriately be said on this head. Let me, however, ask you here, Why you do not first look at home, and remark on the luxury of the bishops of the English Church, and of the head of the English Church? They do not practise Evangelical poverty. The little Church of England enjoys far greater revenues than the whole Universal (Catholic) Church. Why not urge the Evangelical counsel of poverty there?

But let that pass. Let us rather investigate the alleged luxury of Catholic prelates. Even before the recent spoliations, the Pope did not receive half as much as the civil list of the poorest European king; and he spent most of that small sum upon the poor. Out of less than £160,000, he supported his Court, the Sacred College of Cardinals, all his ministers, ambassadors, and diplomatic agents, besides bestowing an immense sum on relieving distress and benefiting the poor. A Cardinal, who is a prince of the Holy Church, receives less than many a Church of England clergyman. The Catholic prelates cannot, then, be accused of luxury.

Let them part with their luxuries, and give to the poor. It was the traitor Judas who complained that St. Mary Magdalene was guilty of luxury when, in her grief and her gratitude, she poured a box of ointment over our Lord's feet: "Why this waste? It

might have been sold for a hundred pence and given to the poor." So you Liberals say of the Church. The stinted incomes of Pontiff, Cardinals, and prelates you term "luxury," and then exclaim, with a well-feigned righteous indignation, "Why such waste? Give it to the poor?" Our Lord rebuked Judas, for the saying which you now repeat.

Princes of the earth use magnificence and luxury, and live in grand palaces, and keep many servants; because these things inspire a notion of their authority, and draw men's hearts towards them. But the prelates of Holy Church have an authority more excellent than earthly monarchs, inasmuch as the spirit is more excellent than the body. Therefore, even if they exhibited magnificence, it would not be wrong in them. For, by parity of reasoning, it would inspire an idea of the authority which God has given to His Church and to them, and cause men to yield submission to them, and to love His Church. For this reason, no doubt, God ordered ornaments of immense price to be made for His Temple and His priests under the Levitical law.

Why, then, do the libertines and revolutionists exclaim against the magnificence of churches and of prelates? Because they wish to lessen the authority of the Church, and to prevent hearts being drawn towards Her, and to take all influence from Her prelates and priests. So, also, as they desire to supplant kings and establish republics, they counsel kings to be "more popular," and to put aside all external marks of majesty, and to run about like ordinary citizens. Why? In order to diminish the

conception of royal authority. When this has vanished they raise the people in revolution against their stripped and denuded kings. The same aim governs them in regard to the Pope. When they see the faithful kiss his foot in reverence, they exclaim, "He is only a man like yourself; why kiss his foot?" Yes, he is a man like us; but he has a dignity which we have not. He is invested with an authority direct from Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ has promised him assistance to keep him from error and to enable him to teach the truth. He has in his hands the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and the power to bind and loose both in heaven and earth. Through his voice Jesus Christ speaks to the faithful. Verily, if we render him every sort of honour, we shall not give him his due. It is not before the man, but before the divine authority in him, that we bow.

The same desire of lessening the Pope's authority, has impelled men to exclaim against his temporal power or sovereignty. For the enemies of the Church have said: If we can only reduce the Pope to the condition of a private man or a subject, we shall strip him of all authority. With this aim, they have invented the following maxims—*The Church would be stronger if the Pope were not a King, that is, if he had no temporal power. The temporal and spiritual powers are repugnant, and cannot coexist in the same person. The Church would gain in moral authority if the Pope were reduced to the condition of St. Peter;*" and the like. The Protestants of England, Switzerland, and Prussia, join in repeating these maxims,

with the atheists, the revolutionists, and the members of secret societies.

Temporal power or an earthly kingdom is unnecessary; the throne is not a necessity for the Pope. True. I concede this much. But that does not prove an earthly kingdom to be bad, nor does it give any one a right to rob him of it. In Protestant countries, in England, Prussia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and also in Russia, there is a head to the national Church. Who, in each country, is the head of the Church? The temporal sovereign. How then do you say that the splendour of the throne is repugnant to the office of Head of the Church? Why have you not discovered that truth by experience in Protestant countries? Around all those thrones—thrones of the head of the Church as well as the temporal ruler—we see luxury; luxury, not only in the ruler himself, but also in his wife and children, in his Court and household, shall we say, in his concubines also? They live in their palaces, they drink various wines of choice vintages, they keep the most expensive cooks, they have their theatres, their dances, their banquets. Why do you not cry out against the incompatibility of the two functions, and of the double ministry? I answer, Because your outcry against the Head of the Church in Rome is the cover of some ulterior design.

Is then the temporal authority not a necessity for the Holy Father? It is. Consider what he is. He is the Head of the Universal Church; he is the authoritative teacher of what has to be believed and done in order to gain eternal life. What is necessary for the accomplishment of the duties of so high an

office? The free exercise of his powers. How can he freely teach what is true, freely condemn what is false, freely denounce the crimes of men and of Governments, freely constitute the hierarchy in various countries, freely let persons have recourse to him in their doubts, and freely reply to them, freely condemn those who refuse obedience to him, freely separate from the Church those who have separated themselves from him by persisting in error or in disobedience—how can he freely do these things if he be not a sovereign, but a subject? He has to define religious and moral truths, *i.e.*, give laws binding on minds in believing, and on consciences in acting. But if he is the subject of another prince, will he be able to speak and legislate freely? Suppose that his definitions or rules of conscience were repugnant to the views, the interests, or the policy of his sovereign, or of the Parliament of the land in which he resides, would he be allowed to publish them for the good of all Christianity? If he were to say that the "principle of non-intervention" is at variance with the principle of love in the Gospel, which puts not only individuals but nations also, under an obligation to benefit each other—would a sovereign, the success of whose intrigues depended on the non-intervention of other nations, allow him to erect the denial of that principle into an article of the Faith? Or if the Pope were to affirm that the principle of the sovereignty of the people is contrary to the precepts of the Apostle Paul, and is an anti-Christian principle, would not the Parliament stop his mouth? Or if he were to condemn the separation of

Church and State, or to declare that the principle of nationalities is no just cause of revolution and war, would those princes who are infatuated for these maxims, allow him to enjoy his freedom as a subject of theirs?

The Holy Father has to constitute the ecclesiastical Hierarchy, and regulate discipline throughout the world. These are two very delicate matters, because of the external influence which the Episcopate must enjoy. Often, to please God, the Pope has to displease men. As a private person, how could he have re-established the Hierarchy in England and Holland, as he did a few years ago? If the Pope had been a subject of France, for example, it would have become a cause of quarrel between us and France, and the French would have had to hinder the promulgation of the decree. The Pope has sometimes to condemn kings to a separation from the body of the Church. If he were the subject of one king, could he excommunicate another king? Could he even excommunicate his own sovereign? Yet this you must allow to be sometimes a necessity, unless you either deny that the Holy Father has spiritual jurisdiction over kings, or deny that princes ever sin; in other words, unless you are prepared to assert that all princes and rulers enjoy infallibility in belief, and impeccability in deed. How then could the Pope exercise these his inalienable rights and duties, over such great personages, unless he were independent of them all? How could he exercise these functions, if the culprits could at any moment lay hands upon him and put him in prison? "Nelli carceri si può patire

per la giustizia, ma dalle carceri la giustizia non si amministra."

By "liberty and independence of the Pope in his spiritual government," is meant not only the liberty and independence of his own person, but also that of the numerous great dignitaries of the Church, who assist him, and of the officials, and ministers, and *employés* of every order, whom he requires and who are required by the numerous ecclesiastical institutions which surround him, and which extend their operations over the whole world. If any Government were to have jurisdiction over them, except that of the Pope alone, or if any Government were able to impede their action, then the Pope would have less immunity and freedom of action than an ambassador of the meanest power in the world. When the Church was smaller and weaker than She is now, when She had much fewer and smaller transactions than She has now, Constantine saw that both he and the Holy Father could not rule in the same city, and he went to Byzantium. Yet, temporal powers were, at that time, far less jealous of the Pope than they are now.

Moreover, the whole Church must feel sure that the government of the Church proceeds purely and simply from the Vicar of Christ, their Pontiff and Father. The liberty of election of a new Pope must, therefore, be undoubted. The Conclave must be in the hands of no Government, nor be subject to any external influence. Besides, if one Government were to acquire an influence over the Pope in his rule over all Christendom, or over a Conclave in its election of a Pope, how jealous all the other powers would

be, and how determined to obtain a like influence. The centre of government of the Church of Christ would thus become the focus of the passions and intrigues of the world. Every power of the earth would seek, by chicanery, frauds, falsehoods, and threats—by diplomacy, in short—to render the Pope the instrument of its own ambition. Even heretic States would join in the struggle, not only because they have Roman Catholics in their own States, but also with the aim of influencing, by means of the Pope, the Roman Catholics in other States, so as to paralyze the action of those States. The power that can succeed in making an instrument of the Pope, would thus acquire two hundred millions of subjects.

We may, by such considerations, divine some of the wise grounds on which, through the direction of God's providence, the Pope obtained his temporal power. He obtained it before Constantine abandoned Rome, and it was confirmed and completed by Charlemagne, more than a thousand years ago. Yet this century, in its frivolity, thinks to take it away. The revolutionists themselves, in 1849, when the Pope was at Gaeta, in the Kingdom of Naples, confessed to themselves one of the difficulties which would at once arise if the temporal power were abolished. They cried out at that time that the decrees of the Holy Father were influenced by the King of Naples to the injury of the new Roman Republic. Napoleon admitted the same difficulty when he said—"The Pope is not at Paris; it is well. We reverence his authority precisely because he is not at Vienna, nor at Madrid. At Vienna and Madrid they feel the same with regard

to Paris. It is, therefore, better that he should be neither with us, nor with any of our rivals, but in Rome, his ancient seat, holding an equal balance between all sovereigns. This is the work of the centuries, and they have done well. The temporal power is the wisest and best institution that could be imagined in the government of souls."

Yes, it is advantageous to all countries, not only in their mutual relations, but also advantageous to each country separately. If the Holy Father were the subject of any Government, what would occur? We have often heard that the Papacy is incompatible with modern institutions, modern civilization, modern legislation. Imagine a law to be passed to decree civil marriages, and the Pope, a subject, issuing a decree commanding the faithful to regard that law as iniquitous! What would be the upshot? Imagine a law to be passed enacting compulsory secular education, and the Pope instantly forbidding Catholic parents to send their children to secular schools; what would be the result? Anarchy. By the side of the proclamation of a decree of the State, there would be pasted a decree of the Ruler of the Universal Church, proclaiming a contrary decree! The State, sanctioning some anti-Christian principle, would the next day be publicly excommunicated by the Pope. The State would soon wish the Pope to regain his own temporal dominion, where he might legislate as should seem to him good; or else it would determine to put him down and blot him out altogether. One result or the other is inevitable. But if it should determine to put him

down, that luckless State may find itself confronted by the two hundred million Catholics of the world, and the God of armies, Who protects His Church.

But the Pope should exercise a little prudence. What do you mean by *prudence?* You mean, doubtless, that the Holy Father is to hold his tongue. You mean that the Vicar of Christ, the organ through whom Christ speaks to the nations, the teacher whom Christ commands to "cry out and shout," you mean that he is to hold his peace out of complaisance to wicked men! You mean that dogmatic verity is to crouch before falsehood, and that moral truth is to cringe and keep silence in the presence of crime! You mean that the bishops of the whole world, to whom is committed the guidance of the faithful, are no more to hear the voice of their Supreme Pastor, and that the faithful are to be lost eternally! Two hundred millions are no longer to have a law to guide them; and eight hundred millions more are not to receive the torch that is to enlighten them.

If the Holy Father is to be no more a King, you must proceed to drag him violently from his throne. With him will fall all sense of right in the world, all feelings of authority and of justice, and every religious and social principle. The foundations of society will no longer be order and justice. For, all the rights with which a prince can be invested, concur to the support of the Papal throne, and all the titles which can attach to property bind his throne to him. Deny them in his case, and the bases of public and private life are abjured, the foundations of civil and religious society are destroyed. Kings beware!

the Pope's right and titles are more assured than yours; deny them, and yours will *a fortiori* be abolished.

But it is not an article of the Faith that the Pope should have temporal power. In the first place, I must remind you that this objection is a mere irrelevance; in the second, that even if it were not an article of the Faith, that would not prevent the usurpation from being a crime. I say it is an irrelevance; for if I have shown that the Pope has a right to his States, if God's providence clearly invested him with his rights, if his rights are a moral necessity for the execution of his office, what has your objection to say to it? The thing remains, whether it is an article of Faith or not. Many things are true which are not articles of Faith. But do you mean that, if it is not an article of Faith, you may help to spoliate the Pope with impunity? May you, in your opinion, attack every right that is not an article of Faith? If you introduce this principle into the world, you will find plenty of persons who will be ready to apply it to you and your property. It is not an article of Faith that your head should remain on your shoulders! nor yet is this a necessity, nor even a benefit to the world; while the Pope's temporal power is both a necessity and a benefit to the world. But if you reply that *non occides* is an article of Faith, then I answer—So is *unicuique suum*, or *non furaberis*. Even the heretics, who ignore so many articles of the Faith, and the pagans, who ignore so many more, yet acknowledge, without hesitation, that these are commands of the natural law. These are not more certain than the articles of

the Faith, but they are more generally known. They have not been revealed by God in the Faith, but they have been revealed by God in nature. Well; one of the rights which the Pope has to his temporal power, rests on the command, *non furaberis.*

This command, then, has been violated by those who have taken away his temporal power. Nay, they have done more than this, for sacrilege is worse than mere robbery. To steal a golden goblet would be robbery. To steal a golden chalice from the altar would be sacrilege, because it had been devoted to the service of God, or of the Church. So also the usurpation of provinces belonging to another king is robbery; the King of Prussia, in seizing Hanover, committed robbery; just as England in seizing Oude, committed robbery. The usurpation of the States of the Church, by the King of Piedmont, was sacrilege; because those States had been dedicated to the service of God, or the Church. They were not only dedicated, but also necessary to the government of the Church, and to the "teaching of all nations." In resisting the seizure of those States, the Pope was not actuated by a desire for material wealth. For as the chalice serves for offering the Divine Sacrifice, which is something spiritual, so the temporal power serves for the condemnation of errors, for instruction in the Faith, and the other functions aforesaid, which are all spiritual things—the spiritual things for which Jesus Christ came into the world. Thus Pitt spoke of Napoleon's attack on the Pope's temporal power as one of the most atrocious crimes which had ever dishonoured the Revolution,

and he, although a Protestant, regarded it as an act of sacrilege.

Moreover, the Faith leaves little doubt on the point. For it teaches that the Pope is the Universal Father of all the faithful, and that all Catholics are his sons. This paternity of his is all the more august, as it has not been formed by nature, but by grace; it is not an institution of men, but of Jesus Christ; its office is not to generate bodies, but to regenerate spirits; its duty is not to instruct in science and guide to temporal happines, but to educate men to attain eternal happiness in the life to come. So much the Faith teaches. If these things be so, what a felony it must be to assail such a Father! More horrible than parricide. In ages of greater Faith, such an act would have curdled the blood of Europe with horror. The indifference of this age does not diminish the atrocity of the act. Therefore, even if the temporal power were not necessary to the life of the Church, yet the spoliation of it would be a most heinous crime; and most dangerous too, for you thereby set up the principle that every right, which is not absolutely necessary to life, may with impunity be violated.

It cannot be necessary to the life of the Church, as the Popes, at the first, had not any temporal sovereignty. There is an ambiguity in the word *necessary*. It is necessary in the sense that God has ordained that it shall be so; it is unnecessary in the sense that God, Who is Almighty, can ordain otherwise, or provide other means of life for the Church. Thus God has ordained that bread should

be our daily means of nourishment; yet bread is not absolutely necessary, for God could send us manna from heaven as our daily food. The cases are parallel. How, then, would you designate your own act, if you were to snatch away the bread from a poor man, on the ground that it is not a necessity?

This argument will be strengthened by a comparison with the voice of the Church. Two false maxims respecting the temporal power of the Pope have been current—(1) *The Pope's authority is incompatible with that of the State.* (2) *The temporal authority is not necessary to the Church, but on the contrary, the abrogation of it would tend greatly to the liberty and well-being of the Church.* Both these maxims have been condemned in the Syllabus. In order to resolve the former question, we have to consider the nature and constitution of the Church, and the spiritual attributions of the Sovereign Pontiff; then we have to enumerate all the regal offices of the State; and then we must compare these two, so as to see whether they are contradictory. Who is able for this? The Church alone is competent to declare what She is and what belongs to Her. Jesus Christ gave Her, not only gifts, but also His powers; nor these only, but also an infallible knowledge of the gifts and powers which He gave. If the Church could err in saying what She is, and what is inherent to Her, what kind of teacher would She be? We must believe that She has this knowledge. But the Church defined the compatibility of the Pontifical and regal rights, when the Holy Father and the Episcopate issued the Syllabus. The

question has, therefore, been determined. Whoever refuses to accept this judgment, whoever regards it as subject to appeal or liable to correction, renounces, thereby, the Catholic Faith. Moreover, the question was determined by the Church long ago, when She pronounced against Wicliff, Huss, Marsilius, and Arnoldo, who affirmed the incompatibility of the two powers. Put, then, these heretics on one side, with Cavour, Laguerronière, and Visconti Venosta; and on the other side put all the Popes and bishops of the Church from the time of St. Peter, and say which party you will believe. Which do you regard as the successors of the Apostles, and the appointed teachers of "all nations"?

The question of the compatibility of the Pontifical authority with the kingly, is a question, not of fact, but of right; it is not a political question, but a religious question, because it concerns the nature and intrinsic constitution of the Church. It involves all the matter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, its nature and its constitution. It turns upon the infallibility of the Church; and if you deny that dogma, you have slipped your cable and are at sea, drifting about with the currents of opinion, and tossed on the troubled waves of Protestantism, Calvinism, Quakerism, Shakerism, Mormonism, Spiritualism, and all the other isms and sophisms.

The second question, as to the necessity of the temporal power, has also been solved by the judgment of the Church. It is true that there may be other means for the life of the Church, which may appear to men to be equally good; but temporal sovereignty

is that which the Church has chosen. We must remember that Her infallibility is not conceded alone when She has to resolve a controversy; but extends to the part She has to take in this world, and to the suggestion of expedients She has to use in order to fulfil Her duties which God has given Her. This is the effect of Christ's promises—"Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world." This guidance is given to the Church through Her Head and Her Episcopacy. It is to them, then, that these suggestions of expedients are made. The Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops to rule the Church of God. It is for the pastors to rule the sheep; not for the sheep to choose their own way.

Moreover, the Holy Father and the bishops have clearly and expressly affirmed that the temporal dominion is a moral necessity for the well-being of the Church; and they have pronounced an anathema against all who impugn it. Seeing that Jesus Christ has guided them to this conclusion, is not such a decision of very much more weight than the assertion of Cavours, and Garibaldis, and Mazzinis, and Palmerstons, and Proudhons? When we remember that the decision of the bishops was perfectly unanimous, do we not plainly see in it the finger of God? Not a patriarch, not a bishop dissented. Those of Europe, those from America, those from Asia, those from Australia and the Islands, had all arrived at the same conclusion, and concurred in the decision. Men of different races, and languages, and nations, had been led to consent to this proposition, that, in order for the Head of the Church to be able to govern Her, he

must also be an earthly monarch. Can we suppose that all the patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops of Christ's Church, with the Pope at their head, could have been united in error? The thing is impossible. Yet so it must have been unless the temporal dominion is a necessity for the Church. Are we then rather to believe ministers of state, who lie to their Parliaments, and counsel their sovereigns to commence unjust wars—are we to believe such men when they assert that, to spoliate the Pope of his temporal dominions will increase the liberty and well-being of the Church? Are we to give credit to newspaper writers and penny-a-liners, when they say that such a robbery and sacrilege will purify the Church, and make the Pope attend to spiritual things? If so, we must believe that the Pope and the whole Hierarchy of Christ's Church refuse to attend to spiritual things, preferring to give themselves up to worldly affairs, and that they will not hear of purification. Are we to take the word of certain fashionable ladies and dinner-going old gentlemen, when they tell us that this decision of Christ's Church is nothing but a vulgar prejudice? These idle and frivolous persons can clearly see truth, while the Pope and grey-haired bishops, and the learned doctors of the Church, who have spent all their lives in study and contemplation, are struck with a fatal and irremediable blindness! Poor pastors of Christ's flock, poor rulers of Christ's Church; their reason is clouded, their faith is extinguished, they have lost the divine assistance, and the Spirit of God has passed from them to the ball-going, pleasure-hunting, sensual, self-indulging *beau-monde!*

The alternative is inevitable; the dilemma cannot be escaped; either that marvellous consent of so many learned and holy bishops and doctors is a proof of the moral necessity of the temporal dominion; or else it was a conspiracy such as never before was heard of or imagined, in favour of ignorance, perversity, and error. Beyond the horns of this dilemma there is a second line of defence—there is this further position from which, also, you cannot escape: you have no right to alter the state of things which has existed in the Church for more than a thousand years; still less have you any right to commit robbery and sacrilege.

What then, and who then are those who, in crying out for the seizure of the temporal dominions, pretend to desire the liberty, the purification, the well-being of the Church? It is the democratic party; it is the revolutionary party, the Mazzinis, the Garibaldis, the Proudhons. But this party does not desire that the Church should thrive and be free. Look at the principles which the chief writers of the party have openly avowed. Feuerbach, for example, in a book addressed to working men, wrote thus—"Let man alone be our God, our Father, our Judge, our Saviour, our fatherland, the end of all our being and of all our powers. Do you wish to secure a durable peace for civil society? Well then, labour first of all at the simplification of humanity, which can never be accomplished without first getting rid of Christianity." One of the leaders of the Swiss Clubs wrote, in 1844, to another of the leaders—"The Lausanne Club is advancing with giant's strides towards atheism and perversion of morals. Many members of the club,

especially Hohne, already talk and think nothing else but atheism." Marr, the head of another of the clubs, reported—"Soon I shall have made all my hearers the personal enemies of God." Baker, formularizing the aims of the Revolution, perorated thus—"Religion shall not only be banished from education; it must also be totally eradicated from the human mind. Our party does not care for freedom of conscience; what it wants, and is determined to have, is the necessity of believing nothing. To attain their end, the democratics will not reject any means; the Revolution has not to strive after reforms; it has to destroy all its opponents, without compunction, or respect of persons, and entirely overturn all the elements of existing society, in order to establish our own principles." The revolutionary party is the same in France, Italy, and Germany; and its principles and aims are the same, as may be seen by its publications in any of those countries. Michelet, for example, blasphemes "the God of the old cathedrals, the rich God of the rich and of the priests." "An honest man," says Quinet, "can be his own God." Terminier exclaims — "Spinosa is great, because he does not fear to make himself the rival of Jesus Christ. The Nazarite proclaimed a Man-God; but the Dutchman proclaimed a God-world." Matter teaches that, to re-establish order, "we must institute the community of land, the community of property, the community of women. Generally speaking, inasmuch as the laws of the Demiurge (*i.e.* God) are despised, inasmuch as man frees himself from all that stuff which the vulgar calls

religion, so much the more does he honour and become like the Supreme Being." The blasphemies of Proudhon against the majesty of the Most High are too numerous and too infamous to be reported here. Mazzini seems to have recognized neither God, nor Church, nor religion of any kind; for him, "God is only that which is incarnate in humanity, and which lives in the conscience of humanity and in the universe which surrounds us;" for him "humanity is the living word of God. . . . We believe in humanity, the sole interpreter of the laws of God." Thus Anacharsis Clootz, in a sitting of the Convention, exclaimed—"I recognize no other God than nature, and no other sovereign than the people of God." And Mazzini wrote—"The people is God." Gioberti, from prudential motives, was content with reducing Christianity to naturalism and with attacking Jesuitism, in order eventually to overturn the Church. So also Garibaldi professed to like Christianity, provided the Pontiff and priests were abolished. This is more fully shown by Ricciardi, in his *Story of the Future*; and by the documents published in the book of Crétineau-Joly.

After having acquainted ourselves with the principles, aims, and measures of the revolutionary party, we shall be able to trace their action in the legislation of States, and in the maxims which are propagated by newspapers; we shall see that the Liberals are the puppets which dance to the piping of the Revolution, and we shall know how to appreciate their pretended desire for the freedom and purification of the Church. The revolutionists do not attempt, in

any country, what they cannot perform. They are content with milder means until they have "educated their party" to accept the more extreme. In countries where they cannot at once suppress the clergy, they endeavour to diminish the power and influence of the clergy, by confiscating all their property and revenues, by reducing their numbers and the numbers of their students, by breaking up religious houses and expelling the religious orders—especially those which are the most pious and devoted; by seizing on all the channels of education, the institutions of charity, the administration of relief for the poor, the ceremony of marriage, chaplaincies of regiments and of prisons, &c.; by heaping calumnies upon all the ecclesiastics, and by inducing priests to becoming "patriotic," or "lovers of their country," so that, in losing the sense and spirit of their vocation, they may more easily fall into the snares and pitfalls of the Revolution. In countries which are still very Catholic, the first step of the revolutionists is to introduce means of moral corruption, and to increase the incitements to it in theatres, ballets, and novels, so as to plunge persons into shameful vices, and thus deter them from resorting to the sacraments of the Church. In this way they lead them to Protestantism, and thence to rationalism and atheism. In one of the documents published by Cretineau-Joly in his book, in a circular which issued from a Haute Vente of the Revolution, this method is clearly laid down. In all countries we have seen it in practice. The next step is to take the education of the children and youths from the clergy, and to indoctrinate them with the principles of the

Revolution at State schools, State colleges, and a State university. Let me now put this question to you: From such men do you expect the liberty, and well-being, and purification of the Church to proceed? from men who have repeated, in every language of Europe, that they hate Jesus Christ and His institutions, His ministers, and the rights and duties which He established?

But Christ said, "Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo." Moreover, St. Peter sat on no throne. Do you mean that by the words, "My kingdom is not from this world," Jesus Christ forbade any earthly dominion? Do you mean that the example of St. Peter confirms this opinion of yours? As to the words of our Lord, your interpretation of them is contrary to that of the Church, who regards in those words an affirmation that Christ while on earth had a kingdom—a kingdom of which there shall be no end, namely, the Church; and a further affirmation that the origin of that kingdom was not earthly, but divine; that the stone is being cut out "without hands" of man. As to the example of St. Peter, there is the example of two hundred Popes to set against your opinion, or rather assumption, concerning St. Peter. Now, of two things, one: either the Church is infallible in Her interpretation of Scripture, or She is not. If not, then the Church must have most miserably fallen into error, and we can no longer appeal to, nor even "believe in the Holy Catholic Church." On the other hand, if you are a Catholic, you believe that She cannot err in interpreting the Holy Scriptures. The passage in

question cannot, therefore, bear the meaning that you have put to it. Indeed, it would be absurd to assert that two hundred Pontiffs have erred in attributing to it one meaning, while you are right in attributing to it another. If you hold that your private judgment is right in the interpretation of Scripture, not only are you no Catholic, but you have adopted the very error of Protestantism, which is the most malignant of all errors, and which in itself embraces every other error. The most malignant error, I say, because you thus make the Eternal Wisdom to be a liar; and the most comprehensive error, because, if you deny the infallible teaching of the Church, there is nothing that you can feel yourself obliged to believe. You have no faith; you merely reason to conclusions, or else accept the conclusions which have been ready made to your hand.

"My kingdom is not of (or from) this world"—that is, My authority, My title to reign does not come from any people; it comes from My Father in heaven. He was speaking of the origin of His power, He was not mentioning the place where that power or authority should be exercised. He continued, "Si *ex hoc mundo* esset regnum meum," and "sed regnum meum non est *hinc*," expressions which can apply only to the origin of His power. That kingdom of Christ is the Church. The Church is the spiritual kingdom of Christ. The Church is in the world; but not of the world. You cannot succeed, therefore, in drawing any objection from this passage of Holy Scripture. You merely falsify a text, and then use the wrested text for your own destruction.

But had not our Lord a deeper meaning when using the words? Did He not intend to intimate that although He was founding a Universal Church, He was not founding a universal earthly monarchy? Yes, truly; but you will not be able to draw a valid objection from that either. The Jews, at that time, expected that the Messias would set up for them a grand earthly kingdom. Hence, when they saw Christ's humility and poverty, they concluded that He was not the Messias. As He persisted that He was the Messias, they explained to Pilate the nature of this pretension (according to their views), saying that He in calling Himself the Messias, was confessing that He was aiming at a universal earthly kingdom, which should swallow up the Roman Empire; and the Jews concluded by adding, "But we have no king but Cæsar." Our Lord was contradicting this accusation when He said, "Regnum meum non est *de* hoc mundo." The two sons of Zebedee shared this mistaken notion, and alluded to it when they petitioned our Lord that they might sit, "the one on His right hand, and the other on His left in His kingdom." The other Apostles had fallen into the same error, as appears from their emulation to obtain the highest offices in that kingdom. But our Lord gave them all to understand, that as His power was of a superior order to man's power, so His kingdom would have nothing in common with human monarchies—that the end which He proposed for His kingdom, was not the temporal prosperity of man, but His eternal happiness. With this end His kingdom was established. The means

He adopted, therefore, were not commerce, nor the arts, nor manufactures, nor industries; but grace, and prayer, and sacrifice, and the sacraments, and the Evangelical virtues. His Church was not an earthly monarchy; but employed spiritual means, and had a celestial end. This is the character which we see in Her to this day. The Church retains the same end, and uses the same means, and Her Head is not a political prince reigning over the world, and guiding all men to earthly ends by earthly means. If this were so, men would not be subject to so many kings and rulers, nor would they be governed by such various forms of rule; for he would be the only sovereign on earth, and the only form of rule would be that which he judged best. No, the society of the faithful, the spiritual monarchy of Jesus, has not its origin from the world, nor has it the same end, nor the same nature as the kingdoms of this world.

But what has this to do with a supposed prohibition of the temporal power? Do you think that, because the end of the Church is spiritual, the Church may not also make use of temporal means towards that end? The Church is a spiritual society; but it is not a society of mere spirits. If She is not to use any human means, nor any external or temporal objects to assist towards that end, then there may be no preaching, nor sacrifice, nor sacraments, no rites, nor ceremonies. But if these outward things are to be used, why are Her revenues and Her administration to be forbidden? If the Head of the Church requires to be independent in order to rule Her, it follows that he must be a

sovereign. In this he does not act contrary to the words of our Lord. In order to contradict those words, he would have to set up a dominion in civil things over all the world—a dominion derived from the will of the people.

But the example of St. Peter, the first Pope. This objection insinuates itself into men's minds, because it has a flavour of desire for Apostolic perfection. Those who do not care to practise such perfection themselves, yet desire to see it enforced upon others. Your objection is this: *St. Peter, who was the Pope in the very infancy of the Church, did not sit upon a throne; therefore, no Pontiff should sit upon a throne.* I remark in passing, that such an argument would cut against the Emperors of Russia and Prussia, and the Queen of England, much more strongly than it does against the Pope. But let that pass; let us address ourselves to the syllogism, or rather to the enthymeme, for it wants a major proposition; add the major, and you will find that it will prove more things than you may desire. Such as these: in your infancy you were nourished by milk alone, therefore in after years you should not be allowed to touch anything else; as a child you wore no beard, therefore you should wear none now; as a youth you were whipped for disobedience and indocility, therefore you should be triced up to the triangle for the same faults now; and so forth. The Church is now adult, and has extended over many monarchies and nations; may She not be guided by God with a different economy than she was in the age of continual and amazing miracles?

St. Peter was lifted up on a cross, to testify to the Faith; is it necessary that every Pontiff should be crucified for the same end? The early Church hid in catacombs, or lived in forests and wild places. Is the Church in these days to do the same? In St. Peter's day, the Church was not a temporal instrument; but this belongs to the essence of the Church, and therefore must be the same in these days. But if the Church is not to become the political instrument of some temporal king, it must be by means of a temporal sovereignty of the Pope. It is, however, competent for you, and for the rest of the faithful if they like it, to make the Church in these days resemble the Church in former days. But until you have done your part in mortification and self-abnegation, you have no right to call on others to imitate the condition of the Church in former days. In what way is it competent for you to do so? Go and sell all that you have, and bring the money to the rulers of the Church, to be applied for the common good of the Church.

Institutions, human and divine, are always different in their beginning, from what they are afterwards. The three states of the one true religion —the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian— are an example in point.

Precisely (say some); *and there it is that the genius of the age demands reforms to be made in the temporal States of the Church; and as the Pope declares he cannot agree to reforms to suit the tendencies of the age, he clearly should not rule a temporal State.* Let

us see whether any other sovereign should concede what the Pope refuses. All the reforms, which the genius of the age can demand, are either material or moral. Material reforms consist in the construction and improvement of roads, railways, telegraphs, banks, nurseries for the army and navy, and so forth. The advances of science have suggested improvements in these material things; and such improvements the Pope is quite as anxious to promote as any other sovereign. At no time was religion the enemy of natural science. As to moral reforms—they consist in change of principles, and change in the consequences deduced from principles. The *nouveau droit;* new maxims of right and of order; new precepts in political, social, and family government, and such like, are moral reforms. Now every moral reform is either right or wrong. If a proposed reform is true and right, the Teacher of truth and right can have no objection to it. If it be wrong—being founded on a fallacy, a false maxim, or an assumed right—neither the Pope, nor any other honest ruler, can admit it. If any ruler refused to admit such a reform, on the ground that it was false and bad, would that refusal give you the right to take his kingdom from him? Moreover, the infallible Teacher appointed by God over the nations, can surely judge the false from the true, the bad from the good herein; while you and every one else must confess your judgment to be fallible.

The Pope certainly cannot sanction indifferentism or liberty of worship, nor civil marriages, nor secular education; he cannot concede liberty, or rather license,

of the Press; nor recognize a sovereignty of the people, nor admit the necessity of the "social evil," nor legalize robbery and murder. No more can any ruler honestly concede such things. No one can give an authority to do wrong. A prince may have to *tolerate* some of these evils, either because he cannot put them down, or else because there is a choice of evils, so that if he abolishes one, a greater will arise. To tolerate is, however, not the same as to legalize or to concede. Still less is toleration the same as proclaiming as a reform, that which is an abuse and moral disorder. The Pope, then, is as a sun in the world, illuminating, with his rays, the politics of other princes. For, when he declares a "reform" to be un-Christian, every other ruler may see that it is bad. When he proclaims that a principle is false, every other prince must shun it as deceptive. But if princes are not willing to learn from him, they are undermining their own States. For righteousness is the foundation of every State; and the definitions of the Pope regard not the tricks of policy, but only righteousness and truth. Your objection should, therefore, not be put in this form—*The Pope will not concede the reforms which the genius of the age demands;* but in this—*the Pope will not remove every restraint upon the gratification of our passions.*

We have been considering objections which offer false pretexts for getting rid of the temporal authority of the Pope. The real ground of this policy was clearly expressed by Proudhon. "Depose the Popes from their temporal throne, and Catholicism will degenerate into Protestantism, and religion will

dreak down into dust. Those who say that the Pope will be more heard when he shall occupy himself exclusively with the things of heaven (mark what I say) are either dishonest politicians who are striving to mask, with devotion in word, the atrocity of their actions; or else they are imbecile Catholics, who are too stupid to understand that, in all the affairs of human life, the temporal and the spiritual are consolidated, just like the body and the soul."

The Pope oppressed his subjects. If there was oppression, there was some kind of oppression. What kind of oppression did you discover in the Papal States? What duty of his office did the Pope violate? What rights did he trample upon? Of what frauds on his people was he guilty? What falsehoods did he publish, in accordance with the modern system of governing? What property did he rob? What confiscations did he make? With what innocent blood did he ever imbrue his hands? Is there any other species of oppression? I defy you to bring any such charge home to him; unless it be that he has been too mild, and has erred continually on the side of gentleness and mercy. The Papal Government has always been the most economical in Europe. In his States the taxes were always lighter than in any other State in Europe. In those very States the taxes have been quadrupled since they have been forcibly put under the King of Piedmont. The schools in the Pope's dominions were the best schools in the world, and had a far higher average attendance than elsewhere. The percentage of paupers to the population was less

in Rome while under its legitimate sovereign, than in any other capital city. There were more charitable institutions in proportion, than anywhere else. As to the laws of the Papal States, they may, for justice and wisdom, be compared with those of any other State. No State maintained true liberty more intact. No State more harmonized unity of action with universality of Government, ordinating, with greater wisdom than the civil Government of the Pope at any period of its existence, the community, the municipality, and the province. On what, then, do you ground your accusation?

On the fact that the Pope could not rule his dominions without the help of foreign troops. You intimate that, without the presence of these foreign troops, his States would have rebelled; and you conclude that, as they were in that temper, it was right to take the Pope's kingdom away from him. Tell me then, are all kings to be dethroned who find the presence of foreign troops necessary to prevent rebellion? Are all kings to lose their kingdoms where rebellions have broken out? If so, how many would remain? The French occupied Spain, for example, in 1822, in order to put an end to the continual revolts. In 1848 part of Austria was, for a like purpose, invaded by the Russians. The frequent revolutions in France are too well known to need mention. In Germany many crowns were tumbled in the dust in 1848. Shall we, therefore, make a *tabula rasa* in all these countries? There have, on the other hand, been very few revolts in the Papal States, although the Pope never possessed

large armies to put them down when they did occur. Those few revolts were excited by other countries which were, at the time, in a state of revolution. The agents of revolution were not natives of the Papal States.

But the temporal power is an obstacle to the unity of the Italian-speaking race. If by unity you mean a federation of States, then the Pope's sovereignty was no obstacle at all. It would have been very fortunate for Italy if the revolutionary party had not laboured to prevent the attempted federation of all the Italian States under the presidency of the Holy Father, in 1848. But if, by "unity," you mean the abolition of a number of thrones, and the fusion of all the States under one central Government, then I deny that unity is the supreme good of a people. It is, at the outside, a very doubtful benefit. The chief benefits are certainly justice, truthfulness, obedience, industry, morality, religious fervour. These good things are not increased and promoted, but, on the contrary, hindered, by the "unity" which you desire. Look at any "united" State. Consider any State which has had to submit to the process which has received the euphemistic appellation of union. Take Italy, or Germany, for example, and see whether the people have become more just, more free, more subordinate, more upright, more industrious, more moral, more pious, less given to speculation and rascality, and more happy than before. Has not luxury increased? has not speculation received an impetus? has not immorality been aggravated? has not fraudulence been developed? have not oppression and wrong been

diffused and aggrandized? have not atheism and impiety advanced and "progressed" both in Italy and in Germany, while the people have become less free and far more burdened than before? The happiness and welfare of a people have truly other causes than "unity" and "nationality."

A number of little States is better than one large State. Each can be ruled so as to suit the tendencies and character of the people. Unite them into one State, put them under one Government, and you will find that, if the Government suits one, it will not be adapted to the others, and can never be satisfactory to all, until some future generations shall have been all cast in the same mould, and all differences of character shall have been ruthlessly ground down. In some great ("united") States it is the metropolis which monopolizes the Government, and forces the rest of the country to submit to that which suits the views of the metropolis. Paris is France. In Italy (before that evil genius, the Carbonaro Napoleon III. had been frightened by Orsini's bomb into swooping down upon it), Palermo, Naples, Rome, Florence, Parma, Modena, Lucca, Venice, Genoa, Milan, Turin, were all great, and their people happy. Now they are dwindling to the straitened dimensions and dull condition of provincial towns. Where will soon be their picture galleries, their libraries, their museums, their universities, their societies of arts and letters? Turin is the only one which appears to have gained anything by the change. When I was there a few years ago, I observed to the waiter who was serving me at the hotel, that many more persons seemed to

attend the week-day morning Mass. "Sicuro!" said he, "Victor Emmanuel and his Court have left Turin."

No, no! your unity is a disease of the body, which attracts all the blood to the heart, and leaves the provinces languid and paralyzed. The heart grows over-great, and those few in it who can grasp the reins of power, then do all they desire, making the whole empire further their aims and support their views. You think a united country is more powerful? Yes; but the power is all at the heart, whose heavy beats are found to shake and shatter the whole system. But it is not strength. Macchiavelli remarked that a free country, or a country where numerous local governments are in vigour, is not conquered until the whole of it has been overrun; but that a despotism, although it opposes a more formidable army to the first onset, is conquered in one battle. A blow at the heart is fatal. Your "unity" is not a cause of power. Neither has your "unity" made Italy free and happy. Her happiness has been ruined since she turned her ear to listen to the perfidies which have been whispered to her across the Alps and across the Atlantic. She has been ruined by the "circles" of the secret societies in her towns. She has been ruined by the idleness and luxury of her nobles, and by the dishonesty of her atheistical middle classes. She has been ruined by her oppression and persecution of that Divine Institution, that nurse of real liberty, the only remedy possible for all her ills, namely, the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church.

But you say that, *the centre of the Catholic Church being in Rome, prevented the unity of Italy.* That centre has been there for nearly nineteen centuries; and if God has chosen to place His Vicar there, who are you that you should complain of what God has done? The Church, the pure Spouse of Christ, is the object of God's greatest love, and the means of His rule of the world. She will grow until Her boughs stretch over all nations. The stone, cut out without hands, will increase until it crushes all kingdoms. Princes, kings, emperors, tribes, and tongues and nations, with all their arts and sciences and trade and commerce, are for the Church. The Church is not subservient to them; for there can be no end higher than the end at which the Church ever aims. Do you imagine that God has made the world to be your plaything? Is it to be conducted, by Divine Providence, towards your little aims? Is it to be ordered to suit your pleasure and minister to your comfort? No; God has formed the Church to lead men to their eternal end. All things on earth —Governments, States, nations, all things on earth— are for man's use, for a short time only, as means to help him towards his eternal end. If, when travelling, you stop, for a night, at a wayside inn, do you set to work to rearrange the furniture, and to order new pieces of furniture to be made, and new works to be undertaken for your comfort? You would say: We are here only to rest and refresh ourselves, that we may pursue our road with vigour next morning. It would be folly to act otherwise. Yet that same folly you commit when you seek to

move the Church, in order to bring about the unity of Italy. You despise the end of the Church. You seek only the welfare of your body, and regard your soul as a salt, whose only office it is to keep your flesh from putrefying.

As is the master, so is the servant; if they have spoken ill of the Pope, much more will they calumniate the whole body of priests. Yet these priests are of your blood and your families. Their interests were, at least, the same as yours. If a great change has been wrought in them, how do you account for it? You say that *Priests are proud, avaricious, incontinent, mean, enemies of society,* and so forth. How did they become so? Do you pretend that the education which they received before ordination has wrought this marvellous change? An effect, which is universal, requires a universal cause. Explain, then, the cause and effect, so as at least to give your charge an appearance of definiteness and verisimilitude. During that course of education, what did they learn? They were taught science, metaphysics, theology, rhetoric, practices of piety and virtue and self-sacrifice. Which of these was the cause and origin of the evil? The laws which governed their education were those of the Council of Trent. Have you, then, the hardihood to assert that young men who go to a secular or Protestant university come out pure, while those who are educated as priests become very bad? Is the Church, through Her educational laws, the mother of corruption, while the world is the nurse of virtue? If a field, which you have cultivated, brings forth thistles and brambles and nettles, while an adjoining

field, which you have not cultivated, yields wheat or hops, then every man of sense would say that it is your system of cultivation which is in fault. If, then, your assertion concerning priests, as a body, is true, the Church must be the mother of corruption, while the world is the parent of purity!—a proposition too absurd to be seriously entertained; and therefore it follows that your charge is false.

Yet some of them give occasion for scandal! Yes, this is true of a very small proportion. But consider this in the first place: you make such a fuss about one or two priests who have been guilty of scandalous acts, while you are not shocked at the majority of princes, and statesmen, and nobles, and other laymen who have done far worse. You are silent about the many in the one class who are profligate, and are open-mouthed about the few in the other class who are not nearly so bad! What is this but an involuntary tribute to the sacredness of the office? That is all we contend for. No one pretends that all the representatives of it are infallible and immaculate. In proportion as a state of life is more sublime, so much the more does any shortcoming, by contrast, offend us. Yet, as the duties are more onerous, so much the more difficult is it to fulfil them. Since sacerdotal dignity resides in frail and feeble man, we must expect that some, who bear that dignity, will fail. Does this warrant you in passing censure upon all? The duties of princes are arduous, and some spend their lives in luxury and amusement. Do you therefore blame all princes? Some ministers of state, especially those of the Liberal Government,

seek to please themselves, rather than fulfil the duties of their office. Do you blame all ministers of state? Some doctors care more for their fees than for the health of their patients. Are all doctors homicides? Some attorneys look more to run up bills than to end favourably the cases of their clients. Are all solicitors robbers? One Apostle was Judas. Were all Apostles traitors? Some women—but I will not speak of your wife and daughters! No; your charge against all priests because of the immorality of a few, is the common fallacy of substituting the general for the particular.

Who, then, is to blame for the shortcomings of the few? One priest in Ireland, we will suppose, "speaks evil of dignities," and resists the lawful authority which has been set over him in the Church. He is lauded to the skies. His case is debated in the House of Commons, and made the subject of articles in the daily papers. A defence fund committee is also formed, to enable him to prosecute his resistance in ease and affluence, and annoy his superiors with comfort. Is not that the best way to lead all priests into a state of rebellion, and to teach them to despise all authority? Another priest becomes too intimate, we will say, and even immoral in his conduct, with a lady of his congregation, and separates himself from the Church in order to marry her. His fame at once becomes world-wide. All men speak of his eloquence. He stumps it in America, and an ample living is made for him in a Calvinistic Republic; and his sermons secure a double-leaded abstract in the *Times*, like Gladstone's "extra-parliamentary utterances."

With this before the eyes of all priests, how many of them are tempted to become immoral, in order that journalism may write them up, and England may worship them!

The fact is, that the character of the clergy is apt to become a reflex of the character of the society in which they live. It is true that if the clergy were to become generally corrupt, the society would be sure to follow in the career of corruption. This is true of every ruler, in so far as he possesses influence. But that which we are considering is something else—not the influence of a ruler for good or evil, but the force of example and the tendency in all men to imitate. The proposition is this: Where the clergy as a body are better than the rest of the society, they are sure to become somewhat coloured by the manners and ideas of the society. Priests are men, and are nearly sure to imbibe, more or less, the ideas which are current, and to acquire, in some degree, the manners which are fashionable. Whatever precautions you may take, a person must always be somewhat affected by the air he breathes daily, and must be susceptible to the changes which take place in the weather. So also, in spite of the vigilance which is exercised in guarding priests from the contagion of the world in which they live, yet no universal specific and unfailing prophylactic has as yet been discovered.

The marvellous thing is, that those who most declaim against priestly scandals are those who do most to promote those scandals. The origin and chief cause of disorders in the clergy is a laxity of

discipline, or a want of subjection to their superiors; because the spirit of insubordination is destructive of a hierarchy. Yet those who find fault with priests, are the very ones who whet the insubordination of the priests, by speaking against their bishops, while they endeavour to kindle a flame of independence in the bishops by depreciating the Encyclicals, or censuring the policy of the Pope. They enlarge, also, upon the "rights" of the lower clergy, and compassionate them for being oppressed and driven by their bishops. Moreover, they labour to sow the seeds of envy between the secular clergy and the regular; just as the secret agents of a foreign power might be expected to sow discord between the artillery and infantry, or between the engineers and cavalry, in order to weaken the action of the army in a war.

To prevent such scandals as are complained of, a vigorous exertion of authority must be maintained. Yet, if there is a priest who shows a spirit of insubordination, or if there is a regular who evinces an inclination to break through the rules, the scandal-mongers forget their righteous indignation, and begin to make much of him, and flatter and protect and support him, and cry out to the Government to pass laws for restraining the legitimate action of the episcopal authority. They thus encourage scandals; and yet whenever a scandal occurs, they throw it in the teeth of the Church, and cry "Shame upon Her," as if it were Her doing.

In spite of these encouragements, scandals among the body of priests are very rare, and of a compara-

tively slight character. While the best priests are the most perfect men of the whole society, the worst priests are no worse than the most exemplary members of the laity. Go, one by one, through your accusations against individual priests, and then judge honestly whether you, or your friends and relatives, do not commit those same sins far oftener, together with many other and worse crimes also. Do not, then, attempt to take a mote out of your brother's eye, while there is a beam in your own eye, which prevents your seeing either your own faults, or your brother's compensating virtues. Let us hear your charges. You set down this priest as a glutton, because he once too evidently enjoyed his dinner at your table; yet, perhaps, he had fasted all that day, and is accustomed to live on humble fare all through the year. Another priest, you say, is worldly, because he appeared in high spirits at an evening party, or because he was once seen at a theatre; but you have not watched him during all the weary hours he has spent in study; nor have you followed him on his visits through the filthy alleys and unwholesome dens of the poor. A third you regard as vain or proud, because his manner is not easy or sedate in company; yet you have not fathomed his learning, nor estimated that solid worth which, if it were only known, would give him a good title to be regarded as infinitely your superior. The worldliness of one should certainly be corrected; but, let me ask, do not you spend every night at theatres or balls, and your days in obtaining more invitations? The gluttony

of another should be mortified; but do you not enjoy French cookery, and would you not loathe a simple and wholesome fare? The pride and vanity of a third should be humbled; but you must surely be conscious that your vanity knows no bounds, and that your pride is repulsive.

If a true Christian sees a scandal, what does he do? Does he run about, publishing it to all the world, and exaggerating it more at each time of telling? No; he deplores it in secret, and prays for his fallen brother. He certainly does not vilify the whole body of clergy, and thus lessen the amount of good they may do.

As to the number of scandals—thank God they are few. Every one that has occurred, has been published far and wide, and repeated whenever occasion serves. All the scandals are universally known, while the many exemplary priests are quiet, and unobtrusive, and secluded, and their existence is not known. If we are to employ ourselves with canvassing the acts of priests, let us then begin with their good deeds, which are many and unknown; because the effect of the example on our own minds may be beneficial. No one can contemplate good deeds without becoming better; just as no one can mix in evil company without a corresponding corruption of his manners. If, then, their sins are to be raked up, let us leave it to be done by the cinder-women and scavengers of society, or that common sewer of human iniquities—the daily paper. Let us rather dwell, in thought, upon their hours of meditation and prayer before the Blessed Sacrament;

let us watch them by the bedside of the sick; let us see the penitent, weak and worn, expire in their arms; let us listen while they speak soft words of comfort to the afflicted, while they guide the erring with their counsel, and impart to children and the ignorant a knowledge of the "Peace which passeth understanding." Every misery, every need, every calamity, every sorrow sees them. They open their mouths to comfort, to preach virtue and peace, to incite others to the practice of good works. Or let us follow them under the burning suns of India, where St. Francis leads the way; or through the wilds, and marshes, and impenetrable forests of South America, where so many Jesuit Fathers have perished in their missions to the heathen; let us accompany them on the battlefield, and see them walk calmly and reverently under fire as they bring the last sacraments to the wounded and dying. The contemplation of such deeds will raise in us a desire to imitate them, instead of living to "kill time," to amass money, to enjoy luxuries, or to calumniate our neighbours.

Yet the Press publishes all the scandals of priests which it can rake up. Why is this? There is a class of men who hate God and desire to extinguish religion in men's hearts. They have found that the priesthood stands in their way; for the priests have much influence over the people. That influence these demons of men seek to destroy; therefore they bribe or wheedle newspaper editors into seconding their purpose; or they supply provincial editors, gratis, with articles; and the editors regard it as so

much gain, and receive the articles without scruple. These men are verily demons, for they hate God, seek the destruction of all religion, aim at having no more law to restrain them, and endeavour to beat down those who inculcate the observance of law, the practices of religion, and the love of God. They plan how to rid the world of kings and princes; and desire to get out of their way all those who preach subjection. They labour to accumulate riches which shall engender more wealth; and to confiscate the possessions devoted by pious ancestors to the promotion of justice and charity. The principle of their lives is sensual enjoyment; and they hate those who practise voluntary poverty and lifelong continence, who preach modesty to maidens, chastity to adults, fidelity to married persons, and the pains of hell to those who persistently refuse to imitate Christ in their lives. Priests continue the mission of Christ on earth; and our Lord said to those whom He ordained—"He that heareth you, heareth Me: and he that despiseth you, despiseth Me and Him that sent Me." It is precisely because those human demons desire to get rid of Christ and His Church, that they desire to get rid of priests. *Ecrasons l'Infame* (*i.e.* Christ) was the motto of Voltaire; and he spent his life and energies in working to undermine the Church. On his deathbed he cried out, in his agonies, for a priest; but his friends would not let him "disgrace himself" and ruin the cause, by seeing a priest; and so he died with all his sins upon his soul, "unloseled, unannealed."

But priests preach politics instead of the Gospel. What do you mean by politics? I mean by it all those maxims which are to guide a Government in directing the society under its rule, to all the happiness which is possible on earth; for this is the end of civil society. In other words, political science is a system of maxims concerning the maintenance of charity and justice between the citizens themselves, and between the State and every other nation. That this is the meaning of politics is manifest from the common parlance. For you say that a Government, which acts on loyal, sincere, and upright principles towards its subjects and foreign States, has a loyal, frank, and upright policy. But if an Administration observes tortuous, deceptive, Macchiavelian principles of action, you say that its policy is tortuous, fraudulent, and Macchiavelian. In short, the word "politics" denotes the principles which regulate the conduct of statesmen.

I ask you, then, whether principles of action are something in the moral order? Of course; every fruit of cognition by the intellect and election by the free will of man is necessarily of a moral nature. The principles which regulate the conduct of a Government must, therefore, be moral principles. Who then, upon earth, is the Supreme Judge of the morality of the acts of men and nations? (I ask this of Catholics, as the objection under consideration can fairly come from them only.) Unless you deny your Faith, you must answer that it is the Church that is the unerring Teacher of faith and morals.

Hence, whenever an immoral principle takes root and spreads, the Church can no longer hold Her peace and allow it to extend further. It would be culpable to let human motives intervene in favour of permitting the extension of a heresy, or of a principle which vitiates men's actions and habits. Suppose, now, that a false principle—the sovereignty of the people, or non-intervention, or any other principle of "le nouveau droit"—to come into the field; and suppose that the Church, with Her unerring eye, sees in that principle a violation of natural law or of Evangelical charity—could She honestly hold her peace? If She were to do so, She would be abdicating Her function as the Teacher of all nations. We must conclude then that priests must enter into politics.

Do you mean that the Church has a right to meddle in questions of trade, commerce, finance, and military and naval matters? Yes, she has a right and duty to meddle in every question, in so far as it is in the moral order. In all such questions there are two sides: (1) The material organization or matter of the question, the circumstances of the time, the opportunity, and the duration; (2) the moral principles, which are mixed up with, and govern all such questions. The former is entirely within the competence of the civil Government, and no one has ever accused the Church of interfering therein. As to the second, I ask you whether you pretend to say that the Church is to permit Her children (Catholics) to be unjust, dishonest, false, deceiving, rapacious, guilty of murder, and so forth? Is the

Church not to condemn fraud, murder, robbery, and every kind of unrighteousness, whether committed by a private person, a general, a minister of state, or even a king? This has been the practice of the Church in all ages, since the time when our Lord said, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven." She has examined the public and private acts of all sorts and conditions of men, from emperors down to hucksters, and has denounced that which was contrary to the law of God. Consult the *De Regimine* of St. Thomas, or the treatises *De Justitia et Jure* of other writers. In all these treatises nothing was defined, or even considered, except the moral side. In speaking of commerce, for example, they did not deal with the material prosperity of the State, but only with the violations of justice which there may be. When they treated of wars, they did not concern themselves with weapons and ammunition, nor with questions of strategy; they discussed those points only where the laws of war were contrary to natural justice. In questions of treaties, they did not dictate with whom alliances should be concluded; but showed only the points where the covenants offended against the laws of righteousness and of charity. When the Church deals with a ruler, She cannot regard him simply as a private individual; She must remember his official character. A ruler will not be judged, in the last day, merely in regard to his attendance at Mass and confession, and his observance of the commands and precepts of religion; he will also have to give an account of the maxims which guided his public conduct, that is to

say, the policy which he adopted, and the honesty and justice of his administration. A magistrate will not be judged merely in regard to his profession of Faith and the practice of his religion; but also with respect to whether he maintained justice and upheld right on his tribunal. The like may be said of generals, and of doctors, and of lawyers, and of clerks, and so forth. All these will be judged, not only as private men; they will also be asked how they filled that station of life, or that office which God had committed to them. For all men are God's ministers or agents, in higher or lower grades; from the Vicar of Christ on the seat of St. Peter, and the emperor on his throne, down to the sheriff's officer and bum-bailiff in his bailiwick. Do you think that any one of them, who attended with the utmost punctuality to his religious duties, but neglected his public duties, or admitted disorders into his public office, or acted in his public capacity against the rights of God or His Church—do you think he will be acquitted in the sight of God? If he has fulfilled all his public and private duties he cannot rank himself at more than an "unprofitable servant;" and if he has fulfilled only his private but not his public duties, he is a sinful, wicked, and unjust steward in the sight of God. Is the Church, then, not to regard him as God regards him? You allow that the Church should reprove the shopkeeper for his unjust dealing, and his unjust weights, by which he robs the poor man's family. Why should She not also reprove a minister of state who has defrauded every family in the nation? You allow that a priest

should censure a labouring man for spending all his earnings upon drink, or on any other selfish enjoyment, while his wife and family are starving at home. Why may he not also censure a ruler for acting similarly towards a whole people? You allow that the chaplain of a gaol may admonish a murderer or a homicide. Why may a priest not also admonish a king for plunging the nation in an unjust war? You admit that a parish priest should rebuke those children who, by their disobedience and wildness, have brought misery into a family. Why may not the Church reprimand the citizens who, by their disobedience, wilfulness, and revolt, have raised a tumult in the whole State?

Yet the Church may not interfere in any way with the State; for the end of the latter is only temporal happiness, which men may attain by the right use of their reason, while the end of the Church is a supernatural end—eternal felicity in the fruition of God—which cannot be known except by revelation, and the means to which are not possessed by the State. Most true; yet a Christian nation, that is, a people to which the supernatural end has been announced in the Christian Faith, must regard the temporal end as subordinate to the eternal. It must look on earthly prosperity as only a means towards attaining the supernatural felicity. A Christian State, therefore, cannot permit anything which would be a hindrance to that supernatural end; and if the subordinate society (the State) should err in this respect, it is the duty of the superior

society to correct it. Thus, St. Thomas,[9] "Dicendum quod potestas sæcularis subditur spirituali sicut corpus animæ. Et ideo non est usurpatum judicium si spiritualis prælatus se intromittat in temporalibus quantum ad ea in quibus subditur ei sæcularis potestas."[10]

Moreover, religion must of necessity enter into politics, if government is not to become an impossibility. There are only three pure forms of government: a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a republic. As no human institution is perfect, each of these forms has its own drawbacks and dangers, and each has its peculiar virtue and advantages. A monarchy is the furthest removed from anarchy, but it is the nearest to despotism. A republic is the furthest from despotism, but is not far from anarchy. An aristocracy is removed from both, but is subject to that internal dissension which splits the society into parties or factions, and the ruling party then becomes an oligarchy. These facts are patent to all observers of "constitutional governments." These are some of the dangers incident to each form of government. Take away the Church, and that which was before only a danger at once becomes a real and present evil. Give to any man the means of indulging his passions, and there is a danger lest he should throw up the reins of self-control, and, restraining no longer his desires and his temper, should rush down the career of vice and fury. It is a danger only. Free him, moreover, from the fear of God, let him forget

[9] *Summa Theol.*, 2a. 2æ., q. 40, a. 6, ad 3.
[10] Note 8.

that there is a Supreme Judge of all men, and an ever-present Ruler of all the world, and there is no longer any reason why the man should restrain himself. It has become a certainty that he will indulge every passion, and give way to every evil temper. If he is also powerful in mind and fearless in character, he will be a maniac scourge of humanity. Let the form of your Government be a monarchy, you will then groan under a tyrant. Let it be an aristocracy, you will then have many rapacious tyrants, divided into factions, and rising successively into oligarchies, which vie with each other in plundering and oppression, and equally disregard the public service in their jealousy. Let the form of Government be a republic, and you will then endure the horrors of the democracy of '89, or of the Commune of '71. But let the Church step in to watch over the childhood of your future king, of your future rulers, of the next generation of the people; let Her form their minds; let Her implant, at a tender age, Her own eternal principles; let Her draw them on to virtue in their youth, by the promises of God, and restrain them by the menace of God's threats; let Her be at their side when they occupy the throne, or frequent the council-chamber, or meet in the assembly of the people, and warn them of evil, and bring to their minds the counsels of God, the Supreme Ruler of the universe, and then you will be governed by those who will restrain their evil passions and violent tempers, even when they are in possession of full powers to indulge them. A nation, on the other hand, which has thrown off the

restraint of the Church, and has learned to despise the promises, and disregard the menaces of religion, will assuredly plunge itself into misery as soon as it attempts to govern itself. The Church never "meddles with politics" for Her own behoof; She is compelled to do so by Her nature. She is the salt of the earth, which guards the world from corruption. She is the guide of men, to prevent them from falling into the pitfalls of Satan. She is the light of the world, to reveal to them the false maxims which are corroding their lives, and the fallacies which are undermining their happiness. She is the remedy for all ills, and the fountain of all blessings; and She must fulfil the functions for which Christ instituted Her. How She is straitened until it be performed!

CHAPTER IV.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS.

In times when the Faith was strong, many persons entered the religious orders, and all men understood and appreciated the sublimity and excellence of them. Now that the Faith in most men is weak, few are drawn to the religious life, and the rest do not understand the principles of it. The principles of a religious life, are the principles of the Christian Faith. Every Catholic must admit the following proposition: Obedience to God's law is necessary to salvation. This is the rule for every man's life. But Christ has, moreover, given three precepts which those, who endeavour to be perfect, must observe, viz., voluntary poverty, perpetual chastity, and entire obedience. "Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata; si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende omnia quæ habes et da pauperibus, et veni sequere me." This is the principle of a religious life.

But I have no patience with the idle lives which the religious lead. This may be said (1) with regard to those who profess a contemplative life; (2) those who profess an active life; or (3) those who profess a mixed life. It may, moreover, be meant to apply (*a*) to the profession itself, or (*b*) to the abuse of it by

some individual who does not fulfil the duties which that profession obliges him to perform. With regard to the latter, it is sufficient to observe that the Church is less inclined than sinful men, to tolerate lax and imperfect discipline. A practical suggestion may, however, be added to this observation. It would be better to mind your own business, and not trouble yourself with that which does not concern you. When you observe some disorder in another man's house or family, is it your custom to interfere and regulate things according to your own notions? No. You feel that you have no right to do so. If every one were to do so, no man's house, no office, no public administration would be free for a day from meddlesome busybodies; and the greatest anarchy and confusion, and detriment to public service would result. I may, moreover, observe that if you have a right to meddle in the house of a religious order, then friars and other religious persons have an equal right to meddle in your affairs. Or if this would be too much for you to bear, then acknowledge the principle that every man must "stand or fall with his own master," that "every man's house is his castle," and that no man may be interfered with except by his superiors or rulers. But if you cannot restrain your zeal, which burns so hotly against all those who disregard their professions, or who lead idle lives, then it would be no more than consistent that you should turn your indignation against that very pernicious and impoverishing idleness of the majority of persons in "good society." You will find many persons, nearer home than the religious, who

pass their whole time in "killing time," that is, in pleasing themselves and procuring for themselves new and unnatural excitements; persons who do not rise until mid-day, nor go to bed until past midnight, "turning night into day, and day into night;" young ladies who skim through novels whenever they are not gossipping or flirting; clerks, or even ministers of state, and heads of public offices, who receive great salaries from the State, and do nothing in return but make a few speeches to mislead the country and hoodwink the House of Commons. If your zeal is so ardent against those who violate their profession in an active or even a mixed order, why do you extend the right hand of fellowship to every religious that has broken through the rule, and mixes in secular affairs, or indulges himself in idleness and pleasure? Why do you raise a stupid Protestant outcry whenever those are being reduced to order who have become lax or kicked against the discipline of the Church?

Having made these preliminary remarks, let us ask ourselves whether the lives of the religious are really idle. Have not the religious orders been the greatest benefactors of humanity? At one time there was no culture except in monasteries. All without was subject to violence, turmoil, and confusion. If it had not been for the monasteries all learning would have disappeared from the earth. The few manuscript works of the ancients would all have been lost; no libraries would have been collected; no sciences would have been pursued; no arts would have been practised. The religious orders formed

schools, and wrote works which still surpass anything which has been composed to this time. They preserved religion and piety and virtue, when their little oasis of peace was surrounded by the tossing waters of fierce and ignorant barbarians. By degrees they brought those barbarians to adopt polished manners and lead lives of greater gentleness. It was the religious orders who made roads through parts of the country as yet unpierced by the Pagan Romans. They built bridges, drained swamps, cultivated waste grounds, and reclaimed lands, throughout England, France, and Germany—indeed, throughout Europe and parts of Asia. Idle lives! Was it an idle life that built the Cathedrals of Cologne, of Toledo, of Milan, and created works of literature, of art, and of charity, which thousands of sightseers now travel every summer to stare at, and perforce to admire?

Are they idle in these days? Nay; how busy they are in hearing confessions, in preaching, exhorting, educating, withdrawing sinners from their evil ways; in carrying on controversies; in composing books to preserve men from prevalent errors, or to promote a greater ardour of piety. Is that idleness? They are of the greatest utility to the world in other ways also. The frivolity, dissipation, material enjoyments, luxury, corruption, and immorality which flood society, require that some men, as examples, should lead simple, retired, calm, self-denying, self-mortifying lives. If it were not for some who do not drift with the tide, how could society see the direction in which it is drifting? If it were not for a light here and there in the world, the world would be involved in

total darkness. If it were not for salt in the earth, the corruption would speedily be past remedy. Is not this a useful work? You think they do nothing because they do not engage in trade, extend railways, lay down telegraphs, promote companies, and enter into speculations. As they do not spend their time in such employments, you regard them as alien to the nineteenth century. What have these things to do with the ultimate end of man, or how do they further the attainment of that end? Man was not sent on earth to make railways or promote bubble companies. Let there be some, amid the surrounding corruption, who may be called "the salt of the earth," even if they do nothing more than live as protests against the universal decadence of nations. Alas! "animalis homo non percipit ea quæ Dei sunt"—the carnal man, a man who lives an animal life, cannot understand the things that are of God.

Then let the active and mixed orders pass; but the contemplative orders, at least, lead idle lives. First let me ask you why you refuse to respect the liberty of another man, who costs you nothing. You perhaps live on your income, without labouring, or doing any real work. So does he live, in common with others, on their income. What right have you to interfere with him, any more than he with you? If a few men choose to live in common and practise ascetic and pious lives, what is that to you? Whose liberties do they invade? If you have a right to spoil them and confiscate their property, because they live a life which you do not fancy, then any one else, by parity of reasoning, may seize your property, if your mode

of life is not according to his fancy. Or, perhaps, you are labouring hard to amass money in trade, or commerce, or agriculture, or in some other industry. Yet I may remind you that it will profit you nothing if you gain immense wealth, nay, even the whole world, and lose your own soul. Consider whether he does not lead a more rational life, who cares not for wealth; who retires from the world, and shuts out temptations, and "brings his body under," and prays and meditates, so that he may not lose his own soul's life? Even if you prefer the more irrational life, yet leave to other men the liberty of living the life they prefer. You cry out for liberty of thought, liberty of the Press, liberty to blaspheme, social liberty, civil liberty, liberty of worship, liberty to desecrate Sundays and holidays, and even the liberty to conspire (which has been called the sacred right of insurrection). Yet you will not recognize the liberty to live a quiet and holy life!

But they lead lives which are useless to others. If they are the lights of the world, to show by contrast how far the world has departed from the model of life which Christ set them, are they useless to the world? Is a lighthouse, beacon, or buoy, of no use to the mariner because it does not grind corn and turn spindles? Moreover, the Church is a body, of which the members are consolidated together in the strictest union. Can you not see that some of the graces which are showered on the whole body, flow from those who lead holy lives on to others who do not; that the oil which is poured on Aaron's head "flows down to the skirts of his garment"? Are

the prayers of righteous men of no avail for erring brethren? Even Sodom would have been saved if five righteous men had been found in it. Can you then say that it is of no advantage to a town, or to a State, that it should have, within it, those who lead pious and self-mortifying lives? Is there not a compensating power in the holiness of some, which lessens God's punishments on others in society for their wickedness? Does not their retirement make up for some of the dissipations of these; their meditations for the neglect of Christ by these; their prayers for the oaths and blasphemies of these; their mortification for the sensuality of these; their fasts for the gluttony of these; their devotion for the impiety of these; their obedience for the insubordination of these; their voluntary poverty for the avarice of these; their chastity for the uncleanness of these? Even the Pagan, Job, knew this much; he offered holocausts for those who feasted and made merry, for he said, "Lest perhaps in the banqueting they have sinned, and have blasphemed God in their hearts." This you cannot see, perhaps; then meditate on that which you say you believe—the communion of saints; and on the efficacy of the prayers of a righteous man, even in cases of bodily sickness and physical infirmity. We, Englishmen, tender our gratitude to you, Victor Emmanuel, and to you, Prince Bismarck; England and America offer you their thanks for expelling the religious orders from your lands, because they have taken refuge with us. The presence of so many more holy men on our shores will draw down blessings on us, and raise us

in the scale of nations. Shall we regard this as the effect of your self-sacrificing policy? Those blessings which you thus draw down on us, you truly deny yourselves. You have deprived yourselves of those everlasting graces, which, by your tyrannical laws, you have enabled us to acquire. On the part of Prussia this self-abnegation is remarkable; for she was rising quickly and attaining to the lead of nations; and she has weighted herself before arriving at the goal. "The race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong." To Italy, and to France again, we are grateful for having allowed those remedial experiments to be made in their bodies, which the slower Anglo-Saxon nations will consequently shun. Germany, Italy, France, and Spain, you have suffered for the warning and safety of other nations, as Herod was struck with a curse and eaten of worms, to make other kings "give glory to God."

But the religious consume and produce nothing; they are a dead hand, which takes, but gives back nothing that it receives. The religious are men; yet you speak of them as beasts or machines. You say: *The cost of their consumption is so much, their produce is so much, therefore they are not worth what they eat.* Animals were made for man; as man was made for God. That expression you may use with regard to animals (although no one would say such a thing of his favourite horse or dog). But take care lest God should use the like expression with regard to you, and say, "Cut it down, why cumbereth it the ground?" Yet your objection goes far beyond this; for the religious do not

belong to you. Society does not slip in between you and your animals and say, with regard to your pet dog or favourite horse: "They do not produce as much as they eat, and therefore they shall be violently taken from you and exterminated." Imagine for a moment the municipal corporation of your town, or the board of guardians of your union, awaking to a sense of their duty, and ordering a commission of inquiry into the receipts and returns from your animals; and fancy them rising to the sublime wisdom of your political economy, and ordering your race horses, and lap-dogs to be converted into super-phosphate manure, without giving you any consolation, except that of remembering that you had thus been protected from useless expense. This sublime wisdom may next be practised by the State and extended in its application; kings, noblemen, squires, rich men, soldiers, and all other "unproductive labourers" may receive a rude hint that they have been consuming much and producing nothing! Of course your bishops and parsons will have been previously exterminated. For all these persons "produce nothing," and live at the cost of others! That would be quite consistent with your theory. It would be a logical consequence from it. But it is utterly repugnant to what we hold. Kings and bishops, and even noblemen and others (if they do their duty as such), do produce something; the religious orders do produce something, as we have already shown. You cannot deny this, unless you disbelieve and gainsay the life of the spirit of man, and the work of salvation, and the attainment of the

ultimate end of man; or if you deny these truths, then you must affirm the contradictory, and, in consequence, exterminate kings, and priests, and learned men, and scientific men, and all women—for they are not "producers." Man was once almost equal to the angels; now, alas! in the nineteenth century he has dwindled down to a mere "producer." "Oh, what a fall was there, my countrymen!"

Yet they must cause some increase, although it be small, in the price of necessaries, such as bread; and this must press hardly on the poor. Firstly: the difference in the price of food must verily be infinitesimally small—nay, quite inappreciable, if any difference at all is caused in it by the existence of the religious orders. Secondly, there would be no injustice if the poor had to pay something for the ministrations of priests and the benefits conferred on them by the religious orders.

First, as to the price of necessities. If a calculation were made in the difference of price in a loaf of bread, which would be due to the consumption of the religious, it would be found to be a very small fraction—not the hundredth part of a farthing. If it were as much as a farthing, the loaf would not be sold for less if the religious were abolished; for the difference of value would go into the pockets of the bakers. This argument, petty though it be, would apply with a hundred-fold more force to the other unproductive classes. Therefore, the ire of political economists should be first directed against the latter. It must, moreover, be borne in mind that the religious live on foundations made by rich

and charitable persons, in order that the benefits of the religious orders might be given gratuitously to the poor. These foundations have been increased by sums of money which each of the religious has given to the order on entering it. These sums were not subtracted from a capital employed in trade or industry, but from money which might otherwise have been spent unproductively and lost to the world. The religious orders have, therefore, even in a merely material point of view, been a clear gain to the world, as much as the Post Office Savings' Banks, which collect the pennies that would otherwise be be squandered in tobacco or spirits. If we turn from the material point of view, and consider the preservation and propagation of the Faith, the gratuitous preaching, and services, and administration of the sacraments, the counsel and comfort which is freely offered to the poor in all their anxieties and troubles, and the example of those who patiently bear, for the love of God, that poverty which the poor have to bear from necessity, then we must acknowledge that the gain to the world is immense.

If we are to be vexed with the material consideration, then we should first turn our attention to other, and greater, and more baneful modes of wasting capital. You desire not to allow a religious house to exist in a town, where hundreds of thousands of pounds are laid out in building and maintaining opera houses, and theatres, and similar luxuries. Of what use are these things to the poor, in whose interest you hypocritically pretend to wish for the abolition of monasteries? Do they reduce the price

of food? Millions are spent in embellishments of the town, in building monuments, and in raising statues to warriors, statesmen, and other historical characters. Is the material status of the poor ameliorated by such an expenditure? How many more millions are annually expended by all the States of Europe in building ships of war, in constructing fortifications, in arming them with great guns, and furnishing soldiers with improved kinds of small arms, in maintaining huge armies and navies —in order, no doubt, that the poor may have the pleasure of crawling off from battle with maimed and shattered bodies; or the greater happiness of leaving their carcasses to rot on the fields of fight? May we not begin first to effect a material saving in this direction? There is here far more pressing need for reformation. These questions are far more urgent than a question whether monasteries should be abolished. One opera singer or ballet dancer wastes more money in a month than a religious house would consume in a year. The army of one State sinks more capital in a year than all the religious orders of Europe. One visit of a Shah or Sultan swallows up as much wealth in a week as would serve for a pious foundation to last for centuries. But every profuse prodigality for the world, the flesh, or the devil, is welcomed by you with acclamations; while every little expenditure for the honour and service of God meets with reprobation and intolerance. As if piety and religion cannot benefit a people; as if the only end of a nation is unbounded gratification and sensual enjoyment!

But that dead hand, that mortmain! how do you defend that? This is the wonderful bugbear, and cannot, certainly, be defended—as long as we do not understand to what the expression applies. All pious foundations, all ecclesiastical property, the revenues of the religious orders, are called goods in mortmain; because the possessors of such property cannot alienate it, sell it, or devote it to other purposes than those intended by the founder. The owners of such property are not possessors. They are usufructuaries, or administrators of it. The complaint against such a kind of property is, that the capital cannot be applied to commerce or industry. But this is conformable to justice. It is, also, the greatest benefit to the people that it should be so. It is consonant with justice; because, as the founder gave the property for a pious use, which he determined to last for ever, it would be injustice to seize the property and divert it to uses of our own. If a man left money to support a school, or hospital, or church in perpetuity; would it be right to defraud the founder by using the money to mend the roads? He might have wasted it in riotous living, or built with it a castle which should stand for ever, and remain as an heirloom in his family, and no one would have objected. Have you a right to object to the pious uses which he preferred?

These pious uses are clearly for the benefit of the people. Is it not better for them that a hospital should have been founded, rather than a castle built? Do they not obtain a greater advantage when a

church has been built and endowed, than when the money has been spent in riotous living? If then you disendow the church, or school, or hospital, you not only defraud the founder, but also rob the poor.

Yet may not the same amount of capital be made more productive by employing it in commerce or industry? Certainly; but that does not give you the right to despoil the owner of that capital. If you may despoil him, you may confiscate the possessions of every one, in order that the State may use the capital in gigantic speculations. Or do you mean that I may employ my own property in any way I may choose, or even lock it up in my strong room and not employ it at all, provided that I do not devote it to pious uses, or to the benefit of the poor; and that the moment I attempt to do either of these, the State will step in and take it from me, saying that it must be employed in a more productive manner? O blindness! O imbecility! O fatal cæcity! At a time when the revolutionary and socialistic party denies all rights, and desires to put all property in common, you cut away the root of all property, undermining the very foundation of the rights of possession! Some day you will hear it said, that, with a view to the material profit of society, you urged the State to take religious property and charitable foundations in order to devote them to secular uses; and, therefore, so much the more, may it take the property of private persons and make it common property of the society. How will you then save your ancestral lands, and retain the capital which you amassed by years of thought

and labour? When you yourself have affirmed the premisses; there are plenty who are ready to draw the conclusion.

It is false to assert that the lands and properties of pious foundations have remained unfruitful. For they received them as barren lands or unwholesome swamps, drained and tilled them, and made them most fertile farms. Or do you suppose that the administrators of the charity have not been as active or provident as a public officer would have been? That is a good reason for insisting upon a better performance of duty; it is no ground for confiscating the property and devoting it to other uses. But the fact remains that, as ecclesiastical land, a vast portion of Europe was drained and brought into cultivation, and therefore it is not true to assert that ecclesiastical lands are always allowed to lie idle.

These foundations are wholly for the good of the poor. For, subtracting the portion which pays for the food and clothing of the religious, the rest is directly devoted to the poor. The portion taken by the religious themselves for their living is extremely small. No other administrators would deduct as little. Every one of the charitable societies of England wastes some two-thirds of their income, or more, on a secretary and other officials; on offices, deputations through the country, public dinners, and the like. A religious house has no secretary, and no paid official. All the work is done by the religious themselves, or by lay-brothers, and it is done for the love of God. Their food is of the poorest description

which it is possible for men to live on; and their clothing is of the humblest and cheapest kind. With the least possible deduction, therefore, the capital of the founder, increased, as it has been, by the labour and care of centuries, is devoted to the good of the poor. The religious have no carriages nor horses, nor paid servants, to reduce the fund; and they give no public entertainments for gluttony and vainglory. The proof of the excellence of these institutions stands in history. England knew no pauperism until after the destruction of the religious houses. The enormous funds, until then devoted to the poor, were at that time taken away by the State, and went to support the King's foreign wars, and to increase the wealth of his parasitical nobles.

But the religious houses maintain and promote superstition. Here, at last, we have an inkling of the true objection to religious houses. Wherever there are religious houses, the people are found to be more tenacious of the Catholic religion; they go more frequently to church; they are more punctual in attending confession and in making frequent Communions; they invoke, with more fervour, the the Blessed Virgin and the saints; they are more prone to live simple lives, and even to practise self-denial and mortifications; and they are not so noisy about their rights, being more anxious about fulfilling their duties. This, then, is the real ground of objection to the religious orders. Believe me, gentle reader (to the ungentle reader it is useless to speak), neither political economy, nor public utility, nor increase of production, nor a dislike to idle lives,

enter, in the least degree, into the composition of this aversion to the religious orders. The hatred of religion is the basis of it all. The presence of a religious community is an obstacle to the schemes of the atheistical party. Infidels detest their existence, because they fear their efficiency. In the lives of the religious is seen, in act, the supernatural power of grace, and the Evangelical perfection which Jesus Christ taught by word and example. Therefore it is that he who hates Jesus Christ and is an enemy to Christianity, must also abhor the religious orders. The sight of religious persons is a tacit reproof to every one who lives merely to please himself. Their poverty is a condemnation of luxury; their patience is a rebuke to injustice and violence; their obedience is a censure on the principles of insubordination and revolt, which prevail in this age. When the vicious see a religious, they shudder and feel an aversion, and then seek to rid themselves of every one who is a living reprobation of their acts and principles. That is the sentimental ground of their enmity. The prudential reason is no less strong. For wherever the religious are accepted, the revolutionary party cannot preach their doctrines: such as the rehabilitation of the flesh; the "sacred right to satisfy the necessary tendencies of nature" (*i.e.*, the carnal passions), or, in other words, a holy liberty of animal enjoyment. There is another prudential reason for abolishing the religious orders. The revolutionary party know that the people never did, and never will, suffice to guide itself, and that it is conscious of its incapacity to do so. As soon

as the influence of the religious orders ceases, the people will cast about for some other leader to direct them; and that is the opportunity for the secret societies. Moreover, they know that a people which was not ready to divide its bread with the religious, will, as soon as the influence of the religious is removed, refuse to support a king, an aristocracy, and the "natural leaders" of the locality. Free a people from "superstition," and it will fly to communism, to revolution, to the guillotine, to fusillades, to petroleum. Get rid of those principles which, by the grave authority of God, now keep the mob in the line of duty, and bayonets and prisons must at once be called in to take their place. You complain of the religious for being unproductive! Get rid of those quiet, unoffending, charitable, devout men and women, and their houses will be occupied by soldiers, who are not only unproductive, but also very destructive. Those houses which furnished models of peaceful, self-denying lives, will exhibit only violent, roistering, turbulent, dissolute lives. Which do you prefer?

The hatred against the religious orders is focussed and concentrated on the Society of Jesus. The calumnies against them are so numerous and so monstrous, that to collect them is to refute them; *e.g., The Jesuits have, for their own purposes, corrupted the Christian doctrine, departed from the life of Christ, practised and taught idolatry, falsified every virtue, indulged every vice, invented maxims in defence of lies, perjury, theft, and even blasphemy; they have resorted to poison and the poignard, the dagger and*

the bowl; they have favoured regicide, stirred up revolutions, caused massacres, &c. Gioberti is a representative man among the calumniators of the Jesuits.

Let us ask ourselves, whether such atrocities are at all likely to be true of those who lead lives like the Jesuits? If these charges are true, how is it that the Jesuits have lived, for centuries, in every country of the world, and yet not one of these crimes has ever been proved against them? How is it that not a single Jesuit has been horror-struck and conscience-stricken at his part and complicity in such conduct, and retired from such a wicked Society, preferring to face the risks of man's revenge, rather than incur a certain destruction from God? How is it that those Jesuits, whom the Church has declared to have been saints, did not denounce such an unholy Society? The secret societies, which have been established only a few years, have been forsaken by numbers of conscience-stricken members, who have revealed the infamous plots and criminal secrets, which had caused them so much horror of mind. Why has there not been found one Jesuit in three hundred and fifty years, who was ready to do the same?

Let us look more clearly into the details of the accusations. In Spain the Jesuits were denounced and persecuted for not observing the rules of their Society, which was admitted to be good and holy; in France they were condemned because, although good men themselves, they belonged to a Society which was essentially evil. These charges are contradictory, and exclude each other. The writers of Port Royal

affirmed that the morals of the Jesuits were lax, corrupt, and corrupting; while Gioberti (although he brings that charge also) asserts that their morals were too strict, and narrow, and puritanical, and without those broad and large views which would cause the Society to comprise representatives of all errors, and hold out the hand of fellowship to all sects. The Jesuits are regicides, conspirators, and enemies to the principle of authority; yet they, at the same time, have sold themselves to every authority, maintain every despotism, are the willing satellites of every tyrant, and, by inculcating submission and respect, they rivet the chains of oppression on the people. The Jesuits (exclaims one) are by no means religious men, nor even good churchmen, although they are, it is true, very eminent in literature and science; yet the Jesuits (another avers) are despicable in literature, ignorant of science, and have no aim in life but to support the Church, and to practise and inculcate every superstition which the Church has ever sanctioned. The Jesuits are retrograde; the Jesuits are allied with the democracy. The Jesuits are idolaters; the Jesuits are too ideal, or spiritual (if you like the term better), and despise those material helps which the ignorant require. The Jesuits administer soporifics to unquiet consciences, and look kindly on heinous sinners. "No," said Pompadour and Choiseul, "they are far too rigid, and harsh, and severe, and strict in their morals." The Jesuits laugh at scruples of conscience, and encourage violations of the laws; yet it cannot be denied that the Jesuits all lead

honest and noble, and some of them most holy lives; for the fault is in the system, or in the commands of their General, which they have to obey. "E via, via dicendo."

Does not this remind us of the accusers of their Master, by Whose name they are called, and of the Scripture words—"And their witness did not agree?" Let us, therefore, turn from these contradictory witnesses, to the testimony of some men of weight who can certainly not be accused of favouring the Jesuits. What says Bayle? "It is quite enough to publish anything, however false, against the Jesuits, in order to secure its being believed by the majority." And D'Alembert? "These accusations are certainly contradictory; for the object was not to say the truth, but to publish, against the Jesuits, as much evil as possible."[1] The Holy Scriptures expressed the same thought in terser language—"Iniquity hath lied to itself."

How can we explain the fact of such contradictory charges having been brought? For more than three centuries, the Jesuits have been energetic in combating every one of the errors which were constantly arising on all sides of them. They thus raised up enemies on all sides, like the allies which fought against Anjou, "one at the north, one at the south, did each fire its cannon into the other's mouth." At one time the flatterers of a King imperilled the throne, not by revolution, but by extravagant adulation—by repeating such false maxims as "L'état, c'est moi," or by favouring the theory which was nick-

[1] *Destruction des Jésuites.*

named "the right divine of kings to govern wrong." The Jesuits taught that a king is not the State, but merely the ruler whom God has placed over the State to rule it in His name, and as His agent or mandatory, and as responsible to Him for its well-being. Thus they drew upon themselves the ire of all the fawning adulators of majesty, and "heartless parasites of royal cheer." At another time the Jesuits saw revolutionists plotting against the throne, and despising the true and legitimate authority of princes, and fearlessly taught them that they owed obedience to rulers, *etiam dyscolis*, for conscience sake. Then the whole fury and bitterness of the rebels and democratic party was poured upon their devoted heads. So again, when a sect of false zealots arose, who, under pretence of honouring Jesus Christ and fostering penitence, kept the faithful back from the sacraments, the Jesuits reminded them that the sacraments were given for the benefit of man, and that God does not desire the death of a sinner, but his conversion. That Jansenist sect then charged the Jesuits with being lax. When they observed modern Pharisees priding themselves on being Christians, without any regard to the morality of their habits, with little respect for the laws of the Church, and leading lives entirely worldly, the Jesuits felt themselves compelled to undeceive these self-righteous persons, and proclaim them "whited sepulchres." Thus the Jesuits acquired the character of fanatics, severe, harsh, and full of scruples. The Jesuits taught that, beside the authority of kings, there is, throughout the world, the authority of the Church. Then the royalists, and the fautors of

the "State as God," reviled them as revolutionists. The Jesuits were anxious to provide for the protection of their missions from the rapacity and enmity of those who desired to devour them; they were then regarded as political. They freely gave their ministrations to all who were in want of them—to all, from the Courts to the galleys; and they were supposed to be meddling, and anxious to thrust themselves into every station of life. The variety and assiduity of their labours thus gave rise to contradictory calumnies—calumnies so contradictory as to be self-refuting. "John came neither eating nor drinking, and you said: He hath a devil. The Son of man came eating and drinking, and you said: Here is a glutton and wine bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners. Yet Wisdom is justified in Her children."

In order to judge of the charges against the Society of Jesus, let us study the origin whence they have proceeded. All those who, during the last three centuries, have assailed the Church, religion, the crown, the principles of morality and justice, have been also the most furious enemies of the Society of Jesus. It has, moreover, not been with reasoning and argument that the Jesuits have been attacked, but with fire and sword. Even the most respectable of their opponents, Calvin, wrote (according to Rohrbacher)—"Jesuitæ vero, qui se maxime nobis opponunt, aut necandi, aut certe calumniis opprimendi"—"Our chief and direct antagonists, the Jesuits, must be murdered, or at least crushed by calumnies." That counsel was made the excuse for cruelties throughout Europe. The Encyclopædists, and the revolutionists

of '89, were the bitter enemies of the Society. The revolutionists of '48 again revived the flame of hatred. The Commune and the Internationalists of '71 steeped their hands in the blood of Père Olivaint and the other martyred Jesuits. The secret societies, in short, are the antagonists of the Society of Jesus. Consider, again, which newspapers most vehemently attack them? The most atheistical, irreligious, and revolutionary papers. What are the means which they have always used? Lies, inuendoes, indefinite obloquy, and barefaced calumnies. The Jesuits have frequently implored that they may be tried in a court of law, for the offences which were laid to their charge. A trial is never denied to robbers and murderers; no accusation may ever be brought against malefactors without bringing them to trial; yet petitions for trial from the Jesuits have been uniformly refused. When such a petition was urged, the other day, by the Bishop of Mayence, the Emperor of Germany, who had been made to utter the calumnies, refused to notice the petition for justice.

Two centuries ago, a book was printed, called *Monita Secreta Societatis Jesu.* It pretended to be a code of rules for Jesuits. This book had no foundation in truth; it was a fiction composed by a Pole, in order to calumniate the Jesuits. It was proscribed at the time by the Papal Nuncio, and by the Bishop of Cracow, and by the Sacred Congregation of the Index Expurgatorius. Yet to this day the same book is used to cover the Society with obloquy. This year the columns of English journals contained

repetitions of its falsehoods, and assertions of the authenticity of the book.

By such persons, and by such means have the Jesuits been calumniated. If such persons had been the friends and allies of the Jesuits, or if such means had been used by the Jesuits to swell their praise, every one would have cried: Shame upon the Jesuits! To be attacked by such persons and such means is therefore an honour and glory. Let me ask, on the other hand, who have been the friends of the Jesuits? All those whom the Church, throughout the world, has held to be illustrious for sanctity and wisdom. Saints are those whose hearts are the most free from passion, and whose mental eyes are least darkened by sin. The saints are therefore the best able to judge other men. Not one of them has uttered a word against the Jesuits. They have all been favourable to the Jesuits. St. Philip Neri often desired to be received into the Society. St. Charles Borromeo always chose a Jesuit as his spiritual director, and opened houses and churches for them in Milan and Switzerland, and finally died in the arms of the Society. St. John of God entertained a special love for the Jesuits. St. Thomas of Villanuova, an Archbishop and a great light of the Augustinian Order; Louis of Grenada; St. Teresa; St. Louis Bertrand; St. Mary Magdalen of Pazzi, a Carmelite; St. Francis of Sales; St. Jane Frances de Chantal; St. Vincent de Paul; and others, were equally ardent in their love for the Society, as the histories of their lives sufficiently testify. All the founders of congregations since the time of St. Ignatius, turned for counsel and direction to the

fathers of the Society. Take for example the Blessed Giambattista of the Conception, founder of the Order of the Most Holy Trinity ; the Blessed Maria Vittoria Fornari Strata, foundress of the Order of the Annunciation ; the Venerable Giovanna Maria Chezard de Matel, foundress of the Order of the Incarnate Word ; the Venerable Giovanni Battista de la Salle, founder of the Christian Brothers ; and many others. St. Alfonsus di Liguori wrote, at the time of the hottest persecution of the Jesuits—"I am more anxious than I should be in a persecution of our own little congregation. There is question of an order which has sanctified the whole world, and continues to sanctify it. . . . Besides the great good which the Jesuits accomplish in the exercise of the Apostolic ministry, we must also esteem them greatly for the special talent which they have for sowing the precious seeds of piety in the hearts of the young, so that their pupils, when they enter the world, edify all classes of persons in all countries. The Jansenists and all the innovators would like to exterminate this Society, in order to get rid of the great bulwark of the Church of God. If the Jesuits were destroyed, the impious would be freed from their most powerful adversaries. The Jesuits are resolute men, and their Society will continually acquire glory in combating all the enemies of the Church." Afterwards, when Pope Clement XIII. entered the arena in their defence, the same Saint wrote to the Pope in the following terms : "Most Holy Father,—The Bull which your Holiness has issued in praise and confirmation of the Society of Jesus has filled the hearts of all good men with a joy,

which I nevertheless can share. I have the greatest esteem for this Society, because of the great good which these holy religious accomplish by their example, and by their labours of all kinds, and in every place where they may happen to be. I can render testimony to the prodigies wrought by their zeal and by their love, which I have been compelled to admire while residing in Naples. The Lord has willed that they should be tried by fiery persecutions in these latter times; yet your Holiness has given them abundant consolation, because, as Head of the Church and Father of all the faithful, you have solemnly undertaken their defence, and published their merits before God and man, in a holy Bull. In this manner your Holiness has responded to those malevolent persons who have attempted to blacken the reputation both of themselves and of their Institute. As for us, the shepherds of souls, who receive from the zeal and labours of these most excellent religious, a great assistance in the direction of our flocks, and I, who am the last of the bishops, together with all the others, render to your Holiness most humble thanks for that which you have done, and pray your Holiness to continue to protect this order, which has given to the Church so many good labourers, to the Faith so many martyrs, and to the world so many good examples."[2]

Lastly, we must refer to the judgment of the Holy See, the unerring organ of truth. Often and often, both in public and in private, in Bulls and Briefs and Apostolic Constitutions, the Holy See has approved and praised and defended the Society

[2] *Life of St. Alfonso*, by Jeancard.

of Jesus, ever since the time of Pope Paul III., who gave his sanction to the foundation of the Society of St. Ignatius—"Those men impelled by the Spirit of God to renounce every earthly hope in order to devote themselves to Jesus Christ in preaching the Word of God, in ministering to the sick, and in the education of youth."[3] Julius III. regarded them as "dear sons, who, having said farewell to the vanities of the age, were serving the Lord in the spirit of humility, with a fervent zeal, combined with doctrine and example."[4] Pope Marcellus II., who sat only twenty-two days on the throne, applied for "two fathers of the Society to discuss, counsel, and decide upon the gravest matters of the service of God."[5] Pope Paul IV. thought them "worthy of all love for their generous endeavours to walk according to the doctrine and example of Jesus Christ, and in His footsteps;" and he added, "The family of this Society which grew from a small beginning, like the Church of God, has become, not faint and tired from so many labours, but more illustrious and great every day."[6] Pius IV., in a brief to the Emperor Maximilian, assured him that the Jesuits were "innocent of the charges proferred against them, and were calumniated through envy, because of the good they had done and were doing." In the Bull, *Etsi ex debito*, he said he was "inclined to enlarge the special favours awarded to them, because, as they bear the name of Jesus,

[3] Bull, *Reg. licet.*
[4] Bull, *Sacræ Religionis.*
[5] See Bartoli's *History of Italy.*
[6] Brumato, *History of Paul IV.*

so they study to imitate Jesus in their works, their doctrines, and their lives." St. Pius V. said, "The Jesuits, by their fervour of religion, by their exemplary lives, by the saintliness of their habits, by their acquaintance with the sacred literature and the Holy Scriptures, have been the authors of the good fruits which have been so abundantly produced in the Catholic world, and the sowers of the Word of God in Pagan lands; so I pray God they may have colleges in every city, and especially in those which are infected with heresy."[7] Gregory XIII. spoke of the Jesuits in twenty-seven Bulls and Briefs as "the indefatigable labourers in the vineyard of our Lord, working to unmask errors,"[8] as "heroes created to resist the audacity of Satan, by their innocence, their learning, their ministrations, and their exemplary lives,"[9] as "a barrier raised against Mahommetanism and heresy,"[10] as "his beloved sons, living partly shut up in their houses to guide youth in religion and in learning, to preach the Gospel and to administer the sacraments; and in part spread over the earth penetrating into savage countries to convert men who lead the lives of beasts."[11] Sixtus V. regarded them as "the instruments to make religion flourish and keep it pure."[12] Gregory XIV. confirmed anew the institution of the Society, and prohibited all

[7] Bull, *Innumerabiles*, and Brief of May 21 to the Archbishop of Cologne.

[8] Brief, *Immensa pictas.*

[9] Brief, *Semper amavimus.*

[10] Brief, *Dum attenta.*

[11] Bull, *Salvatoris.*

[12] Brief, *Cœlestis.*

attacks upon the Society, under the severest penalties, for "the molestation or weakening of the Society of Jesus is a common injury to the whole Church; and the peace and strength of the Society is for the good of the Church."[13] Clement VIII. called the Society "the right arm of the Apostolic See."[14] Paul V. considered the advance of the Society of Jesus as "the progress of the Faith, of piety, and of religion."[15] Gregory XV., Urban VIII., Innocent X., and Alexander VII., used similar terms of eulogy. Clement IX. said he loved the Society of Jesus because it consisted of men adorned beyond measure by piety and religion, and learning and science.[16] Clement X. and XI., Innocent XI., XII., XIII., and Alexander VIII., enforced, in other language, what their predecessors had already said. Benedict XIII. loved them because of the abundant fruits which they obtained by their preaching and by the example of their holy lives; and Benedict XIV. spoke similar laudations of them in ten Bulls. Clement XIII. mourned for the attacks made upon them by Voltaire and his followers, and undertook, with ardour, to defend them. He wrote a letter to the King of Spain, protesting that they were entirely innocent of the calumnies which the infidels had invented against them, and urging that they were of the utmost benefit to the cause of the Christian religion. He wrote also twenty-seven briefs to various parts of the Catholic

[13] Bull, *Exponi nobis.*
[14] Suarez, *De Relig.*
[15] *Instit. Lit. Apost.*
[16] *Instit. Lit. Apost.*

world to reveal and denounce the plots which had been secretly contrived against the Society. Can any Catholic, seeing this overwhelming weight of testimony by the Head of the Catholic Church, for a moment imagine the Society of Jesus to be open in the least degree to the charges which its enemies have been hardy enough to bring against it? If so, the Head of the Church must, by them, be not only condemned as having been remiss in not warning the Church of the dangers which she incurred from the Jesuits; but he must also be judged guilty of having directly led the Church into error by those frequent Bulls of approbation and eulogy. If the Society of Jesus is not a company of holy men, then the Holy See is not the judge of truth. They stand or fall together.

It is true that many Popes have approved of the Society of Jesus; yet one Pope suppressed it. Do you mean to insinuate that the culpability of the Society had been proved to him, and that he acknowledged its culpability by its suppression?

Before entering upon this question, let me ask you whether it does not seem a curious circumstance that all the enemies of the Catholic Church, all heretics, all atheists, all libertines, all the calumniators of every other Pope, should make an exception in favour of Pope Clement XIV., and insult him with their praises? Do you consider his judgment unimpeachable on the ground that he was Pope, or Head of the Church? Then I reply—So were all the others who approved of the Jesuits. Or do you merely beg the question, and therefore praise the

only Pope whose acts can be wrested into an apparent concurrence with your own opinion? Let us, then, consider, what act of his is it that you thus wrest? The suppression of the Jesuits. I will first show this to be a non-sequitur. I deny your conclusion or rather your supposed deduction from a fact. The suppression of the Society by Pope Clement XIV. is no proof of the culpability of the Society. The perverse philosophers of last century who had resolved to bend all their efforts towards an extermination of the Church, first turned their malicious eyes on the Jesuits, whom they called the "Jannissaries of the Pope." They seduced the ministers of various Governments, and thus succeeded in gaining over, or, at least, deluding a few weak princes, such as Joseph of Portugal, Louis XV. of France, and Charles II. of Spain. These Courts then became loud and urgent in their clamours at Rome for the suppression of the Jesuits. Clement XIII. replied by Bulls and Briefs in which he asserted the innocence of the Jesuits, and defended their order. The Governments then resorted to violence in order to carry out their views; they suppressed the houses of the Society, killing some Jesuits, imprisoning others, and driving the rest away to the coasts of the Pontifical States. They also invaded the Pontifical territories, taking Avignon and its dependencies, Pontecorvo, and the Duchy of Benevento. They even went so far as to menace a schism from the Church. Clement XIII. never flinched, but descended to the tomb burdened with the afflictions of the Church. Lorenzo

Ganganelli, Pope Clement XIV., was his successor. Finding the circumstances of the Church in this deplorable condition, he endeavoured to temporize, and to calm the tempest. Not succeeding in this policy, he was forced to choose one of two evils ; on one side he put the threatened schism and the impossibility of fully exercising his functions in the face of the enemy ; and on the other side he placed the suppression of an order. The latter was clearly the lesser evil.

That Pope Clement XIV. did not believe the Jesuits culpable is proved by the Bull in which he ordered their suppression. This has been remarked by the Protestant, Schoel. "Most willingly we grant," wrote the Pope, "the treasures of heavenly gifts, of which the Most High has vouchsafed to make us the dispensers, to those who are impelled by love towards God and men, and by zeal for the religion of Christ, to labour incessantly for the salvation of souls ; among whom we reckon the religious of the Company of Jesus." While signing the Bull, the Pope exclaimed in anguish—"Compulsus feci, compulsus feci." If to this fact we add the solemn Bull of his predecessor in their defence, published only a year before, we cannot suppose that the Church regarded them as blameworthy.

Pope Pius VI. endeavoured to re-establish the Society, but was deterred by a continuance of those reasons which had weighed with Clement XIV. Yet he authorized the institution of the Society in Russia, and took that opportunity to load them with encomiums. Under Pius VI., and even under Pius VII.,

the Church was still labouring in the tempest. But at length Pius VII., at the request of the whole Church, re-established them throughout the whole world. Leo XII. testified his trust in them by putting the Gregorian University under their sole charge, as well as his new College at Spoleto; and Gregory XVI. gave them the direction of the Propaganda.

Those who had driven the Pope to suppress the Jesuits, all received a punishment from God. The King of Naples lost part of his dominions. Louis XV. died full of remorse, and his son Louis XVI. expiated his father's crime on the scaffold. The house of Braganza had to fly across the seas; Charles IV. of Spain paid by a perpetual exile for his father's participation in the evil. Austria, under Joseph II., was humiliated and mutilated. At a later period Charles X. drove the Jesuits out of France, and was himself soon driven into exile. Louis Philippe was unfriendly to them, and had to run from his country in the disguise of a servant, and bearing the name of Smith. Napoleon III. followed in his footsteps, being (as stated in the *Life of Reine Hortense*), a sworn member of the Carbonari; he was humiliated, and died in exile. If there is a providence of God in the affairs of men, these facts are signs to us that the Jesuits are the devoted servants of God, and innocent of the charges falsely laid to them.

We must remember that, at the suppression of the Jesuits in each country, their papers fell into the hands of the respective Governments. France, Austria, Spain, Portugal, and Rome itself obtained

all their authentic records, and yet nothing has ever been proved against them. In 1848, again, their houses were forcibly entered and their papers seized; still nothing was proved against them. It is true that their opponents raised a shout of triumph in having found at their house in Fribourg a number of instruments of torture; but a too curious public, who pressed to see those instruments, found that they were only astronomical and other scientific instruments. During the Commune in Paris, all their houses in that city were seized and ransacked, and some of the fathers were shot. Yet nothing was found against them. How, then, can any charge be justly brought forward, when none has ever been proved?

But the Church endured and grew for fifteen centuries without Jesuits, and so there can be no necessity for them. Yes; and England endured until the time of William III. without a standing army; is that a proof that the expenditure of twelve or thirteen millions a year for the army is unnecessary? You yourself have endured fourteen or fifteen years without the powers of a man; are you therefore to be prepared and fitted for guarding a Turkish harem? A man may labour for his bread until, in his old age, some one leaves him a competence; are you justified in taking it from him, on the ground that, as he has hitherto done without it, there cannot be any necessity for it? There is no necessity that you should live any longer; the world could do without you; yet no one has, therefore, the right to hang you.

Besides, if God saw it to be good to raise up St. Ignatius and his order, I say that the Society of Jesus is a necessity. I say, moreover, that it remains a necessity until God sees that it would no longer be good for the Church; and then He will at once put an end to it, without your devising a means or yielding your assistance.

But if the case is as you say, how is it that the Society of Jesus is so unpopular, and has to undergo so much persecution? Verily, a most naïve interrogatory! You have done all you can to render it unpopular, and then you ask so innocently and with the utmost apparent simplicity of heart—How is it that they are so unpopular? You have recently pulled the strings by which Governments are governed, and then you say—How is it that they are persecuted? You have openly published books and pamphlets, and secretly written *Times*' leaders against them, and used every endeavour to disseminate your scandalous writings and flimsy leaders, and then you say—Ah! they are unpopular. You belong, perchance, to the secret societies, and you receive the *mot d'ordre*, and then you go to balls and parties and drop your remarks here and there and urge them, with the authority of your secret society, on a minister; and then you say—Alas! they are persecuted. How like that "damned Iago, the inhuman dog," you say—

> Kill men i' the dark! Where be these bloody thieves?
> How silent is the town! Ho! murder! murder!

Of itself the Society of Jesus is not unpopular. It enjoys the favour of the people in all Catholic

parts. The Jesuit colleges are frequented; the Jesuits' churches are always full. They give missions and preach; the people run together to them. They take their places in the confessionals; and every one is attracted to confession. If they were really unpopular, what need would there be for you to go about spreading calumnies against them? Why not let them fall under their own unpopularity, instead of stirring up Governments to acts of violence against them? No, they are popular; the people esteem and reverence and love them; and you know it.

But yet they are hated and persecuted! The Society is not hated for opposing Christian liberty; for it has never opposed any liberty except in so far as the Church has opposed it. The Society is not hated for favouring one form of government more than another; for it has lived and still lives under every form of government, and admits the peculiar advantages of each as much as the Church admits them. The Society is not hated for having entered into strict alliances with some Governments; because the Society is not a power which makes leagues, but a religious order which respects every ruling authority, just as the Church respects every constituted authority. Why, then, do some persons hate the Society? Some persons, who are lovers of libertinism and license, hate them as censors; they hate them because they are importunate with their preachings, with their ministerings, with their quiet and gentle words of counsel, and, above all, with the silent protest of their lives, against libertinism. Others hate them merely because they have heard them evil spoken of. For

the majority do not investigate the truth of assertions, but are content to adopt any opinions which they may hear in their club, and then repeat them as their own at the next dinner-party while they dine. The majority of those who hate the Jesuits, hate them because they also hate the Church of Christ. To declaim openly against the Church, and to impugn Her and contradict Her, without cover or disguise, will in most cases prove innocuous; it may even excite reprobation. But to impugn a religious order is comparatively safe, and may meet with approval, if it be done with a spice of hypocrisy—if you say, for example, that you feel deeply grieved to have to say such things against the order, but that you do so for the honour of the Church, and so forth. You may hear, in every good society in England, the aptest forms of words to use on such occasions. Having made various inuendoes, or even asserted broad charges against some members of the Society, you give a name to those few hints and calumnies, as if they were part of a system; and under the name of "Jesuitism," or that of "Ultramontanism," you may covertly assail, in safety, all the points that are most vital in the Church. You may become eloquent against a true and fervent piety (naming it "a religious frenzy," or "Pharisaism," or "religiosity," or "sanctimoniousness," or "a morbid state," or any of the other terms so common in the *beau monde*); you may likewise appear pained at the lightness and irreverence shown by the too great frequenting of the sacraments, which practice is "peculiar to Jesuitism;" you may inveigh against prayers and meditations,

likening them to the idle contemplations of the Brahmans; you may assume an ideal turn, and sneer at "external worship;" you may disapprove of a daily examination of conscience, and of frequent confession, and of many other things, which you will take care to pretend are the peculiarities of Jesuitism. The world, which drinks deep, is sure to swallow the poison; and then ever afterwards, when your hearers see examples of piety, or when they are urged to pray or meditate, or are invited to attend public services, or are advised to watch the sally-ports of their hearts to prevent the entrance of sin, they will sneer and turn away, saying it is "Jesuitism." Thus you may be successful in turning devotees into atheists. Having felt your way, you may proceed further, and represent, as "Jesuitical exaggerations" or "Ultramontane perversions," obedience to princes, patient endurance of political evils, submission to episcopal guidance, and so forth. The fervent zeal which labours to advance every spiritual good, and to protect every soul from spiritual evil, becomes, in your mouth, an "agitation," or a "Jesuitical conspiracy." The whole divine activity of the Church, in whatever direction it may be, under whatever form it may appear, may then be made to appear as part of this great conspiracy. You may thus play the game of atheists, heretics, pagans, and revolutionists, while appearing to be patriotic, sincere, and even religious. The secret societies will recognize you as their friend; and "the world" will never find out that you are its secret enemy, but will imagine that you are an

upholder of the present order of things, a defender of modern society, and an apologist for religion. As for the Church, She is gentle and slow to speak, hoping all good and thinking no evil, and therefore She will probably not openly condemn you.

This was the course followed by Gioberti through five ponderous tomes; he impugned religion under a pretence of attacking Jesuitism. We know how Gioberti is praised and cried up by those who have not taken the trouble of reading him.

The facts of history make it apparent (to any one who wishes to understand) that those who are enemies of the Church are enemies of the Society of Jesus. Pombal, under the disguise of opposition to the Jesuits, very nearly made Portugal secede from the Church. Death intervened; the State retraced her steps; the opposition to the Church was allayed, and the Jesuits were recalled. During the last hundred years in Spain, the various Governments have been as numerous and as contradictory as a doctor's prescriptions. One thing only in their history was constant; every Government that broke with the Apostolic See, began by breaking with the Jesuits; and every Government which ceased to resist the Apostolic See, began by ceasing to persecute the Jesuits. Before the Revolution of '89, in France, the exile and persecution of the Jesuits was a first step; the abolition of the Catholic religion the next; and the enthronement of an Aspasia or Laïs, as the Goddess of Reason, was the third. In the Republics of South America, there is a continual alternation of Governments, now Catholic, at

another time Voltairian: the first sign of their tendency is their conduct towards the Jesuits. The same is seen in individuals. When Hürter was a Protestant he was an enemy to the Jesuits; when he learned to love the Church, he loved the Jesuits. While Lammenais was an apologist for religion, he wrote marvellous eulogies on the Society of Jesus; when he became an enemy of the Church and a friend of the secret societies, he wrote furious and bitter invectives against the Jesuits. Gioberti, as long as he maintained reverence for the Church, was profuse in his encomiums on the Jesuits; when he turned against the Church, then the five heavy tomes appeared. So then it appears that the enemies of the Jesuits are the enemies of the Church; they are the heretics, the Jansenists, the revolutionists, and all the members and the affiliated of the secret societies. Their accusations, or rather calumnies, are frivolous, unsustained and unsustainable, and, above all, self-contradictory. While, on the other hand, the friends of the Jesuits were all the saints of the Church who lived during the existence of the Society; all the Pontiffs who have occupied the seat of St. Peter, and enjoyed that guidance of the Holy Spirit which enabled them, with unerring accuracy, to utter the truth; all the archbishops and bishops of the Catholic Church; all the doctors of the Church, and the sincere apologists for religion. If these witnesses are not enough, it is surely useless for me to continue to offer my humble endorsement.

CHAPTER V.

CHRISTIAN LAW.

SOME persons find no difficulty in receiving the Faith; they do so on the ground of its having been revealed. Yet they refuse to admit the law of Christ, although that has been revealed likewise. If the divine revelation obliges you to believe, surely the same revelation puts you under an equal obligation in conduct.

But no one can be obliged to do an impossibility; and to observe the Christian law is an impossibility. This fallacy was first started by the Arab Averroës, a Mahommedan, who said—"Lex christianorum, lex impossibilium." This dictum is directly contradicted by our Lord, Who said—"My yoke is easy and My burden is light;" and by St. John the Evangelist, who wrote—"His commandments are not heavy." Jesus Christ is a true legislator, not a tyrant; and you assert that He imposed on us a law, which it is impossible for us to obey! Yet the non-observance of this law entails the loss of the ultimate end of man, and an eternity of torments. Such would not only be repugnant to the goodness and mercy of God; it would also be irreconcileable with His wisdom, justice, and holiness. If an earthly ruler were to decree an impossibility, and then punish

those who do not fulfil it, we should call him a tyrant—a monster of cruelty and injustice. Yet you assert worse than this of God, in proportion as the punishment is eternal and infinitely greater!

Imagine, for a moment, that God had called you into council, before promulgating His law. Suppose that He had said to you—"As I have created man, do you think he should worship Me only? or should he be allowed to choose the sun, or moon, or even devils, as the objects of his adoration?" You would surely make answer that—All man's homage and adoration is due to God alone. God may then be supposed to continue thus—"And do you think that, as man is to adore Me, and Me only, I should allow My name to be made light of by every man who may get into a rage, and to be bandied about by drunken sots? or do you hold that My name should be used with more reverence than the name of any man?" Of course Thy name should not be taken in vain, would be your reply. "And what is your judgment on the following point—I will give all the earth to man, and also all the time of his life on earth, to spend in furthering his own interests, and in seeking his own pleasures; but in order that he may not forget Me, do you not think that it would be better that some buildings here and there should be set apart to Me, and that some hours once a week, or a little oftener, should be consecrated to My service?" You would reply—Yes, Lord, let all the Sundays and feast-days be sanctified to Thee, and let all the churches be regarded as sacred. "Now let us pass to the relations between men; and tell Me whether

you think that, as men are to adore Me Who created them, so they should honour and reverence those who have given them birth, and tended them, and brought them up." This also you would at once acknowledge to be just. "And shall I allow men to fly at each other's throats, or to waylay each other, or to poison or to destroy each other in any other way?" No; it would be preferable to have no life at all, than to live in such continual danger; no man should be allowed to plot to take away the life of his fellow. "Shall all on earth live like brutes, bringing children into the world without a family to receive them, and to secure their being brought up?" No; assuredly not. "Shall men live, like wild beasts, by rapine? And shall there be no property, and consequently no agriculture and no industry? Shall each one seize the fruits of the earth, or take from another whatever he can get?" This would render society impossible, and life intolerable; allow no one to steal; in other words, sanction the possession of property. "Do you think, moreover, that a merely apparent and external obedience to these commands will be sufficient, while the heart retains all its most depraved desires?" No; as the law is pure, so let men's hearts be pure from coveting the wife, or the daughter, or the servant, or the property of another.

By your answers, you have sanctioned the whole Decalogue. How then can you say that the observance of it is impossible? Every point in it has appeared to you not only reasonable, but necessary also, and dictated by the very nature of man.

Yes; the Decalogue. But the law of Christ embraces many other things. I purposely limited my answer to the Decalogue, because I never have found any one who was really anxious to obey that much, who did not also desire to observe the rest. I may go further, and say that those who determine to observe the sixth (against adultery) and the seventh (against robbery) are disposed to keep the whole Christian law. I will go yet further, and say that the whole difficulty lies in the command not to covet.

Let us, consider, however, how Jesus Christ (as you say) made the task more arduous by the additions which He made to the Decalogue. Truly, He showed us the close relations in which we stand to God; He has made us understand more of God's greatness, His power, His providence, His infinite justice, His unlimited goodness and love. The contemplation of these things do not fail to overcome the intellect and to captivate the heart. It follows, then, that He has thus given a great impulse to our will, to adore God fervently and reverently, and to adore Him alone. Similarly with regard to the other commandments.

Yes; but He has imposed new obligations, such as the Sacraments, the Mass, the Laws of the Church. True; but these obligations are found to be more attractive, and to give us more happiness the more we observe them. This was not the case with the primary law (the first in the Decalogue), on which they are based. Try to see this by means of an analogy. Imagine two servants to be sent, by a king, with despatches to a distant city. The one receives

merely the command to hasten to that city; to the other there are given means of transport, and servants to administer to him, and various comforts and alleviations for the journey. Would the latter be justified in complaining that he had been burdened with these helps? The Jew was commanded, as we also are commanded, to adore God, to acknowledge Him as our sole Master and Ruler, to propitiate Him for every sin, and to love Him above all things. What did Jesus Christ do for us, in regard to this commandment? He gave us various means to help us to observe it. The sacrifice of the Mass—the greatest possible act of worship, will help you greatly to adore. *Experto crede.* The Sacrament of Penance teaches you how satisfaction is to be made for your sins. The Sacrament of the Eucharist both evinces and increases your love for Him.

The Jew was merely told to keep holy one day in seven, beside some other days at stated periods. Jesus Christ removed all doubt as to the time to be kept holy, and as to the manner of doing so. Has He not, then, rendered more easy the observance of this command? The wheels of a carriage add to the weight of it; but take them away, and see whether you will find it easier to drag the vehicle along. The rudder, and sails, and steam engines are a weight in the ship; yet how could she advance towards her destination without them? Such were the additions which Christ made to the Decalogue.

But He requires a greater perfection of us; and this adds to our difficulty. He requires a greater perfection, without having added to the difficulty.

For example: He was not content with the *lex talionis* of the Jewish law, viz.: exacting an eye for the loss of an eye; and extracting a tooth from your enemy's head, if he had knocked one out of your mouth. Our Lord was not content with this deduction from the command against murder. He required that you should love, forgive, benefit, and pray for your enemies. This is a greater perfection; yet it is easier to forgive freely and entirely and with all your heart, than to exact "the pound of flesh," the just measure of your enmity; and much easier than to exact retribution without letting it pass into hatred, and allowing "the sun to go down upon your wrath." "Thou shalt not commit murder!" No, said Jesus Christ; nor may you be angry with your brother. "Thou shalt not commit adultery!" No, said Jesus Christ; nor may you look upon a woman with desire. "Oh, how difficult!" you exclaim. You should say: How much more perfect; for, it is easier to nip the first bud of desire, than to pull off the bough when it has grown; it is harder to keep yourself from the act, after the desires have become strong. "Turpius ejicitur, quam non admittitur hospes."

A similar remark you will find applicable to all the other perfections which our Lord added to the law. They are means of facilitating obedience to the commands of God, and rendering more easy the attainments of greater perfections therein. That man knows little of the human heart who is not aware that it is easier to abstain altogether from some things, than to use them in moderation and with self-restraint.

Moreover, Christ, while He added these perfections, also promised us the grace to enable us to fulfil them. The world sees only the difficulties, and is scared; it does not see the supernatural powers which are freely given for overcoming those difficulties. For the world receives its ideas from the senses, and measures all things by the senses. Grace illumines the soul of man and enables him to see that what God has commanded, is really good for man. The world, which prefers to obey the sense, cannot see this; for it is not a sensible thing. "The carnal man cannot see the things of the spirit." The man under grace has, therefore, a motive or desire to obey which another has not. After desire comes the courage to attempt, and the determination necessary to accomplish. This interior transformation of the will appears a mystery to those who are ruled by sense. It is a supernatural effect, and more real than those things which are cognized by sense.

Add to grace the power of love—a fervent love of Jesus Christ. What difficulties cannot love overcome! What stormy straits will not a Leander swim! Even a love of the chase makes men undergo fatigue, and privations, and wet, and cold. The love of learning makes a man shut out all pleasures and distractions, and bend for days and nights, in the sombre library, over dusty folios. Love of glory makes men volunteer for dangerous climes —leads them to "Seek glory at the cannon's mouth." These are merely natural loves; yet see what they can do. How much more will the supernatural love of Jesus Christ dare and accomplish! Will not a

love, which is infinitely more fervid, more pure, more ardent, perform infinitely greater things? Can it not make martyrs rejoice in the anguish of torture and pains of fire? Can it not give to the anchorite a serene happiness in the midst of the hardest privations? Will it not enable virgins to rejoice in silence and solitude, or in the fetid airs of a hospital? If these are not its effects, how was it that the Pagan, on a sudden, felt a horror at his former life of luxury and pleasure, and preferred a life of abstinence and severest mortification? The Pagans were men of like passions with us; and a sudden and remarkable change was produced in them. There must have been some cause to work that change. What was it? Was it not the love of God, which made that appear easy which looked so difficult before; and caused that to be desired, which before seemed harsh and uninviting? The pleasures which they previously enjoyed, now excite only loathing and horror.

It is true that the law of Christ does not demand a life of mortification, restraint, and privation. But even if it did, who would not gladly spend a few years in such a life, in order to attain to an eternity of infinite happiness? Who would not do this little for God, Who gave up His glory and happiness in heaven, to lead a life of poverty, privation, and labour; to be scorned, and buffeted, and calumniated, and wounded, and crucified for us? The present life is, truly, no play; but a most grave affair. The earth is not our home, but only a hostelry. It is the arena of battle, into which we have descended, for a few hours of direst combat, in

order to obtain a crown of glory. What? do you undergo labours, and fatigues, and privations, and anxious thought, in order to obtain a few shillings, and do you refuse to undergo the same for the kingdom of heaven?

Yes, so it seems; but my passions——! Your passions are tyrants. Yes; but I tell you how to fight for your liberty. Passion (as the word imparts) denotes suffering; and I show you how a moderate self-mortification may supplant the sufferings of passion. Does the proud man not feel acute pangs, although he is too proud to let it be seen? Does he not undergo painful labour in order to reward his pride. How bitter it was for Aman to lead the horse of Mardochai! The mind of every proud man is crowned, only with thorns; and Christ in His humility bore that crown for all proud men. The cure, then, is a voluntary abasement. The envious man is always pale from the worm that is gnawing at his heart. His passion consumes his very flesh and taints his blood. The miser! who can count the miseries he imposes on himself? Far less privation, if undertaken for a better end, would gain for him a treasure of eternal riches in heaven. The angry man bites his lip and clenches his hand from inward pain, and agitation of soul. How the impure man is drawn hither and hither, and is restless and tossed and tortured by desires! Inordinate affections are indeed their own punishments. But you complain of the annoyance of a life of perfection! You have not tried it. Even if it were so (which I deny), I ask you, would it not be better to suffer for

eternal life, that which others undergo for eternal damnation?

The truth is that a life of perfection is that which gives the least annoyance of all; and those who lead such lives receive compensations which do far more than recoup them for their mortifications. The serene peace! the quiet joy in the still depths of the conscience! the absence of any strong gusts of torturing passions! the consolations from God! the clear light of supernatural grace! above all, the fervour in prayer, the fertility in meditation, which few or none in the world can ever experience! Indeed, the Christian life is harsh only in aspect; but in reality it is more cheering and rapturous than every liberty of the world; it is "bitter in the mouth, but in the belly is sweeter than honey." Jesus Christ could not err; and He has assured us that it is so. The saints who have confirmed it after their experience, were men like us. Those sinners, whose remorse on their death-beds have made them testify the same, are witnesses, surely, beyond exception.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MASS.

EVERYTHING, whether in the order of nature or in the order of grace, which is possessed by man, has been received from God. In all ages, therefore, man has felt it to be his duty to make a full acknowledgment to the Giver of every good thing which he has. Yet he has felt that the only adequate offering would be that of his whole being. This does not seem possible. What, then, did nature suggest? The sacrifice of a victim—substituting a victim for himself, and, by the destruction of it, shadowing forth the total offering of himself to his Maker. This, according to Eusebius, and all the doctors of the Church, was the origin and signification of sacrifices.

The necessity of sacrifice is proved by the common consent of mankind. The custom of offering sacrifices, has, at all times, been universal on the earth. From the Scripture we learn that, as soon as there were men, there were sacrifices. The custom has continued, in all parts of the world, until this day. This custom was regulated by a law of God dictated to Moses, which, at the same time, ordained that all the commerce between earth and heaven (so to speak) should be carried on by sacrifices.

There was the thank-offering, or eucharistic sacrifice; there was the sacrifice of prayer; there was the sin-offering, or sacrifice of propitiation; there was the holocaust, which denoted the total annihilation of the creature before the Creator, the offering up of man, body and soul, to God. This was decreed by the Infinite Wisdom in the ancient law. In the fulness of time Jesus Christ sacrificed Himself upon the Cross; and from this there issued the Church, as the woman in Paradise was taken from the side of the man. The origin of the Church was sacrifice. Could She remain without a priesthood, without altars, without a victim, without sacrifices? To be without temple or altar, without priest or sacrifice, was foretold by the prophets as the last and greatest punishment of the Jews, when, for their infidelity, they should be discarded from being God's peculiar people, and the Church should take their place. It was also prophesied by Malachy that, at that time, in the Church there should be offered a pure sacrifice every day. This is the Sacrifice of our altars—the Holy Mass. I do not delay to prove this, for I speak only to Catholics. It has, moreover, been often fully proved, and cannot gain strength by reiteration. The Mass is not a mere representation of the Sacrifice upon the Cross, it is a bloodless repetition of it; it is the Sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ, under the accidental appearance of bread and wine. It is a mystery. Christ every day offers Himself for us on the altar. The Mass thus answers all the various ends and meanings of sacrifice. Christ is the Victim which is offered; and Christ is the Great

High Priest Who offers it to God. It is a sacrifice of prayer, in that we there ask for and obtain all the graces which God gives to man; it is a propitiatory sacrifice, for the merits and satisfaction of the Passion of Christ are thereby applied to us; it is a eucharist or sacrifice of thanksgiving; and it is a holocaust, for Christ offers Himself up wholly for us, and we consecrate our wills wholly to God. Then the earth touches heaven; supernatural things and things of earth come together; men on earth and saints in heaven are united in God. It is a tremendous mystery; a stupendous miracle of wisdom, of power, and of love.

Suppose now, O reader, that you had never heard of these truths, until one morning I told you that I had most important tidings to deliver to you, and said: "For sixty centuries all the world have been waiting for a Liberator—a Redeemer to loose their fetters and guide them into the way of life. That Redeemer—hoped for by all the patriarchs, and announced by all the prophets, and sighed for by all men who love justice—has at last descended from heaven to consecrate the world by His coming. This morning He is to go up Mount Calvary and deliver Himself into the hands of His enemies, and after three hours of dreadful agony, He is to expiate all our sins by His death, and obtain eternal life for every one who desires it. Come with me, then, up the mountain, and see this great sight. Let us catch the last sighs of our dying God, and receive upon our heads some drops of His Blood; let us join our sufferings in sympathy with His agony;

let our tears accompany His tears; and when the sun shall be darkened, and the earth shall quake, and all nature feel horror at the deed, let us breathe a sigh of fervent love for our God Who suffered and Who died for us." What would be your answer were I to say this to you? Would you not bless God for having permitted you to live at a time when you could witness such a thing? The Catholic Faith teaches you that this is a reality in the Mass. There is the Victim Who was once offered on the Cross; He is now being offered in the Mass; and there is the same High Priest to offer Him!

CHAPTER VII.

THE PRINCIPLES OF 1789.

ALTHOUGH these principles have relation to the order of civil society, yet they touch much more directly on religion. The principles of '89 oppose religion with the aim of abolishing it from the earth. This will be clearly seen from a study of the axioms on which the principles of '89 are founded, and the maxims which are derived from them.

In the first place it is necessary to remark that every encomiastic epithet which is applied to the principles of '89, or to the logical consequences of them, amounts to begging the question, and therefore involves a fallacy. *The glorious Reformation* is an example of such a *petitio principii.* It is true that the principles of '89 are the applications, to society, of the same principles which Luther applied to the Church. But as they consist in rebellion against legitimate authority, they are in no way "glorious." In England, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Bollingbroke, Toland, and others, who professed the principles of the Reformed religion, were too logical to stop there. They carried those principles on to their legitimate conclusions ; and, advancing from negation to negation, they arrived at a total rejection of the revelation of Christ, and professed simple naturalism.

Voltaire and Rousseau, and the encyclopædists, spread the same infidel doctrines in France, taking as their watchword, *Écrasons l'Infame* (*i.e.* Jesus Christ). Their avowed aim was to beat down Christianity. At last, in France, the infidel followers of these infidel leaders gained power in the State, and established their principles by giving them the force of law. This was begun in 1789, when Louis XVI. convoked the States General. Their pretext was to abolish superstition (by which term they designated Christianity); and they directed their first blows against the vital points of Christianity, viz., the Sovereign Pontiff, and the clergy both secular and regular. They confiscated the ecclesiastical revenues, and established an equality of Churches (or "liberty of worship"); they divided the funds among all the sects. They, moreover, pretended to dissolve the vows of the religious, and drove them from the religious houses. They then enacted an impious "constitution," cutting the Church off from the Head of the Church, and making it a mere human constitution. Those men were, doubtless, more criminal than their German imitators in these days; for they knew what they were doing. They had learned their catechism; and Sieyes and Talleyrand had studied theology. In order to blot out of the minds of the people, all memory of Christianity, which was bound up with their habits and modes of life, they suppressed, by law, all the Christian feast-days, and decreed that labour should be done on Sundays; and changed the week into decades. Another decree abolished the calendar of the saints.

Having, as they thought, got rid of Jesus Christ, Robespierre demanded that "a Supreme Being" should be proclaimed, such as the Masonic lodges term "The Grand Architect;" and that he should be honoured by the people keeping "patriotic feasts." As Christianity lived in the virtues which it had engendered, and by which it had transformed the world and laid the solid basis of civil society, the Revolutionists speedily saw the necessity of destroying these virtues also. What were they? How can we sum up the virtues engendered by Christianity? We may say that the world was transformed by the triple love which Jesus Christ had taught. (1) An ordinate love of oneself; which consisted in a resistance to the passions of the heart and the flesh, and in keeping them under by an incessant mortification of self: "He that hateth his life in this world, keepeth it unto life eternal." (2) He taught a love of our superiors; which was to be evinced in submission and respect: "Be ye subject therefore to every human creature for God's sake;" "whether it be to the King . . . or to governors, . . . for so is the will of God." (3) He enjoined a love of all men as great as the love of oneself: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." The origin of these three kinds of love, is the grace which Christ infuses into our hearts; and the motives to them, which our Lord sets before us, are the love of God, the imitation of Christ, the hope of good things which never pass away, and the fear of evils which have no end. How, then, did the men of '89 deal with these? Instead of mortification they proclaimed,

and decreed in every particular, the principle of absolute freedom of the passions (*e.g.* repealing the law by which punishment had been imposed on seduction); they set up, against submission to superiors, the principle of absolute Equality between all men; and that love of others, which is based on supernatural motives, they exchanged for a mere assertion of "Fraternity." Thus it was that they endeavoured to blot out, with the name of Christ, all the principles of Christianity.

The new principles of '89 were set forth in the "Declaration of the rights of man." Some of the applications of the principles were also therein made; *e.g.* every acquired right of individuals and of the family, was denied; all sovereignty was rendered impossible, except perhaps in name; the pretended right of saying and doing anything was proclaimed; legal atheism was formulated; the "sacred right of insurrection" was established in various forms; the authority of the father over his children was set at nought, and that of masters over servants was rendered impossible. In short, the family, society, and the Christian religion were overturned, and man was handed over to Paganism again—or, to worse than Paganism, for the Declaration denied many natural rights which Paganism held sacred.

The principles of '89 may be thus described: Atheism, or at best, deism, in religion; anarchy in politics; materialism and rationalism in philosophy; and hatred of Jesus Christ in all things. There are two sorts of men who profess these principles. (1) Those few who know what they are, and what

they import; and who see the end at which they are being impelled by malice. (2) Those many (οἱ πολλοί) who do not keep any end in view, and who are ignorant of what the principles import; but have allowed themselves to be fascinated by the other class, and have adopted the principles without examination, and then defend them through prejudice. Or perchance they have thought one part of those principles good, and then illogically accepted them all. Of this latter subdivision are the regalists and statists, who have adopted that part of the principles of '89 which asserts, for the civil authority (either for the King, in which case they are regalists, or for the Republic or State, in which case they are statists), the right to regulate all matters relating to religion; which right Christ appointed to His Church.

There are grades of regalists and statists.

1. *The Reformers*, who wish to modernize the institutions of Jesus Christ, or to adapt them to "the exigences of the time," but who shrink from otherwise touching the work of Infinite Wisdom.

2. *Doctrinaires*, who renounce violence, and desire to carry out their principles only by means of "right" and law. They discover a right for spoliating the clergy; a right for suppressing monasteries; a right for separating from the Church of Rome; a right for reducing the influence and diminishing the property of landlords; a right for introducing legal concubinage (civil marriage); a right to take all education out of the hands of the Church. Perhaps they imagine that their end is the good and reformation of the State, according to

the "wants of the times." They fancy that their aim is to "bring it into harmony with social exigences," and "to reconcile society and religion," and "for the good of the Church," and so forth. For they have a number of misty expressions, with no definite meaning, to denote their "policy." Such persons are rarely honest; for although, perhaps, they have never stopped to consider what is their end, yet much less have they endeavoured to reflect whether that end is right. They are rarely honest; for they have adopted the principles of '89, and are seeking to carry them out, even while they profess (and even fancy that they feel) a horror of the "Declaration of the rights of man," and of the great French Revolution.

3. *The Party of Progress* ("Progressisti" of Italy and Spain, as opposed to the "Oscuranti," or "retrograde party"), who have utterly broken with the past, and have ceased to respect ancient customs, and to honour their forefathers. They desire to fashion all anew; and, in their eagerness, they fail to distinguish that which is immutable and therefore divine, from that which, being human, may be changed.

4. The large herd of *Moderates*, or those who are infected with the principles of '89, and have fully accepted them, but are too indolent, or too timid to advance. These are called in England, "the great Conservative party." They differ from their opponents merely in pace, not in principle. They shrink from moving of their own accord, although they do not object to be dragged on by the popular

cry, so that they may retain office. These persons cannot distinguish between the essential and the accidental. They desire, moreover, to conciliate all parties, and are, therefore, sure to serve the cause of the worst party. In their hearts they know that there is no middle term between truth and error, between right and wrong, between justice and injury, between Revelation and science, between knowledge and opinion. They acknowledge that every proposition is either true or false; that every act is either right or wrong, either just or unjust; that whatever is known is certain, either because God has said it, or because it has been proved; and that every assertion is either known, or is merely assumed as likely, or apparently true. Yet they endeavour to conciliate and make concessions and compromises, without remembering that they must thereby be giving up some truth, some right, something just, some part of religion, in favour of false, preverse, or inane opinions; and, as they endeavour to conciliate all parties, they give up some more truth, deny some more right, cast away more and more religion, to please each new comer.

I do not deny that the majority in each class are "led by the nose;" that they have been seduced, and know not what they say, nor what they are doing. Yet there are some in each class who know what they are, and are wicked enough to be contented in being so. With that minority it is useless to argue. The majority of poor, ignorant, and silly creatures, must be reminded that they are "without excuse." For the Church has, without ceasing,

proclaimed the true doctrines, and pointed out the sophisms in the principles of their seducers. It is necessary also to blame many good Christians, who know the truth, but who, from fear of man, or human respect, hesitate to unmask the false principles whenever they hear them affirmed.

Among those who have accepted all the principles of '89, and desire to tear up Christianity by the roots and cast her away, there are also various grades, or rather classes.

1. *The Freemasons*, who recognize "a Supreme Being," but do not recognize Jesus Christ, nor His mission.

2. *Panthcists*, who not only refuse to recognize Jesus Christ, but also get rid of the "Supreme Being," by substituting something else.

3. *Socialists*, who push equality and fraternity to their logical conclusions, and thus annihilate all authority, human and divine.

4. *Revolutionists*, or *Voltairians*, some of whom wait, in taverns, for the moment when they may spring upon the rich, and glut their passion for rapine. Others sigh, at universities, for the time when they may help to inaugurate a new era, by establishing the principles of '89. Others, who are profound thinkers and deep intriguers, have got into the various public offices, and, as "permanent secretaries" or head clerks, influence ministers; or prepare to hand, to young and ardent parliamentary officials, Bills embodying the step towards their revolutionary views which it is judged advisable, at the time, to get enacted; who falsify returns

and even despatches; or who write articles for the newspapers, with the same end steadily in view. Others, again, are gentlemen and ladies of fashion—the *crême de la crême*, princes, duchesses, and others—who move in gilded saloons, playing their parts by dropping innuendoes; by hinting away an honest man's character; by drawing ministers "with the cords of love;" by gambling with rising young men in order to assist them with money; by ferreting out some shameful crime, so as to enslave the titled or official criminal, and so forth. For they have learned how to use their instruments—the vanity, pride, jealousy, folly, ambition, rapacity, and carnal passions of others.

5. *Positivists*, who deny all that is not sense and matter. They get wholly rid of "the Supreme Being," and of the soul, and of religion; but yet they are content, contemptuously, to leave others to enjoy their own opinions.

6. *Solidarists*, who add to positivism, a furious, maniac hatred of Christianity, and of all its cognate truths.

All these species of men aim at destroying Christianity. The year 1789 led to the year 1793—a period far worse than the persecutions of Decius, or Diocletian. When Napoleon I. was in Italy, the commands, directions, and letters which he received from the Government of France, were filled with burning incentives to destroy the Pope, the Catholic Church, and all religion. When the Revolution had gained head in Rome (1849), the massacres of San Callisto occurred, and the orgies of the Capitol,

and the sacking of churches, and the obscene profanations of the sacred vessels; and blasphemies against Christ were publicly uttered. Such deeds revealed the character of the principles of '89, and filled Europe with horror. Or look at the publications which have proceeded from their members —the novels, the pamphlets, the newspaper articles! They impugn, one by one, all the dogmas—they scoff at all the mysteries—they sneer at all the practices of the Catholic Church. These men "despise holy things." *Nolumus hunc regnare super nos,* is their reiterated cry. It is the same as Voltaire's motto, *Écrasons l'Infame.*

But times are changed, and require principles more in harmony with modern society. Yes; times have been changed by the wonderful discoveries of natural science, by steam and the telegraph, for example. These have given a new impulse to commerce, and have brought about corresponding changes in the habits of life of the people. But do you assert that the eternal laws of justice, honesty, and religion have been changed? that the everlasting principles of truth and right have been altered? that the Faith has decayed? that any of Christ's laws have passed away? Answer those questions. This is the point with which we have to deal. By all means traverse the seas, explore nature, make treaties of commerce with other nations; but let the ancient justice and religion and honour be always maintained. In former days it was wrong to adulterate your goods, and commit frauds in your manufactured produce; and so it is now. In former days it was right to revere the

Church and the Mass and the sacraments, and to acknowledge the Pope and the Hierarchy and the priesthood, and to practise mortifications, and to attend confession; in these things the increase of material riches has made no change. In former days it was right to respect legitimate authority; and so it is now. For the laws of justice are eternal; the kingdom of Christ can have no end; and that which God has revealed can never be retracted. Yet it is in these unalterable things that the Revolution does pretend to make changes. It introduces "new rights," which contradict eternal right. Property and authority, the two bases of all right, the revolutionists abolish; they spoliate the Church; they rob the clergy of their revenues; they proclaim "the sacred right of insurrection;" and they take from the parent the claim to educate his children. But, above all, they attack the Catholic Faith, by their "liberty of worship" (equality of religions); by the "liberty" to blaspheme and spread falsehoods, which they give to the Press; by secular education; by civil marriage, and so forth. Moreover, they endeavour to prejudice religion in the eyes of the people, by blinking honest argument on these real points of antagonism, while they roundly assert that the only point of difference is that the Church is opposed to scientific discoveries and material well-being.

But Christianity has been used up, its time has gone by. What does this assertion mean? It can have but one meaning: that Christianity is a system of impostures, which have now been exploded; a fiction invented by a combination of priests and politicians;

an entirely human invention. If you admit Christianity to be divine, you could never say that it has been used up, and that its time has gone by. Such an assertion as the above means, moreover, that all the proofs of Christianity are sophisms, fallacies, and hypocrisies, which the acuteness of atheists has not succeeded in exposing. It means that Jesus Christ (Who was believed to be God, and was adored by men for nineteen centuries, Who made a revelation that was confirmed by signs and miracles), was no more than——. I cannot finish the sentence! It means that the world, which believed in Christ, has been deceived; that those great intellects who wrote upon Christianity were fools; that eleven millions of saints and martyrs shed their blood in vain; and that myriads of men, who led lives of austerity and mortification, were misled by chicanery and falsehood! It means that all the virtues inculcated by Christianity—that purity, chastity, virginity, love towards God and man, penance, &c., have no basis but fiction; that idolatry fell before a fiction; that slavery gave way to a fiction; that the woman received dignity and respect through a fiction; that nations were civilized through a fiction; that the world was filled with churches, hospitals, and monasteries through a fiction!

No, this cannot be true. The time of Christianity will last until the end of the world: "Heaven and earth shall pass away, but Jesus Christ's words shall not pass away." Christianity began on the day that God promised a Redeemer to fallen Adam. Since that time Christ has been the only means of salvation

He was prefigured and symbolized in Judaism, and was an object of faith in Christianity. Eternity itself will be but the lasting triumph of Christ.

Your desire (which is father to the thought), is that the time of Christianity should be passed ; your desire is to get rid of the restraints of religion. You will also lose the benefits of religion, in time and in eternity ; you will have to keep up great armies, to increase your police, and to enlarge your prisons and reformatories ; you will have to guard against frauds and adulterations in trade, against conspiracies to undermine the Government, against plots to attack or even swindle the wealthy. The day that you drive a poor religious from his cell, you also proclaim the right of the mob to drive your king from his palace. That mob you fear even now ; and yet you have proclaimed the sovereignty of the mob as one of your principles ?

CHAPTER VIII.

LIBERTY.

EVERY passion which can burn violently in the heart of man, is sufficient, at times, to make him mad. But more than others, the love of what is falsely called liberty is apt to render him insane; because it is the condition for the full satisfaction of every other passion. No one, therefore, should wonder at the follies and crimes which have been committed in the name of liberty, nor at the false maxims which have been invented in their defence. Such are these —*Man is born free, and no one may ever restrain him. Thought is free, and therefore every expression of thought should be free;* and so forth.

1. *Man is born and remains free.* Who has ever taught this maxim with authority? Who has ever been successful in defending it. No one. The contrary to this maxim is true. Man is born in a necessary dependence and subjection. The family, society itself is full of relations which import the dependence of the newly-born child; the inalienable rights of the father and mother, the indispensable authority of nurses, the superiority of the elder brothers and sisters, all conspire to secure the subjection of the child. He has no property, no food, not even the faculties for obtaining necessaries.

For all necessaries he must depend on others. It is the same at a maturer age. You must yourself acknowledge it. If your son were, in your house, to order and arrange everything to suit himself, on the ground that he was in no subjection to you, and in no way dependent upon you, would you not be the first to deny such an outrageous position? Would you not say that he was usurping your powers and violating your rights, and therefore committing an unnatural wrong? You confess then that no one is born free. Even when your son has attained to the stature of a man, you act upon the right to instruct him, to form his reason, and to guide his judgment. You do not regard him as free to believe what he likes, and to hold what opinions he may choose to hold.

Let us pass from the subjection which is inherent to the family, and consider that which is due to a larger society. The State has its ruler to govern it, and its laws which no one may violate, and its institutions and customs which every one must respect. That is to say, every one is dependent, and subject to the constituted authority. If we expect others, throughout life, to respect our rights, we must respect their rights. In other words, we can never, throughout life, escape from our dependence. The contradictory of the axiom, therefore, is true, namely: man is born, and must remain dependent.

2. After the consideration of liberty in general, we must now turn our attention to particular liberties. *Thought is free.* Liberty of thought is chiefly asserted and desired in matters of religion; so that the

intellect may escape from submitting to the authority of the Church. What does the proposition mean? If it means that, as the acts of the intellect are internal, they cannot be judged by external authority, nor be imposed by force, nor be subject to a penal action—then the proposition is true. But it is not pertinent; for no one has ever pretended to any power over the acts of the intellect. Least of all has the Church done so; for She has said—"Ecclesia non judicat de internis." But if the proposition means that there is no law or rule over our thoughts, and that, without sin or error, we may think what we like—then the proposition is an absurdity. For the intellect is formed for truth, and is under obligation to think conformably with truth. The intellect is not a faculty or power which is, in itself, free, as the will is. For it is not elective, but cognoscitive; that is, wheresoever it sees the truth, it cannot but embrace it. It is not free to accept or to reject, except when ignorance puts the mind in such a state that it cannot see the truth. Whenever the mind sees the truth, it is constrained to accept it. When the mind does not see the truth, then the intellect does nothing; and if the mind then asserts one proposition rather than another, it is merely an act of will, and not an intellectual act; *e.g.:* if I am asked whether the fixed stars are inhabited, and I answer that they are inhabited, I assert it merely because I choose to do so. I am not compelled to do so by any evidence; for I do not *know*. But if I am asked to how much two and two amount, I cannot choose my answer; I must say "four." Yet it may be pleaded that a case

of conflicting evidence may arise. To this I answer that one truth cannot contradict another; and as evidence means that which makes a truth manifest, evidence cannot be conflicting. If we do not know what and how much each argument proves, we may find that our own conclusions, or rather assumptions, are conflicting. But that is because we have allowed the will to intervene; we have chosen to come to a conclusion before the intellect has seen whether it is true or not. In this sense we may say that "free thought" is the same as error, being a capricious act of the free will, instead of being a conclusion to which the intellect has, *ex necessitate rei*, arrived.

To assert that we are free to hold any opinion we choose in religious matters, is far worse. For it is the same as to say that, in religion, we do not know, and cannot know what is true. It amounts to an assertion, either that God has not revealed the truth, and has left us unable to know it; or else that we cannot believe the word of God. To establish the former, would be to sweep away all Christianity, and deny all the work of Christ; nay, the very existence of Christ Himself. To assert the second is utter atheism. If we believe Christ's teaching, we are not free to say, for example, that there are three Gods Who are one in Person; we are constrained to affirm that there is one God—one in substance—but three Persons. So also we are not free to say that there are no more than two sacraments; we must assert that there are seven sacraments, and no more.

Let us suppose that you speak to your son, telling him what he has to do, and instructing him about

some family matter; and that he turns round upon you, and says that he considers himself free to think what he likes as to those family events, and to believe you or not, just as he chooses, and that he is therefore free to act as he pleases; how would you judge him? In like manner judge yourself when you enter a claim for freedom of thought. Nay, judge yourself far more harshly; for you are not an infallible guide of your son; while God cannot err in teaching you. Moreover, while you have the rights of a father over your son, God has far greater rights over you; for He created your mind as well as your body, and formed you altogether as it pleased Him.

If you concede liberty of thought, you concede, at the same time, a liberty of action, a liberty to commit any crime—(or rather, we should say, if you have liberty of thought, there can be no crime, or sin, or error; for, as you may think all things, so you may do all things). If I may think as I like, I may think that those ordinances, which other men call divine laws, are not divine laws at all, but only imaginations of foolish or designing men. I may hold that those which you call human laws are merely brutal tyrannies; and I may therefore proclaim that we should, by all means, cast off both these yokes. I may also find hundreds of reasons, which I may judge sufficient, to prove that what you call right is merely injustice; that what you call property is, as Proudhon said, merely theft; that what you call probity is, according to Dean Paley's teaching, merely a longsighted selfishness—a clever fraud, which is not found out; that what you call chastity is a prejudice of education,

which is contrary to nature ; that what you call piety is only superstition ; and so forth. If then I join the revolutionists in attempting to hurl the Queen from her throne, and in taking the property from all proprietors, you will not be able to blame me ; for, according to your own maxim, I am free to think these things right to be done ; that is, I have a right to do them. Joseph Mazzini had equally a right, according to your maxim, to conspire to overturn all the thrones in Europe for the sake of establishing a "universal republic ;" and Joseph Garibaldi was right in trying to carry it into execution ; and the *Times* was right in writing up Garibaldi and establishing his nefarious acts as precedents of legality, and justice, and international law.

It would be absurd for you to say—*You are free to think as you like, but you may not do as you like ;* because I may think that I have a right to do as I like ; and so if you deny my liberty of action, you deny my liberty of thought, and your own maxim. The Protestant "Reformers" asserted liberty of thought as their principle in matters of religion. They have consequently been constrained to admit every kind of folly and impiety—Mormonism, Quakerism, Spiritualism, Agapemones, and what not. By proclaiming the same principle in politics, the "sacred right of insurrection" was established. By proclaiming the same principle in philosophy, the deliraments and insanities of Fourrierism, Saint-Simonianism, and the like, had to be gravely recognized. Liberty of thought is, in fact, the principle of disorder and uncertainty, and a license to commit every crime.

3. Still less is the *liberty of speech*, that is, liberty of saying all that we think, a sane or safe maxim. I defer to another head, viz., the liberty of the Press, that which I have to say on this. Here I shall content myself with the following general observations. I say, then, that a liberty to publish one's thoughts is more mischievous than a liberty to think and keep one's thoughts to oneself; for it includes the evil of liberty of thought, and superadds to it the wickedness of misleading others. Who will say that it is right to speak against truth, against justice, against virtue? Who will say that it is well to publish falsehoods, to incite to rebellion or crime, to disseminate obscene compositions? The majority of men cannot, of themselves, know truth, in all cases, from falsehood, nor right from wrong, nor purity from impurity. Is it, then, right for you to seduce the majority from truth, right, and purity of life?

4. Another liberty, as bad, is, *Freedom of worship*, *Religious liberty*, or *Equality of Churches*. This is a corollary of the preceding liberties, and a most pernicious one it is. What do those mean by it who are loudest in their demands for it? A license to profess any religion or no religion, without the law or the State taking any cognizance of it. Such a liberty exists in no country in the world. In England, even, where there is most religious liberty, Jews, until very lately, could not sit in Parliament; to this day a Catholic cannot sit upon the throne, nor can a Catholic be Chancellor, nor Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland; and, practically, no Catholic can be in the

Cabinet. The Catholics of England and Scotland are totally unrepresented in the House of Commons; and the Catholics of Ireland cannot, at present, be represented, except by Home Rulers, so that those Catholics of Ireland who are not Home Rulers are also unrepresented. These are some of the disabilities under which Catholics are suffering in England; so that the law in England does take cognizance of the religion of individuals; or, in other words, there is not entire religious liberty. Religious liberty is, however, not a good thing. It means that any one may build a mosque and become a Mahommedan, or a fire worshipper, or a Mormon, or a devil worshipper, and yet be under no restraint or disability. It is the sacred right of denying Jesus Christ, and setting up any fetiche instead.

With what arguments is this dubious right defended? *Religion is a matter between the individual and his Maker, with which no one else has any concern.* This is only a half truth. Religion is also the duty of the society as a whole. God is not the Lord of individuals only. He created societies, and has set the bounds of nations. He is therefore the Lord of states, and cities, and families also. The whole society must, therefore, profess a religion, in the name of all its members. Every State which has ever existed, or which now exists, has confessed this truth and has acted upon it. It has been enacted, as it were, by universal consent. To these days has been reserved the infamous distinction of denying it.

With regard to the religion of the individual, it is false to say that no one else has any concern with it.

No doubt, a pagan society, which has no knowledge of the truth of its religion; and a heretical society, which denies that a divinely guided teacher of all nations has been appointed by Christ, has no right to command its members to conform to its false religion. But all Catholics admit that there is an infallible guide to truth in faith and morals; so that every Catholic society certainly knows which is the true religion, and what is right and what is wrong. Such a society may therefore command every one of its members to practise the Catholic religion, just as it may command them to observe that which it knows to be morally right, and abstain from that which it knows to be wrong. If you deny this, you assert that a ruler has no right to speak the truth, nor to take any cognizance of falsehood, nor to command what is right and forbid what is wrong. Yet he possesses no right in a more eminent degree than the right to do these things. For it is not only his right, but his duty and proper function to do and command what is for the greatest good of the society under his government, and for the individuals under his care. But to honour and serve the true God is certainly for the greatest good of the society and of its members; because it has the promise of good things in this world, and of eternal life in the world to come. Even if we confine ourselves to the lowest point of view, yet one great earthly benefit is apparent in a denial of the maxim that no one has any concern with a man's religion: the concord and unity of a people is the greatest temporal good; and this there cannot be unless they are all of one religion.

As, then, religion is not an affair between the individual, only, and his Maker; and as the society has a right to take cognizance of the religious profession of its members, therefore, freedom of worship, or religious liberty, is a false and pernicious liberty.

If you assert that no society, and no ruler, has the right to see to the religion of his subjects (which would be a necessary consequence, if religion were a matter entirely between a man and his Maker), then you affirm this of the family, which is one kind of society. You hold that the children may all profess different religions, as they do in the United States of America. You say that the father has no right to interfere, nor even to take cognizance of the religion which any one of his family may profess. The divisions and heart-burnings which this maxim has caused in the families of the United States, have caused the loudest complaints to be raised against such a pernicious doctrine. This maxim is, therefore, false as regards the family. The evils which are caused in the State, by the same doctrine, are no less. The only difference is that they are brought less home to each person; and, from the narrowness of vision of most persons, the condition of the whole State is not generally perceived.

We may also put it in this way: To say that the social authority has no right to guarantee a unity in religion, is to say that an authority established to maintain order, has no right to maintain order; that the authority established to promote the public good, has no right to promote the public

good; and that the principle of unity among the members may not be allowed to produce harmony and concord. Q.E.A.

But if a conformity of religion were to be enforced, troubles would be engendered; and if, in a heretical State, tolerance is not preserved, the true religion will be suppressed. True; but toleration in such a case is accepted, not because it is a good thing, but because there is a choice of evils put before us, and toleration is the lesser evil. This objection is an admission that toleration is a real evil. Let us take a parallel case. In a country where justice or righteousness reigns, it would be sinful to tolerate any one who taught men that it is permissable to violate one of God's laws—*e.g.* by giving way to lust, in order to calm the lust and get rid of impure thoughts (which was the error of the Nicolaïtanes). But in a country, such as the whole of Europe with but few exceptions, where a community of women ("prostitution") is the custom, it would cause great troubles and even bloodshed to put it down suddenly and with a strong hand. We have then to tolerate it (while we confess it to be evil), and seek to repress it as much as possible.

But if we demand toleration in inimical States, we must grant it in Catholic States; or if we refuse it in the latter, we must not complain of not enjoying it in Protestant States. Remember that there is many a thing which the Catholics ask for, not because it is absolutely good, but because it is relatively good—that is to say, a lesser evil than their condition would be without it. Let us explain

this by an analogy; it would not be absolutely good for passengers to leave a large steamer, and take to a raft in mid-ocean; yet it would be a relative good, if the steamer were on fire, or were sinking. Thus it is that Catholics, in some countries, ask for liberty of education, liberty of worship, liberty of speech, liberty of the Press, and so forth; not because these are good things, but because, in those countries, the compulsory education, the law for conformity of worship, the Press law, &c., enforce that which is far worse. In the Egyptian darkness of error, it is good to obtain a little struggling ray of light. It is better to be on a Cunard steamer than on a raft; but if the steamer is going down, the raft would be preferable. So it is relatively good, in a pagan or heretic country, to obtain liberty of worship, or religious liberty; but that choice no more proves that it is absolutely good, and should be granted in Catholic countries also, then your getting on a raft in mid-ocean proves that every one, in all cases, should do so. Still less does it follow that, because liberty of worship is demanded in Protestant countries, therefore it should be granted in Catholic countries. To deny religious liberty would be contradictory of the principle of Protestantism—which is the right of private judgment. But the principle of Catholicism is repugnant to a liberty of worship; for the principle of Catholicism is that God has appointed an infallible Teacher of faith and morals.

Even if there were not this essential difference between Protestants and Catholics, yet Catholics

would not have to grant liberty of worship in one country, in order to have the right to require it in another country. For truth only can have the right to be free. Error can have no rights. In order to acquire the right to sell wholesome vegatables, must we grant to others a permission to deal freely in poisonous herbs? In order to gain a freedom in making contracts, must we legalize frauds and swindles? In order to allow to men the right of self-defence, must we concede to others a right to assassinate? No more, then, in order to gain liberty for the Catholic Church, are we constrained to give free scope to the errors of Calvin, of Luther, of Mahommet, of Brahma, or of Brigham Young. It is truth only that has the right to be asserted, to be propagated, and to be maintained. Lies and errors have no rights.

But Protestants imagine that the truth is on their side. Yes; but is it enough to imagine? If so, you must justify Mormons, Mahommedans, idolaters, medical quacks, spiritualist quacks, and every falsehood and folly under the sun. You must say that Decius and Diocletian were right in killing the Christian martyrs. You must write an apology for the King of Dahommey. They were all wrong; and none of them should have imagined or believed that he had the right on his side. The same may be said of the Protestants. They have no business to imagine that truth is on their side. That is precisely their crime. For the Church is "as a city upon a hill," that all may see it, if they will but look. If they are honest, if they are in good faith and

cannot help being in the darkness of ignorance, they may, by God's free mercy, be excused, for not embracing Catholicism; but they can never be excused for intolerance against the Catholic Church. I assert this for two reasons. (1) Because in accordance with their own principle, the principle of Protestantism, every Protestant is obliged to admit that every one has a right to choose his own religion and be a Catholic; and that no one else has anything to say to it. (2) Because they believe that every one who is sincere is as sure of salvation as a Protestant can be. So that according to their own showing their intolerance is inexcusable.

An argument, almost blasphemous in character, was invented by Lammenais, and repeated by Mazzini and others; namely, that *Our Lord Himself established Liberty, and the Gospel is but a code of freedom.* First let us remark that no word has been used so thoughtlessly as the word liberty; and no word is so ambiguous as liberty. Liberty is spoken of as a thing—as a good thing. Liberty may be good or it may be evil; but it is no thing. It is a relative state or condition. It means freedom from something that hampers or obstructs. The free will which God has been pleased to give to every man, and which is a consequence of the gift of reason, is certainly a good thing; otherwise He would not have given it. What intention had God in view when He gave to man a free will? He intended that man should freely choose the good and reject the evil, and thus have a merit that is denied to the beasts. For beasts blindly follow the guidance

of their instincts and passions. But do you think that God, by giving man a free will, dispensed him from the observance of His laws? Of course not. God being, in Himself, infinite Holiness, Justice, Goodness, Wisdom, and Purity, cannot but hate all wickedness, injustice, error, and impurity. He cannot, therefore, be supposed to concede to His creatures, a license to commit acts utterly repugnant to His own nature, and repugnant also to the nature of man, who was made in the likeness and image of God. No use of liberty can therefore be consistent with reason, which is not based upon a hatred of all that is evil, unjust, unkind, false, or impure; and upon a strong desire to attain to all that is good, and true, and perfect. What, then, are the worst enemies of the liberty of man? First, that ignorance and error which prevents him from clearly distinguishing what is just and right, what is good and what is evil, what is true and what is false. Secondly, his passions, which sway him from embracing the good which he sees and knows, and impel him to desire what he knows to be evil. Thirdly, any powers or authorities external to man, who prevent him from doing that which he knows to be good, and which he desires to do; or who force him to do that which he sees to be evil, and which he shrinks from performing.

Now let us turn to Lammenais' maxim. *Jesus Christ has not forbidden man to enjoy a just and reasonable liberty.* Not only has our Lord not forbidden it, but He has established it, by means

of His Church, throughout all the world. Before Christ's advent, men were sunk in errors, and blinded by fallacies concerning good and evil. They were subject to false maxims; and false maxims are worse than ignorance. Jesus Christ then came into the world as "a Light" to enable men to choose freely between good and evil. Before Christ's advent, men's passions exercised a sway and tyranny from which men despaired of escaping. Jesus Christ, by His grace, enabled men to moderate that tyranny, so that they may embrace that which they know to be good. Before Christ's advent, man, abusing his natural superiority, brutally trampled on woman and made her his slave. Jesus Christ made marriage a holy sacrament, and declared the wife to be man's inseparable companion; and, without destroying her dependence on man and subordination to him, He completely revindicated her liberty. Before Christ, some men, who were more astute or more strong than others, abused the right of every man to enjoy the work of others; and, regardless of justice, made slaves of other men. Jesus Christ declared all these slaves to be, as much as their masters, sons of God and heirs of eternal life, if only they would believe Him Who died for all. By the supernatural virtue of charity He then broke their chains and loosened their fetters, without abolishing the necessary submission of the servant towards his master. Before Christ, most rulers, abusing the authority which God had conferred on them for the good of society, and using everything for their own advantage, ceased to be rulers and became tyrants. Jesus Christ told

them that all Christians are sons of God, and showed them that a true brotherhood subsists between men. He told them, also, that every ruler is merely a mandatory of God, to carry out His will upon earth; and so, without diminishing authority or sanctioning revolt, He established respect between man and man. Thus Jesus Christ was the author of liberty, in so far as it brings light to the intellect, and grace to the heart; in so far as it imposes restraint on the passions, and puts down violence; in so far as it produces respect for all rights, and the stability of order. Jesus Christ gave liberty to the great and small, to the master and to the servant, to the husband and to the wife, to the prince and to the people.

Among the liberties which Jesus Christ has given, can we find that which Lammenais and Mazzini defended—that to which modern demagogues aspire? Can we find a liberty to profess any religion, or to profess a negation of religion? Can we find a liberty to abandon oneself to all the abominations of "the thoughts of the heart"? Can we find a liberty of indulging all the passions? Can we find a liberty to overturn constituted authorities, in order to enjoy one's own "sovereignty"? Can we find a liberty to utter and publish false and even monstrous and immoral doctrines? No; Jesus Christ put such liberties under a ban. He, the Son of God, could not be the author of that which is repugnant to the nature of God and man.

What apparent ground, then, could Lammenais have had for his proposition? A fallacy! He had

read that: "The truth shall make you free"—*Veritas liberabit;* "if the Son shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed;" and "Jesus Christ has given us liberty;" and "where is the Spirit of God, there is liberty;" and "we are called to the liberty of the sons of God;" and so forth. Yes; liberty! That of which we have spoken. It is not that dethroning of all authority, divine and human, which modern demagogues desire. No; liberty! He that serves a master becomes the servant or slave of that master. "He that serves sin, becomes the slave of sin." Every man, both by original sin, and by his actual sins, has become the servant or slave of his passions; and the slave of the devil. Every one has become "bound hand and foot," and ready to be cast into hell. Jesus Christ came and loosed us from our chains, and cast out the devils from us, and enabled each of us to "sit down in his right mind," as He did to the demoniac among the tombs. "The truth, then, did make us free." "Jesus Christ has given us liberty;" He did "call us to the liberty of the sons of God." Moreover, Jesus Christ freed us from the yoke of the Mosaic law and Levitical ritual, and gave us, instead, a law of grace and love. His yoke is easy, and His burden light. So that in this sense also He increased our liberty. Jesus Christ, then freed us from sin, from our passions, and from the devil. But it does not follow that He has freed us from all law and every legitimate authority. Yet this is the blasphemy which modern demagogues have uttered.

Our Lord left no doubt of His meaning; for after saying: "If the Son shall make you free,

then shall you be free indeed," He proceeded to correct a false interpretation which the Jews were putting on His words, and told them that He was not alluding to political liberty. He rejoined: "He who commits sin, is the slave of sin," and he who is in this slavery "cannot remain in the house of the Heavenly Father; if therefore the only-begotten Son shall make you free, then shall ye be free indeed." So also, when the Apostle says: "The creature shall be made free,"[1] he explains the kind of slavery which shall be ended; the creature (he says) shall be made free "from the slavery of corruption, and shall be restored to the liberty of the glory of the sons of God." That is, we shall become more and more free, until at last we shall be entirely free from the domination of the passions of time, and shall be pure and bright in the freedom and glory of holiness. Modern demagogues, if they wish to defend themselves by arguments drawn from Scripture, had better remember the injunction of St. Peter, and not make of their liberty "a cloak (or veil) of malice." For their notion of liberty is a veil before their eyes, which prevents them from distinguishing good from evil, and truth from falsehood. It renders it difficult, or even impossible for them to judge of their own acts. Let them remember this injunction of St. Peter: "Be subject to every human creature for God's sake, to the king as to him who is over all, or to governors &c. . . . Servants be subject to your masters, not only to the good," &c. Or this of St Paul, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for every

[1] Romans viii. 21.

power is of God; and he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and brings damnation on his own head. Wherefore be subject, not through fear, but in conscience." There are a thousand other passages of the like kind. The spirit of the Gospel is a spirit of order, of humility, and of submission. The fathers of all centuries until now have found in the Bible only condemnations of Liberalism. It remained for the demagogues of the nineteenth century to rest their Liberalism on the Bible.

Opposition to legitimate authority is not only a political error, but also a crime. Non-resistance to lawful authority may seem "retrograde," or "obscurantist;" but it is a Christian duty inculcated by the Gospel of Christ. Why (let me ask) do you attempt to defend your Liberalism by the Gospel and by the example of Jesus Christ? Because you think that no one can reasonably reject such an authority, or impugn such an example. Well then; if you find that obedience and submission to legitimate rulers are commanded in the Gospel, and recommended by the example of Christ, you must not reject such an authority, nor impugn such an example. Remember that he who resists an authority constituted of God, "brings upon his own head damnation." Revolt, and rebellion, and resistance to lawful authority are not light faults; they are grave crimes against God's majesty. For every ruler is a mandatory of God, and commands in God's name. This is the essence of a ruler's authority: "There is no power but from God." A rebellion is, therefore, not a resistance to a human authority, but a revolt against God. Just as an insult

to a judge, who is the lieutenant or mandatory of the monarch, is an insult offered to the Queen herself. It was on this ground that the Christians in all ages have regarded rebellion as so great a crime, even when they were called upon to submit to a Nero, a Decius, or a Diocletian.

Moreover, a rebellion causes a great injury to your neighbour—loss of property, loss of peace, often loss of life. It is a detriment to letters, to the arts, to commerce, to manufactures. It is a terror to society, and destructive of religion. If the calumniator is punished for injuring a person's reputation; and if a thief receives no compassion because he has taken a person's goods; and if an assassin is awarded the severest punishment for spilling blood; and if the sacrilegeous person is execrated for a damage to religion, how much more hardly should the revolutionist be treated for combining all these crimes in his one sinful act! How wicked, then, was the proclamation of the "sacred right of insurrection!" It is a doctrine of the synagogue of Satan. How blasphemous also was the maxim of Lammenais! The Pagans imagined that they would be able to indulge their vices with impunity, by attributing their vices to the gods; so do modern demagogues lull their consciences by saying that our Lord preached revolution both by word, and by the example of His life.

5. *Liberty of the Press.* There is another liberty (which is most baneful in its consequences and most oppressive to individuals), which requires mention, because it is the idol of those who pride themselves

on what they imagine to be the superior light and intelligence of the times. The freedom of the Press is regarded by them as the portal which admits to all the other liberties.

The liberty to print anything or everything is the most hurtful of liberties. On what maxims is it founded? The following is the most common: *No one has a right to obstruct the propagation of truth.* That is very true. But it does not say anything in your favour. It is directly against you. If no one has a right to impede the diffusion of truth, does it follow that no check should be put upon the Press? Are no just limits to be imposed upon the Press? Do you mean that a license to print anything you like, is the same as a freedom in propagating the truth? I do not suppose that a man of sense could be found anywhere in the civilized world who believes all that he sees in the newspapers. Least of all do the editors and writers themselves believe what they read in newspapers. They know that a dinner-party entails praise, where praise is not due; and a refusal to commit an ignoble or criminal act in their favour brings down a continuance of malicious articles and damaging insinuations, like the "constant dropping of water." They know that French dukes can bribe one leading journal, that foreign ministers can bribe another with sums openly mentioned in the estimates of foreign States (Prussian, Brazilian, and others), and knowingly voted by Parliaments. They know that nations were manipulated, before the Danish, the Italian, the Prusso-Austrian, and the Prusso-French wars took place, so that other Governments were

rendered unable to interfere. Such results were worth much money; and much money was given to secure the end, through a powerful Press.

The Press may serve the cause of falsehood as easily as it may aid the cause of truth; and as wicked men care to pay for the insertion of falsehoods, and no one will bribe an editor to insert a truth, it is a matter of certainty that falsehood and not truth will be disseminated by the Press. Well, then, say that no one has a right to impede the publication of truth; but say also that there is a right and duty to impede the publication of falsehoods, and you must at once agree that checks should be imposed upon the Press. No one has a right to prevent the dispensation of medicines for the sick; but does it follow from this, that no restraint may be put on the sale of poisons?

Do you think the people themselves desire that the Press should be utterly free? I do not allude to those who have felt the tyranny of an editor who persists in repeating base insinuations and giving currency to calumnies, cleverly framed so as to "keep to the windy side of the law." I do not allude to those who know a subject thoroughly and scientifically, and are daily vexed in seeing articles written on purpose to diffuse error, while the editor rejects a letter sent for publication in correction of his errors. I allude to those thousands who depend for their information on the daily papers, and yet do not like to be duped. Is it not a tyranny for them to pay their three-pennies and their pennies every morning in order to be misled? Every one can see this out of

their own class. Employers of labour cry—"Shame! upon the *Bee-hive*, *Lloyd's Weekly* or *Reynolds'*, or those papers which (they say) mislead the working classes." Aristocrats ask how the ultra-radical and revolutionary papers can rightly be allowed to be disseminated among the poor and ignorant. While religious persons of all sects unite in indignation against a Government that permits the diffusion of atheism or immorality in a low weekly Press.

No one has a right to obstruct the spread of truth. Most true! But do you not thence infer that there is a right to remove every obstacle to the spread of truth? "Qui facit per alium, facit per se." If you permit another to hinder the spread of truth, you are yourself guilty of hindering it. If then the obstacle to the spread of truth is the freedom of the Press, it follows that there must be a right to confine the Press within just limits. If an editor can abuse the liberty of the Press; if, through ignorance or malice, he can disseminate errors; if the dissemination of errors is not without danger for men; if, in short, it is true that the Press can, in a thousand ways, be made to impede the spread of truth, and to implant subtle fallacies and the germs of errors, then it follows that there must be a right, in the proper authorities, to supervise the Press, and to govern it so that it should not possibly injure others by the publication of errors and falsehoods.

The freedom of the Press seems, then, to be a crime. Of all things good for men, truth is, without doubt, the greatest good. Truth is the good thing

for the intellect. Because the intellect has been created to embrace the truth, to unite itself with the truth, to find its repose alone in truth; just as the eye was made to receive light, and the ear to detect sounds, and the hand was created to work. Truth is the good thing for the heart, because the heart cannot exist without some love; and where the truth does not show it an honest object of love, the heart is sure to contaminate itself in a sordid love. The truth is the good thing for society; for if the truth does not guide its steps, society must fall into misery, and, setting itself against the divine laws of the universe, will speedily be ground into powder. It is the good thing for men; for they cannot attain their ultimate end—they cannot reach eternal goodness, except by means of the truth. So necessary is truth to men, that the Son of God came down from heaven to teach them the truth. Truth, then, is above all good things; it is a greater good than wealth, a greater good than honours. It is above life and death, above prosperity and adversity, above individuals and families, above cities and monarchies, above men and angels. The only fountain of truth is God; and truth is the only guide that leads to God; for truth, essential and supreme, is God.

If this be so, what right can there be to obscure the truth, to rob men of the truth, to proclaim errors instead of truth, to proclaim errors under every attractive form, to proclaim errors to every class of men? No, there is no right to a freedom of the Press. What! May the Press deny or prevert

religious and moral truths? May it sneer at what is good, in the present and in the future, for the intellect and will of man? May it entangle men in the subtle webs of sophisms, and draw religion and morality from the hearts of men? May it instil doubts and disputes about social truth, which is the only stable foundation on which nations and empires can tranquilly repose? May it, day by day, enforce maxims and principles which are in contradiction to that only stable foundation? Verily, the freedom of the Press is a right to insult the Lord and to destroy man.

But some good men have been in favour of Freedom of the Press. Why do you urge this? Are you willing to be bound by what good men have said or done? If not, it is useless to advance the proposition. It is true that, in heretical countries, good Catholics have demanded a freedom of the Press. For where all the newspapers were in the service of error, they were anxious to establish one newspaper in the cause of truth. Where the Press was a monopoly—a monopoly of error, there freedom was the same as opening a postern to the ingress of truth. But such an example is no argument for what is called the freedom of the Press; it is an argument for the publication of truth alone.

The attitude of the Church towards the Press, and Her frequent condemnations of the freedom of the Press, should be enough for the faithful. Those condemnations have been the cause of the bitterness of the Press towards the Church. When St.

Paul preached against idolatry, the idol-makers felt that their craft was assailed, and so they appealed to the popular passions and prejudices, and cried, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" and raised an *émeute* against the Church. So it is now; the craft of the newspaper editors is assailed, and their power of telling lies in public is threatened, and therefore they appeal to popular prejudices and passions, and raise an *émeute* against the Church. Soon after the invention of printing, the Lateran Council, held under Leo X., issued strict orders that no one should publish anything without the previous sanction of the bishops. The Fathers of the Council of Trent renewed these orders, as Rule x. of their Index demonstrates. Alexander VII. subjoined other injunctions to prevent the evasion of these commands. Clement VIII. wrote more particular instructions on the subject. Benedict XIV. gave rules for those who were to exercise the censorship of the Press. When, in 1789, the liberty of the Press was proclaimed, among so many other "liberties," the Pontiff (Pius VI.) issued a Consistorial Allocution, and in his letter to the clergy of France, he pointed out that atheism and impiety alone could desire a liberty to publish indiscriminately anything. Pius VII., Leo XII., and Pius VIII. showed as great opposition to the freedom of the Press. They condemned all the "liberties" proclaimed by irreligious Liberalism, giving the first place to that which they considered the most pernicious of all, namely, the liberty to publish anything and everything. Gregory XVI. said the freedom of the Press

is "detestable" and "execrable." These were his words: "Deterrima illa ac nunquam satis execrata ac detestabilis libertas artis librariæ ad scripta quælibit edenda in vulgus." Lastly, the Supreme Pontiff, Pius IX., in the seventy-ninth proposition of his Syllabus, has said that: "Plenam potestatem omnibus attributam, quaslibet opiniones cogitationesque palam publiceque manifestandi, conducere ad populorum mores animosque facilius corrumpendos, ac indifferentismi pestem propagandam."

What I have said of newspapers, applies also to the other part of the Press—namely, the books of the day. Some of the books of the day are written to light the flames of revolt; and some to inflame the sensual passions. Some attack the truths of the Catholic religion; others make an onslaught on all religion; others openly advance materialism, deism, or even utter atheism. They are of all forms, and are written for all tastes. There are sober and "learned" books, filled with pretentious sophisms, for those whose vanity makes them aim at passing for philosophers. There are lively descriptions and seducing pictures of life, for the amusement of lighter readers. There are love tales for worldly women, and amatory poetry for the sentimental. In short, as with the journals, so with the books, there is a dish for every taste, with the same slow poison in all. No one who has been so fortunate as to escape getting so low as to call evil good, and good evil, can observe the effects of a free Press, without desiring that a wholesome restraint should be put upon it.

But it is impossible to abolish the liberty of the Press; such a thing would not be tolerated in these times. If the evil has really grown to such an extent, then we are indeed far gone in decadence. If men are either not sensible of the evil—if they do not perceive that immoralities, fallacies, sophisms, and even downright falsehoods, are the staple of newspapers, periodicals, and ephemeral books; or if, having perceived such things, they care not to repress them, then is England worse than I take her to be. In the revolutionary times of England, under William and Mary, Press laws were enacted and enforced. Within the memory of living men, the Press was nicknamed "Grub-street," after a London prison in that locality. For in 1817, Lord Castlereagh passed six laws against the Press, and filled the prisons with collusive scribblers and lying editors. According to a Parliamentary return, the Government, during the years from 1808 to 1821, obtained one hundred and one convictions under the Press laws, imprisoned ninety-four journalists, and transported twelve more. So great an effort was then made to save England from her destruction! It appears, then, that it is very possible, even in England, and in the nineteenth century, to repress the baneful license of scribbling—that "execrata et detestabilis libertas opiniones cogitationesque palam publiceque manifestandi."

It is very few years ago that a severe Press law was passed for Ireland. Sir George Grey was Home Secretary in a Liberal Government, when the House was asked to meet on a Saturday, and the Coercion

Bill ran through its six stages without delay or intermission. The leave to introduce the Bill, the first reading, second reading, committee, third reading, and the passing of the Bill, all were disposed of at one sitting; while the Lords despatched it with an equal rapidity. A very popular Liberal Government therefore can find it in its heart to pass Press laws. There are similar laws in France. In every country there are laws which are strict enough, against vilipending, or ridiculing, or reviling the Government in print; and no Government is found to have many qualms of conscience against putting such laws into execution. All that is desirable is that the Governments should be equally anxious to repress insults against God, and to punish infractions of God's laws.

Every authority is instituted, not for its own good, but for the good of those over whom it is placed. Any ruler who considers his own good more than that of his people, is a tyrant. But to read ridicule or revilings of the Government does not cause so great an injury to the people, as to be supplied, in the daily papers, with sneers at religion and insults to God. Any Government, therefore, which defends itself, and does not vigorously defend the cause of God, is a tyrannical Government, and deserves not the name or position of government or ruler. Furthermore, it is idiotic folly and blindness for a Government to attempt to guard its own honour without being more jealous of the honour of God. The ruler cannot effectually protect himself without repelling attacks on the name of God. Freedom of the Press, in regard to religion or morality, has

always led, and must always lead to revolts, and seditions, and revolutions; it must bring about, if it continues unchecked, the overturning of thrones, the fall of dynasties, and the destruction of empires.

But if the liberty of the Press is to be abolished, the Government must become censor of the Press, and must define truth; which is absurd, because a Government has no prerogative to know the truth better than a private person. No Catholic can offer such an objection as this; because every Catholic knows of an Infallible Teacher of faith and morals, who can define truth with accuracy; and it is with Catholics alone that I have to do. Nevertheless, I would ask Protestants, or even atheists, who may bring such an objection, whether the Government is ignorant of the natural law, or whether they can tell right from wrong? If they are ignorant of the natural law, and of right and wrong, then they have no qualifications for governing; but if they know them, then let them repress what they see to be wrong, and we will not quarrel with them. Let them defend those truths of Christianity which they and we in common believe, and we will not complain of their not guarding those further truths which we hold, but which they have rejected or lost.

CHAPTER IX.

FRATERNITY.

As dogs have their bark, and "brindle cats" their mews; as horses have their neighs, and donkeys their brays, so have the populace their cries. Cries are sounds which involve no definite meaning, but which nevertheless recall to the minds of ignorant hearers, by means of the power of mental association, various circumstances of strife and bloodshed, which immediately arouse fierce and angry passions. They are, to use an expression of Horne Tooke's, "sounds most brutish." Mention but the word liberty, and the populace will blindly and furiously follow you, to forge for themselves fetters, under the name of liberty. That is the first sound in the cry. The other sounds are *Fraternity* and *Equality*. I went to Paris after the Commune, and found that, as on every building which had been gutted by fire and was cracked and oxydized by the heat, there was written *Propriété Nationale;* so on all the walls which were pitted by rifle balls, and bore the marks of a severe and sanguinary struggle, there was written *Liberté, Fraternité, Egalité.* In the name of liberty, the most oppressive laws are imposed. In the name of fraternity, men cut each other's throats. In the name of equality, dirty democrats

overthrow those who are above them, in order to leap into their seats and oppress all the other dirty democrats.

We are all brothers! This is an article in the modern creed. Well; what have we to say against it? Nothing, if it means simply what the words imply. For what is there more sublime in the world than true fraternity? "Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." But if this be really the meaning of the modern maxim, how has it come to serve as the veil to so many traducements, perfidies, and slaughters? Fraternity indicates love. But modern fraternity means the destruction of love, and the fierce flames of internecine hate. The cry "fraternity," was first heard with the clanking of the guillotine and the stridental sheering of heads by its heavy axe. Fraternity sent two hundred thousand citizens to Hades before their time; and the other citizens, who remained, lit up the flames of war throughout Europe to the cry of "fraternity." Every country which is content with the ancient virtue of charity, is in peace and quiet; but as soon as your "fraternity" comes in, then there is bloodshed and discord; the employed envy their employers, the employers deal unjustly with the employed; farmers despise the rights of their landlords, and the landlords lose consideration for the farmers. "Fraternity" brings disunion into families, setting fathers against sons, and brothers against each other. So that wherever fraternity establishes itself, discord has its seat.

If by fraternity we understand the opposite to brotherhood, we shall not be wrong. Fraternity is a cry—a sound most brutish. The word was adopted in hatred of religion; that is to say, it was invented in order to exclude the true brotherhood of the Church of Christ. At the end of the last century, philosophy and the Revolution set before themselves the aim of abolishing Christianity; —*Écrasons l'Infame*, was the motto of Voltaire. After having impugned the arguments in favour of Christianity, scoffed at its mysteries, and derided its Faith, it tackled the Christian virtues. It was necessary to substitute something else for them, if only to save appearances, and to content those who retained in their hearts a secret longing for the Catholic Church. What was to be done? Among the virtues which the Christian Church introduced into the world, charity held the principal place. A false imitation of charity had therefore to be substituted. This was not easy; as charity is one of those plants which will not grow but from the soil of the Catholic Church. The philosophers, therefore, cleverly devised a virtue which should have the deceptive appearance of charity without its duties and calls. This was *fraternity.*

Let us compare charity and its imitation. Charity is a supernatural virtue, which streams down from God. It requires a principle, which is above man's nature, to reside in man's heart and form his acts; a principle which moves him, on supernatural grounds, to love. Charity makes a man love his neighbour, not because he is a man, not because

he is good, not because he is amiable, not because he is agreeable, but because he is an adopted son of God, because he has been redeemed by Jesus Christ, because God has commanded every one to love his neighbour, because Jesus Christ has, so to speak, transferred to our neighbour the titles which He has to our love, and has said that He will regard as done to Himself whatever we do to our neighbour. This love has to be exercised through the grace which God puts into our hearts, and in virtue of that habit of supernatural charity which He gives us. Fraternity, on the other hand, comes only from the earth, and knows no principle of operation outside of human nature. It places no motives before the eyes beyond natural motives. It sees in one's neighbour only that which is human—external beauty, natural probity, good-nature, animal courage, and so forth. It does not see in man anything which is above the senses and above reason. It knows of no supernatural grace, no adoption, no redemption, no gifts of God. Its ken does not extend beyond the natural order. Christian charity is the highest and most noble of all the virtues. Because, according to the Catholic Faith, it is one with the love of God ; it is from the same origin, and it tends to the same end as the love of God ; viz., loving the Creator, more than the creature, in man. Fraternity, on the contrary, is merely human, and, like philanthropy, loves only the human in man, and altogether ignores the divine. Charity has broken the chains of slavery for half the world ; it has changed brutalized savages into men ; and it has

raised men and made them Christians. Hospitals, and schools, and asylums, and orphanages, and homes for the aged, were the work of charity. Fraternity declaims about "the evils that flesh is heir to," but leaves them as they were. Charity endures and perseveres, and is magnanimous in overcoming difficulties. Charity makes men love when unloved in return; it makes men love even those who hate and persecute them. Fraternity does not so. A cold look is enough to make fraternity languish. For fraternity, according to Aristotle's maxim, "loves its friends and hates its enemies." Its love is, moreover, not enduring. Nor is it capable of overcoming difficulties; because it has no principles, nor fixed motives of action. He that, in encountering a difficulty, recognizes a command of God—he who knows that it is the will of God that he should overcome it, and aims at being like his Master, Christ—he cannot fail to forget himself and rise higher than himself; while he, who sees no end before him but the "benefit" of a fellow, and feels no reward except the satisfaction of a natural compassion, will not endure when the benefit of another is opposed to his own benefit or even enjoyment, nor when the feeling of satisfaction is overcome by a feeling of annoyance or fatigue. It has been well said that fraternity is without eyes to see a neighbour, without a heart to love him, and without a hand to serve him.

Fraternity would seem to denote a universality of union, if we are to believe the declamations of those who assever that all men should love one

another, and that all men form only one great family, and that the only good a man should seek, is the good of "humanity." That is the theory. What do we see in fact? A clique of audacious men combined, who seek to hold the whole of society enslaved to their caprices. "All men are brothers, therefore handle your poignards; prepare the poison; load your revolvers; and 'remove' out of our way all who do not agree with us. All men are brothers; what need have we of any religion? Religion only 'brings a sword,' and sets 'father against son, and mother against daughter, and mother-in-law against her daughter-in-law.' Nor do we want superstitions, nor the brotherhood of your regular orders, nor so strict a chastity, nor such severe self-repression. All men are brothers; therefore we must get all schools into our power, to educate children in our way, and to bring up a new generation which shall second our views; we must also get the reins of Government into our hands, in order to rule the world in our way, and save society in our own way. All men are brothers; therefore we will not have men divided into nations; and we will permit no patriotism, no national trophies, nor Vendôme columns of victory; for these things arise from divisions and antagonisms of nations; and we say that all men are brothers, and prove it by petroleum."

All men are brothers, said the French Revolutionists at the end of last century. Chateaubriand (quoted by Cautù) states that a law was passed im-

posing, on all opponents of the Revolution, only one penalty, namely, death. By Art. 9, of that law, every citizen was authorized to arrest and bring before the tribunal, any one suspected of harbouring principles contrary to the Revolution; by Art. 13, witnesses were dispensed with; by Art. 16, the accused were denied the benefit of counsel; and by a subsequent Article, appeal from the sentence of the tribunal was absolutely forbidden. Prudhomme has left a nominal list of criminals who were beheaded: viz., one thousand two hundred and seventy-eight noblemen; seven hundred and fifty ladies; one thousand four hundred and sixty-seven artizan's wives; three hundred and fifty religious; one thousand one hundred and thirty-five priests; thirteen thousand six hundred and thirty-three other men; a total of eighteen thousand six hundred and thirteen. There were, in addition, three thousand four hundred women who died from premature confinement arising from ill-usage and terror, and three hundred and forty-eight who were murdered while *enceinte*. There were also fifteen thousand Vendean women killed; twenty-two thousand children; and ninety thousand men. Besides these there were thirty-two thousand victims slaughtered by Carrier at Nantes; thirty-one thousand at Lyons; and many thousands more at Versailles, Avignon, Toulon, Marseilles, and elsewhere. In the execution of the *Loi des suspects*, of September 21, 1793, there were instituted no less than fifty-thousand Revolutionary tribunals (committees), which cost the country five hundred and ninety-one millions of francs a year. There were,

besides, five hundred and forty public prosecutors who had the power, of themselves, to pass a sentence of death. And all these tribunals and prosecutors vied with each other in bloody activity! This was Fraternity!

CHAPTER X.

EQUALITY.

LIBERTY, and Fraternity, and Equality, are the three heads of the idol to which the Liberals offer incense. What do those want who cry out for *equality?* They must desire something that they have not got; something different from what Christianity brought into the world. This is what they want: to wit, they desire that, in the social order, there should be abolished all distinctions between him that commands and him that obeys; that no difference of grades or ranks should be admitted; that all privileges, whether of birth or condition, should be swept away; and so forth. On what ground do they demand such equality? *Because God* (say they) *made all men equal; because human nature is the same in every man; because a privilege granted to one is an affront to every one else.* These are sophisms, invented in order to overturn and destroy all society. Let us consider them carefully, one by one.

1. *God made all men equal.* This is their first principle. If taken absolutely, it is false. If you speak of substance, or specific nature, it is true; for all men have reason and the animal part. But if

the meaning be such as to exclude individual differences, then it is utterly and entirely false. Men are unequal in respect of the gifts of nature; one man has a quick and tenacious memory, another has next to no memory; one has a mind acute and watchful, another has an obtuse and torpid mind; some have a natural aptitude for an art or science, which others cannot learn without great labour and difficulty; some have a magnanimous and generous character, others are naturally mean and selfish. It is therefore not true that men are equal by nature. From these differences it follows that men cannot all apply themselves to the same things, nor succeed with equal results, nor enjoy the same advantages, nor surmount the same difficulties. Each one will succeed in proportion to his powers, and genius, and judgment, and faculties. If a man is to enjoy liberty, if he is to be free in the use of his powers, then he may use them to advantage or employ them foolishly; he may work with diligence, assiduity, and perseverance; or he may waste his time in indolence, frivolity, and inattention. The effects produced by different men, and the amounts of property they will acquire, will therefore be very different. There are differences also in another order of things. Men are not in a purely natural state. In the order of grace there is also a distribution of good things; and God "distributeth to every one as He will." Neither in the natural order, therefore, nor yet in the order of grace, are men equal.

From the inequalities in the natural gifts, and in the various gifts of grace, there results a great variety

of rights. These are entirely contradictory to the pretended equality of men. The man who has a talent for the arts, or capacity for the sciences, or depth and expertness in the management of public affairs; the man who by study and diligence has increased his powers and profited by his experiences, and who by unswerving honesty and an unimpeachable moral character, has won the respect of all men, must necessarily be in a superior position to any one who has not all these excellent qualities. Would you consult a country clodpole as a doctor, or intrust a bucolic mind with the legislation of the country, or expect justice from a town councillor? Would you allow yourself to be led by a blind man, or to be examined by a Civil Service Commissioner, or be docile under the instruction of an ignoramus? If not, then you must subscribe to the inequality of men. Again, if you see two men who are equal in all respects, except that one labours incessantly and persistently and indomitably to improve himself, while the other spends half the day in bed and the other half in frivolities, would you expect those men to be equal at the end of the year, or await an equal fortune for them? Or if one of them practises self-restraint, and even self-abnegation, while the other flings himself into the vortex of vice and gratifies every passion, would those two men long remain of equal worth? If you find two labourers, one of whom works constantly, and spends no money in beer and tobacco, while the other works only when he has nothing to eat, and then squanders his wages in self-indulgence and folly, would you not predict

that the former will "lay by," and acquire property, while the other will become a pauper? And would you not acknowledge the justice of such an outcome? Or if a young man in society has always endeavoured to devote himself to the good of others, would you not say that he has justly acquired the esteem and affection of all men; while a selfish and self-indulgent young man is justly despised and disliked? It appears, then, that as the soil in different fields is of a different fertility, so are men unequal in their natural gifts; and as the soil of a field which is well cultivated becomes vastly ameliorated, while that which is in bad hands becomes impoverished and sour, so men may become unequal by the different uses which they make of the gifts of nature and of grace.

What consequences can be drawn from the specific equality or substantial equality of men? The only legitimate deductions are—(1) that men have equal rights, until some fact intervenes by which some one legitimately acquires an individual or peculiar right; (2) that every one may justly aspire to such rights and endeavour to acquire them; and (3) that when any one has acquired them, they ought to be respected by others. But it cannot be legitimately inferred that no one may become superior to other men. He who has justly acquired riches, may justly use them; he who has merited more honours than others, may justly enjoy them; and we may continue this litany through all the prerogatives which constitute the various grades of society.

Is it then true that *all citizens should be equal before the law?* In one sense justice demands that it should be so; in another sense the maxim is false, as justice demands the contrary. It is true that a judge should respect equally the rights of all citizens, valuing them according to universal law; so that, for example, if there is a dispute as to the ownership of a piece of land, the judge must decide from the title-deeds, without respect to persons or considering whether one is a nobleman and the other a plebeian, whether one is learned and the other ignorant, whether one is a private individual and the other an official. If the question is the punishment of a delinquent, the judge may not inquire whether he has possessions or titles, or whether he is a proletaire and of ignoble origin. So far the maxim is true; but there was no necessity for the Declaration of '89 to proclaim so trite and evident a truth. The foregone centuries had asserted it by a million mouths. In so far then as the Declaration of '89 announced a well known doctrine, it was true; but in so far as it pretended to promulgate a new principle, it was false.

The business of the Declaration of '89 was "spargere voces in vulgum ambiguas," so that its maxims might be received by reason of their likeness to truth, and yet that they should, after having been accepted, logically warrant the most false conclusions. Let us, then, consider the other meaning of this ambiguous maxim, namely, the new and false principle which it published. Although a judge

must sentence according to the laws alone, and without respect of persons, it is not unjust to assign one tribunal for one class of persons, and another for another class; nor yet is it unjust that there should be variety in the application of penalties. In many cases nature itself demands that this should be so. Consider for a moment; what is the essential function of a judge? To secure the perfect triumph of the right. In order to secure this, he must know it perfectly. Now it is clear that there are many species of rights which cannot be fully known without a special study, and practice, and even experience. It is not every one who knows what would be just or what would be an injury, in a matter of commerce, or of seafaring, or of art, or of medicine, or of education, or of war, &c. And yet a just sentence is founded on a correct idea of these things. A legislator would be acting wrongly, therefore, in instituting only one tribunal for all things; for he would not be securing a proper defence of right. Would a jury of shoemakers, and scavengers, and huxters, and tobacconists be able to judge of right and wrong in a naval question? Could they decide, even the simplest question in politics? So again: Although it would be unjust that any class of citizens should escape punishment, or that any class should be punished with unequal severity for equal offences; yet justice does not require that the *materia* of punishment should be equal. On the contrary, this would be most unjust. Would three months of hard labour be an equal punishment for a labourer and for a

soft-handed nobleman? Would ten shillings fine be as burdensome to a millionaire as to a peasant? Would prison fare be as insupportable to a poor man, who was accustomed to a worse than prison fare while out of prison, as it would be to a man who "fared sumptuously every day"? Would solitary confinement be the same thing to a man who had always lived in society, as it would be to another who was accustomed to be alone? Would the shame of imprisonment be as great for a man of no character or position, as for a man of reputation? Would a man, of no fixed habits of life, suffer as much in prison, as a man of fixed habits incompatible with prison life? An equal punishment, in such cases, would, therefore, be most unjust. It is no use declaiming in favour of equality; for individual and social conditions are so various, that such an equality would amount to the grossest injustice.

Then, in the name of equality, let us get rid of the aristocracy, and of accumulated capital, and let us make the social conditions of all men become equal. Reader! It would be easier to get rid of all men. Understand me not to speak of the form under which the aristocracy appears, but of the thing itself —I mean a class of society which is above other classes. Whether you please to call every one of that class "lord," or plain "Mr."; or some of them by one title, some by another title, and some by no title at all, makes no difference. What I say is, that you cannot prevent one class from being superior to others; because it is the work of nature

herself. Can you deter a man of intellect, who has used his mind to good purpose, from being superior, and from acquiring a superior position in society, to a man of little intellect, or a man who has never used his mind except as an instrument to procure carnal pleasures? You cannot stop the influence of the former, nor can you give any influence to the latter. You cannot prevent the former from acquiring property and leaving it to his son, and so bequeathing to his son some of the influence which he has himself obtained. I will go further and say that aristocratical titles are also natural. Is it not natural that he who has great intellect and who, with great diligence and labour, has devoted his time to the good of the nation, and has made great sacrifices in order to do so, should receive some recompense and some honours from the public? It is for the advantage of the nation that this should be so; because these rewards and honours incite others to do the same. But what is a recompense, except a greater abundance of good things, a greater reputation and esteem than others are held in, or a greater prerogative of authority? Here, then, you have a titular aristocracy, and the distinction of ranks. If you give a property to the father, it is his, and he may dispose of it to his son. If you take away this testamentary right, then you diminish the amount and value of the reward. Thus, then, we arrive at hereditary privileges. Even if no titles are admitted, yet rank and influence cannot be excluded. There is an aristocracy in the United States of America, as

there used to be also in the Republics of Venice and Genoa.

The privilege which most of all offends the Liberals, is the *privilege in foro ecclesiastico*, namely, that in virtue of which the clergy claim for ecclesiastical persons and questions a trial before their own special tribunal. I do not need to prove that the Church was founded by Jesus Christ; nor yet must I show that there is in Her a true authority to direct the faithful to a spiritual end (namely, eternal salvation), and to guide them, moreover, by those external means which were determined for that purpose by Jesus Christ. I have not to prove this, for it is, beyond all doubt, a part of the Catholic Faith. I ask any Catholic, then, to whom must it appertain to judge of that end and of those means, except to that same Authority which alone is cognizant of that end and of those means, and which is the sole depositary constituted by Jesus Christ? He that judges a case must have full knowledge of the case; and no one can judge, except he that has superior knowledge. But the Church alone has knowledge in ecclesiastical matters; and, therefore, the Church alone can judge. No one will believe that the State has knowledge in ecclesiastical matters, until the State can show that to it has been confided the deposit of Christian revelation. That the authority of judging was given by Jesus Christ to the Church, has been attested by the Gospel, by tradition, by the fathers, and by the doctors of the Church, as well as by reason and by good sense. If the Church is a

Society, She must have the power to rule Herself. If the Church has authority, She must be able to exercise it. And how can She exercise it, unless (in that which has relation to Her end and to the means established by Jesus Christ) She has a *Cathedra* for teaching, and a tribunal for defining?

I know that the worshippers of the divine-State will say that some of the judgments which the Church wishes to monopolize are concerning material objects. Marriage, for example, they call material! Benefices they call material! He who speaks in this manner, proves thereby that he is himself more than a little material. It is true that such things have a physical side which is material. The Church, however, cares only for the spiritual aspect. She cares not for the stones of which the Church is built; nor for the physical laws of production; nor for the courses of agriculture which are practised on the lands of the benefice; but She desires that the congregation should hear Catholic preaching in the church, and that the man and wife should be united conformably to the will of Christ Who instituted the sacraments; and that She should administer, for the good of the poor, the patrimony of the poor in the parish. In these matters, if the State desires to rule (on the ground that the church of the benefice is stone, and that marriage is a union of two rational animals), it would grossly confound the end with the means, and the spiritual with the material. In order to avoid error, it is, therefore, necessary to recognize a double object, and a double authority. Each of these authorities must have the

right to direct the nation or society towards its own end, and on each there is imposed the duty of judging of its own end. The lay judge may not pass sentence as to the spiritual end, nor may the ecclesiastical judge pass sentence in respect of the temporal end. There must be two distinct tribunals.

As every one sees the necessity of permitting only those judges to pass sentence, who have a knowledge of the subject, we always have separate tribunals for the various temporal subjects of dispute. There is an Admiralty Court, and a Military Court, and a Probate Court, and a Divorce Court, and a Chancellor's Court, and a Civil Court, and a Criminal Court, and so forth. By parity of reasoning there should be an Ecclesiastical Court, seeing that ecclesiastical matters require much more learning to understand them, than any of the other subjects. It would be very wrong for the Church to give up Her rights in this respect; for to do so would cause injury and be a great injustice to Her members.

Moreover, the State itself would suffer from an abolition of the Ecclesiastical Courts. If you were to do away with them, what beautiful example of levelling, what a taste for abolishing distinctions you would give to the populace! If you assert the levelling principle, you will do more harm to society than the sects and secret societies, who, unknown to you, are hounding you on; for you will establish new principles of action, and new false maxims of conduct. If you refuse to recognize the authority of Christ in the Church, how can you expect your subjects to recognize your authority in the State?

If it is lawful for you to revolt from the Church, it must be lawful for others to rebel against the State? Kings and rulers are thus the first, in these days, to teach that their rights should not be respected. Kings are the greatest revolutionists. They lay down the maxims or first principles of revolution, and thus authorize the people to arrive at the conclusions which can be legitimately drawn from them.

There is one kind of equality which is more mischievous than any other—one which puts princes and people, monarchs and subjects, superiors and inferiors on a par. By means of it, the principle of authority is directly denied, and the right of revolt established. From this equality there spring various false and dangerous maxims. Let us consider a few of those which have the greatest verisimilitude.

The people is sovereign. If this be granted, it follows that it belongs to the people to administer public affairs; and that the people may get rid of their rulers, when their rulers please them no longer; and that the people may offer an armed resistance to their so-called sovereign on the throne. It is very apparent that if this maxim were regarded as true, no Government would be possible. Whether there is a monarchy, or an oligarchy, or a democracy, some stable authority is always necessary. But if the people is sovereign, the people may, at any moment, turn out the president of a republic, or discard the ruling body in an oligarchy, or hurl the king from his throne. Having created another

ruler instead, the people may also depose him whenever the whim takes them. Four sophisms, uttered by a demagogue, suffice to move "the people" in any direction. History has amply proved this fact. Therefore, as soon as a society has fully received the maxim of the sovereignty of the people, it must evermore be a prey to ever-recurring revolutions. But how can any sane man allow himself to be persuaded that God, the Author of society, and of order, and of peace, could have established such a fearful disorder as must result if the maxim of the sovereignty of the people be true? Moreover, the fact that (with a few short exceptions in late years), at all times and in all places, the sovereignty of the people has not been admitted, is enough to show that, by common consent, men have regarded it as a folly. Men have always lived in submission. There has always been a permanent authority over every society. Therefore we may safely hold that this is right. To say that, for six thousand years, men have not understood, and that Nature has never established those institutions which are natural, is utterly puerile.

What do the few short exceptions in later years prove to us? Whenever a people has attempted to exercise this supposed sovereignty, what has been its consequent condition? It has always been plunged in the greatest misery. So it was in '93; and so it was in '48. Again: Those who are loudest in their arguments in favour of the sovereignty of the people—even they assert that the people must work, if they would eat, and drink,

and be clothed; that if they are ordered out, they must go and fight and endure hardships and wounds and direful death; and that, when the time for paying the taxes comes round, every one of the people must pay, or go to prison. A curious kind of sovereignty, indeed! A sovereign with the attributes of a subject merely! Certainly no man except an enclyclopedist could have discovered such subtleties, and no one but a "philosopher" can understand them!

Whence comes an authority to command the people? If we regard only the nature of man, or the essential qualities of human nature, we must say that no one man should be above another. The authority to command must, therefore, come from some one external to man, that is, from God. Nature proves the absolute necessity of an authority in every society; and no other origin of authority can be found, except God. The child in the family cannot live the life of the body, and still less the life of the spirit, without an authority to supply it with physical food for the body, and education to form the spirit. As the family was unquestionably made by God, this proves that the paternal authority in a family society is the will of God. But the insufficiency of the family for itself, and its want of defence and of other advantages, proves that God made the family with a view to a larger and higher society. This larger society, also, must have an authority over it. It is impossible, in fact, to conceive of a society without a ruling authority. Such a conception would be self-contradictory; it would be absurd. For the idea of a society is a multitude living

together, and ordered to a definite end. A society without an authority is a multitude which is, at the same time ordered, and not ordered—a society that is not a society. As, therefore, an ordinating authority is essential to a society, it must be the will of God that there should be an ordinating authority. He could not have desired a thing to exist without that which is essential to its existence. Therefore authority is from God.

Faith also, shedding her divine light over the subject, supports the conclusions arrived at by the discourse of reason, and makes them certain. Faith tells us that every paternity, and every other authority comes from God, Who is the Supreme Ordinator of all societies. I need not quote the passages of Scripture which prove this, for they are all well known.

Yes, authority comes from God to the people; and the people delegate it to whom they will, retaining, nevertheless, the power of revoking the delegation. Tear away, I beseech you, the veil of passion, and look on God Who moves every authority. Turn your eye, from the people to whom you desire to attribute authority, and contemplate the nature of authority itself, and you will see that your affirmation is absurd. What is authority? It is the right to impose, on another, one's own will, provided it be just. It is the right to restrain, by an act of will, the will of another. It is the act of a superior. Can you then imagine an authority in your sense? Can you conceive of a right to impose, on oneself, one's own will? Can you suppose it possible to restrain

one's own will by an act of one's own will, making oneself superior to oneself? Such a supposition is absurd. Yet if authority resides in the people, the people is superior to itself, and commands itself, and obeys itself, and imposes its own will on its will!

If the people has a real authority, why should it delegate it? Why should it not itself exercise that authority? Let us, for once, see it perform the juggling trick and acrobat feat of functioning the office of sovereign and commanding, while it also plays the part of subject and obeys. What supreme wisdom in the legislation of tinkers! what far-sighted prudence in the commands of clodpoles, hucksters, and scavengers! and, at the same time, what a docility and readiness to obey in their beer-wrought, undisciplined minds! And what a clear judicial acumen each of such men will exhibit, as he examines his conscience, and puts the criminal side of his character on its trial at the bar of the innocent and sovereign side! Above all, what order, what harmony will prevail in the whole people as it performs this metaphysical legerdemain, and goes through the various phases of this difficult psychological conjuring! Why does not the people continue always to do this ingenious trick, if it really possesses the authority, and has the right? Or if this would be impossible, why should God have given the people an authority which it is impossible for them to exercise? Such a supposition is in the highest degree improbable. It follows, then, that the people possess no authority; and as they have it not, they cannot delegate it.

But the delegation of sovereign authority to some person, is itself an act of sovereign authority. By no means. Without any authority to confer a dignity, to give a title, to appoint to a function, to bestow a spiritual force or power, a chapter or an agent may designate a person as a fit and proper recipient of that dignity; and after the designation of the most worthy person, he that has the authority to confer the dignity, title, function, or grace, may then appoint. The *congé d'elire* to a chapter does not invest a person with the powers which are bestowed in consecration. Even in elective sovereignties the authority is not conferred by the electors. The person is merely designated as a condition precedent to the gift of authority to him by God, the Supreme Ordinator of all things. In hereditary monarchies, the death of the former monarch and the legitimate descent of the successor are the only conditions precedent. If a number of children assemble in a school, the master can exercise his authority as master; and if they do not assemble, he cannot exercise his tutorial authority. Yet it would be absurd to conclude that the authority of the master resides in the children, and is delegated by them to the master on their assembling in the school.

But if that be so, how is it that one man should be the superior in preference to any other man? How is it, I ask you, that in a place of learning, every one gives place to the most learned? Or in a hospital, how is it that the best doctor is put forward? Or in war, how is it that the ablest general is preferred? Plainly, because inherent superiority designated them

to the place of command. So in a society; when it is first formed, the authority is soon perceived to be in that man who is able, whether by valour, by intellect, or by strength, to benefit the society the most. Not that the ability is in itself the authority, nor does it give the right to command; but it is the reason why the people are sure, by acclamation, to recognize that man as formed to be their leader. As the courage, or wisdom, or strength of body was given him by God, so also is the authority given him by God.

So much for incipient societies. In old societies also, the authority still comes from God. Every social superiority and distinction comes from God. He gives to one man more wisdom, to another more valour, to another more strength, to another more prudence; thus one man becomes rich and exercises preponderance thereby; another becomes a great warrior and acquires power in the State; and so forth. To others God gives great landed property by the laws of inheritance, and they have a consequent influence. In every grade of social inequality, the same is true; the power or influence or authority which a man possesses, is from God. To give power to one person, God may have used sudden revolutions. Pestilence may have cut off many intervening heirs to a property or to a crown. God may have granted to another not only the powers but the opportunities to win his way. Another may have succeeded to property or to the Crown by the laws of the land and without any shock or dislocation. God can use any means; but it is always God Who

rules the world. In America a President is elected ; does not God govern the minds of the electors ? In Poland the candidature was by cooptation in only a few families. In Turkey the successor to the throne is the oldest surviving relative to the throne. In England it is the oldest son or a daughter, being a Protestant. In France the daughters are excluded. Still it is God that has done it. "Whatsoever is done upon the earth, lo, it is He that doeth it altogether." The people may, in the constitution, have imposed the conditions providing for hereditary succession, in one line or another, or for succession by election. But the people do not confer the authority. Still less can they delegate authority, nor have they any power to retract it.

What then becomes of the natural equality of men ? That is not touched. Men have all the same nature. But that does not exclude the accidents of birth or circumstances. If it were not so, what would become of the independence or freedom of men ? If men have freedom of action (as long as they regard justice, *i.e.*, as long as they do not interfere with the rights of others), it follows, as a matter of course, that they must become unequal. Suppose a society just formed, or a society plunged in anarchy, and suppose that one man of capacity, decision, firmness, and valour comes forward, and is recognized as the only man who is able to save that society ; who would presume to forbid him, even although he should mount the steps of the throne ? You allow, then, that men are equal essentially, but unequal accidentally. The inequality is in authority.

Authority is not despotism; it is not tyranny. It is a benefic institution for protecting, defending, securing, and promoting the public good. The sovereignty of the people, on the contrary, is the origin of every sort of evil, and the destruction of the public good or "common weal." It is true that a prince, who has a lawful authority, may abuse his rights and oppress his people. But a people, which has never a right to rule, invariably oppresses and tyrannizes far more. There are many things to restrain a king; yes, a king, even, who has cast all sense of duty and religion and conscience aside. There is, for example, a care for his reputation with the people, the interests of the reigning family, the love of his children, the fear of revolt. These motives restrain a king; but not one of them can affect the people. Furthermore, there are many motives which urge the people strongly to abuse their powers. The people cannot ever understand the principles of justice; they have lost, behind their counters, the little sense of right they had. Having lost the sense of right, they have discovered the power of numbers, and learnt how to use the dagger and petroleum. When they have attained their object, they do not stop; they toss like the waves of the sea; having reached one aim, they dash off to another; and those among them who to-day have seated themselves on the throne of command and sipped the nectar of power, are to-morrow dragged to the block, while others take their place.

Are there any ecclesiastics—alas, there are—who play with the sovereignty of the people, and make

ad captandum orations, and sprinkle Liberalism with their holy water, and care for applause and popularity? They are puffing at the dying embers that lie in the midst of the dry and combustible grass of a prairie. They are traducing the cause of religion, the cause of the throne, the cause of the people; and are putting their own necks into the noose. Alas, let us shut our eyes to them.

But, surely, some theologians have admitted the sovereignty of the people. When Cicero spoke Greek, the Roman populace did not understand him, and he spoke to the ears of the select few. I do not like to say that you, who bring this objection, are guilty of quoting theologians that you did not understand as you read them; for I know that you have never read their works. What you have done is this: you have read some pamphlet, or heard some speech, in which a designing servant of the Revolution has hinted at such a possibility without boldly asserting the fact; and you—honest individual!—not fearing a refutation, have asserted it boldly as a fact, without shielding yourself behind hints, innuendoes, and ambiguity of language. Some theologians have asserted that God invests princes with the authority to govern, independently of all human acts; others have asserted that it is God truly Who invests princes with authority, but that He does so after some human act. It is God that gives grace in the sacraments; but He waits for the human act to precede. In Baptism, for example, water, and the form of words, must be used with the proper intention; yet it is God that washes out the guilt of original sin and gives the

grace in Baptism. No theologian has asserted that a number of men, assembled together (which is styled in modern phrase, a community), has the authority to govern itself, or may delegate that authority to whomsoever they please. If you do not choose to take this assertion upon trust, I must ask you to read the whole of Suarez's *De Legislatione et Deo Legislatore*—a large folio volume of six hundred and eighty-four pages, double columns, and small type—where the matter is fully reasoned out.

Perhaps, however, you imagine that the human act which must be precedent, is enough to prove the sovereignty of the people? By no means. Let us understand the word people. There are some attributes, which may be said to belong to "the people," but which are not suitable to the individuals; there are others which are suitable to all the individuals, but which do not belong to "the people." England is the mistress of the seas, and yet you cannot say that each Englishman is a mistress. So, on the other hand, you may truly say, that Englishmen like to understand and look after their own affairs; yet England certainly does not like to look after her affairs; she allows her prime ministers and the *Times* to do what they like, and to hoodwink Dame Britannia to their heart's content. Well, any one who speaks of the sovereignty of the people, with any regard to truth, would do well to assert beforehand that he does not consider that the aforesaid sovereignty resides in the individuals. Nor yet do the various attributes of sovereignty reside in any of the individuals of

the people—*e.g.*, the power of life and death, the prerogative of pardon, judicial power, and so forth. You, gentle reader, no doubt possess intelligence. Mind resides in that corpus which is called by your name. Yet you surely will not tell me that your big toe is intelligent, or that mind resides in your nose. So you will fail to find any theologian that ascribes sovereignty to the individuals of the people; although many have asserted that sovereignty resides in the whole body or society: it having streamed down to it from God. If then you decide to follow theologians, you must give up the notion that any of the fat or lean incapacities of the people have anything to do with any acts of sovereignty. The ruler having once been designated (whether by the constituted law of succession, or by election), the only office of the individuals of the people is to practise obedience and the other Christian virtues.

Yet every one recognizes a Plébiscite as a valid act, even to spoiling a sovereign and annexing a country. A Plébiscite is of no value or validity whatsoever. It is always a fraud, and generally a veil for robbery. A Plébiscite is therefore a crime, in that it makes the people a party to a theft. An established Government consists of a multitude of acquired rights—rights of ruling in the prince, of which he cannot be despoiled without injustice; rights of that host of mandatories, deputies, ministers, and officials of the ruler—men who, by long studies and labours, have merited the posts they enjoy, and who cannot be robbed of it without hardship and injustice. Yet all these rights are violated by an

annexation. Again: When you consider that every king, and every ruler, is a living representation of the majesty of God, and of His dominion over mortal men; that every ruler is a delegate or mandatory of God, to order all the society placed in his charge, and to conduct the people to the greatest happiness which is possible upon earth—then the crime appears of a still blacker dye. To every king God has given power, even a power of life and death. He has forbidden every appearance of disrespect to a ruler. He has ordered the ruler's authority to be obeyed. What a crime it is, then, for another king to usurp that authority! What a crime for a people to expel their king, and assail God in His most august image! When there was faith and piety on earth, an exiled king was a rare sight, which brought universal shame on the people that had done it. Now there are many exiled kings; and yet no horror has been excited, because infidel orators, and infidel books have taken from us the sense of evil. Let us remember, however, that the nature of things, and the judgments of God, are not changed by the false conclusions of men.

How is a Plébiscite prepared? At the best, in the way that Absalom prepared his sinful revolt. "Sollicitabat corda virorum Israel." Nay! Worse! Before a Plébiscite, you see the frauds which are being prepared, the falsehoods which are being disseminated and published, the treachery which is being perpetrated, and even the murders which are continually being committed. Then comes the cor-

ruption of rulers and of men in high position. Lastly, there are the treacheries, and falsehoods, and frauds of the scrutators. Of so many crimes does a Plébiscite consist!

Again: As the duty of the prince is to seek the good of his subjects, so the duty of subjects is to remain loyal to their prince. The divine law constrains the former to practise justice, and the latter, fidelity. Yet those who present themselves at the urn, consent to the robbery, and violate their loyalty and fidelity. How heinous an act, then, every Plébiscite is! But, of all Plébiscites, the worst was that which added to all these crimes the crime of sacrilege—that which was committed against the Head of the Church.

It follows from this, that a Plébiscite can neither confer a right, nor take a right away. It is absolutely null and void. A Plébiscite is no more than a veil which covers violence.

I may not be a sovereign, yet I am equal to the king; for I am bound to obey only by a contract between the society and the ruler; and if he breaks the contract, society must rescind it, and become free. Before this supposed social contract was made, how did men live? *In a savage state, each one for himself and disassociated from every one else; all men were then equal, and free, and independent.* This assertion of a pretended historical fact is totally contrary to the testimony of sacred and profane history. These agree in representing man as having been very far from the savage state. If he was as you say, there

could have been no conjugal society, and no family, and none of the family bonds and relationships. Still less could there have been any of the social helps and assistances, which are now so necessary to us that we cannot live without them. You say that all these were first made—you say that the present state of society was first brought about by the "social contract!" Who, then, was the inventor of the social contract, and of all the minute and multifarious, yet strong and lasting, relations of the family, and of every other kind of society? On this point no one has as yet been satisfied; and, therefore, I prefer to believe that the hand of nature constituted every society, and formed every relation of life.

Moreover, that social contract (if there ever was such a thing) was certainly the most important and solemn act which ever took place in the world. Surely, then, you are able to tell me when and where it was signed? What! Do no state archives contain it? Nor even a copy of it? Was no monument erected to testify to it? Did not history condescend to notice it? No; no vestige, no sign of it can be discovered! *Mirabile dictu.*

When we remember that man could not have been born without the most elementary society —the conjugal union; that a child could not live through its young physical life without the family society; nor receive its moral formation, nor its mental culture without the family society, then we no longer hesitate to pronounce that the notion of the social contract is absurd. There was no

necessity for such a contract to form society, seeing that the Creator had already determined the existence of societies, when by His Word all creation was formed. It would be as reasonable to suppose that your legs bear you up, and walk, and run, and jump, in virtue of a crural contract; or that your stomach performs its functions in virtue of peptic and alimentary contracts!

You assert that man was in a savage state before the social contract was made? Were men, then, brought together, and persuaded to act together, and, therefore, induced to enter into the contract? But if so, they had formed a society before they made the contract! Moreover, savage men would not be likely to enter into a contract, the effect of which would be, to take from them at once all their savage freedom. This would have been a capitulation, without a warlike nation, or even an army, to force them to capitulate. For remember that these savages—that is to say, all mankind, according to your theory—could have had no notion of a civil state, nor of union, nor even of cooperation, nor even of chieftians and followers; nor could any individual have even formed an idea of a civil State and of its advantages. It follows, then, from your theory, that all the world entered into an accidental contract, which no one had composed or written out, and which entailed the loss of their savage freedom, and yet that no one even knew why they should do so! *Credat Judæus!* The supposition would be too extravagant to find a place even in Mr. Disraeli's novel of *Lothair.*

Even if we grant that such a contract was entered into, at a time beyond the memory of man—a contract of which there remains no vestige nor even sign—then I ask: How is it that we, in this day, are bound by it? May not any man proclaim his non-adherence to the contract? Or do you assert that treaties and covenants made by an unknown ancestry, are binding on their posterity for ever? Moreover, you have proclaimed that the rights of man are inalienable. Every one has, therefore, a right at any time to withdraw from the contract, and live in his or her own way, and independently of the laws of society. For if no one can alienate his own rights, still less can he alienate the rights of his own posterity. Our forefathers, five or six thousand years ago, could not, therefore, by any valid act, have alienated from us our inalienable rights.

Let us now sum up the Catholic doctrine on social authority. The Catholics say that it is not without the providence of God that one man rather than another has been raised up above the rest of the nation, to reign over it. Because God, Who minds even the death of a sparrow, does much more extend His providence over man; and if He orders every event in the world, even to the falling of a hair of your head, how much more does He order those things on which such great good or such great evils depend! As He gives a good prince to a people when He intends to bless them, so He puts a weak or corrupt prince upon the throne when the nation deserves punishment. As to the

authority which the ruler possesses, Catholics say that the designation of the person or persons who are to rule, depends upon some precedent human act; but that God then confers the authority on that person. He does not need to confer it in any extraordinary way, because He orders all things that are done in heaven and earth. There is, therefore, a divine authority in every form of legitimate rule or government. "Every power is of God." "By God kings reign and princes decree justice." "The king is the minister of God for good." The subjects must, therefore, "submit for righteousness' sake, not as to man, but as to God, Whose minister the king is;" and the king rules, not as a man, but as the lieutenant of God, in the external ordering of society.

CHAPTER XI.

NATIONALITY, NON-INTERVENTION, AND THE ACCOMPLISHED FACT.

DEDUCED from the maxim of the sovereignty of the people, there is another maxim—or rather a term, for the rest of the proposition is usually suppressed—which is used to incite the people to rebellion. It is *Nationality*. It is opposed to the Church's precept of submission to lawful authority. There are others like it, namely, *Non-intervention*, and the *fait accompli*, or *accomplished fact*. By the principle of nationality, revolutions can be made. By the principle of non-intervention, those, who are able to suppress a revolution, are forbidden to do so. By the theory of accomplished fact, the recognition of the new order of things is wrung from all Governments. Let us see whether justice, which should be the only rule of action for men and nations, is opposed to these theories, or not.

The maxim, of which the term nationality is a part, may be thus expressed in full, by supplying merely the suppressed elements of the proposition—*Each nationality has a right to constitute itself as a State, and has, therefore, also a right to put down every obstacle, whether offered by rulers or by a people, which hinders its forming itself into a separate State.* If this

be a right, it is certainly a most terrible right, a very "monstrum horrendum informe ingens;" for it means no less than the subversion, and introversion, and retroversion of half the universe. Let us, therefore, carefully examine it.

First: Who is it that has this supposed right? *The nationality.* What is a nationality, and what are the elements which compose a nationality? Do the national or geographical frontiers of seas, mountains, and rivers define it? *Clearly not; such a principle would be in contradiction to every case where the principle of nationality has been triumphantly, or at least successfully asserted.* True; Italy would then be separated into two long nationalities by that high backbone called the Appenines; Northern Italy would also be cut up by its fine rivers. Prussia would lose Alsace and Lorraine. France would be deprived of her Savoyard provinces and of Nice; and so forth. Is then nationality determined by sameness of religion, or perhaps by similarity of material interests, or shall we say that nationality is defined by race? *No; there are various religions in each nationality; besides religion is a matter which we put out of our consideration altogether; there are also many conflicting interests in each nationality; and these interests vary from year to year, so that nationality could never be determined by similarity of interest; as to race, I must ask you who can distinguish races in Europe, where, for centuries, races have become so confused and mixed together?* Well, then, is it by sympathy of feeling, or by mental constitution, or by bodily form, that we are to define a nationality? *No,*

those things are merely good subjects for verses. Most true; they will not serve to turn the world upside down. But how, then, can we define a nationality, so that we may not be left in any doubt in applying so potent a principle? *By language.* You mean that all who speak the same language, and none who speak a different language, are to form one State? *Precisely.* Yet there are in every country many dialects; like the many shades of colour, which lead off insensibly from yellow to red, and from red to blue, and from blue to yellow; there are also many distinct languages which yet have so close an affinity, that it is evident they have all descended from one parent stock. How then shall we be able, in every case, to trace on the map where one language ends and another begins? If there should be any doubt, obscurity, or ambiguity on this point, how shall we ever avoid all those delicate and nice, but nasty and irritating questions of frontiers? Nationalities will be perpetually clamouring for *rectifications of frontiers* and *revindications of territory*. For us in England, such a definition would be truly disastrous; we should lose the greater part of the princedom of Wales, together with parts of the highlands of Scotland, and the best part of Ireland, to say nothing of the Channel Islands, and Malta, and all our dependencies. Germany would be separated from Poland and Gallicia, and from Hungary. Switzerland would be cut into three parts, each of which would be swallowed up by its big neighbour. Russia would have to disgorge her ill-gotten possessions—Finland, Lithuania, Circassia, and all Asia. France would

have to resign her Basque provinces, and Corsica, and even Normandy and Brittany. Belgium would be bisected. Prussia would come out best from this ordeal; so that it would seem that such a definition as that which you now propose must have been of German invention. The United States would not be badly off, as that country would annex Old England. Now I ask you, can you gravely assert that such a principle is true? If so, we must certainly carry it out everywhere without flinching; if not, then we must discard it altogether.

But why has no one explained to us, not only the grounds for regarding it as true, but also the necessity for regarding it at all? The world, for sixty centuries, has never even suspected the existence of such a principle. Such a principle did not preside at the formation of a single State in the world. The Assyrian Empire, the Medo-Persian Empire, the Chaldean Empire, the Greek Empire, the Roman Empire, the Kingdom of Charlemagne, the dominions of the House of Austria, the huge Spanish territories on which sun never set, all consisted of various "tongues, and tribes, and peoples, and languages." The only people in the world which was tenacious of nationality was the Hebrew nation.

How is it, moreover, that there should be such an outcry for nationalities, in these days, when men perorate so touchingly in favour of "universal fusion;" when they declare, with so much sentiment, that "all men are brothers," and conclude by asserting that "all mankind should form but one universal republic?" Why are we to have divisions and dis-

memberings, and, like the ancient Greeks, regard all men as barbarians who do not speak our tongue? Why are we to kill those who cannot pronounce shibboleth as we are wont to pronounce it? The Chinese are in advance of Europeans in this respect; for this has been their practice for six or seven thousand years.

No, it matters not how many nations and tribes, and tongues and peoples, form one State and are ruled by the same king; it matters not whether the king speaks the same language as his people, so long as the laws are wise, so long as justice is observed, and so long as religion bears sway. Goodness does not depend on language, and happiness is independent of nationality.

Non-intervention. What is non-intervention according to history? And what is non-intervention according to morality? According to history this is the account of it: One day a Government, composed of revolutionists, succeeded, by means of treachery, fraud, violence, and assassination, in urging a foreign people to revolt, and making them get rid of their rulers; that Revolutionary Government thus usurped the whole of the foreign territory. One who had secretly promoted this revolution, and was interested in the result, proclaimed the *principle of non-intervention*, and, being powerful, he procured its acceptance by all Europe. Non-intervention then came to mean: *That which has been robbed, has been honestly robbed; and the violence used in driving the legitimate rulers from their territories, has been justly employed; beware then of defending the unfortunate*

victims, or of asserting their rights; it is true that it is wrong in other men to rob, but not in me; it is true that I made semblance of protecting my victims, in order more securely to attain my end by treachery; but what of that? Beware then of intervening in their favour.

As to the morality of non-intervention, the question has already been answered. Further, we may remark that it was at least great arrogance in one sovereign to proclaim a "principle" which contained a menace to every other State, even if that principle were just and honest. For this would be the act of a superior. Yet sovereigns, whatever be the number of their legions, are equal among themselves. What would be said of a nobleman who, with drawn sword, swore to his brother peers that he would cut down any one who uttered an oath or told a lie? They would say—"Who made thee a ruler and a judge over us?" Yet to utter an oath, and to tell a lie are wrong acts; and to abstain from them would be right. What, then, would you say of him, if he stood by, revolver in hand, while his servants joined some bandits in robbing another peer and his family, and swore that he would instantly shoot any one who should presume to protect the unfortunate peer from robbers, or save his wife and daughter from violence? Would not such a man be justly called a bandit and an assassin? Would not any bystanders be justified in menacing that bandit and saying to him—We are free to take what part we deem right, and you may not prevent us nor offer us any obstruction? The same argument is true when applied to

States. Each State is free to take that course to which its duty points; and no State may constitute itself the judge over other States. Further, it is just and lawful for a State to defend a right. It is in most cases a duty to do so. It would, at the least, be uncharitable, if not unjust, to stand by and look on unconcernedly while a wrong is being done. On what principle could intervention in favour of the Duke of Modena, for example, have been wrong? A Prince most just, most benign, and one who maintained a rare fervency in religion, combined with wisdom and moderation in civil government. On what principle did nations stand by and see the assassination of a lady, against whom nothing could be alleged; and of a Grand Duke of Tuscany, who, although blameworthy for some of his acts towards the Church, yet ever towards his people evinced the greatest benevolence? On what principle did States calmly witness sacrilege, and robbery, and violence, directed against a learned and saintly old Pope—the centre of authority in the world? Moreover, these things were done by a Government already hardened with crimes—a Government which has brought heavy taxation and heavier misery into every country it has usurped.

Christian charity commands men and nations to come to the rescue of one another. If one man is attacked by murderers, or has fallen into difficulties without a fault of his own, every bystander is in duty bound to protect him, if he can do so without certain death to himself. A sailor was hung for witnessing the murder of a man on a heath near Portsmouth,

without intervening for his assistance. Of the necessity of that assistance, the person or State which is attacked is the proper judge; of the opportunity of rendering that assistance, the person or State which is asked to interfere is the only judge. For one sovereign, then, to proclaim the *principle of non-intervention* is to ignore those rules of morality which have, until this century, been known and practised as a duty by each individual towards his fellow, and by one State towards another. Mutual help is a fundamental duty of Christianity; and therefore non-intervention must be a principle belonging to Paganism.

If it is lawful for revolutionists throughout the world, whether they sit on thrones or sip in pot-houses, to combine in demolishing now one society and now another, and no one is to presume to offer them let or hindrance, then it will not be long before anarchy will be universal. If States may not help each other in their difficulties, the revolutionists of every country will combine and act as one man in overthrowing each Government in turn, and then indeed they will have brought about that new order of society and established that "universal republic" of which they now dream.

The accomplished fact. This again is an example of a term which is used as a maxim, the rest of the proposition having been suppressed. As error is more likely to lurk in an enthymeme than in a syllogism, because a premiss has been suppressed; so also a proposition which, by suppression, has been

reduced to a single term, is a most prolific source of fallacies. The whole proposition stands thus—*When a deed has been done, it must, simply because it is an accomplished fact, for ever remain unquestioned, and be regarded as lawful.* If we ask for a proof of this proposition, philosophers offer us, as the ground of it, what they call the *morality of success*, i.e., *that which has succeeded was therefore a moral act, for no immoral attempt can ever succeed.* Let us not ask for the proof of the latter proposition, for no proof will be given. Let us now proceed to consider this principle.

We will suppose that you, when on your travels, have been set upon by bandits and robbed of all your money and jewelry and other effects. The bandits are at large, but can easily be captured. On applying to the chief magistrate, you are told that the robbery is now an accomplished fact, and was, therefore, a legitimate proceeding, and you can have no redress. Presently you see the bandits bringing your goods into the town and openly selling them in the market-place. You proceed again to the mayor, and claim the goods as your property. He replies that they are not your property, and the seizure of it by the bandits, while it was in your possession, was not a robbery, for the deed would never have succeeded had it not been a just and moral act.

Or suppose that twenty thousand Turks set upon as many Christians and murder them, do you suppose that the nations of Europe would sit with their arms folded, and say, "The deed has been accomplished, and therefore it must have been right"?

If we grant such a proposition, it follows that, as long as the success of an enterprize is uncertain, the morality of it is also uncertain; but as soon as success has been attained, the deed instantly becomes just and right. It was on this principle that, when Garibaldi sailed with his pirates from Genoa to Messina, the Piedmontese, and English, and French Governments, who had been informed of his destination and intentions, gave orders to their cruisers to watch, but to take no part in the proceedings. As soon as it had been found that Victor Emmanuel's previous bribery, treachery, and underhand proceedings had secured success for the filibusters, then all the Governments cried out, *It is an accomplished fact*, and threw their caps in the air with delight. So Garibaldi's successes were recognized by every Government in Europe as soon as they had been done, and his robbery and sacrilege were declared right and just when they had been accomplished.[1]

[1] The writer of these pages may be excused for recalling the fact that he alone in England raised a public protest against Garibaldi while he was accomplishing his successes. On November 21, 1860, he addressed the following letter to the editor of the *Times;* and as it was very severely attacked by all the London and provincial press, he afterwards wrote a defence, entitled, *A few words on Garibaldi*, which was published by Ridgway, with the motto from Epictetus—*ταράσσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων δόγματα.*

"To the Editor of the Times.

"Sir,—A letter from 'X.,' in your impression of this day, has caused me some little surprise. He seems horrified at the intelligence that some of the funds intended for Garibaldi's assistance should have fallen into the hands of Mazzini. He seems to deem it a shocking thing to help Mazzini, but a virtuous action to supply Garibaldi. To

It was on the same principle that Lord Dalhousie's annexation of Oude was accepted by the British Government, as soon as it had been perpetrated. It was on this principle that we, even we English, regarded Hanover as a part of Prussia, as soon as the Prussians had surreptitiously entered the territory of their ally and taken it to themselves. Yet a material fact can never alter a moral right; and that which has to be done, whenever an evil had been already accomplished before we heard of it, is to see that as speedy and as full a reparation as possible should be made.

me the public morality of the one seems to differ little from that of the other. Of their private characters I know nothing. Their public acts have this difference—the one has been unfortunate, the other successful. But the public morality evinced by each of them is much on a par. It is, no doubt, a matter for rejoicing that the people of the Two Sicilies should have been freed from galling tyranny (if such they really suffered), but yet Garibaldi's conduct in freeing them does not seem the less immoral. Grant that he is a brave, and honest, and generous man. He then is worthy of admiration for these virtues, and perhaps for other good qualities also. But yet his public acts, I think, are not the less reprehensible. If a subject were to raise a rebellion against his lawful sovereign, would you, sir, defend his conduct, or argue that the doom of death was not his due? He might be rising against his king's oppressive rule; but still you would not applaud the rebel's acts. And if a man killed the despot who tyrannized over his country, would you not brand the regicide as a murderer, even while you congratulated the nation on being freed from tyranny? But is it not a hundred-fold worse for a man of another nation (be he Savoyard or Frenchman) to raise a rebellion in a friendly State, and shoot down the soldiers who observe their oath, and defend their lawful sovereign?

"If Napoleon were to publish a pamphlet to commiserate the Irish on the score that they are oppressed and that their religion is not respected, and were then to invade and conquer that country (which he would call 'freeing an oppressed nationality'), without having made any previous declaration of war, would you not condemn him in the

Yet it is true that if an injustice and wrong has been done, and has unfortunately been acquiesced in for so long a time that a multitude of rights have legitimately grown up on the part of persons innocent of the crime—rights which outweigh the old rights which would have to be restored if the old order of things were to be again inaugurated, then the persons of the old system, whose rights had been violated, may have to acquiesce in that violation; not because justice can change with time, but because circumstances have so far altered as to render a return to the old order of things impossible, without

most powerful of philippics? But would it not be far worse for a private individual — M'Mahon, for instance—to raise a rebellion in Ireland while France remained at peace with us? And if France supplied him with money, and arms, and ammunition, would you not lavish the most opprobrious epithets both upon the marauder and on the perfidious country which gave him countenance and assistance?

"Let us not excuse ourselves on the ground that Naples was oppressed while Ireland is free. This is merely a veil to blind our moral sense. We have read in the newspapers that Naples was oppressed. That is all we know about it. M'Mahon might have read in a certain pamphlet that Ireland is oppressed, and that the exercise of the religion of the Irish is restricted, and he may entertain an opinion that such is really the case. How would the objection then apply? But even if we were to grant the substance of this objection; yet if a man who did not suffer from the oppression which we allow to have existed—who was not connected with the country which he invaded, and whose sovereign and people were at peace with the State which he overturned—I say that the act of such a man is no better than the act of a filibuster, murderer, and cut-throat adventurer. By these terms he would have been designated, and people would have welcomed for him the fate which was adjudged to Walker for the same offence, had not success palliated his trespass and gilded his crime.

"I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

"ROBERT MONTAGU, M.P.

"November 21, 1860."

doing a greater injustice to innocent persons. This is more especially the case where the new order of things has provided those benefits which the old order of things also provided. It is in fact a choice of evils. In such a case if, in good faith, all is done that can be done to make reparation, it is said that prescription has rendered valid the new rights. This clearly is not applicable to "United Italy." There, many grievous acts of injustice were done; there all the people are now groaning under vastly increased and ever-increasing burdens of taxation, and under the oppressive tyranny of the new laws; there no new rights have grown up on the part of persons innocent of any of those crimes, for those only who partook in the crimes have shared the spoils; there no good faith has been shown, and no desire to make reparation has been evinced, but only crime upon crime in a never-ending chain of iniquities; there, above all, the injured persons have not acquiesced in the changes; and lastly, no grave injury to innocent persons would be occasioned by a return to the old order of things.

CHAPTER XII.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

THOSE who so lustily shout—"Death to Priests," "Death to Kings," "Death to Capitalists," also cry out against the infliction of a capital sentence on murderers, assassins, child-slayers, or rebels. Yet it is not a sin to be a priest, nor to be a king, nor to be wealthy; while it is a grievous sin to commit murder, or to kill an illegitimate child, or to rise in rebellion against a lawful ruler. Let us then examine this paradox, and the sophisms which have been invented on the subject.

Capital punishment is a legal assassination. The world was not made yesterday, and we must attribute some sense to our forefathers. If capital punishment was inflicted by them, we must assume, *a priori*, that they saw good grounds for doing so. If capital punishment is a legal assassination, then it is contrary to nature; and if it is contrary to nature, it should not under any circumstances or at any time, be inflicted; and it never could have been lawful. Yet no one, who believes the inspiration of the Bible, can admit this logical consequence from the maxim. Every one, who pretends to be a Christian, must admit that capital punishment was, at one time, lawful and right; for God commanded that certain

offences should be punished with death. As the logical deduction from the maxim is false, the maxim itself must be false, and deserves to have Q.E.A. written after it.

Even those who do not acknowledge the authority of God, and who admit only the authority of men, must come to the same conclusion. For, by the common consent of mankind, at all times and in all places, whether civilized or barbarian, whether under a king or under a democracy, capital punishment, for certain offences, has been regarded as lawful and just.

Even the philanthropists themselves deny their theory by their practice. They send out soldiers to shoot down banditti. They do not hesitate to declare war against an enemy. What are these acts but capital punishment inflicted on those that have injured you, and that, frequently, without any trial or judgment?

Capital punishment may be inflicted on a criminal for one of three reasons—(1) for the amendment of the criminal; (2) for the restoration of order; (3) for the defence of society.

1. Many a criminal will continue a course of crime as long as he lives. But, when he no longer has the opportunities for crime, when he knows that his life is drawing to a close, when the fear of God's judgment is upon him, then he is weaned from an inordinate love of earthly things, and begins to set his heart upon a treasure in another life.

2. The necessity of capital punishment to restore moral order by expiation, is evident. Justice requires

that the punishment or expiation should be equal to the crime. I am not speaking of a material equality, or of a resemblance of circumstances—which was the *lex talionis* ("an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth")—but I say that the penalty must be an adequate compensation for the violation of justice.

3. The defence of society also frequently requires the death of a malefactor. It consists of two parts—(*a*) amends to society for the injury; (*b*) securing society against the fear of a recurrence of the injury. Some persons are so hardened in guilt, that there are no limits to the horrors they may invent, and the crimes they will commit. With them the extremest measures are necessary; for nothing else will stop their infamous career. Nothing less than fear of death will, moreover, deter other evil disposed persons from following the criminal example—an example and excitement which is attractive enough for wicked persons, if they think that, even if captured, they will escape with comparative immunity.

But would not perpetual imprisonment serve the purpose as well? While there is life there is hope. The criminal may some day contrive his escape. Bribes may open the prison doors. An emeute may cause a general gaol delivery. The hardened criminal may somehow regain his liberty. As he has not ceased to hope, he has spent his time in prison, not in repentance and resolutions to amend, but in planning new robberies and murders on a grander scale; and when he has effected his escape, he

repays society ten-fold for his sufferings and imprisonment. It is better to kill one assassin now, than let him murder twenty innocent persons a few years hence. Capital punishment is not only a social necessity; but it is also an incentive to repentance which is not found in a life-long imprisonment.

The conscience of every one will testify to the justice of capital punishment. Read of some brutal act—such as Miss Edmunds poisoning sugar-plums and giving them to children in Brighton, in order to revenge herself on a confectioner; or such as a son murdering his aged father, or a husband killing his wife, or Palmer of Rugeley poisoning his guests, or Dr. Smethurst poisoning his patient—and see whether you are not at once filled with a righteous indignation against the criminal; see whether you do not desire that he may have to make expiation for his crime, so that all society may be saved from the horror of his memory and the terror of his presence.

But surely if you feel compassion for the criminal, you must desire his escape? Compassion is of many kinds. Some feel an interest in the robber (from an association, perhaps, with Walter Scott's Rob Roy); some pity the robbed; some regard the criminal as the hero of a romance; some, by an act of imagination, raise in themselves the feelings of the innocent victim when he was about to receive the mortal stroke. Compassion with a criminal may arise from similarity of interests, or of profession; from conformity of thought; or from a fear lest we may,

some day, be in the position of the accused. Should such feelings be allowed to outweigh the motives for inflicting capital punishment?

No man may take from another the life he can never give back. Certainly no man may murder another; nor may he fight in an unjust war. That is the reason why we punish homicides and murderers. But is capital punishment the same thing as "one man killing another"? No; it is justice, it is the law, it is the legitimate authority which kills the murderer. Every power is of God; and the king is the minister or mandatory of God; so that it is God Who kills, by the hand of His agent: "non sine causâ gladium portat." Certainly those who do not see the king to be one who is acting in God's stead—certainly those who hold the absurd theory of the sovereignty of the people and the delegation of the people's authority to the king—they truly cannot kill without committing an act of murder; and those of them who shrink from murder, cannot see capital punishment to be right. Yet those very men may hang untried persons on the next *lanterne*—their haste to kill is so great; or they may send suspected persons, in droves, to the guillotine; or, morning and evening, they may turn five hundred men, taken at hazard in the streets, into a barrack yard, and shoot them down with a mitrailleuse.

Life that you cannot give back. Why were these words tacked on at the end of the maxim? Do you mean to assert that you may never take from another that which you cannot give back? This you frequently do, and no one blames you. What

have you to consider before taking a thing from another? Not whether you can give it back; but whether you have a right to take it. The intention to restore a thing does not make it lawful for you to take it; nor does the impossibility of restoring it make it wrong.

CHAPTER XIII.

LIBERAL CATHOLICS.

THE CHURCH has now existed nearly nineteen centuries. Surely it is not necessary at this time to give a new name to the true followers of Jesus Christ! Until now they have been called Catholics, which has always meant that they belonged to the One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church. This one term, Catholic, distinguished them from all the sects of heresy. They were known by this term throughout the world. Yet within the last few years a set of persons have arisen who are discontented with the name of Catholic, and call themselves *Liberal Catholics.* To explain in what they differ from Catholics, they have taken this motto as their device: *Catholic with the Pope, but Liberal with the Government.* This motto reads very like: "Running with the hare, and hunting with the hounds." Having examined all the other kinds of liberty, let us now consider this one.

The Church, who abhors every novelty, can hardly approve of this new-fangled epithet, especially as it suggests a new love and a new moral tendency. If the object of this love, and the aim of this tendency are reasonable and good, then it is superfluous to attribute it to Catholics, as they are

bound, in virtue of their profession as followers of Christ, to aim at all that is good. We would never, for example, divide Catholics into just Catholics and unjust Catholics, honest Catholics and dishonest Catholics, truthful Catholics and lying Catholics, self-denying Catholics and luxurious Catholics, and so forth. So, also, we refuse to distinguish certain Catholics from others by calling them Liberal Catholics—if it is a virtue to be liberal. For whatsoever is good and virtuous is comprised in the term Catholic; and in so far as a person has a defect of character, he is so much the less a Catholic. On the other hand, if the object of this new love, and if this tendency are bad, then it is an insult to the Catholic Church to add it to the name of Catholic. Thirdly: if the object be indifferent, that is to say, if it may be neither good or bad to be liberal, then I ask, Of what use is it for you to attribute this term to a species of Catholics? Why attempt to distinguish by a *differentia* of an indeterminate character, which cannot be a distinguishing mark?

If we turn to the motto, we are left as much as ever in the dark; for to be *Catholic with the Pope* and to be *Liberal with the Government*, are contradictory characters; they cannot coexist in the same subject. If Papal Catholicism is the truth, its contradictory must be false. He that is Catholic with the Pope, holds, with the Pope, those principles which should inform Governments and regulate civil constitutions—such as truth, justice, charity, order, &c. He who professes with a Government, any right, just, true, charitable, and wholesome principles, professes

them together with the Pope. The second member of the motto, which purports to exclude a portion of the former member (*but*, &c.) is, therefore, false. If this second member means that which the words seem to denote, it makes a profession of Liberalism which the Pope cannot hold, and which is therefore inconsistent with Catholicism.

Some Liberal Catholics endeavour to build, on the true foundation of the Church, all the false theories of Liberalism; which, as the Holy Father said, is like mingling light with darkness. Others call themselves Liberal Catholics because they have fallen in love with some one Liberal crotchet, accepting the rest of Liberalism for the sake of it; for example, they put their faith in liberty of the Press, representative government, ministerial responsibility, or the like. Others, again, start from the opposite side, and are Liberal Catholics because they say that it is a mistake to protect and foster religion; because religion will flourish much better if left alone. Others, again, say that the world has entered a new phase, and is beginning to run a new course; and that the Church must put Herself at the head of the people, if she does not want to be left behind and forgotten altogether. All these grounds betray not only an ignorance or oblivion of what is vital to religion, and of the principles which Christianity requires in Governments and Constitutions; but also a most false and pernicious opinion; namely, that religion has to do only with the private lives of men—that religion must keep inside the church—that religion is meant for Sundays alone. It appears,

then, that a Liberal Catholic is a compound of true and false principles—a heterogenous mass of repugnant elements.

The Catholic Church does not demand any one form of civil government. She has lived with the Venetian aristocracy, with the Swiss democracy, with the mixed aristocracy and democracy of Genoa, with the British Constitution, and with many absolute monarchies. But She has always demanded that justice, piety, truthfulness, love towards the people, the maintenance and advancement of religion, and so forth, should be preserved in the policy of Governments and in the forms of Constitutions. In bygone days there were no Liberal Catholics. In these days there is not a single Government in Europe which is not hostile to the Catholic Church, and which has not rejected the principles of the Christian Faith and morality. All the Governments of Europe in these days act on the principles of Liberalism; and these are "Liberal Catholics." Is it not a matter of marvel that any one should imagine himself to be a Catholic, while he is *Liberal with the Government?*

All modern Constitutions have been founded on a theory which is contrary to nature. Liberal Constitutions are all based on a separation of the three great powers which are indispensable to all social authority—the legislative, the judicial, and the executive powers. It is necessary that there should be some authority: otherwise there is anarchy. Yet authority is, in these days, regarded as essentially maleficent and hostile to the people. It has there-

fore been cut up into three parts, which are balanced against each other; it is subjected to all the "checks" which ingenuity has been able to invent. Yet such a conception of authority is an insult to humanity, to society, and to nature. The true idea of authority is directly opposed to it. Authority is the principle of order, the centre of unity, that in which (so to speak) God is personified for the good of society. If this idea of authority is contradicted, counterbalanced, or checked, in the constitution of a country, then the Government is founded on a basis which is opposed to reason, to nature, and to the Christian Faith.

Again: "Every power is of God." It is no matter how the power has come into the hands of the ruler; it is always the delegation of God's authority. Yet modern Constitutions radically destroy this principle; for they treat the ruler as one who has not really any authority. That authority which he exercises is regarded as having emanated from the people, and belonging inalienably to the people; so that it may be taken from him at any moment, if he should fail to exercise it in accordance with the wishes of the people. A modern constitutional king is a mandatory of the people. A king according to the Christian Faith is a mandatory of God. How can these two principles be reconciled? The one is of the earth, earthy; the other is from above. Modern Constitutions have therefore put themselves into direct antagonism to the Catholic religion.

Again: If the people is sovereign, it must have the attributes of sovereignty. The most important

of these is the legislative power. As all the nation cannot assemble to exercise this power, the nation elects representatives, who are to function that sovereignty. Even these representatives, according to the theory, are of course not to act as they judge best; for the people has the sovereignty inalienably. The representatives are delegated or deputed to exercise the sovereignty of the sovereign people. They have, therefore, merely to carry out the will of the people who appointed them. It has always been held the most difficult task of a monarch to choose out the persons who are the most fit to govern, by reason of their wisdom, their knowledge of affairs, their prudence, their honesty of purpose, and so forth. Yet, according to modern Constitutions, the ignorant among the people, being the most numerous class, have, after having been misled by falsehoods, perverted by bribes, fuddled with spirits, and bemuddled by beer, to choose persons from among candidates whom they have not seen before, and whom they have no means of knowing, who are to exercise the sovereignty of the people. The elected members are therefore not likely to be the wisest men. Nor is it to be expected that they should be the most able to legislate, even if the sovereignty were to be inalienably vested in them, so that they should become free from all influence on the part of their beery constituents. Such men, if they are to be always dragged down, by the expression of the wishes or commands of their debased and ignorant electors, from any little eminence of virtue or knowledge which they may have reached, cannot but be the cause of many direful

evils to their country. The members know that a knowledge of the subjects on which they may be called upon to legislate, and a course of conduct which will be pleasing to their constituents, are two incompatible things. They save themselves, therefore, from the painful dilemma, by carefully remaining in ignorance and voting blindly. If a Gladstone, with exuberant energy and scrupulous honesty, must study and try to grasp every subject which is likely to come before him, he must make up his mind to be kicked out of the representation of Oxford University to find refuge in South Lancashire. After stumping it in Lancashire and exhibiting his vast stores of knowledge and eloquence, he must be turned out, and fly to Greenwich. The electors of Greenwich, again, consider themselves to be a sovereign populace, and presume to judge their great member, and place him at the bottom of the poll. But every member is not a Gladstone. The others are pleasing to their sovereign electors. The world hateth not its own; and constituents are well pleased with those members who are not above their own level and are content to serve them. These things being so, how can the legislation of a representative assembly be wise or prudent? In the course of a few years, thousands of laws, various, silly, contradictory, are passed to bring Cardwellian confusion in the army; to introduce a low, mean, niggardly confusion in finance; to foster a godless confusion in the education of the people; to encourage meddling abroad and muddling at home, and to excuse a "plundering and blundering" everywhere. Every honest man, in every country, now

sighs out a new prayer to his litany—"From a Legislative Chamber, good Lord deliver us."

When the Legislative Chamber has been elected, it proceeds to make a further election from its own body. The Crown is said to appoint Ministers. But, in practice, the Crown may choose only those whom the House of Commons has already tacitly designated. So again, when a Ministry is outvoted, it is assumed that the sovereign people is tired of them, and the Crown is compelled to select a Ministry from the men who sit on the Opposition benches, and who are the more pleasing to the House of Commons—the more pleasing, whether from excellence of cook and frequency of dinner-parties, or from the character of the cellar, or from amatory "successes" in society, or from glibness of tongue—"railing smoothly and reasoning wrong." Yet it does not follow that, if Gladstone's policy is mistrusted, Disraeli must be loved; nor yet does it follow that, if Ayrton is disliked, Hardy should be respected.

There is a proverb that a barrel cannot yield better wine than it has inside. If the Legislative Chamber is irreligious, corrupt, ignorant, and inept, so must the Ministry be. But if the Crown were left to itself, and to the advice of its Council, it would show that it is its interest to pick out, for each office, the most learned, the wisest, the most fit to exercise its functions—men who, by early education, by long practice in the office under a good master, and by a ripe experience in each grade, are intimately conversant with every detail. We should then be no longer, in the matter of foreign affairs, like children

in the hands of foreign Ministers; nor, in home affairs, at the mercy of every country attorney. If the Crown were left to itself and to the advice of its Council, it would soon show that it knows it to be its interest to frame the best, the wisest, the most sensible laws for the country. But then this would be in accordance with ancient Catholic principles; and therefore the nineteenth century rejects it.

Representatives and Ministers, according to the theory of the nineteenth century, are merely mandatories of the people. As the people are changeable, *mobile vulgus*—whence "mob"—it is to be expected that, as soon as one unfortunate official out of a score has studied and learned his business, and begun to shake off the leading-strings of his chief clerk, he should be turned out in order to make way for another, who is utterly ignorant of the subject. When the whole Ministry are turned out, then all the new Ministers have to be led and tutored by their chief clerks, and the clerks enjoy their tranquil reign. After all, a "change of Government" is a very cheap and comparatively harmless way of gratifying the sovereign people's passion for revolution. There is certainly a little mischief in the result; viz.: the whole new Ministry being ignorant of its business, while the outgoing Ministry, which has begun to know the subjects with which it had to deal, now sit in Opposition, and bother the new Ministers' lives out, and force them to tell numberless lies in order to conceal their ignorance. The absurdity is, that it is only the talkers in the legislative assemblies that are changed. The first clerks, the bureaucrats, who are

the real Government, are not changed. It has been said in the House, that the country was being crucified between two thieves. I say now that the country is like a wild elephant between two tame ones—Gladstone and Disraeli.

As the sovereignty is in the people, in the people must be the prerogative of justice. For where the whole is, there must be all the parts. This is what is meant by the saying that law or right is only the will of the people. The modern jury is, in this department, a parallel to the House of Commons. Hodge and Stodge, Starveling the tailor, and Snout the joiner, and Bottom the weaver, and a few stupid tinkers and greasy porkbutchers are called upon to sift contradictory evidence, to divine motives, and to determine subtle points of law. It is a common saying that as no judge can stand a live duke; so every jury gives its finding against a gentleman. In such a state of things, every citizen should clearly be either a duke or a blackguard. That is the effect of modern legislation! The country is becoming a congeries of peers and blackguards. The modern jury is an offshoot of the principle of Parliamentary Government, and is the true way to procure a Government without justice. If, on the other hand, the representative of the Crown were not to share his responsibility with a jury, his judgments would be much more just. Love of his fair fame and good name would then make him scrupulous.

The third part of sovereignty is the executive power. If the sovereignty is in the people, this also must be in the people. If authority is essentially

maleficent, of course the executive power should not be left in the hands of the central authority. Or if the Crown is to retain the army, then we must come as near as possible to a "Parliamentary army." The people must have their "Guarde Nationale" (a powerful arm in achieving revolutions). In England this body is called the Volunteers. The principle of this part of the theory is simply a Government without the power of execution.

So, then, Parliamentary Government, or rather the principle of the sovereignty of the people, has brought us to this: the attributions of sovereignty, the legislative, judicial, and executive powers, are regarded as separate things, and are severally corrupted and debased by being brought down to earth. If the people is sovereign, if it possesses an inalienable sovereignty, you cannot escape from the consequences by saying that it has committed the function of legislation to its representatives. For every sovereign has a right to supervise, to judge, to correct, and to command its agents. The people assert this right, by requiring members of Parliament, at stated times, to render an account of their stewardship. If the people is sovereign, the judicial power must reside in a Parliament of twelve men (which is not the ancient jury). If the people is sovereign, the executive power must be handed over to a Parliamentary army.

All this imbroglio follows directly from denying the social reign of Jesus Christ — from saying: "Nolumus hunc regnare super nos." The social action of Christ's reign first shows itself in conse-

crating authority, and securing a ready obedience of subjects; whence tranquillity, peace, and order result. Regard a ruler as a mandatory of the people, and his officials are subordinate agents, who are all responsible to the people for carrying out the will of the people, and the whole complexion of the State and of society is changed. What obligation to obedience any longer exists? Legislation ceases to be the declaration, and the application to varying circumstances, of the eternal laws of God. The laws themselves cease to have any foundation, except in the arbitrary will of a majority of the people. Schools, and colleges, and universities become no longer places where truth is taught, and errors are guarded against. For, when Christ's social reign on earth is denied, the Teacher of truth, by whom we attain certainty, and who is Christ's Vicegerent on earth, is denied; and when the Teacher of truth is denied, nothing is left but the uncertain and fluctuating opinions of men. The social action of the reign of Christ is also shown by the unity, the holiness, the publicity, the universality of worship. Deny the reign of Christ on earth, and religions multiply in ever-increasing hypodichotomy of schisms and of warring sects, until there come to be as many religions as there are men. For religion is then no longer Faith, but only opinion. Men do not believe; they possess religious opinions. The centre of unity being denied, the unity of the world is destroyed.

The formula: *Catholic with the Pope, but Liberal with the Government,* has for its basis the infidel

doctrine of the separation of Church and State, condemned by the fifty-fifth proposition of the Syllabus. This doctrine amounts to a denial of the social reign of Christ, in that it tends first to separate the State from the action of Christ in His Church, and then to put the State above the Church; as if the State were the omnipotent ruler of all things, the teacher of truth, the fountain of right, the source of law, and the interpreter of the Faith. A limit to the rights of princes and rulers is declared in proposition sixty-seven, and the liberty of worships is condemned in the seventy-seventh; the freedom of the Press is censured in the seventy-ninth; civil marriage is reprobated in propositions sixty-five to seventy-four; secular usurpations of education are proscribed in propositions forty-five to forty-eight; and oppression of the clergy is denounced in proposition forty-nine and the following. Finally all the principles of Liberalism, of progress, and of modern civilization are declared, in proposition eighty, to be irreconcileable with the Catholicism of the Pope. How then can Catholics have the hardihood to profess themselves to be Liberal, while they flatter themselves they are Catholic? Or do they imagine that Catholicism is a vain and empty word which is without meaning, which can be repugnant to nothing, and which can change with the times? No; Catholicism means those principles which Christ taught, which the Church has proclaimed, which the saints have professed, which the Popes and Councils have defined, and which the doctors of the Church have defended. He who receives all these principles,

in their fulness, is a Catholic; he that denies one of them, or hesitates to receive one of them, is not a Catholic. He claims to exercise the right of private judgment in regard to the Faith, and therefore he is a Protestant—he is a heretic.

CHAPTER XIV.

CIVIL MARRIAGE.

CIVIL MARRIAGE is one of the greatest evils which has been bequeathed to us by the year 1789; for it has infected the domestic sanctuary of society. *But is not marriage merely a contract? Should it not, then, be put under regulations by the State, like any other contract?* It is not a contract like any other contract; it differs both in the natural order and in the supernatural; and even if it were a contract, it would not follow that the State has any right to regulate it.

Marriage is a contract. It is a natural contract; because it is directed to an end which is desired by nature, and immediately connected with nature. It is a civil contract; because made by man in civil society, and ordered for his civil well-being, and producing many civil effects. Yet it has very essential differences from other contracts. Other contracts, being submitted to the free will of men, receive infinite variations and limitations as to time, use, end, scope, obligations, &c. Marriage is determined irrevocably by nature as to end, means, duties, and rights. In entering into other contracts, a man may be bound by an ancestor, an agent, or a proxy. In marriage his consent must be personal. The

objects of other contracts are external and material. The objects of marriage are human individuals. Moreover, marriage being entirely domestic, and belonging essentially to the family, escapes from State control. It begins in the family; it produces its effects in the family; and it ends in the family; both the parties to the contract belong to families, and, by marrying, they become detached from their respective families, in order by their union, to constitute a new family. Now, the family is before the State by priority in time, and by essential priority. The family existed first; and the family is the species, while the State is the genus. The State grew out of the family; and families are the units or elements out of which the State is composed. The laws of property, the laws of master and servant, and the laws of education, the conjugal laws, and economic laws (as Aristotle has shown) are merely laws of the family. These are the bases of all the laws of the State. The State, therefore, cannot destroy the family without destroying itself.

Matrimony belongs not only to the family, but also to the individual. As Aristotle observed, the woman is the complement of the man. The man alone is not sufficient for himself; nor is the woman sufficient of herself. For God distributed the habits of the intellect, of the affections, and of the body, between the two sexes, so that what is wanting in the one is compensated in the other; and it is only by union that a perfect equilibrium and whole is formed. The man is able to conceive vast ideas,

and to treat the external relations of the family; he is incapable of descending to the minute details of domestic affairs. The woman can manage domestic affairs and rule the house, but has little capacity to conceive great principles. The man is inclined to sternness and violence; the woman is mild, and gentle, and amiable, and a centre of attraction at the family hearth. The man is robust and loves risk; the woman is timid and calculating. It is only in the union of these two temperaments, that the excesses compensate the defects, and a harmonious and perfect whole is formed. Who, then, will assert that a contract, whose end is the perfecting of the human personality, is of the same nature as a contract for the purchase or sale of a horse? Even in the natural order of things, therefore, marriage is not a contract like any other contract.

If marriage is regarded in the light of the Faith, the dissimilarity is seen to be a hundred times greater. The Council of Trent defined marriage to be a sacrament. A contract, therefore, which has been raised to that height is not on a level with other contracts. What is required to constitute a sacrament? The materia, the form, and the intention (of the last I need not speak at present). In Baptism, for example, the water is the materia, and the words, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," constitute the form. In Extreme Unction the oil is the materia; and the words that are spoken constitute the form. So in the Sacrament of Marriage, the

bodies of the contracting parties are the materia; the words by which each of them gives himself to the other, or establishes the right of the other over himself, are the form. No cavil as to this is possible, for it is Catholic doctrine. It is plain, then, that those things which are the essence of the natural and the civil contract, are the very constituents of the sacrament. If this be so, how among Christians, can such a contract belong to any but the Church? Has any one ever had the hardihood to pretend that the civil authority can properly administer the sacraments? How, then, can it belong to a civil tribunal to judge of matrimonial causes? Is not the jurisdiction of the Church, without any doubt, the defining or determination of all that is supernatural? Suppose that some doubt arose as to the validity of a baptism which had been conferred on a child; would you have recourse to a civil magistrate for a solution of the doubt? If you did not feel sure concerning the absolution which you had received on a particular occasion, would you apply to the Home Secretary or to the President of the Local Government Board? If you were to apply to them, they would tell you in unmistakeable terms, that supernatural affairs are no business of theirs. That would be quite true. We are treating of affairs known only by revelation. But the deposit of revelation was confided to the Church alone. The Church alone has, therefore, any competent authority concerning the sacraments, and the Church alone can decide any doubts concerning the Sacrament of Marriage.

Do you deny that it is a sacrament? The Apostle Paul not only asserts that it is a sacrament, but calls it a great sacrament, full of profound mysteries, and prolific of the greatest effects. It not only unites two hearts and souls, but raises their love to heaven, and sanctifies it, and renders it the living expression of the love, and a participation in the love with which the only-begotten Son of God loves Her whom, by His Blood, He made His Spouse. Marriage is raised into being a sign and effective instrument of grace which sanctifies the soul and strengthens the inner powers to the performance of virtuous and meritorious acts. Its end and scope is not only the propagation of the human race upon the earth, but also the multiplying of the sons of God in the Church. The man and wife are not only partners in a human contract, but also the dispensers of a divine mystery. They are two holy ministers of a heavenly sacrament. It is a burden, not as a Pagan marriage is a burden, but as the wings of a bird, which certainly have their weight, but yet serve to raise the body heavenwards.

Do you urge that the State may, nevertheless, judge of the human and natural part of the contract of marriage? That would be like the notion that a linen-merchant must be a good judge of pictures, because that a picture is painted upon canvas; or that a chemist may determine doubts as to Baptism, or Confirmation, or Extreme Unction, as he is able to analyze the water, the chrism, or the oil that is used; or that a paper-maker must be a good critic and judge of poetry, as he can determine the value

of the paper on which the poetry is printed. This would be folly; but to regard marriage as within the competence of the State is worse than folly. I do not here insist on the insult offered to Jesus Christ and His Church, by pretending to impose human regulations on them. I speak of the injury which would thereby be done to the State itself. Love is a very strong passion; and if it is not sanctified, it will speedily drag men downwards into crime. If you declare to be lawful, according to the laws of the State, a union which the Church declares to be unlawful and unholy, then the populace will assuredly begin by siding with you, but will soon surpass you, and clamour for an alteration in the laws, so that indiscriminate concubinage may also become lawful. If legality depends on the will of the State alone, what is to prevent a majority from insisting on a greater scope and license? Nay, what will deter them, the sovereign people, from allowing themselves that license in despite of your laws? The most fervent passions are also the most passing. The love which this year drives men to overleap all bounds of right, of decency, and of shame, will have died out before next year, and another impetuous torrent of love will have taken its place. A law of civil marriage is but the first step to a community of wives and indiscriminate concubinage. In one diocese of France, as the old bishop averred with tears in his eyes, there were two thousand concubinages within a few years after the publication of a law of civil marriage. Aye; it is this which makes so many persons support

the measure. For the seducer and seduced know, thereby, their shame before men may be cleared away. They may each go though a form of civil marriage with other persons, and receive honour of men. But in God's sight their marriage has taken place before, without the grace of marriage. Therefore, their respective families receive in their circle, without their knowing it, not a married couple, but a meretricious sister and a man who is an adulterer.

CHAPTER XV.

SECULARIZATION OF EDUCATION.

THE secularization of education has a special place assigned to it among the principles of '89. The maxims which have been invented to lead up to this principle are as follows: *It belongs essentially to the State to form its youth;* or, *Teaching is essentially an office of the State. Priests do not understand education, seeing that they are not accustomed to family life, nor to the society for which children are destined; least of all do the religious orders understand education;* and so forth.

1. *It belongs essentially to the State to form its youth;* or, *Teaching is essentially an office of the State.* Is this true? No; the Author of nature could not have been so improvident. He could not have designed children to be pauper orphans —with neither father nor mother to rear and teach them, and only the State to care for them. He would not have confided them to hands that are venal and full of other affairs, and to hearts that are not set on the children's welfare. God raised fathers and mothers to the sublime dignity of giving a natural existence to their children. So has He intrusted to them the further honour of giving them a second being, by means of moral formation. God's

providence has been shown in thus constituting the nature of things. For who else can have as much interest in the children as the father and mother, who love them as themselves, and who feel that they will live in their children, after they have themselves descended to their graves. No other educators could give such guarantees of fidelity. The above maxim, therefore, even if it were true, would be most imprudent. It is not only imprudent; it is also a denial of the sacred right of paternity. No one may compel the father to educate his child in a way that he does not like. It is a tyranny and oppression to forbid the father to choose the master who is to teach his child, or the subjects which the child is to learn.

In the formation of a child's mind, instruction is the least important part. Instruction denotes the implanting of ideas adapted to the child's age; but education of the spirit is the development, in the mind, of moral and religious principles. This, therefore, is the most important part of education. It has to be prosecuted with the greatest energy and care; for it is of greater importance to become an honest man than a learned man; it is of more value to become virtuous than well instructed.

Then let the father and mother form the children while they are quite young; and afterwards let the State undertake the task. Did our Lord designate secular rulers as the proper teachers? No; it was to the Apostles, whom He had ordained, that He said, "Go and teach all nations—teaching them to observe all that I have told you." In other words,

the moral and religious education of youth and maturer age was committed to the ordained priests of His Church. This is the most difficult and the most important part of education; the rest is subsidiary. We find, therefore, that in the early ages of the Church, and thence down to the last three hundred years, the supervision of education was treated as a special function of the clergy; and no secular Governments ever presumed to meddle in education, more than they did in any other private and domestic concern. In these days, on the contrary, Governments thrust themselves into every house and family, prying into everything, and resorting to State compulsion in regard to domestic concerns. This they do in the name of liberty! But why should I be compelled to deliver my child to a person of whom I disapprove, in order that it may receive a godless education which I abhor? If the Government has a right to insist upon meddling with the education of your children, why may it not also take upon itself the administration of all your property? The latter would be a usurpation of one of your rights as the father of a family; but the former is an arrogant assumption of a far graver right. The Government has merely those rights which are required by the end of Government —which is the temporal well-being of society; but it has not the right to meddle with the family, nor with religion. If it oppresses and destroys the family, by usurping one right after another, it injures society; for the domestic society is the element of civil society. It thereby enters, moreover, on a class

of operations for which it is utterly unfitted, and in which it can be no judge. The State cannot form a good citizen; it cannot teach morals; it cannot inculcate religion. Nor has God ever invested the State with a mission to do so; He never constituted the State to be a teacher. Paganism arrogated to itself the exercise of this function, and Cæsar was its High Priest or Pontifex Maximus. For a modern State to do the like, is worse than Paganism; for the Pagans did not exclude those who had a divine mission, and who performed it as a duty. Modern States arrogate to themselves the exercise of this function, and at the same time exclude those whom God has appointed to do it.

The younger the children are, the more does their education consist in the formation of character by moral and religious principles, and the less secular instruction can they receive. Therefore it is clear, without further argument, that while children are young, the supervision of their education should not be taken out of the hands of the authorized teachers of morals and religion. This cannot be denied, without either denying that religion and morality are the most necessary part of education in a child's tender age; or else controverting the truth that Jesus Christ did constitute the clergy to be the teachers of morals and religion. The former position even Pagans did not deny, and Quinctillian unreservedly asserts. The latter even Protestants affirm.

But the only intention is to promote education. If the parent's rights are not to be interfered with, if

the father is to be at full liberty to send his children to any school he prefers, and to have them taught what he likes ; if denominational schools are to be maintained at the public expense, and to be in every respect on an equality with Board schools, so that every parent shall have a full and free opportunity of choosing his school, then the danger and damage (although such there would still be), would not be so great. There would still be danger and damage ; for there would be a danger lest children should be seduced into going to secular schools, by escaping the religious lessons, or by a remittance of a school fee. The damage done to them, then, in receiving no religious education, would be enormous. You would, moreover, not be promoting education, but only furthering secular instruction. What would you say of a Government who thrust itself into your house, and took from your table all the meat and all the condiments, and left you nothing but a dry and hard crust of bread to gnaw, alleging all the while that it did so in order to promote your dinner ?

But we allow half an hour at the beginning, and another at the end of every school meeting, to be set apart for teaching religion! In the first place, I reply, this is the case only in some schools ; but not in all. Secondly, it is the schoolmaster, even in those denominational schools, who is to give the religious lesson. Yet those to whom Christ confided the deposit of religious teaching, are those who should both teach religion and also determine the times and manner of teaching it. Thirdly, the first half-

hour is a time during which there is the confusion and noise and shuffling of the children arriving at school; and the last half-hour is the period when they are all tired out. Now, I ask any honest man whether he thinks that those who were in earnest about religion would have made such regulations as these? I ask him whether he thinks it possible that, by such means, the principles of religion will be effectively implanted, and a love of religion permanently engendered? I ask him whether he thinks that you will ever thus form honest citizens, who shall be capable of conducting themselves well, and of keeping themselves pure amid the temptations of life? Or do you imagine that moral and religious principles are so common in the world, and so sure to be implanted in the mind by the accidents of daily life, that you need to take little trouble about them? Facts prove the contrary. Youths do not usually evince a love of justice, and a hatred of wrong doing. They do not feel a fervour in the exercises of religion, nor a pleasure in the practices of Christian charity. They are not proof against the seductions of error, nor strong against the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil.

But the State has a right to form all those who are about to enter into the public service. There is some truth and some falsehood in this objection. The State has a right to debar those from acting as doctors who have not a competent medical knowledge, and to deter those from practising as surgeons who are not sufficiently versed in the construction of the human body. It may

prevent those from accepting briefs, or from carrying on the business of attorneys, who are not learned in the law. It may keep out of public offices and employments all who are destitute either of the knowledge or the abilities to perform the duties of the office. These rights of the State are founded on the duty of the State to take care that no one, for his selfish profit, should injure another person, whether by endangering his life or his health through defect of medical or surgical knowledge; or by putting his property in jeopardy through a want of legal knowledge; or by misdirecting the acts of public offices, and thus injuring the public, through ignorance, passion, or stupidity. But this does not warrant the Government in invading the rights of others, by forcing on them a secular education, or by deterring them from receiving moral and religious education; or by subtracting them from the healthy influences of the Church. If the State takes upon itself to teach, without the supervision of the Church, either philosophy, or history, or public law, or ethics, it may implant false principles, and teach fundamental errors. For this reason it was that, for centuries, and indeed until lately, schools, and colleges, and universities were placed under the bishops and clergy, in order that false principles should not be instilled, and that sophisms should not be propagated.

But ecclesiastics are a caste that know neither the family nor yet society; how, then, can they prepare for the family or for society, those whom they teach? These words cover much ignorance and a vast

amount of malice. "A caste!" A caste is a class of men who perpetuate themselves by natural generation, and who belong only to a certain defined condition of society. But ecclesiastics, on the contrary, are constituted by free will alone, and belong to every grade and condition in society. Hence the idea of caste is contradictory to that of an ecclesiastic.

Even if ecclesiastics had not a practical knowledge of certain necessities and infirmities of society, would that render them ill-adapted for the teaching of youth? Should no one teach medicine who had not experienced every disease and swallowed every drug? The doctor may know diseases without practical experience of them; and the ecclesiastic may know society without having experienced its wants, and practised its foibles. As a matter of fact, ecclesiastics know society far better than laymen. Ecclesiastics stand apart, and see everything from a just point of view, because they are not whirled round in the vortex. "Lookers on see most of the game." Those who are engaged in the pleasures of society, cannot see things except under the colour of their passions. Ecclesiastics can truly know society, because they have true principles whereby to judge it. Religious habits render clear the principles of order, of justice, and of morality, and enable men to estimate things according to their true value, and to give them their real importance. Men of the world, on the other hand, are apt to regard evil as good and good as evil, and thus they are sure to misestimate and misjudge the facts of society.

The only principle on which the clergy can be excluded from education is, the exclusion of religion from education. This is indeed a fundamental maxim with some persons, that *Education should be entirely secular.* Has such a system been found beneficial where it has been practised? Let those families answer who have become desolate, from their young men and women growing up without principle. Let those answer who are now waiting in idleness and self-indulgence for the time when they may overturn society by fire and the sword. Let those Governments answer, who have to maintain armies that burden the people sorely for their support, and to enroll police in number out of due proportion with the populace. Let the half-smothered, half-confessed terror of Europe answer—Europe, which has sown the wind, and is daily expecting the whirlwind.

If what we have said of education by secular priests is true, how much more is it true of the regular orders. I do not urge merely the judgments of the Church, who has consecrated many of them to the duty of education. I remark, also, that a body which has undertaken the duty of educating, can devote to it all those powers which individuals must necessarily fritter away on the cares and affairs of life. A regular body has much more than the experience of all its existing members; for the gathered experience of many members, during centuries of its existence, is handed down to each novice as he enters the Society. The novice starts where his elders left off. What a vast experience the patriarchs must have gathered! Such is the experience of a regular

body. Only such a body can give a true unity to all its teaching; for it alone can engender the same spirit in all its members. A religious body alone can be certain of the characters and qualifications of its teachers; for it has them all in its eye; they are not seen from a distance and under those artificial appearances, which are customary in society. How superior such teachers must be, in forming the minds of the young, to those governesses and tutors who are always thinking of dress, and talking of fashion, and discoursing on all the pleasures of the world, and spending their time in detraction and calumny! Do you not know that the young copy their elders, and that inordinate affections are thus fostered in them; and that principles are implanted in them which are inconsistent with true piety, and destructive of religious fervour? A little seed of vanity, or of worldly love in a child, will soon grow and overshadow the heart of the youth. From this evil, those who are educated by the religious orders are likely to be free.

CHAPTER XVI.

CONCLUSION.

WE have now examined the principal sophisms and false maxims which are leading the world astray. Any one who has honestly considered what we have said, will be in possession of a chart whereby he may avoid the shoals and quicksands of modern life. And let us remember that any one who remains obstinately in error, and shuts out the truth which is offered to him, is guilty of the gravest crime. Besides this, he gives occasion to others, by his example, to depart from the truth, and will therefore have to answer at the throne of God's justice, for all the errors of all whom he has caused to err.

It remains for us to call to mind the rule laid down by St. Ignatius of Loyola for retaining one's mind in harmony with the Church—"We must hold our minds in readiness to obey, in all things, the true Spouse of Christ our Lord, namely, the Holy Roman Church." He also expressed himself hyperbolically of the submission which we should evince, and the implicit confidence which we should place in the Church: "I am ready to believe that to be black which appears white to my eyes, if only the Church defines it to be black; for," said he, "between Jesus Christ the Husband, and the Church the Spouse,

there is only one Spirit Who governs us and directs us to our salvation—that same Spirit and Lord Who at one time gave the law on Mount Sinai, and Who now rules and governs the Holy Church." This adhesion to the teaching Church is that which distinguishes us from all Protestants, from all schismatics, from all heretics. As the Protestants, in abandoning the Church, the principle of truth, wandered in a maze of million errors, while they flattered themselves that they judged for themselves; so, *per contra*, Catholics, while they keep in the footsteps of the Church, and humbly submit to be taught by Her, must retain within themselves the principle of truth and of certainty. The rule of the Saint is not superfluous. He alone, who knows not of the infallibility which the Church, by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, must always enjoy, can ever suppose such a rule to be superfluous. If the Spirit of Jesus Christ and the Spirit of the Church be one and the same, then that which the Church orders is ordered by Jesus Christ; and that which Christ forbids is forbidden by the Church.

The principle of heresy is the principle of rebellion —rebellion against the Church, in the first place, and then against every legitimate authority on earth. The principle of the Church, on the contrary, is submission to every lawful authority, and "obedience in the Lord," which is "better than sacrifice." "Except ye become as little children, ye cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven." The central principle of politics, and the central principle of life is ardently to love the Church, profoundly to revere the Church,

unhesitatingly to submit to the Church, and to be ever united in strictest bonds with the Church. Our Lord asks of us no other submission, and He requires of us no other Faith but that which the Church teaches. For His will and His truth are manifested in the Church. "He and His Father are one," as He and the Church are one. No one can truly call God his Father, who does not regard the Church as his Mother.

Only in the Church is there certainty, and security against error. All around this Rock are raging tempests and disastrous shipwrecks. Protestantism has filled the world with ruins. Here there is indifference as to religion; there, negation of all worship. Here is the brazen forehead of atheism; there is derision of holy things. Among a few there is a fanatic pietism, or a delirious sensibility, or a demented religiosity; among the many there is rationalism, or the denial of all revelation and of everything supernatural. Some there are, who think that the Church is passing away. But we know that "the gates of hell shall not prevail against Her." Our own observation can teach us this. Does not every man of sense perceive that Her opponents are day by day being weakened and divided up into a hypodichotomy of warring sects? Does not the anxiety of doubt make itself seen on the face of every unbeliever? Is it not also plain that every earnest man, every one who seeks to know what he is to believe, every one who yearns for certainty, must sooner or later turn to the Church as the only fountain of certainty, and the

only depositary of the Faith? Even morality itself has been set at nought outside the Church. A "Nouveau Droit" has been set up, which is without any authority, and, therefore, may be altered again any day or every day. Every right-thinking man, therefore, and every one who respects justice, must sooner or later turn to the Church in order to find steadfast morality. The Church is the Ark that fears no storm; while outside, in the troubled sea, "the wicked have no rest."

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

1. Page 9. "I am a politician, and I am also a believer: as a politician, and as a believer, I have distinct duties. As a believer, I have my own creed, my own worship, my own practices of religion. As a politician, I have no religious creed, no religious worship, no practices of religion. In my individual capacity, I am ready to die for my religion; as a politician, I fearlessly wave the now consecrated flag of religious indifferentism."

2. Page 28. "They will be united to God by the enjoyment of good things in the natural order, and thus they will be capable of enjoying Him with knowledge to love in the natural order."

3. Page 28. "They know happiness indeed in general, under its common character, but not in particular; and, therefore, they do not grieve for its loss."

4. Page 29. "It is evident that the existence of God, and many other truths, may be attained by the natural light of reason, even by those who have not as yet received the Faith, but that God alone could manifest those more hidden dogmas which concern the supernatural elevation of man, and his relations to God. . . . . And, indeed, as these dogmas are above reason, they cannot be comprehended by unaided reason and natural principles."

5. Page 30. "The revelation of Christ was made known to many Gentiles. . . . . If, however, any were saved to whom this revelation was not made, they were not saved without Faith in a Redeemer; for although they had not explicit Faith in Divine Providence, they had implicit Faith, and believed that God would redeem men."

6. Page 34. "For neither could God Almighty in any way permit the existence of any evil, for He is infinitely good, were He not so Almighty and so infinitely good, that He can draw good even from evil."

Page 35. "I inquired what was iniquity and I found no substance, but only the perversity of a will turned from Thee, O God, the Sovereign substance, to earthly things."

Page 36. "God, Who, when He willed, in His goodness created all creatures, both spiritual and material, good indeed, because they were created by the Sovereign Good; and the Church asserts that no nature is evil, because every nature, inasmuch as it is a nature, is good."

Page 36. "For the devil and the other demons were created indeed, by God, good by their nature, but they became evil through their own act."

7. Page 57. "Thou hast created us, O God, for Thyself, and our heart finds no rest unless it rests in Thee."

8. Page 236. "It must be held that the secular power is subject to the spiritual power, as the body is subject to the soul. And hence it is not a usurped authority when a spiritual prelate interferes in temporal matters, in those things in which the secular power is subject to him."

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